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The will to revolt, so widespread as to be almost universal today, seems to be something more than a reaction to political circumstances or material conditions. What it seems to express is a newly awakened consciousness, not of "causes" but of potentiality. It is a spreading awareness of the possibilities of human existence, coupled with a growing sense of the causal nature of the universe, that together inspire, first in individuals, then in communities and entire nations, an entirely new attitude toward life. The effect of this sudden awareness, this sudden fruition of consciousness, is to produce [...] a pervasive and urgent desire for radical change, based on the new insight, startling in its simplicity, that the conditions of life that had seemed immutable can, after all, be changed.

This, at any rate, describes the state of mind of the modern insurgent, the guerrilla fighter, whatever his slogans or his cause; and his secret weapon, above and beyond any question of strategy or tactics or techniques of irregular warfare, is nothing more than the ability to inspire this state of mind in others.

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By way of comparison, Fidel Castro's Cuban guerrillas, fighting on an island with a population of close to seven million, never at any time exceeded fifteen hundred armed men. Yet when the decisive battle of Santa Clara came in December of 1958, cutting the island in two, the whole city, except for the isolated military garrison, became involved in the conflict. And when Batista finally fled the country on the last day of the year, virtually the entire population of Cuba claimed participation in the victory. Far from being isolated or indifferent, all had been rebels, it seemed.

The error that the Viet Cong insurgency is the work of a fanatical minority directed from outside the country nevertheless persists, fostered by Washington for reasons which will be examined in subsequent chapters.

immediately I'm reminded of our current government and the love of "russian hackers" or more topically, "Hammas agents" being the outside actors fostering the dissent

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When we speak of the guerrilla fighter, we are speaking of the political partisan, an armed civilian whose principal weapon is not his rifle or his machete, but his relationship to the community, the nation, in and for which he fights.

the guerrilla has the initiative; it is he who begins the war, and he who decides when and where to strike.

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In all of these areas, the incumbent regime and its military arm present highly vulnerable targets to an

enemy who is himself as elusive and insubstantial as the wind.

For, while the army suffers from an embarrassment of wealth, and especially of expensive military hardware for which there is no employment, the guerrilla has the freedom of his poverty.

He can afford to run when he cannot stand and fight with good assurance of winning, and to disperse and hide when it is not safe to move. In the extremity, he can always sink back into the peaceful population—that sea, to use Mao Tse-tung's well worn metaphor, in which the guerrilla swims like a fish.

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That military victory against true guerrillas is possible seems doubtful on the basis of modern experience, barring the use of methods approaching genocide,

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They must use the liberal rhetoric and also pay something in the way of social compromise—schools, hospitals, decent concern for the well-being of all but the most isolated poor—if they are to retain power and keep the people to their accustomed, profit-producing tasks. This fact makes such governments extremely vulnerable to a sort of war—guerrilla war with its psychological and economic weapons—that their predecessors could have ignored, had such a war been possible at all in the past. They are vulnerable because they must, at all cost, keep the economy functioning and showing a profit or providing the materials and markets on which another, dominant economy depends. Again, they are vulnerable because they must maintain the appearance of normalcy; they can be embarrassed out of office. And they are triply vulnerable because they cannot be as ruthless as the situation demands. They cannot openly crush the opposition that embarrasses and harasses them. They must be woosers as well as doers.

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Guerrillas who know their trade and have popular support cannot be eliminated by the means available to most governments. And on the other hand, few governments can stand the political, psychological, and economic stresses of guerrilla war, no matter how strong they may be militarily.

Fulgencio Batista fell, not because he was a dictator, but because his situation in a country with democratic institutions moreover, a country almost entirely dependent on the favor of the United States with its similar institutions and traditions did not permit him to be dictator enough to resolve the contradictions that confronted him. His hands were tied by conventions he could not break without losing his foreign support. His use of counterterrorism, that is, the illegal use of force, only increased his domestic opposition. Yet without it, he had no effective means to combat the disorder and subversion that threatened his regime.

Biggest military tools in the west are airstrikes, drone strikes, bombing runs, mass collateral damage to instill fear within the population and to avoid direct combat with their own militaries. This military doctrine could not, feasibly be applied within the United States, without also breaking the United States. Incidents like the MOVE bombing or even the Blair

mountain bombing are isolated, lacking the context of our current material conditions. The US military simply could not do strafing runs with A-10 warhogs in the suburbs of Ft. Worth

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His weakness is merely—I use the word advisedly—a military weakness. He lacks the arms, and usually the manpower, to risk a military decision. In the circumstances, it is obvious what the guerrilla's tactics must be. Politically, he must seek to aggravate such social and political dissension as exists and to raise the level of political consciousness and of revolutionary zwill among the people. It will also be part of his design, as well as the natural consequence of his actions, to bring about an intensification of the political repression that already exists, so deepening popular opposition to the regime and hastening the process of its dissolution.

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The guerrilla is sometimes said to deal from weakness, but this is an absurdity. In fact, he exploits his own kind of strength, which lies in the extreme mobility of lightly armed forces without territorial or hardware investments, a bottomless well of manpower from which to recruit, and the fact that time—which is both money and political capital—works in his favor.

Given the material conditions made manifest by the coming climate collapse, we simply do not have the time. This is our greatest weakness then, a weakness that no other, however, due to said conditions, the capitalist is also running out of time, each year, each natural disaster, the grip must be tightened lest the sand slip from their hands. Thus then, we must rapidly act to *inspire* this radical new notion that a better future can be achieved.

Time works for the guerrilla both in the field —where it costs the enemy a daily fortune to pursue him—and in the politicoeconomic arena.

See above

Almost all modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls "world opinion." For sound reasons, mostly of an economic nature, they cannot afford to be condemned in the United Nations, they do not like to be visited by Human Rights Commissions or Freedom of the Press Committees; their need of foreign investment, foreign loans, foreign markets, satisfactory trade relationships, and so on, requires that they be members in more or less good standing of a larger community of interests.

United States doesn't need to worry about this, Israel is a test run for how far they can push the limits of "international law", this does not negate the previously mentioned conditions, merely we must be aware that no international assistance for the movement will be leveled, no current state could push back against the US, nor would any other western powers fail to tow the line. We should not and cannot count on anyone but our own country men.

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It follows that it must be the business of the guerrilla, and of his clandestine political organization in the cities, to destroy the stable image of the government, and so to deny it credits, to dry up its

sources of revenue, and to create dissension within the frightened owning classes, within the government bureaucracy (whose payrolls will be pinched), and within the military itself.

As the guerrilla's support widens—and this will come automatically as the weakness of the government is revealed—political trouble is sure to follow, in the form of petitions, demonstrations, strikes. These in their turn will be followed by more serious developments—sabotage, terror, spreading insurrection.

Insurrections may be provoked or incited or may occur spontaneously as the expression of grievances or of frustrated aspirations or because of other factors: religious frenzy, blood feuds; mass hysteria induced by anything from a sports contest to a rape in Mississippi can lead to bloodshed and temporary anarchy. Guerrilla warfare does not necessarily follow. Insurrection is a phenomenon, revolution a process, which cannot begin until the historical stage has been set for it.

pg25

But its real work will be to serve as a respectable facade for the revolution, a civilian front, or, as the Cubans called it, *resistencia civica*, made up of intellectuals, tradesmen, clerks, students, professionals, and the like—above all, of women—capable of promoting funds, circulating petitions, organizing boycotts, raising popular demonstrations, informing friendly journalists, spreading rumors, and in every way conceivable waging a massive propaganda campaign aimed at two objectives: the strengthening and brightening of the rebel "image," and the discrediting of the regime.

This within the brand/counterculture framework, lots of potential.

pg27

This is not to say that guerrillas can win battles. In the early stage of the insurgency they will have no business to seek battles and every reason to shun them. Rather, the rebel strategy will be: (1) To attack only when assured of success by the overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element of surprise, and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement; (2) To use the campaign as an educational tool and a propaganda weapon by disclosing the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be defied with impunity; to proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its grievances and aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of bloodshed on the repressive government as the clear aggressor it will necessarily become in the course of the anti-guerrilla campaign. In the beginning, only small actions in isolated sectors will be possible. Later, as the guerrillas grow stronger, they will divide their forces, to take their revolutionary message into new areas, and to harass the army on a broader scale, forcing it to extend its lines so that its defenses are weakened, and small units can be reduced, one at a time.

pg30

Other actions during the first year were on a similar scale, or smaller, and at no time during the entire insurrectionary period did battles involve more than a few hundred men on either side. In almost all cases of unprovoked attack, where there was no prior move by the Batista military, the rebel purpose was to capture weapons with which to arm more guerrillas.

This isn't something we need to be concerned with because LAND OF THE FREE BABYEE. No need to capture a military outpost to get weapons when there's more guns than people doubled over.

pg31

When Castro grandiosely announced a "total war" in March of 1958 and warned of "columns" moving quickly north, east, and west toward key objectives in all parts of the island, the army reacted as to an invasion. It had no way of knowing that the "columns" consisted of fewer than two hundred men in all, or that a so-called "second front," announced at the same time, had been opened in northern Oriente by a force of no more than sixty-five guerrillas—their heaviest weapon a .30-caliber Browning automatic rifle.

65 people aint many

pg 32

One of Castro's first acts on entering the Sierra had been to execute two bandits, accused of rape and murder, so dramatically establishing a revolutionary government with a code of law, which could be looked to as a stabilizing force in an area long neglected by the Havana government.

What areas are this overlooked within the US?

pg33

The villagers were treated much as they would have been treated by any ordinary government—except that political indoctrination was more intense and more was demanded of them, in the way of identification with the revolution and adherence to its goals.

pg35

In northern Oriente, they had control of the entire national coffee crop, worth some sixty million dollars; since the government had to have it and could not get it in any other way, it was allowed to come to market, and was duly taxed by the guerrillas.

Port of
pg41

So Mao's military problem was how to organize space so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how to organize time so that it could be made to yield will, that quality which makes willingness to sacrifice the order of the day, and the ability to bear suffering cheerfully the highest virtue. So Mao's real military problem was not that of getting the war over with, the question to which Western military thinkers have directed the greater part of their attention, but that of keeping it going. Mao's problem, then: how to avoid a military decision. His answer: hit and run, fight and live to fight another day, give way before the determined advance of the enemy, and, like the sea, close in again as the enemy passes. The formula, space for time, is well conceived. But in his Selected Military Writings, Mao makes it clear that nothing is gained unless the time is used to produce political results, by raising the revolutionary consciousness, the will of the masses: When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, and to help them establish

revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.

We basically deal with the completely opposite material conditions, we lack time, given our previously mentioned climate collapse scenario lest capitalism be stopped. Traditionally time has been the strongest arrow in the guerilla's quiver, how then, does one make do without it? Could this be our achilles heel? Or our greatest tool?

Time is required, not alone for political mobilization , but to allow the inherent weaknesses of the enemy to develop under the stress of war.

Again, if time is "required" our hopes become dashed before they can even take hold. 6 years is a very, very short amount of time.

pg45

. . . the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven it not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale, but also to approach its final collapse. In terms of development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by her ruling classes, but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.

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The principles of the operation may be observed in the Communist war on Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops in the period immediately following World War II. Analyzing a campaign of seventeen months duration in 1946-47, during which 640,000 Nationalist troops were killed or wounded and 1,050,000 were captured, Mao lists the following points of insurgent strategy:

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong forces later.
2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
3. Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place will be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.
4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all-out strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in protracted war every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all of the enemy.
5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.
6. Give full play to our style of fighting—courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear or fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).
7. Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of

positional attack and capture enemy-fortified points and cities.

8. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and material are at the front.

9. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train, and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training, and consolidation should not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

Much of what Mao enumerates will seem obvious, but there are important points to note, some of which are in direct conflict with conventional military doctrine.

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Mao had no scruples, for that matter, about recruiting bandits; they were of the same class origin and in much the same condition as the Nationalist soldiers and those of the war lords, and could be easily indoctrinated to fight in the popular cause. His reasoning, no doubt, was that peasants who had some military training were easier to absorb than peasants who had had none.

Gangland USA

The harassing tactics of the guerrilla, while they bear superficial resemblance to the delaying actions fought by rear-guard regular troops, have a different purpose. It is to wear down the enemy, and to force him to over-extend his lines, so that his manpower can be annihilated, a unit at a time.

pg56

the basic ingredients of revolutionary war: space, time, and will

We lack time, we have will, we need space.

pg59

In addition to scattering to wear out the enemy, it is necessary to regroup big armed forces in favorable situations to achieve supremacy in attack at a given point and time to annihilate the enemy. Successes in many small fights added together gradually wear out the enemy manpower, while little by little strengthening our forces. The main goal of the fight must be destruction of enemy manpower. Our own manpower should not be exhausted from trying to keep or occupy land.

Writing of the first years of the long guerrilla campaign, [Vo Nguyen Giap] says that in the beginning "there appeared a tendency not to take into due account the part played by political work, and the political workers did not yet grasp [the fact] that the main task was political education and ideological leadership."

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Leclerc's armored columns rushed in, seized the major roads and the important crossroad towns, and felt that they had made a successful start, since they met little determined resistance at any point. What they failed to realize initially was that, although they controlled the roads, they were fighting an enemy that had no need of roads, being without transport or heavy artillery to move. They seized strong points, but

these strong points commanded nothing, since the enemy was not stationary but fluid and offered no contest for strong points or for territory.

For where the French were fighting to control the national territory—that meant to occupy it—the guerrillas were interested only in winning its population.

pg64

Both sides made serious mistakes in the early phase of the eight-year struggle. The French, for their part, devoted a full five months of 1947 to the fruitless task of attempting to capture Ho Chi Minh and his staff, thinking in this way to cut short the war. The effort was wasted. Even if they had captured Ho, it probably would not have affected the course of a war, the outcome of which depended not on individual military genius but on a strategy dictated by the politico-military situation—a strategy that any Communist leader, aware of the lesson of China, would have applied.

pg66

The progress of the Vietminh was slowed to some extent by General Giap's premature decision, at the end of 1950, to begin a general offensive. The attempt to force the campaign into Mao's decisive third stage of revolutionary war, the strategic offensive, when the situation was not yet ripe, cost the Vietminh heavily. In a single clash in the Red River delta area, January 16-17, Giap lost 6,000 men. When he tried to seize the port of Haiphong in March, 1951, he was again defeated. And in June, a third drive for control of the delta likewise failed.

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Our strategy started from thorough analysis of the enemy's contradictions. It aimed at concentrating our forces in the enemy's relatively exposed sectors, annihilating their manpower, liberating a part of the territory, and compelling them to scatter their forces, thus creating favorable conditions for a decisive victory. For the French Expeditionary Corps, the war was a continuous process of dispersal of forces. The enemy divisions were split into regiments, then into battalions, companies, and platoons, to be stationed at thousands of points and posts on the various battle fronts of the Indochina theatre of operations. The enemy found himself face to face with a contradiction. Without scattering his forces, it would be impossible for him to occupy the invaded territory; in scattering his forces, he put himself in difficulties. The scattered units would fall easy prey to our troops, their mobile forces would be more and more reduced, and the shortage of troops would be all the more acute. On the other hand, if they concentrated their forces to move from the defensive position and cope with us with more initiative, the occupation forces would be weakened and it would be difficult for them to hold the invaded territory. Now, if the enemy gives up occupied territory, the very aim of the war of reconquest is defeated.

pg71

The Communist Party's Central Committee put its collective mind to the problem, Giap soberly relates, and came up with a slogan: "Dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in the face of new situations." While less than informative, the slogan did have meaning, as Giap explains: Keeping the

initiative, we should concentrate our forces to attack strategic points which were relatively vulnerable. If we succeeded in keeping the initiative, we could achieve successes and compel the enemy to scatter their forces. . . . On the other hand, if we were driven on the defensive, not only could we not annihilate many enemy forces, but our own force could easily suffer losses. . . .

pg83

Yet the Diem regime could not make such a response without confessing that all was not well with the country, and did not find it politically expedient to make the admission. Instead, Diem played ostrich, pretending that the "bandits" were under control, and hoping that the national police would soon justify the pretense.

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"Clear and hold" operations, patterned on the French oil-slick technique, failed to remedy the situation, for the obvious reasons. The "clear and hold" strategy is always doomed to failure because the government, while strong enough to clear any given area temporarily, cannot hold many such areas without dangerously scattering its forces. In the face of a determined "clear and hold" drive, the guerrillas simply withdraw and redouble their activities elsewhere.

pg86

The early strategy of the movement was aimed at breaking the chain of political command from Saigon to the rural areas, isolating the government from the population of some 17,000 hamlets and 8,000 villages by subverting, kidnapping, or assassinating local officials—in particular, village chiefs and members of village councils. The campaign was begun in 1957, when more than 700 officials were killed, and was sharply stepped up in 1959, continuing through 1963 despite government efforts to halt it, and accounting altogether for an estimated 13,000 lives.

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The questioner was a Vietnamese reporter. He had taken local buses to hamlets in insecure or disputed areas in the delta and found himself in a hamlet about which there was no dispute. Night and day it was governed by the Communists. . . . Except for the leader, the guerrillas seemed to be in their late teens or early 20's. They would not give their names, for fear of disclosure to the Government. They all said they were natives of the hamlet. All spoke Vietnamese with the local accent. . . .

pg95

The purpose of the war of national liberation, pitting the feeble resources of a small and primitive nation against the strength of a great, industrial power is not to conquer or to terrorize, but to create an intolerable situation for the occupying power or its puppet government.

pg99

At the same time, the entire arsenal of revolution—guerrilla fighting, terror, sabotage, propaganda—is brought to bear in an effort to take the profit out of colonialism by demoralizing labor and impeding production, boycotting imports, inciting insurrection, forbidding payment of rents to foreign owners, wrecking foreign industrial installations, and in every way increasing the cost of exploitation and of political control—the expense of maintaining the bureaucracy and the police and military forces that must be used to put down the rebellion.

If the goal is clearly understood and revolutionary tactics are resolutely applied, the colonial power quickly becomes involved in a struggle that simultaneously blackens it before the world and inflicts financial losses that will soon be translated, at home, into political liabilities. The very efforts of a colonial power to end the struggle will only accelerate the process, for the more stringent the methods of suppression applied, the greater the hatred of the colonial population for the colonizers (or of the satellite people for the imperialists), and the harsher the picture of oppression to be held up before the world.

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Hundreds of political prisoners crowded the jails, and the Crown forces were kept so busy with searches for arms and I.R.A. suspects that more than 20,000 house raids were recorded between January of 1919 and March, 1920.

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At one point, the fear of the I.R.A. gunmen—and any casual stroller might be a gunman—reached such intensity that a military order was posted warning civilians that any man walking with his hands in his pockets was liable to be shot on sight. Pockets could conceal pistols, and the British were taking no chances.

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Although the British Viceroy, Lord French, estimated it as some 100,000 strong and the British Secretary for Ireland doubled the estimate, reporting an army of 200,000, "ready to murder by day and night," its peak strength, on paper, was never more than 15,000 men, and Michael Collins later put the effective fighting strength of the I.R.A. at 3,000. But then, as noted before, the Irish rebellion was a political rather than a military contest, and the truce that ended it late in 1921 brought a political victory that obviated the need of a military decision.

If at the end of some centuries of sporadic struggle against foreign domination the Irish failed to hurl the English invader into the sea, they accomplished something better and more economical: By their resistance they took the profit out of colonialism and turned the colony from a British asset into a liability, so, in effect, persuading the enemy to withdraw.

Draconian solutions are possible only in isolation, in an indifferent world, and even then, only against a population that has not the will to resist.

Indifferent world, which we live, ergo, draconian measures are more likely, yet still the contradiction stated above holds true.

pg109

There is a point to be made here. If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorists, political assassins as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are of the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being.

It may be argued that terroristic movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society, and in a revolutionary situation the criminal, the psychopath, may become as good a revolutionary as the idealist.

pg114

Full-scale guerrilla warfare began with seventy simultaneous attacks across the country on October 31, 1954, launched more for their psychological effect than for practical military reasons. The principal stronghold of the rebellion was the rugged Aures mountain region, where, as Michael K. Clark has noted in *Algeria in Turmoil*, an entire army corps could have been wasted. It was apparent from the start that a modern striking force was ill-suited to conditions in the Aures. Heavily equipped units dependent on motor transport lost much of their mobility in the hills and were easily out-maneuvered. . . . The rebels, slithering through the thousand gullies and defiles of a region the size of Connecticut and as wild as the Mountains of the Moon, had every advantage; they could have eluded an army corps. And did. The tactics practiced by Mao in China, by Giap in Indochina, were pursued in the seven-year struggle to follow, and little is learned by detailing them.

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'The British, who arm their commandos with knives and instruct them to kill . . . from the rear—protested vigorously when such tactics were applied to themselves. It may be argued that these things are only permissible in war. This is nonsense. I was fighting a war in Cyprus against the British, and if they did not recognize the fact from the start they were forced to at the end. The truth is that our form of war, in which a few hundred fell in four years, was more selective than most, and I speak as one who has seen battlefields covered with dead. We did not strike, like the bomber, at random. We shot only British servicemen who would have killed us if they could have fired first, and civilians who were traitors or intelligence agents. To shoot down your enemies in the street may be unprecedented, but I was looking for results, not precedents. How did Napoleon win his victories? He took his opponents in the flank or rear; and what is right on the grand scale is not wrong when the scale is reduced and the odds against you are a hundred to one.'"* The words are from *Memoirs of the EOKA leader. General George Grivas*; the subject, terror.

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In an order dated June 28, he informed EOKA group leaders: The aim of our next offensive will be to terrorize the police and to paralyze the administration, both in the towns and the countryside. If this aim is achieved, the results will be threefold: Disillusionment will spread through the Police Force so rapidly that most of them, if they do not actually help us, will turn a blind eye to our activities. Active intervention of the Army in security, which will stretch the troops and tire them out. The falling morale of the Army will also influence its leaders. In the face of our strength and persistence and the trouble they cause, it is very probable that the United Nations, through member countries who take an interest in Cyprus affairs, will seek to bring about a solution. The results we want will be obtained by:

1. Murderous attacks against policemen who are out of sympathy with our aims or who try to hunt us down.
2. Ambushes against police patrols in towns or raids on country police stations.
3. Obstructing free movement of the police across the island by laying ambushes (against individuals or groups).

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The killing in broad daylight before hundreds of people in the heart of the capital was a fatal blow to police morale. The killer, Karaolis, was later caught and sentenced to death, but his work had been done. The slaying of the Special Branch man, says Grivas, "shattered opposition to EOKA among the Greek police."

British propaganda was bitter in its denunciation of the methods used by EOKA, but Grivas was not concerned. As he later wrote:

All war is cruel and the only way to win against superior force is by ruse and trickery; you can no more afford to make a difference between striking in front or striking from behind than you can between employing rifles and howitzers. The British may criticise me as much as they like for making war in Cyprus, but I was not obliged to ask their permission to do so; nor can they now deny that I made it in the most successful way.

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A state of emergency was declared throughout the island on November 26. Police were given extraordinary powers of search and arrest. Strikes were forbidden. The death penalty was imposed for carrying arms, and saboteurs were liable to life imprisonment. British troops, responding to the assassination of their comrades in arms much as the Black and Tans had done in Ireland, vented their feelings on the civilian population. Soldiers stopped farm trucks on the way to market and dumped their loads of fruit and vegetables out on the road. Search parties invaded private homes, abused the occupants, and destroyed their possessions. Suspects were arrested without warrant and held for weeks or months in detention camps without trial. 'The 'security forces' set about their work," comments Grivas, "in a manner which might have been deliberately designed to drive the population into our arms." It had that effect.

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It is an irony of political warfare—and a political fact to be considered and understood—that the rules are not the same for both sides.

pg138

Unwilling or psychologically unable to take the initiative, they failed to seize and hold the popular imagination and so to create the broad mass unrest needed to topple the government or to build a revolutionary army capable of confronting and defeating the government army. "Public opinion," says Clausewitz, "is ultimately gained by great victories." The Huks needed, if not great victories, then a strong foretaste of success in order to create the bandwagon effect on which successful revolutionary movements are built

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The jungle in which they necessarily found refuge was inhabited not by farmers, but by tribal aborigines scarcely able to grow enough food to support themselves. Consequently, the food on which the guerrillas relied had to be smuggled from the villages, through the Min Yuen network, and this was soon halted by vigilant police activity.

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The expense of the military effort can be judged by the following detailed account of "Operation Nassau," described as typical of battalion-sized British counter guerrilla operations in Malaya:

Operation Nassau . . . began in December, 1954, and ended in September, 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about thirty yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about December 21, 1954. On January 9, 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were well prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them. Plans were modified; harassing fires were reduced to nighttime only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for three months without results. Finally on March 21, an ambush party, after forty-five hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map, and local morale rose a little. Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to camp accounted for two more terrorists. The Number 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food. On July 7, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four, including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, twenty-three terrorists remained in the swamp with no food or communications with the outside world. . . . This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each one represented 1,500 mandays of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" was

considered a success, for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.* Nine months of continuous effort by an entire battalion, backed by artillery and aircraft, with the expenditure of more artillery and mortar shells and aerial bombs than exist in the arsenals of some Latin American republics—to eliminate thirty-five guerrillas

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Early success and other factors—the support given Athens by the British and then by the Americans, and that given the Democratic Army by the three Communist countries north of the border—led to serious, indeed fatal, errors.

The first was to lose effective contact with the Greek population. For reasons relating perhaps partly to political security, partly to simple material expedience, the Communists early in the campaign began to raid the villages from which the gendarmes had been driven and to strip them of their cattle, their food supplies, and eventually of their inhabitants—the latter being either forcibly inducted into the Democratic Army or driven out of the guerrilla base areas entirely.

Hordes of refugees from the war zones created something of a problem for Athens—but at heavy cost politically to the Communists, in terms of prestige and popular support throughout Greece. There were also military consequences: With a civil population in the war zones, the government had to think twice about bombing villages and scattered dwellings; civilians presented a serious problem of target identification to government pilots, who could not always know whether they were strafing a guerrilla mule supply train or a group of farmers on their way to market. With the war zones emptied of all but combatants, the bomber pilots as well as the troops on the ground had a free hand: Anything that moved, except government soldiers whose positions were known, was automatically a target

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The second major blunder of the Democratic Army, made for reasons still not entirely clear, was to begin in 1947 to try to hold ground, adopting conventional defensive tactics for which their inferior numbers, light arms, and weak logistical system were entirely unsuited. The guerrillas had grown strong; eighteen thousand to twenty-six thousand men is a formidable force—for guerrillas. They were, however, obviously no match in any clear test of strength against an army and a National Defense Corps which together commanded some two hundred sixty-five thousand men, supported by armor, artillery, and a more than adequate air force.

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It seems not unfair to say that, to a very great extent, it was destroyed by the Communists themselves. Their alienation from the civil population in the northern mountains, the terrorism practiced against civilians, their dependence on foreign bases and supplies, and their premature decision in 1948 to hold ground and to expose large formations to a numerically, technologically, logistically, and organizationally superior army cost them a series of defeats from which there was no recovery. Their loss was twofold. They were defeated militarily. And the Greek army's success spelled defeat for the revolutionary movement politically, as well.

ill the Greek context, the revolutionary principle bears repetition: The object of the guerrilla is not to win battles, but to avoid defeat, not to end the war, but to prolong it, until political victory, more important than any battlefield victory, has been won. In sacrificing the advantages of guerrilla tactics for military strategy based on territorial investment, the Greek Communists opposed strength with weakness. In risking a military confrontation, they gambled not only their available manpower, but something more important—their political prestige as a revolutionary force able to defy (by skillful evasion and superior tactics) the military colossus. And in losing the gamble, they lost the essential momentum, the high sense of popular anticipation, the bandwagon effect, on which the success of any political movement depends.

Revolution is by definition a mass phenomenon.

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The problems of generalship remain the same. The variable factors of terrain, weather, space, time, population, and, above all, of morale and strategy still determine the outcome of battles and campaigns.

In the process of accomplishing his goal, he may have to defeat—and he will certainly have to engage and out-manuever organized, professional military forces. If so, however, his maneuvers, except where immediate survival is at stake, will be undertaken primarily for their political effect. Each battle will be a lesson, designed to demonstrate the impotence of the army and so to discredit the government that employs it. Each campaign will be a text, intended to raise the level of revolutionary awareness and anticipation of the popular majority whose attitude will determine the outcome of the struggle.

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Successful insurgency presupposes the existence of valid popular grievances, sharp social divisions, an unsound or stagnant economy, an oppressive government. These factors obtaining, revolution will still be far off, unless there exists or comes into existence the nucleus of a revolutionary organization, capable of articulating and exploiting popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Ordinarily, however, revolutionary situations produce their own revolutionary leadership. Coming from the most unstable social sectors, it can be expected to include the most radical, most frustrated and ambitious elements of the political "out" parties, the more idealistic and least successful members of the middle class, and those most outraged by the unaccustomed pinch of oppression. (The long-tyrannized peasant, for example, is seldom as revolutionary as the relatively fortunate student or worker who has been led to believe that he has rights, and finds, in a change of political climate, that he is deprived of them.)

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The overthrow of Batista was presented as a panacea, the remedy of all existing evils. As a "cause," it related and made understandable each isolated political development: the assassination of a policeman, the martyrdom of a terrorist, the suspension of civil liberties or a public demonstration demanding their

restoration, any disruption of the ordinary routine, anything that helped to undermine the regime, was held up as a skirmish or a battle in a great crusade.

The Cuban example provides as well as any other the recipe for successful insurgency. The prerequisites are the following:

1. An unstable political situation, marked by sharp social divisions and usually, but not always, by a foundering or stagnant economy.
2. A political objective, based on firm moral and ideological grounds, that can be understood and accepted by the majority as the overriding "cause" of the insurgency, desirable in itself and worthy of any sacrifice.
3. An oppressive government, with which no political compromise is possible.
4. Some form of revolutionary political organization, capable of providing dedicated and consistent leadership toward the accepted goal. There is one final requirement: the clear possibility or even the probability of success. Until people believe that a government can be overthrown—and it must be the first act of the insurgency to demonstrate this possibility by successful defiance of military force—the attempt will not be made, the revolutionary following will not be found.

The guerrilla is, above all, an improviser.

Successful evasion means the ability to avoid confrontation except at one's own choosing yet always to be able to achieve the local superiority to strike with effect.

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"We always know where the soldiers are," Fidel Castro told me when I first interviewed him in the Sierra Maestra, early in 1957, "but they never know where we are. We can come and go as we like, moving through their lines, but they can never find us unless we wish them to, and then it is only on our terms. "* At the time, Castro had perhaps one hundred guerrillas at his disposal; in theory, he was "surrounded" by some five thousand Batista soldiers. But in the wild and trackless terrain of the Sierra Maestra, roaming over some five thousand square miles of mountains and dense forest among the rural populace surely sympathetic to him and hostile to Batista, his being "surrounded" was an irrelevance. The ocean is surrounded, but the fish do not care.

Since there will be no great government stake in any given hamlet, farm, or village, in economic or strategic terms, the natural decision of the army will be to withdraw to safer ground. Yet each such withdrawal will widen the area of guerrilla control and feed the insurgency, providing it with more supplies, more recruits, more room in which to maneuver.

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Soldiers, especially foreigners, can suppress urban rebellion (as in Budapest) by treating the entire metropolis as a city under wartime siege, controlling all movements, and ruthlessly killing the inhabitants of any quarter where resistance is offered. Gradually an urban population can be starved and terrorized into submission. But such methods scarcely apply to the civil war situation in which there is no sure way of knowing friend from foe.

The guerrilla nucleus initiates the conflict, if possible, on the edge of a wilderness sanctuary, in a thinly populated agricultural area with a marginal economy, within easy striking distance of strategic targets—railway lines that can be cut, communications that can be disrupted, mining or industrial plants that can be sabotaged, small military or police posts from which arms can be seized. At the same time, urban insurrection of a hit-and-run rather than sustained character is created by the revolutionary underground, so as to give the insurgency a general, national complexion for maximum propaganda effect.

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It is not enough to rebel: The rebellion must be the object of national attention, too shocking in its initial effects to be ignored by even a controlled press, or quickly explained away, as has been the case with many abortive provincial insurrections, by a government safe in an untroubled capital, far from the scene of battle.

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The key to this kind of action is the well placed ambush. "Generally," writes Sam Tzu, "he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the fight and rushes into battle is weary."

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Che Guevara writes: When the force of the guerrilla band is small and it is desired above all to detain and slow down the advance of an invading column, groups of snipers, from two to ten in number, should be distributed all around the column at each of the four cardinal points. In this situation, combat can be begun, for example, on the right flank; when the enemy centers his action on that flank and fires on it, shooting will begin at that moment from the left flank; at another moment from the rear guard or from the vanguard, and so forth. With a very small expenditure of ammunition it is possible to hold the enemy in check indefinitely.

Night, as Guevara has noted, is the best ally of the guerrilla fighter. Although the Cubans used the phrase, "encirclement face," to describe the look of someone who was frightened, Castro's guerrillas never suffered a single casualty through encircle- 162 WAR OF THE FLEA merit, and Guevara considers it no real problem for a guerrilla force. His prescription: Take adequate measures to impede the advance of the enemy until nightfall and then exfiltrate—a relatively simple matter for a small group of men in country well known to them, where the cover is good.

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The army cannot be everywhere. Yet if the troops do not remain, the territory is, in effect, ceded to the insurgents, who proceed to turn its agricultural economy and its rural population to their own purpose. This is the dilemma of the military commander.

The general public will be excited and divided by the deterioration of the government's position, as it becomes more apparent. The more radical elements of urban society will be emboldened; revolutionary sentiment, stirred up by the underground, will grow stronger and more widespread, and the government will grow progressively more fearful and repressive.

Is the United States itself immune? The complexity of modern, urban, heavily industrialized societies makes them extremely vulnerable to wide-scale sabotage,

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Where the will to resist authority exists on a wide scale, the means can be found; nor are urban, industrial societies, however well policed, guerrilla-proof.

Once the war of the flea has reached settled rural regions, even these limited means become ineffective, because aircraft cannot attack guerrillas without killing the civilians whose support the government must win—and they all look alike from the air. Great faith was placed in helicopters; they were of service in the Sahara but have failed to come up to expectations in the jungles of Viet Nam, where the Viet Cong has learned to set successful traps for them and crew casualties are heavy.

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Considering the great effect of the Chinese charges of "germ warfare" against the Americans during the Korean war, and the fresh outcry against gas, it is doubtful that guerrillas will have much to fear from either gas or biological warfare in the near future, especially since the practical military value remains unproven. Other weapons of modern military technology are more frightening. White phosphorous is invariably crippling if not fatal because it burns through to the bone; it will penetrate steel, and nothing extinguishes it but total immersion.

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New amphibious gun carriers can penetrate the deepest swamps and marshes. Infra-red and heat-sensitive sniperscopes detect guerrillas in the dark. A later model operates by magnifying the light of the stars. Mobile radar units can spot infiltrators on the ground at a thousand yards. Silent weapons make the trained guerrilla-hunter patrol even harder to detect than guerrillas themselves.

[Technology] can only make [guerillas] task more difficult and dangerous. The crux of the struggle is the social and political climate.

The needs of the guerrilla are few: his rifle, a blanket, a square of some impermeable material to shelter him from the rain, a knife, a compass, stout boots—the minimum of ordinary camping equipment. Personal qualifications are greater. Physically, the guerrilla must be strong, with iron legs and sound lungs; temperamentally, he must be a cheerful stoic and an ascetic; he must like the hard life he leads. But what

is indispensable is ideological armor. Above all, the revolutionary activist must stand on solid moral ground, if he is to be more than a political bandit.

People are quick to detect the difference between opportunism and dedication, and it is the latter that they respect and follow.

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To be successful, the guerrilla must be loved and admired. To attract followers, he must represent not merely success, but absolute virtue, so that his enemy will represent absolute evil. If the soldiers are idle, drunken, and licentious, the guerrilla must be vigorous, sober, and moral. If enemies are to be disposed of, it must be for moral reasons: They must be traitors, murderers, rapists. The revolution must show that its justice is sure and swift. By contrast, its enemies must be revealed as venal, weak, and vacillating.

Those in doubt, even the adherents and servants of the regime, must be given a clear moral choice. They must be told, in effect: It is still not too late to join forces with virtue, and to have a share in the bright future, more secure and certain than the property or the position you value now.

Revolutionary propaganda must be essentially true in order to be believed. This is simple expedience. If it is not believed, people cannot be induced to act on it, and there will be no revolution.

Guerrilla leaders do not inspire the spirit of sacrifice and revolutionary will that creates popular insurrection by promises alone, or by guns alone. A high degree of selfless dedication and high purpose is required.

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The study of guerrilla movements of the postwar era leads to the conclusion that the United States is slowly moving into a worldwide conflict which it cannot win.

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Yet in the modern era it is not possible to colonize or to govern profitably or to keep a subservient native government in power—in other words, to exploit—without the consent of the exploited. To kill them is self-defeating. To enslave them is, in the light of modern political and economic realities, impractical where it is not impossible. Hence the guaranteed success of any determined popular liberation movement once afoot.

Under such conditions, to try to suppress popular resistance movements by force is futile. If inadequate force is applied, the resistance grows. If the overwhelming force necessary to accomplish the task is applied, its object is destroyed. It is a case of shooting the horse because he refuses to pull the cart.

Poverty does not of itself engender revolution. But poverty side by side with progress creates a new amalgam; the hope of social change stimulated by even a little education produces a new social phenomenon: the ambitious poor, the rebellious poor, the cadres of the revolution, who have nothing to lose, and see much to gain around them

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Without a clearly articulated cause, without forceful and persuasive leaders, without political organization, generations of slum dwellers have lived and died in misery, generations of peasants have scratched the soil, and there have been few real revolutions.

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In the labor barracks of the Brazilian Northeast, radio brings the message of the Cuban revolution, of fighting in Viet Nam and the Congo, of riots in Panama and Harlem. The plantation workers are poor, but not too poor to know what other men like themselves are doing, and how they are setting about it, and with what results.

Revolutionary leadership is found, first in the poorer and more ambitious or idealistic sectors of the middle class, then in the spreading new class of poor white-collar workers, who, scorned by both the middle class and the elites, unable to make common cause with them or to aspire to their privileges, follow the only avenue open to their ambition and form a radical political opposition, taking the cause of the humble and the disfranchised as their own.

Incipient guerrilla movements can be stamped out before they begin—the first, larval stage is, indeed, the only stage at which they can be stamped out. But, conditions remaining the same, others are certain to arise.