

Schizoanalytic metamodelling

Psychoanalysis is in crisis; it is bogged down in routine practices and ossified conceptions. Social movements are also at an impasse due to the collapse of communist regimes and the conversion of social-democrats to liberalism. In each case, individual and collective subjectivity lack modelisation. And it is quite obvious that neither Freudianism, even when revisited by structuralism, nor Freudo-Marxism, have anything worthwhile to offer at this level. In fact, an immense site of theoretical recomposition and invention of new practices has opened up. I have tried to show that questioning subjectivity's foundation on personological Universals, structural mathemes, biological or economic infrastructures, involves a redefinition of machinism. From now on the machine will be conceived in opposition to structure, the latter being associated with a feeling of eternity and the former with an awareness of finitude, precariousness, destruction and death.

Beneath the diversity of beings, no univocal ontological plinth is given, rather there is a plane of machinic interfaces. Being crystallises through an infinity of enunciative assemblages associating actualised, discursive components (material

and indicative Fluxes, machinic Phylums) with non-discursive, virtual components (incorporeal Universes and existential Territories). Thus the singular points of view on being, with their precariousness, uncertainty and creative aspects take precedence over the fixity of structures so distinctive of universalist visions. In order to establish an intensive bridge between these actual and virtual functions we are inclined to postulate the existence of a deterministic chaos animated by infinite velocities. It is out of this chaos that complex compositions, which are capable of being slowed down in energetico-spatio-temporal coordinates or category systems, constitute themselves.

Rather than beginning with automatic systems of articulation between a plane of Expression and a plane of Content, we will stress the partial operators of their assemblage. For example, the mechanical aspect of the linguistic double articulation between signifying, monemic unities and non-signifying, phonemic unities will be replaced by abstract machines which traverse these two heterogeneous registers and are capable of bifurcation and the production of new associations. It is not evident that Universes of value function in concert with semiotic machines, or that semiotic machines combine with concrete machines, that existential Territories cut out points of view on the world.... By making assemblages of enunciation open, chaotically determined, the concatenation of the four ontological functions of Universe, machinic Phylum, Flux and Territory, preserve their pragmatic processuality. The structuralist mode wanted to bracket out the problematics of the signified, the icon, the Imago and the imaginary, to the advantage of syntagmatic articulations. Attention was focused on interactional, structural mechanics, which supposedly animated the phenomenal landscape. Thus the points of ontological crystallisation emerging from this landscape were lost from sight. The

phonological, gestural, spatial, musical...discursivities, all annexed by the same signifying economy, had to have absolute control over the contents they were supposed to divide into discrete paradigmatic figures. But what gives consistency to these discursive systems, what authorises the erection of enunciative monads should be sought on the side of Content; that is, on the side of this existential function which, taking support from certain discursive links, diverts them from their signifying, denotational and propositional incidences, making them play the role of a refrain of ontological affirmation.

The assemblage of the four ontological functions.

	Expression actual (discursive)	Content virtual enunciative nuclei (non-discursive)
possible	Φ = machinic discursivity	U = incorporeal complexity
real	F = energetico-spatio-temporal discursivity	T = chaosmic incarnation

The functions F, Φ , T, U have the task of conferring a diagrammatic, conceptual status (pragmatic cartography) on the virtual enunciative nuclei stuck within manifest Expression. Their matricial concatenation should preserve, as much as possible, their radical heterogeneity, which can only be sensed through a discursive, phenomenological approach. They are described here as metamodelisers to indicate that their primary purpose is to take account of the way in which the diverse existing systems of modelisation (religious, metaphysical, scientific, psychoanalytic, animistic, neurotic...) nearly always skirt around the problem of self-referential enunciation. Schizoanalysis

does not thus choose one modelisation to the exclusion of another. Within the diverse cartographies in action in a given situation, it tries to make nuclei of virtual autopoiesis discernible, in order to actualise them, by transversalising them, in conferring on them an operative diagrammatism (for example, by a change in the material of Expression), in making them themselves operative within modified assemblages, more open, more processual, more deterritorialised. Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex, will work towards its complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological heterogeneity.

The location of nuclei of partial life, of that which can give an enunciative consistency to phenomenal multiplicities, is not a matter of a pure objective description. A monad's knowledge of being-in-the-world, of a sphere of for-itself, implies a pathic apprehension which escapes energetico-spatio-temporal coordinates. Knowledge here is first of all existential transference, non-discursive transitivism. The enunciation of this transference always occurs through the diversion of a narration whose primary function is not to engender a rational explanation but to promote complex refrains, supports of an intensive, memorial persistence and an event-centred consistency. It is only through mythical narratives (religious, fantasmatic, etc.) that the existential function accedes to discourse. But this discourse is not a simple epiphenomenon; it is the stake of ethico-political strategies of avoidance of enunciation. The four ontological functions, like safety barriers or warning lights, have the task of making visible the stakes of these strategies.

For example, the incorporeal Universes of classical Antiquity which were associated with a polytheistic compro-

mise relating to a multitude of clanic and ethnic Territorialities, underwent a radical reshaping with the trinitary revolution of Christianity, indexed on the refrain of the sign of the cross, which will recentre not only the ensemble of social, existential Territories, but also the corporeal, mental, familial assemblages, on the unique existential Territory of Christic incarnation and crucifixion. This extraordinary attack of subjective subjection obviously goes far beyond purely theological considerations! The new subjectivity of guilt, contrition, body markings and sexuality, of redemptive mediation, is also an essential piece of the new social apparatuses, the new machines of subjection which had to construct themselves from the debris of the late Roman Empire and the reterritoralisations of feudal and urban orders yet to come.

Closer to us, the mythico-conceptual narrative of Freudianism has effected a reshaping of the four ontological quadrants. A whole dynamic and topical machinery of repression governs the economy of the Fluxes of the libido; while a zone of enunciative nuclei (that the clinical approach had bypassed) — of an oneiric, sexual, neurotic and infantile order relating to the lapsus and jokes — invades the right hand side of our picture. The Unconscious presented as a universe of non-contradiction, of the heterogenesis of opposites, envelops the manifest Territories of the symptom, whose tendency towards autonomisation, autopoietic, pathic and pathogenic repetition threatens the unity of the self. And this will reveal itself moreover during the history of the analytical clinic to be increasingly precarious, indeed fractalised. Freudian cartography is not only descriptive; it is inseparable from the pragmatics of transference and interpretation. In any event, I would argue that it should be disengaged from a signification perspective and understood as a conversion of expressive means and as a mutation of ontological textures releasing new lines of the possible

— and this from the simple fact of putting into place new assemblages of listening and modelisation. The dream, as an object of renewed interest, recounted as a story concealing keys to the Unconscious, put through the screen of free association, undergoes a profound mutation. Just as after the revolution of the *Ars Nova* in Fourteenth Century Italy music will no longer be heard in the same way within the European cultural atmosphere, so too the nature of the dream and oneiric activity will intrinsically change within their new referential assemblage. And, at the same time, a multitude of psychopathological refrains will no longer be lived, and consequently modelised, in the same way. And the obsessive who washes his hands a hundred times a day exacerbates his solitary anguish within the context of a profoundly modified Universe of reference.

With the invention of the analytic apparatus, Freudian modelisation brought about a clear enrichment in the production of subjectivity, an enlargement of its referential constellations, a new pragmatic opening. But it quickly encountered limits with its familial and universalising conceptions, with its stereotyped practice of interpretation, but above all with its inability to go beyond linguistic semiology. While psychoanalysis conceptualises psychosis through its vision of neurosis, schizoanalysis approaches all modalities of subjectivation in light of the mode of being in the world of psychosis. Because nowhere more than here is the ordinary modelisation of everyday existence so denuded; the “axioms of daily life” stand in the way of the a-signifying function, the degree zero of all possible modelisation. With neurosis, symptomatic matter continues to bathe in the environment of dominant significations while with psychosis the world of standardised *Dasein* loses its consistency. Alterity, as such, becomes the primary question. For example, what finds itself fragilised, cracked up, schizzed, in *délire* or halluci-

nating when confronted with the status of the objective world, is the point of view of the other in me, the recognised body in articulation with the lived body and the felt body; these are the normalised coordinates of alterity which give their foundation to sensible evidence.

Psychosis is not a structural object but a concept; it is not an irremovable essence but a machination which always starts up again during any encounter with the one who will become, after the event, the psychotic. Thus here the concept is not an entity closed in on itself, but the abstract, machinic incarnation of alterity at the point of extreme precariousness; it is the indelible mark that everything in this world can break down at any time. The Unconscious is intimately connected with the concept: it too is an incorporeal construction which takes possession of subjectivity at the point of its emergence. But it is a concept which at every moment risks becoming clogged up, and which must be constantly cleared of the cultural scoria which threatens to reterritorialise it. It requires reactivating, machinic recharging, due to the virulence of events which set subjectivity into action. The schizo fracture is the royal road of access to the emergent fractality of the Unconscious. What could be called the schizo reduction goes beyond all the eidetic reductions of phenomenology — it leads to an encounter with the as-signifying refrains which give back to the narrative, which recast in artifice, existential narrativity and alterity, albeit delirious ones. Note the curious *chassé-croisé* between psychoanalysis and phenomenology: while the first essentially lacked psychotic alterity (in particular, because of its reifying conceptions about identification and its incapacity to think intensive becomings), the second, although having produced the best descriptions of psychosis, did not know how to bring to light, through it, the foundational role of narrative modelisation, the medium for the uncircumventable existential function of the

refrain — phantasmatic, mythic, novelistic.... Here we find the source of Tertullian's paradox: it's because it is impossible for the son to be dead, buried and resuscitated, that these facts must be held to be certain. It's because in many respects Freudian theory is mythical that it can trigger refrains of mutant subjectivation.

In place of the traditional logic of sets described univocally (where one always knows without ambiguity whether or not an element is included) schizoanalytic modelling substitutes an onto-logic, a mechanics of existence whose object is not circumscribed within fixed, extrinsic coordinates; and this object can, at any moment, extend beyond itself, proliferate or abolish itself with the Universes of alterity with which it is compossible. As I have already indicated, the work of Daniel Stern clarifies these kinds of transversalist entities in the context of the development of the interpersonal relations of infants. The ethology of a child's preverbal phases reveals a psychical world where family characters do not yet constitute autonomised structural poles, but disclose, in my own terminology, multiple, dislocated and entangled, existential Territories and incorporeal Universes. The maternal, paternal, fraternal Universes — territories of the self — agglomerate into a kind of phenomenon of an autopoietic snowball which renders the development of the sense of self and the sense of the other totally interdependent.

A primary assemblage of subjectivation, which Daniel Stern calls the emergent self, is already apparent at birth and is deployed until the second month. Outside of any linguistic or corporeal distinctivity, it develops a Universe of early perceptions of forms, intensities, of movement and number. These abstract and amodal forms install themselves transversally in the diverse perceptual registers; already at birth the infant has the extraordinary capacity of seeing and feeling what it hears

(and reciprocally). The emergent self — atmospheric, pathic, fusional, transitive — ignores the oppositions of subject-object, self-other and of course masculine-feminine. It is the reign of an absolute maternitude, which won't buy into any Oedipal triangulation, but which will be perhaps after all (*nachträglich*) the elective site of a schizo brother-sister incest. As a Universe of emergence, a sensitive plate registering all incorporeal becomings, the emergent self can in no way be assimilated to a psychogenetic phase, such as the oral phase. First of all because it is not a phase, since it will persist in parallel with other self formations and will haunt the adult's poetic, amorous and oneiric experiences. Furthermore, because the orality it puts to work is not passively physiological or reducible to a question of pressure, source, goal and drive object, it is a partial nucleus of subjectivation, actively machinic, opening onto the most heterogeneous Universes of reference. For example, the fantasm of a devouring orality or of a return to the maternal breast refers to a mother who is neither real, imaginary, nor symbolic but who is cosmic becoming; it is a Universe of processual emergence as much as of abolition. For all that, we are not in the reign of Jungian universal Imagos or mythological entities such as Gaia or Chronos. The Universes of which the mouth and the breast are the refrain-operators are constellated in a composite and heterogenetic way: they constitute singular events.

Between the age of two months and six months, the core self confers its auto-coherence to the body proper and to the corporeal schema. The proprioceptive and exteroceptive givens become complementary, whilst sensory-motor integration develops in parallel to inter-relations with the milieu. A Territory of action, of physical totalisation, of the location of affect and of personal proto-history is established and consolidated. The potential fragilisation of this Universe of corporeality

will manifest itself later in the form of catatonia, hysterical paralysis and the feeling of derealisation or paranoid states. We also find it at the root of another figure of death — the death of the body, the cadaver, organic decomposition — which prevails in obsessional neurosis.

The constitution of the subjective-self between seven and fifteen months is correlative to the structuration of affectivity. A dialectic of attunement is established between affects that are sharable with others and those that are not. There is a recognition of the fact that the other can experience something that the subject experiences for itself. It is at the heart of this proto-social and still pre-verbal Universe that familial, ethnic, urban, etc., traits are transmitted (let's call it the Cultural Unconscious). This subjective territoriality is crowned by the designation of self identity (name and pronoun) in the presence of the mirror, at about eighteen months.

The verbal self appears from about two years of age, when linguistic significations are shared with others. It deploys the structural scene of personological identities and familial complexes, with their games of identification, rivalry, conflict, negativism, denial, and their anal and educative disciplines, their prohibitions, their investments in transgression and punishment.... It will be relayed by the scriptural self associated with school assemblages, then to the self of puberty, with the intrusion of genital components, then to the self of adolescent phases, to the professional self, etc. All the Universes of reference in action are superimposed in a kind of incorporeal existential agglomeration. When one of these Universes foregrounds itself, there will not be, strictly speaking, repression of the others, but rather a placing in reserve, in latency, possibly accompanied with a loss of consistency of the contextual constellation; and this can in no way be inserted within a topos, nor balanced within an energetic economy. Any metaphorical representa-

tion of the drive, whether topical, dynamic or energetic risks arbitrarily deforming the aporetic character of the crystallisation of these existential Territories, which are at once incorporeal, intensive and multicomponential. The lapsus, for example in this perspective is not the conflictual expression of a repressed Content but the positive, indexical manifestation of a Universe trying to find itself, which comes to knock at the window like a magic bird.

Schizoanalysis obviously does not consist in miming schizophrenia, but in crossing, like it, the barriers of non-sense which prohibit access to a-signifying nuclei of subjectivation, the only way to shift petrified systems of modelisation. It implies an optimal enlargement of pragmatic entrances into Unconscious formations. Autism, for example, no longer being linked exclusively to an infantile regression of the maternal era, will be accessible to interventions other than those of transference focused directly on the body and projective identifications. Indeed, its chaosmic Universe can be constellated with many other Imagos besides those of the personological mother, with vegetal, animal, cosmic or machinic...becomings. The psychotic complex is thus not the exclusive concern of verbal communication and individuated transference. The treatment of a psychotic, in the context of institutional psychotherapy, works with a renewed approach to transference, focused henceforth on parts of the body, on a constellation of individuals, on a group, on an institutional ensemble, a machinic system, a semiotic economy, etc. (grafts of transference), and conceived as desiring becoming, that is to say, pathic existential intensity, impossible to circumscribe as a distinct entity. The objective of such a therapeutic approach would be to increase as much as possible the range of means offered in the recomposition of a patient's corporeal, biological, psychical and social Territories.

To this effect it will engage multiple semiotic vectors relating to corporeality, gesturality, posturality, the traits of faciality and spatiality which are connected to the levels of preverbal assemblages described by Daniel Stern. Treated as an ensemble of autopoietic and transversalist social machines, the caring institution becomes a field propitious to an ability to discern these vectors which intersect with individuated subjectivity, which work it despite itself.

Consider, for example, the institutional sub-ensemble that constitutes the kitchen at La Borde Clinic. It combines highly heterogeneous social, subjective and functional dimensions. This Territory can close in on itself, become the site of stereotyped attitudes and behaviour, where everyone mechanically carries out their little refrain. But it can also come to life, trigger an existential agglomeration, a drive machine — and not simply of an oral kind, which will have an influence on the people who participate in its activities or just passing through. The kitchen then becomes a little opera scene: in it people talk, dance and play with all kinds of instruments, with water and fire, dough and dustbins, relations of prestige and submission. As a place for the preparation of food, it is the centre of exchange of material and indicative Fluxes and prestations of every kind. But this metabolism of Flux will only have transferential significance on the condition that the whole apparatus functions effectively as a structure which welcomes the preverbal components of the psychotic patients. This resource of ambience, of contextual subjectivity, is itself indexed to the degree of openness (coefficient of transversality) of this institutional sub-ensemble to the rest of the institution. The semiotisation of a *fantasm* — for example the chef who reincarnates “Père Lustucru”¹ — therefore depends on external operators. The proper functioning of the kitchen from this point of view is inseparable from its artic-

ulation with the other partial nuclei of subjectivation in the institution (the menu committee, the daily activities information sheet, the pastry workshop, greenhouse, garden, the bar, sports activities, the meeting between the cooks and a doctor with respect to the patients they are working with...) The psychotic who approaches an institutional sub-ensemble, like the kitchen, therefore traverses a well-worked zone of enunciation which can sometimes be closed in on itself and subjected to roles and functions, or find itself in direct contact with Universes of alterity which help the psychotic out of his existential entrapment. It is less by way of voluntary decision than by induction of an unconscious collective assemblage that the psychotic is led to take the initiative, to accept responsibility. Note that collective is not here synonymous with group; it is a description which subsumes on one hand elements of human intersubjectivity, and on the other pre-personal, sensitive and cognitive modules, micro-social processes and elements of the social imaginary. It operates in the same way on non-human subjective formations (machinic, technical and economic). It is therefore a term which is equivalent to heterogeneous multiplicity. Thus in the context of institutional psychotherapy what is called too schematically the care-giver/care-receiver relationship is broken down into heterogeneous dimensions: 1) of psychiatric knowledge and technicalities that concern clearly defined problems from a nosographic perspective; 2) of social activation within permanently worked collective Territories; 3) of pathic apprehension of the existential differences borne by psychotic Universes. Knowledge establishes a distance which collective social life tends to dissolve while the existential caesura brings about a far more intimate and enigmatic rapprochement. Training in this domain consists in articulating, in a relatively harmonious way, these three dimensions; the moment of the return to the socius and technical skills, after

the chaosmic submersion in psychosis, being by far the most problematic.

The most autistic psychical world is not in itself lacking in alterity. It is simply engaged in a constellation of Universes disconnected from the dominant assemblages of sociality. Lines can be thrown to the psychotic by mediations which will give consistency to certain of these components of Universes, or by the aggregation of other components which did not previously exist. (Through the introduction of materials of expression unknown to the subject, for example, relating to the plastic arts, video, music, theatre or quite simply...cooking!). Schizoanalytic cartography consists in the ability to discern those components lacking in consistency or existence. But it is a question here of an essentially precarious undertaking, of a continual creation, which does not have the benefit of any pre-established theoretical support. The enunciative emergence of the kitchen at La Borde, to stay with this example, can lead it to take on the role of partial analyser, without any guarantee in time. The autopoietic character of such an instance calls for a permanent renewal of the assemblage, a verification of its capacity to welcome a-signifying singularities — unbearable patients, insoluble conflicts — a constant readjustment of its transversalist opening onto the outside world. Only the network of nuclei of partial enunciation — comprising groups, meetings, workshops, responsibilities, spontaneous constellations and individual initiatives — could arguably hold the title of institutional analyser. The work of the psychotherapist in the office is only a link in this complex apparatus; individuated transference is but one element of the generalised transference already evoked. Just as the schizo has broken moorings with subjective individuation, the analysis of the Unconscious should be recentred on the non-human processes of subjectiva-

tion that I call machinic, but which are more than human — superhuman in a Nietzschean sense.

This novel type of procedure is not reserved for the analysis of psychotics but is also applicable to neurotics, psychopaths, normopaths — following Jean Oury's felicitous expression. It both puts into question future analytical apparatuses in the domain of pedagogy, the life of the neighbourhood, the ecology of retirement — in a whole field of molecular revolutions; and it works towards an escape from contemporary social desertification. The stakes of a metamodelling theoretical recomposition of analysis are accordingly raised. They primarily involve a repudiation of the universalist and transcendent concepts of psychoanalysis which constrain and sterilise the apprehension of incorporeal Universes and singularising and heterogenetic becomings. In this respect, the Lacanian concept of the Signifier seems to me to be particularly poorly adapted to cartographise psychosis; it is even worse for the machinic forms of subjectivity which develop from the mass media, informatics, the new telematics and the inflation of Paul Virilio's "dromospheric" velocities of exchange, displacement and communication. The Lacanian Signifier homogenises the various semiotics, it loses the multidimensional character of many of them. Its fundamental linearity, inherited from Saussurian structuralism, does not allow it to apprehend the pathic, non discursive, autopoietic character of partial nuclei of enunciation. One indicative topos refers to another indicative topos, without the trans-topical dimension of agglomeration — which characterise intensive Territories — ever emerging.

Let us illustrate these remarks with the Lacanian rereading of Freud's famous observation of the game of an eighteen month old child, which consisted in throwing, out of its curtain-edged bed, a reel attached to the end of a string, accompanying its disappearance with the sound "Oooo" which Freud

translated into adult German by the word “*Fort*” (gone) and its reappearance by “*Da*” (there).² Freud thought that with this Fort-Da refrain, the child incessantly replayed the departure, absence and return of its mother. Above all, he put emphasis on the first sequence of rejection, which he considered more important and of a painful character. He associated this kind of pleasure in repetition (peculiar to childhood, according to him — whereas adults would be more inclined towards the desire for novelty) to the repetition, for example, of accident dreams one finds in some traumatic neuroses, or the indefinite repetition of oppressive affects in psychoanalytic transference. He broadly referred it to what he called the compulsion to repeat (*Wiederholungszwang*) at work in sadism, masochism, ambivalence, aggressivity and in the majority of neuroses. This compulsion manifested an irrepressible tendency (that he often called demonic) towards the complete discharge of excitation and the extinction of tensions and conflicts. His economy would no longer respond to the pleasure principle — which tends towards the substitution of an agreeable state for an unpleasant one — since it would repeat to infinity a disagreeable state. It would instead correspond to the submission of the pleasure principle to the death drive, namely, to a presumed tendency of life to return by itself to an inorganic state — the life drives being no more than a provisional detour from the direction of death. When Lacan evokes the Fort-Da refrain in his *Écrits*, he no longer takes into account the absence of the mother. According to him, it is essentially a matter of an intersection between a play of occultation and an alternative scansion of two phonemes. The wait for the return of the object is constituted as an “anticipating provocation,” which takes form “in the symbolic dyad of two elementary exclamations” and announces in the subject “the diachronic integration of the dichotomy of phonemes, whose synchronic structure existing

language offers to his assimilation.”

While Freud reduces the child's complex game to the lack of the mother and makes it subsidiary to the death drive, Lacan ties it down to the signifying discursivity of “existing language.” Which does not spare this innocent refrain from being marked by death — although in a more Hegelian way, since Lacan comments, with respect to this symbol, that it “manifests itself first of all as murder of the thing, and (that) this death constitutes in the subject the eternalisation of his desire.”³ Thus the reel, the string, the curtain, the observer's gaze, all the singular characteristics of the assemblage of enunciation fall into the trap of the Signifier. Rather than recognising that with this refrain the child encounters unforeseen Universes of the possible, with incalculable, virtual repercussions, Lacan defines it as “a point of insertion of a symbolic order that pre-exists the infantile subject and in accordance with which he will have to structure himself.”⁴ The structure, here, precedes and envelops the machine in an operation that strips it of all its autopoietic and creative characteristics. The symbolic order weighs down like a deterministic lead cape, like a deathly fate, on the possible bifurcations of incorporeal Universes. The eternisation of desire, mentioned by Lacan, is a petrification — moreover, in a subsequent phrase he suggests that the sepulchre is the first symbol by which one recognises humanity.

Unlike Freud, schizoanalysis doesn't make the Fort-Da refrain depend on a feeling of frustration with regard to the mother and on universal principles of life and death; nor like Lacan on a transcendent signifying order. It considers it as a desiring machine, working towards the assemblage of the verbal self — in symbiosis with the other assemblages of the emergent self, the nuclear self and the subjective self — and thereby inaugu-

rating a new mastery of the object, of touch, of a spatiality dissociated from Winnicott's transitional space.⁵ As Freud observed, Fort-Da is found in other behaviours; it can be expressed in relation to the effective absence of the mother or in a child's game with its own image in the mirror that it makes appear and disappear. It is, in fact, a matter of a rich, multivalent, heterogenetic machine that can neither be legitimately fixed to a maternal-oral stasis, nor to a language stasis, although they incontestably participate in it. It is all these things at the same time and many others besides! We have to choose here between a mechanical conception of deathly repetition and a machinic conception of processual opening. There is an inspired element in Freud's intuition about a relation between the automatism of repetition and a death drive, that I would prefer to put down to the desire for destruction that inhabits all desiring machines. There is no encounter or relation of intimate entanglement between two distinct drives, Eros and Thanatos, but a coming and going at infinite speed between chaos and complexity. Fort is chaomic submersion; Da the mastery of a differentiated complex. The drive is not "conservative" as the death drive would be (this is how Freud liked to describe it). The insistence on failure, the eternal return of the splinter in the flesh, the appearance of demonic fatality that sometimes occurs in neurotic "bad-luck" stems from the persistence of a loss of consistency of the assemblage, or if one prefers, from the consistency of a loss of consistency (reterritorialisation). The submersion in chaomic immanence is always ready to exploit the slightest weaknesses. Its presence haunts, with more or less intensity, unstable situations — intolerable absence, bereavement, jealousy, organic fragilisation, cosmic vertigo.... The rituals of exorcism brought to bear on it can become refrains of fixation, reification, tenacious fidelity to pain or unhappiness. Surely here we are far from the child's proba-

bly happy Fort-Da refrain. The Unconscious of the dualist hypothesis of drives of life and death, like that of the transcendence of the Signifier — the murderer of the “things” of context — petrify chaotic abolition, by making it lose its immanence; they transform it into deathly negativity, into a cadaverous object. It is true that a certain capitalistic, reductionist use of language leads it to the state of a signifying linearity of discrete binary entities which smother, silence, disempower and kill the polysemic qualities of a Content reduced to the state of a neutral “referent.” Isn’t the task of analysis precisely to recharge Expression with semiotic heterogeneity and to run counter to the disenchantment, demystification and depoetisation of the contemporary world denounced by Max Weber?

- 1 [Père Lustucru is a character in an advertisement for pasta.]
- 2 Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*, The Pelican Freud Library Vol. 11, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1984, p.284.
- 3 Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits*, trans. Alan Sheridan, Tavistock, London, 1977, pp.103-4.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.234.
- 5 *La Psychanalyse*, Tome V, PUF, Paris, 1959.[See D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, Tavistock Publications, London, 1971.]