>>21909The question of language goes right to the core of Hegel’s notion of systematic science, of truth that actually takes place in the embrace between thought and being. If a language of science is one meant to convey objective truth, then Hegel’s singular take on science must imply a special grasp of both its language and objectivity. What sort of discourse can claim to express objective truth within an idea of science that sees itself as the systematic articulation of existing knowledge? To answer this question we must guard against importing epistemological and linguistic notions foreign to the Hegelian idea of objective truth, neither must we import notions of objectivity and discourse alien to his idea of science.
Failure to comprehensively understand the nature of Hegelian scientific language has allowed to go unchallenged a wide-spread misunderstanding regarding the nature of Hegelian objectivity. This misunderstanding can be bluntly summarized as follows: the world itself operates dialectically, obeying an inherently dialectical logic. Many who know something of Hegel will probably find nothing objectionable in this statement. In fact, it appears readily verifiable with regard to that part of worldly objectivity Hegel deals with on the Spirit side of his philosophy, for example the rise of consciousness and inter-subjective relations. Indeed, spirit, as human activity, can easily be said to reflect thought or "mind", which, as the Logics tell us, is inherently dialectical. And it is this objectivity or "second nature"i that most commentators are interested in. When the natural world itself is brought into consideration, however, there is some embarrassment. It is indeed hard to verify, for example, that cosmological phenomena and chemical reactions operate along strictly dialectical lines. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature therefore tends to be taken less seriously, or ignored.
However, even when the inherently dialectical nature of Hegelian objectivity is ascribed solely to the Spririt side of his philosophy, crucial (Kierkegaardian, Marxian) questions arise concerning the coherency of the entire philosophical endeavor. If objectivity itself operates dialectically, what is the status of the philosopher subject (i.e. Hegel)? Or, more precisely, what is the status of Hegel's scientific discourse? From where does it derive its own objectivity and truth? It should be obvious to readers of Hegel that his scientific discourse cannot claim to simply represent or reflect objectivity, and garner its own truthfulness and objectivity from the exactness of this representation.
Such a view could not help but fall within what Hegel refers to as (Kantian) subjective idealism, i.e. the representation, whether faithful or not, would never be more than mere appearance (Schein), the reflection of Hegel's own self-certainty; the supposed "truth", stemming from personal observations, would, in fact, reflect nothing other than subjective certitudeiv. In other words, this view contradicts Hegel's explicit rejection of scientific truth based purely on confirmed observation (perception) of empirical, experimental data, which we find reiterated in all his major works and in a good deal of his minor onesv . This does not mean that Hegel entirely discounts empirical science. For example, as I will show, there is a place, or a level, for the representations of the natural sciences within the body of systematic (philosophical, Hegelian) science. However, as we will see, this level of representation only achieves objective truth through a certain notion of discourse essential to this science.
Hegel's repudiation of sense perception as an adequate ground for systematic, objective truth must be understood in linguistic terms; sense certainty goes hand in hand with the notion of referential language, i.e. with the idea that language refers to, reflects or denotes an objectivity which is real but somehow removed from the language itself. According to this view, truth and objectivity are entirely based on the exactness of the reflection, on the faithfulness of how "sentence-tokens" signify "reality". Although many commentators understand Hegel's critique of sense perception and its corresponding referential languagevii, they seem unable to break away from the idea of Hegelempiricist, the lucid and profound observer of the world around him. I believe this is because they have been unable to grasp the true nature of Hegel's scientific language as non-referential, where there is no distance between signfier and signified, and where the objectivity of language is not the impoverished objectivity of "sentence-tokens".
In dealing with the question of how Hegel sees the truth of his discourse as objective, I therefore want to show that his claim to scientific truth implies a certain grasp of objectivity different from the one summarized above, and a certain notion of language that is not referential and which is constitutive of Hegelian objectivity. More explicitly, I will argue that the Hegelian idea of "Science" supposes a discourse that is not only objectively true but is also, itself, true objectivity. he use of the term "objectivity" in the preceding paragraphs may cause some consternation. This is because we are accustomed to using the term in two distinct acceptations: 1) in the sense of non-subjective, non-arbitrary truth; 2) in the sense of a concrete reality existing outside the subject. By saying that, for Hegel, science is a discourse that is "not only objectively true but is also, itself, true objectivity", I am purposely conflating the two acceptations. For Hegel, scientific objectivity is non-subjective, non-arbitrary truth existing as a concrete reality.
Whether we question a modern-day theoretical physicist or an 18th century empiricist, his or her definition of objective truth in science will involve the adequation of thought and being, of concepts and experience. For example, a subjective theory (thought) takes on objective truth when it can be adequated to reality (being). The adequation of thought and being also lies at the heart of the Hegelian scientific endeavour.
According to the notion of Hegelian scientific objectivity I am proposing, the adequation of thought and being is realized in language, in a language which can therefore be grasped as truth and "objectivity", in both senses of the word, namely, language that is not based on subjective representation and language which is itself a real object or thing (Sache) ix that is both thought and being. This language occurs in several different contexts, and each of these expressions forms specific, objective content for science. The total content of science thus appears as the true and objective discourses of natural science, subjective and objective spirit, art and religion. This is another way of saying that the Hegelian project, consisting of finding true objectivity in the meeting between (natural) being and the dialectical or negating activity of thought takes place, on the highest scientific or systematic level, in the articulation itself of the Encyclopedia.
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