GENOCIDE BY PROXY

Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard

MICHAEL HAAS

$55.00 (Review copy) 3/18/1992

Genocide by Proxy

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PRAEGER

New York
Westport, Connecticut
London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Haas, Michael, 1938–
Genocide by proxy : Cambodian pawn on a superpower chessboard / Michael Haas.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–275–93855–7 (alk. paper)
1. Cambodia—Politics and government—1975– 2. Cambodia—Foreign relations. 3. World politics—1975–1985. 4. World politics—1985–1995. I. Title.
DS554.8.H33 1991
327′.09′047—dc20 90–24507

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 90–24507
ISBN: 0–275–93855–7

First published in 1991

Praeger Publishers, One Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

The great tragedy of Cambodia
is to have fallen prey to
external states which have
no concern for the people.

—Jacques Beckaert

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PREFACE

In 1984 the film *The Killing Fields* reported to the world a horror that recalled the concentration camps of Adolf Hitler. Pol Pot's Cambodia was depicted as an open-air Auschwitz. Most filmviewers, however, are unaware of the fact that cuts were made in the section of the film where Cambodians were shown welcoming Vietnamese soldiers as liberators. Congress's decision the following year to vote overt military aid to non-Communist resistance forces in Cambodia might have appeared to respond to the public view that something should be done to improve the situation. But this US aid did not help; instead, it was part of a pattern of aid for the perpetrators of a second Holocaust. Indeed, US food aid kept the Khmer Rouge alive in 1979 and escalated to covert military aid by 1981, and in 1985 the congressional overt aid package went to Pol Pot's allies. By 1989, when the US secretary of state was in favor of placing Khmer Rouge leaders in sensitive positions in the Cambodian government in order to achieve a "comprehensive political settlement," the American people again did not get the true picture. For decades, Cambodia has been a mere pawn on a chessboard of geostrategic foreplay involving China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

I first visited Cambodia in 1988 as a member of the United States–Indochina Reconciliation Project (USIRP) team led by John McAuliff. We began at Angkor Thom and Angkor Wat, where magnificent monuments to an ancient and powerful Cambodia remain. We then reboarded our aircraft the same afternoon to spend two nights in Phnom Penh. Rather than seeing a city emptied of shopkeepers, as it was from 1975 to 1978, we saw evidence of hope and prosperity. A Cambodian phoenix had somehow arisen from the terror of the Pol Pot era. Cambodians whom we met were unanimous in not wanting the Khmer Rouge to return to the capital city.

During our stay we received briefings at the Cambodian Foreign Ministry.

Two Foreign Ministry officials, along with the editor of a popular newspaper, dined with us subsequently. We also met representatives of private voluntary organizations from Australia in Phnom Penh.

What captured our attention most was Tuol Sleng, a museum set up to portray the Khmer Rouge massacre. Instruments of torture, numbered photographs, and a pile of skulls stood out in the tour of the facility, which was a former school that the Khmer Rouge had turned into a detention compound. Our guide, who avoided the walking tour, finally came to collect us in a reception room where an enormous mural depicted how so many Cambodians were rifle-butted on the head as they went single file into mass graves. All Cambodians had been affected by the unspeakable terror of the Pol Pot era, so we were not surprised when our guide broke down at this point. Many of us had already done so ourselves, albeit less visibly.

But my interest in Cambodia came before my trip in 1988. When Vietnamese troops entered the country, chasing the Khmer Rouge to the hills and jungles, I was academic adviser to a student from Thailand, Komgrit Varakamin. I had been reading about relations between Thailand and Vietnam as he prepared a dissertation on the subject, and his writing impressed me. I began to pay more attention when a deadlock developed in Cambodia and a superpower proxy war was superimposed upon an intense internal struggle. As I analyzed the situation in my essay "The Indochina Tangle," the preference patterns of the participating countries were such that a resolution was nowhere in sight.

By August 1988 the deadlock was breaking up. The four Cambodian factions met for the first time at Jakarta in mid-July, establishing ground rules for a peace process. The newly elected prime minister of Thailand talked of turning "battlefields into marketplaces" only a few days before we flew to Ho Chi Minh City to begin our tour of Indochina. We learned in Phnom Penh that Vietnam wanted to withdraw its troops by June 30, 1989. The People's Republic of Kampuchea, understandably nervous about the capabilities of its own troops, informed us that they wanted Vietnamese soldiers to remain until March 31, 1990.

When I left Indochina at the end of August, the information obtained seemed so extraordinary that I wrote up a short essay for distribution. At a forum on the campus of the University of Hawaii, the reception was less than enthusiastic. I was flanked on a panel in September between a US State Department officer, exuding a CIA bearing to my right on the panel, and a Cambodian student who later admitted to being "Khmer Rouge" to my left. I sent the essay to the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Honolulu Advertiser*, and *San Francisco Chronicle*; again my concerns fell upon deaf ears. One friendly editorial writer said that his readers "would not understand" the complexities of what I was writing about. A brief letter to the editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* about Kampuchean-Vietnamese differences on the alternative June 30 and March 31

withdrawal dates, however, appeared immediately after it was faxed to Hongkong. At the suggestion of Komgrit, my essay was sent to *The Nation*, a Bangkok daily, where it appeared under the title "Is Khmer Peace at Hand?" on October 24, 1988. A melodramatic inference was that Asians had grown weary of an unending conflict, while American editors were not ready to announce the beginning of a genuine peace process.

At this point I decided to apply to the US Institute of Peace to study the Cambodian conflict, utilizing computerized methods to model decision-making. As soon as my grant was approved in mid-1989, I flew to the Paris Conference on Cambodia, stopping in Washington en route and in New York on the trip back. When I arrived, at the beginning of the second week of the conference, I was accredited as a member of the press. I received a list of conference delegates and telephone numbers, and I proceeded to write a letter of self-introduction, followed by telephone requests for interviews with delegates. Interviews proceeded, but I had to return to start teaching at the University of Hawaii before the conference reached its conclusion at the end of August. In late December I resumed interviewing in Southeast Asia, going to Indonesia, Thailand, and then Vietnam and Cambodia. In early January 1990 I flew to England to teach the winter term at the University of London, where I could more easily reach authoritative sources throughout Europe and where audiences wanted to hear the facts about Cambodia. I returned to Hawaii in April 1990 via Washington and New York. Efforts to disseminate what I had learned in the British and US press met the same fate as in 1988. *The Nation* of Bangkok then published a piece with the somewhat overdramatic title "Fallacies of Cambodia's UN Plan" on June 12, 1990, after the *New York Times* and similar outlets decided otherwise. "Stopping the Khmer Rouge's Return" followed on October 15, and "Who will Govern Cambodia Next?" on March 13, 1991.

This book presents the multifaceted nature of my concerns. An introductory chapter presents basic facts about how genocide by proxy began. The next three parts of the book relate, in the style of the film *Rashomon*, how each country perceived events and framed narcissistic policies to use the conflict for its own ends, treating Cambodia as a mere pawn on a superpower chessboard. Rather than explicating a computerization of bargaining positions in this volume, I comment instead on alternative policies in Chapters 2 through 27, and I reserve a more thorough treatment of my methodology to another book, *Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact*, also published by Praeger. In the last chapter of this volume I suggest an alternative to a world of chesspieces that would accord more fully with the aspirations of most countries in the world.

The contribution of this work is not only in showing how self-centered foreign policies ran amuck in regard to Cambodia but also in providing new information obtained during my interviews. To supply background information, I also rely on many secondary sources.

I am indebted for information and insights to more than a hundred interviewees in my efforts to find out why Cambodia has remained at war so long, possibly longer than any other country in history. I wish to extend particular thanks to interlocutors from twenty countries and the United Nations. My Australian informants include Graham Alliband, Gareth Evans, Malcolm Leader, Ian Lincoln, Robert Tyson, and Mary Wilk. The Cambodians include Kek Galabru, Tep Henn, Khieu Kanarith, Uch Kiman, Kann Man, Truong Mealy, Ieng Mouly, Dith Munty, Thiounn Prasith, Keo Puth Rasmey, My Samedy, Sichan Siv, Ly Sorsane, Keat Sukun, In Thaddee, and Boonroen Thach. From Canada I had an opportunity to talk to Daniel Dhavernas and David Sproule. Interviews with Hu Qianwen, Li Shichun, and Zhang Wuwei of China were also very useful. French diplomats Sylvie Bermann, Marie-Claire Gerardin, Jean-Jacques Galabru, Hugues Nordi, Jean-Claude Poimboeuf, Daniele Spengler, and Violaine Charpentier de Villemeur provided useful information, too. German interviewees were Joachim Broudre-Groger and Hans Carl von Werthern. From India I was briefed by Jesudas Bell, R. R. Dash, and C. D. Sahay. Indonesians aiding my project were Azhari Boer, Soendaroe Rachmad, Malikus Suamin, Juwono Sudarsono, Admiral R. M. Sunardi, and Jusuf Wanandi. Japanese interviewees included Hiroshi Inomata and Satoshi Nakajima. A New Zealander, Frank Wilson, provided very pertinent information. From the Philippines I had an opportunity for frank discussion with Alberto Encomienda and Leticia Shahani. S. R. Nathan of Singapore provided useful information. From the Soviet Union I benefited from discussions with Victor Anissimov, Georgy Kunadze, Alexander Ilitchev, Vladimir Mikoyan, and Alexandre Pavlov. Sweden's ambassador to Hanoi, Karl Lindahl, was one of the best-informed observers I encountered. My Thai informants included Surapong Jayanam, Pisan Manawapat, Upadit Pachariyakun, Don Paramatwinsi, Rangsan Phaholyomin, Amnuay Viravan, and of course Komgrit Varakamin. In the United Kingdom my list of government officials includes Peter Carter, Andrew George, Julia Nolan, and former diplomat John Pedler. United Nations contacts were Margaret Carey, Linda Hazou, Sir Robert Jackson, Udo Janz, Fritz Loebus, Painda Manely, John McCallin, Ghia Mendoza, Guy Ouellet, Janet Reilling, Nessim Shallom, Dhannanjaya Sunoto, Patrick Van de Velde, Jean-Louis Vignuda, and Kaiser Zamel. US informants were Stephen Blake, Richard Bush, Timothy Carney, Thomas Ferguson, Robert Glass, Marie Huhtala, Harriet Isom, Karl Jackson, Jeff Milstein, Charles Twining, Daniel Russel, Richard Wilson, Jay Winik, and Dalena Wright. Among Vietnamese officials I received the cooperation of Nguyen Can, Pham Van Choung, Tran Quang Co, Mai Chi Hai, Bui Xuan Khoa, Le Hong Lam, Vo Dai Luoc, Le Mai, Tran Xuan Man, Le Duc My, Dao Huy Ngoc, Do Tin Nham, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Chau Phong, Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong, Ngo Ba Thanh, Nguyen Trung, Vo Tong Xuan, and Vu Zung. A secretary at the Yugoslavian mission to the United Nations provided useful information. I

also interviewed Andrew Mutandwa of Zimbabwe, and I was assisted by R. Zunenga of the Zimbabwe government. Three other persons cannot be identified in view of their positions. To protect my sources, the reader will discover, I use sequential interview numbers when referring to all interviewees except for a few prominent individuals whom I interviewed on tape.

I would also like to acknowledge the insights of many speakers at various conferences, including Chester Atkins, Muthiah Alagappa, Radda Barnen, Lady Borton, Helen Chauncey, Jerome Cohen, David Elder, David Feingold, Anne Goldfield, Harry Harding, John Holdridge, Richard Holbrooke, Judith Ladinsky, John Lapp, Bertil Lindblad, Kishore Mahbubani, Paul Peterson, Frank Sieverts, Noordin Sopiee, Paul Strasberg, Bryan Truman, Lonnie Turnispeed, Sesto Vecchi, and Richard Walden. I am also grateful for wisdom gained in personal contact with such dedicated citizens and scholars as Fred Z. Brown, Ruth Cadwallader, Michael Dukakis, David Hawk, Stephen Heder, Bill Herod, Robert Immerman, Rudolf Joó, François Joyaux, Kathy Knight, Michael Liefer, John McAuliff, Steve O'Harrow, Gareth Porter, Hua Shiping, Sheldon Simon, Robert Smith, Estrella Solidum, Jerold Starr, Maureen Steinbruner, Jeremy Stone, Laura Summers, Daniel Susott, Lec Tan, Carlyle Thayer, Ngoc Diep Trinh, Khien Theeravit, Ngo Ngoc Trung, Hediana Utarti, Michael Vickery, and Linda Worthington, as well as news editors and reporters Susumu Awanohara, Elizabeth Becker, Nayan Chanda, Kavi Chongkittavorn, Jack Colhoun, Sally Gelston, Hamish McDonald, Ted Morello, Keith Richburg, Sabam Siagian, Rodney Tasker, Nate Thayer, Michael Vatikiotis, and Paul Wedel.

The book presents my own judgments and thus should not be construed to imply any endorsement from these helpful sources. My effort at scholarship does not represent the position of the US Institute of Peace, the primary financial sponsor. For errors of fact or interpretation I alone am responsible.

Part I

THE GAMEBOARD

1

FROM THE KHMER EMPIRE TO FOUR WARRING FACTIONS

ENDLESS WAR IN CAMBODIA

Angkor Wat, an architectural masterpiece appreciated around the world, inspires awe in a civilization that valued art, dance, and music. But the monument was built by forced labor, and it represented the power of the once-mighty Khmer Empire.[1]

Pol Pot, who wanted to return to the glory of the past, reestablished a system of forced labor from 1975 to 1978. As a result of his rule, more than one million Cambodians were apparently sacrificed in what have been called the "killing fields."

On December 25, 1978, Vietnamese combat soldiers drove Pol Pot's forces out of harm's way. After Angkor Wat was liberated, various Cambodian factions accepted aid from outside geostrategic chessplayers. Fundamental disagreements among the external supporters of the various Cambodian factions then brought about a military and diplomatic stalemate during the 1980s, depriving the Cambodian people of any hope for an autonomous, peaceful history. When Vietnam withdrew its major contingent of forces from Cambodia in late 1989, Angkor Wat again fell into the middle of a battleground between contending Cambodian factions.

This book is an account of a country at war, a people consigned for centuries to play the role of pawn in world politics. We begin by tracing the historical record. We then examine the "proxy war" after 1978, particularly in the early 1980s. Next, we describe attempts, primarily in the late 1980s, to bring about a "proxy peace," contradictory as that term may sound. We proceed to show how "deproxification," an uncoupling of Cambodian factions from sources of outside support, provided the only way to proceed from the killing fields to the tilling fields of a peaceful Cambodia as events of the 1990s unfolded.

Although the text is descriptive, we pause from time to time to juxtapose facts against justifications for policy options of various countries. The aim is to expose the basic narcissism that reigns when one state forces another to be a pawn. The analysis compares foreign policies, explaining how the priorities of several states pushed Cambodia into the quicksand of contemporary world politics. We conclude by arguing that the world needs a new kind of politics to avoid future Cambodias.

Since Cambodians have not been blameless in the worsening of their country's plight over the centuries, we begin our account with a period in Cambodian history when the rulers of Angkor Wat were eager chessplayers, even regional superpowers, and then fell victim to a geostrategic game that they themselves introduced but could not end.

THE FALL OF THE KHMER EMPIRE

At its zenith in the twelfth century the Khmer Empire included all of present-day Cambodia; parts of Burma, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand; and the southern part of Vietnam. The latter territory, previously ruled by non-Khmer Malays of the Champa state, was then known as Kampuchea Krom (lower Cambodia).

When Jayavarman VII exhausted his people with demands for forced labor, military service, and heavy taxation, the empire slowly began to collapse.[2] Although Khmers defeated the Chams to rule in Kampuchea Krom from 1203 to 1220, they later abandoned the area in order to defend themselves against the Thais, who descended from Southwest China to carve out a homeland in the territory soon called Siam. When Angkor was abandoned to Siam by 1431, the Khmer capital moved to Oudong. Unconquered, Phnom Penh grew in importance, becoming the Khmer capital in due course. In the later struggle for dominance between Siam and Vietnam, Cambodian autonomy faded. By 1720 Vietnam defeated Champa and thus was in a position to rule Kampuchea Krom.

As the Thais grew stronger, the Khmer court hoped to gain autonomy by playing Vietnam off against Siam. In the seventeenth century Chettha II, who married a Vietnamese princess, agreed to allow the Annam court at Hue to establish colonies in Kampuchea Krom. Chettha II's third son seized power in 1642 with the aid of Cham mercenaries, and then he massacred his opponents. The first two sons fled to Hue, enlisted the aid of the Hue government against Champa through Chettha II's Vietnamese widow, and regained power in 1658. Hue then forced Cambodia to pay tribute, and Vietnamese settlers were granted equal rights with the Khmers in Kampuchea Krom.

War then raged in Cambodia between pretenders to the throne. Chey Chettha IV established his reign in 1674. Siam aided the Khmers in holding back the Annamese but otherwise kept the Cambodian civil war alive so

that there was a buffer between the two powerful states of the Southeast Asian mainland. Although Chey Chettha IV abdicated three times, later deposing his successors in each instance, by the early eighteenth century the Phnom Penh government was forced to accept vassal status to Annam. More Vietnamese colonists went to Kampuchea Krom, and Annam absorbed most of the province by 1759; the Mekong Delta portion of Kampuchea Krom fell under Vietnamese control in 1780.

During much of the eighteenth century Cambodia was spared dismemberment. Thai attacks were delayed in order to head off Burmese incursions, while Hue sought to extend control over the Tonkin kingdom of northern Vietnam. As the nineteenth century began, Siam emerged victorious over Burma under the Chakri dynasty, and Vietnam was unified. The name "Vietnam" dates from the unification of 1802.

During the 1790s Siam would not allow Cambodian King Ang Eng to reign until he was first anointed in Bangkok. In the 1830s his successor, Ang Chan, resolved to play the "Vietnamese card" against Siam, which struck back, but soon Cambodians chafed under increasingly repressive Vietnamese rule. Encouraging a proxy rebellion in the early 1840s, Siam intervened in the resulting civil war to install Ang Duang, the king's brother, on the throne. When the Siamese-Vietnamese war ended in a draw by 1845, Vietnam withdrew. Cambodian autonomy had been preserved, but Siam's resident in Phnom Penh kept the victorious king, Ang Duang, under control. Continuing Cambodian tribute to Vietnam meant that the king was a joint vassal of both states.

CAMBODIA UNDER FRENCH RULE

The French East India Company was formed in 1664 to trade in Asia. France considered mainland Southeast Asia to be "Indochine," a territory between China and India. Initial trading posts in Indochina merely whetted the appetites of the traders. In 1850 a French military force attacked Danang, and the Nguyen dynasty at nearby Hue decided to use the French to stabilize rule, as there were numerous peasant revolts against the monarchy. In 1862 France made Kampuchea Krom a colony, renaming it "Cochin China," and French troops arrived in Cambodia during the same year. In 1863 King Norodom learned that France planned to set up a protectorate over Cambodia. When a French resident was posted to Phnom Penh, the king agreed to French terms in 1864, including new borders that surrendered even more of eastern Cambodia to the French colony of Cochin China. Cambodia signed a secret treaty with Siam to avoid subordination, but Bangkok capitulated to French demands to give up dominion over Cambodia in 1867. In the Franco-Siamese treaty, the French conceded Angkor and Battambang provinces to Bangkok but promised not to incorporate Cambodia into Vietnam. In 1884 and 1885 Paris negotiated protectorate arrangements with

two local governments—Tonkin in the north and Annam in central Vietnam. France drew new boundaries that transferred more territory from Cambodia to Vietnam. Cochin China grew in importance, culturally and territorially, as the Khmer Krom were mostly in rural areas. Vietnamese had only arrived in the cities a century before and French culture thus easily established a dominant role in the development of the principal city, Saigon.

In the 1880s the French resident in Phnom Penh imposed new taxes and compelled King Norodom to agree to demote the protectorate to the status of a mere colony. In 1885 an uprising occurred in response, but the king asked the people to lay down their arms when Paris falsely promised that he would be restored to full power. French control gradually extended up the Mekong, and in 1893 Paris forced Bangkok to return Angkor and Battambang provinces to Cambodia.

Paris imposed rule through native administrations in its protectorates but maintained direct rule in Cochin China. Hanoi was the administrative center for French Indochina. When the Khmers would not let the French exploit their labor, the colonial rulers brought Vietnamese into Cambodia to run the civil administration and to work the rubber plantations. For their education, Khmers could choose between primary schools run by the Catholic church and the traditional Buddhist schooling in which young Khmers became monks. Resistance to colonialism in Cambodia lagged behind Vietnam, whose university students soon learned that the notions of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" were inconsistent with French colonial rule (Hall 1968:762). Most educated Khmers studied in Cochin China (Kampuchea Krom), and many cadres that spearheaded the Cambodian independence movement were Khmer Krom.

When Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 1930, he did not have the future of Cambodia in mind. Later in 1930 the Communist International (Comintern) insisted that the party bear the name Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and admit Cambodians and Laotians in good standing. In 1935 the ICP dutifully adopted a resolution calling for an Indochinese Soviet Federation; Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam had the right to join or to form separate states. The first Cambodian ICP members were ethnic Vietnamese.

WORLD WAR II

Japan was the next foreign power to enter Cambodia. When France fell to Hitler in 1940, Siam tried to retake Angkor and Battambang provinces militarily. After the Vichy regime signed an alliance with Japan, Bangkok followed suit and was awarded Cambodia's two western provinces. Cambodian King Sisowath Monivong died in early 1941, reportedly in anguish over the loss of Khmer lands to Siam, whereupon Vichy asked an eighteen-year-old student in a French high school in Saigon to discontinue his studies

to become the new king. His name was Norodom Sihanouk. When Japan entered Cambodia one month later, Tokyo deferred to the French, and the teenage king was retained. Shortly thereafter, when Japanese troops landed in Bangkok, Siam dutifully declared war on Britain and the United States.

Japan tried to back groups in Indochina in order to have an independent power base, but Ho Chi Minh began a concerted war for Indochinese liberation rather than accepting joint Japanese-Vichy suzerainty. Khmer emigrés in Bangkok started a separate Khmer Issarak (Independence) Movement in 1940 under the leadership of Son Ngoc Thanh, a Buddhist monk. Thanh escaped to Japan in 1942 after Vichy cracked down at a pro-independence rally in Cambodia.

A 1941 ICP resolution stressed again that each of the three countries could "either organize themselves into a Federation of Democratic Peoples or remain separate national states" after foreign powers were expelled (Burchett 1981: 14). Ho Chi Minh formed a united front, the Vietnamese Independence League, in 1941; known as the Vietminh, the group relied initially on aid from the Kuomintang army of the Republic of China (ROC), which was fighting Japan. The Cambodian Communists, nonetheless, remained under the influence of Ho Chi Minh.

After France was liberated from Nazi rule in 1944, Tokyo could no longer work through the defunct Vichy regime. When General Charles de Gaulle sought to replace Vichy officials in Vietnam with those loyal to the Free French, Japan arrested all French colonial officials in March 1945 and forced Emperor Bao Dai to abrogate the French treaty of protection, thereby seeking to dissolve the colonial states of French Indochina in a *coup de force*. But Bao Dai was set up as emperor of Annam, and King Sihanouk appeared to go along with the French. Tokyo quickly installed Son Ngoc Thanh of the Khmer Issarak as its proxy premier, offering independence to the three Indochinese states. In the confusion over colonial authority, the Vietminh persuaded highlanders in six northern provinces in Vietnam to resist Japanese rule by joining a Free Zone. In July 1945 a joint Franco-American mission of six soldiers parachuted to Vietminh headquarters to prepare the way to expel the Japanese, a development that gave considerable momentum to the Vietminh. In early August 1,000 Vietminh triumphantly marched into Hanoi. A Japanese force of 30,000 permitted this event, hoping to gain good will in order to resist later attempts by France to reestablish colonial rule (McAlister 1971:172, 174). When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the French colony of Cochin China reverted to the authority of Annam. Sihanouk declared Cambodia's independence but retained Thanh as premier. Thanh then sought to ally Cambodia with Ho in order to outflank the collaborationist Sihanouk, who opposed a détente with Vietnam until Cambodian-Vietnamese border disputes could be settled on favorable terms. At the end of August the Vietminh in Hanoi declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), which was duly recognized by

the ROC. Meanwhile, ICP member Tran Van Giau declared a Provisional Government of South Vietnam.

FRANCE'S ATTEMPT TO REIMPOSE COLONIAL RULE

In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt, believing that France left Indochina worse after a century of colonial rule, contemplated placing Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam under the UN trusteeship system. In March 1945 France recognized the autonomy of Indochina, and the Vietminh declared its willingness to accept a French governor for five to ten years until full independence was granted (McAlister 1971: 258–59). The allied powers agreed at Potsdam in July 1945 to divide the task of defeating Japanese troops in Vietnam by having the ROC army mop up north of the sixteenth parallel, while British troops were to handle the south. British Major General Gracey, upon arriving in Vietnam, asked surrendering Japanese authorities to remain during the transition. With US aid, French, Gurkha, and Japanese troops sought to establish control over the southern part of Vietnam in September 1945, when most of Indochina was in the hands of insurgent forces. Sihanouk appealed to the French to go to Phnom Penh, and an Anglo-French force soon restored him to the throne as their proxy. ROC troops, meanwhile, occupied Laos. There was little resistance in either Cambodia or Laos, as the new rulers wanted to forestall Vietnamization (McAlister 1971:271). ROC occupation authorities wanted to keep the French out of Asia, so they allowed the Vietminh to remain in a dominant position in the DRV. In November the Vietminh bypassed the ICP to form a united front with non-Communist parties to contest DRV parliamentary elections. The ICP won only ten of the three hundred National Assembly seats, although they held key positions in the Cabinet.

According to the terms of the Chungking Agreement, signed by China and France in January 1946, some 60,000 ROC occupation forces withdrew from Laos and Vietnam in exchange for concessions on the Yunnan-Hanoi Railway, abandonment of French extraterritorial rights in China, and recognition of the special position of ethnic Chinese in Indochina (Chang 1985:4). In March the popular front postwar government of France agreed to recognize the existence of Ho's DRV as an autonomous state in the French Union. Paris promised a referendum on unification for the country, a phaseout of French troops by 1951, and an Indochinese federation in due course within the French Union, a structure concocted in Paris to be a clone of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But French authorities later decided to proclaim an independent Republic of Cochin China in the south, and a reshuffled French Cabinet disavowed the recognition of DRV independence later that year following repeated Vietminh attacks on French troops for actions designed to bring the DRV under greater control.

When France returned to Cambodia, Thanh was arrested, tried in Saigon,

and exiled to France. France forced Thailand to return Angkor and Battambang provinces to Cambodia and to expel the Khmer Issarak from Thai protection. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh began to provide financial support to the Communist Cambodian resistance. In January 1946 Sihanouk signed an agreement to rule an internally autonomous Cambodian state within the French Union until France could establish the promised Indochina federation.

In 1947 Ho appealed to the United Nations, offering to join the French Union and the proposed federation if France would unify all parts of Vietnam into a single state. When Paris refused and the UN failed to respond, war between France and the Vietminh was inevitable, and the ICP went underground. In 1949 the French propped up Bao Dai as a proxy emperor of a unified Vietnam, composed of three Associated States. Only one member of the French parliament objected when Paris handed Cochin China to Bao Dai's control instead of considering Cambodia's claim to Kampuchea Krom.

When the federation idea fizzled, Sihanouk proceeded to set up a democratic state. Cambodia enjoyed a constitution, elections, a parliament, and political parties. Since France sought to encircle the Vietminh, in which Cambodia could serve as an ally, France devolved more power to Sihanouk's government, and Cambodia became an associated state in the French Union in 1949.

Backers of Cambodian independence viewed French moves as Talleyrandian, but the opposition was divided into Khmer Issarak on the west, Communists to the east, democratic dissidents in Phnom Penh, and Buddhist dissidents scattered throughout the countryside. The outcome of the elections in 1946 was that various groups seeking an independent Cambodia with a figurehead monarch won under the banner of the Democratic Party, placing Sihanouk on the defensive. The Prince labeled his right-wing opponents *Khmers Bleus*, his left-wing opposition *Khmers Rouges*.[3] Son Ngoc Thanh returned from exile to rejoin the Khmer Issarak. The Nekhun Issarak Khmer (Khmer Freedom Front) formed a separate resistance group on the Thai border, while a Khmer People's Liberation Army organized along the border with Vietnam as an adjunct to the Vietminh, which operated inside the southern part of Vietnam. In 1950 the First National Congress of Khmer Resistance met in the jungle; composed of members of the various resistance factions, the body founded the United Issarak Front (UIF). Son Ngoc Minh, who had joined the ICP in 1946, became UIF head. He died in about 1972, before Pol Pot's forces achieved victory (Chanda 1978b).

In 1949 the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged victorious over the ROC. In 1950 the PRC recognized the DRV as the sovereign power in Vietnam. When the Soviet Union followed suit somewhat later, the United States changed from covert to overt support of France (Kahin 1986), forgoing any pretense to an anticolonial policy in order to pursue cold war objectives in light of events such as the outbreak of war in Korea.

In February 1951 the ICP was dissolved. National rivalries dictated that

the three states take differing paths to liberation, according to the Comintern. In Hanoi the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP) formed. Former ICP and UIF members then formed the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), although most were ethnic Vietnamese. UIF and counterpart national fronts of Laos and Vietnam met in March to form the Viet-Khmer-Lao People's Alliance at a conference that affirmed the equality and free choice of each separate national liberation struggle. Ho Chi Minh still wanted to coordinate a unified struggle against the French, and he moved his troops into Cambodia in due course.

France paid little attention to Cambodia in seeking control over Vietnam; this left Sihanouk without resources to control much more of his country than the capital city. To dramatize his plight, Sihanouk dismissed the premier in 1952, dissolved parliament in early 1953, and then went to Paris to negotiate Cambodia's freedom, threatening to abdicate if his mission failed. The French government yielded to Sihanouk's demands later in 1953, whereupon most of the non-Communist Cambodian resistance disbanded. France pulled its troops out of Cambodia, but the Vietminh dug into enclaves along the border to carry on as guerrilla fighters, aiding allies in the southern part of Vietnam.

After the Korean War ended in 1953, China decided to send more supplies to the Vietminh, and the US contributed 78 percent of the costs to the French to hold out in Vietnam (Buttinger 1977:20), but France soon suffered defeat at Dienbienphu. The Geneva Conference met in early 1954 to decide the fate of Indochina. China wanted to see a divided Vietnam and quickly agreed to a partition at the seventeenth parallel, separating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north from the newly created State of Vietnam (SOV) in the south, which remained under France; elections for a unified Vietnam were to be held in 1956. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev wanted to maintain good relations with the United States during that time, the period of the "thaw," and Moscow was so eager to see France veto the proposed European Defense Community that it pressured Ho Chi Minh to stop all support for insurgencies in the rest of Indochina. An International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) was set up to monitor the implementation of the Geneva agreement, with offices in all four Indochinese countries. A riot temporarily closed the Saigon office in 1955, the Lao unit disbanded in 1956, and the Cambodian counterpart suspended operations in 1958, leaving an ineffectual office in Hanoi.

ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA

Sihanouk achieved recognition for Cambodia at Geneva as a sovereign, nonaligned nation. He reserved his right to claim sovereignty over Kampuchea Krom at a later date. While Ho Chi Minh was represented at Geneva, Cambodian Communists were not. Hanoi pulled all Vietminh forces from

Cambodia, under the terms of the Geneva accords, forcing UIF to disband. Ho's aims were to achieve a prompt French withdrawal from southern Vietnam and to deter the United States from serving as a replacement for the French. Son Ngoc Minh led his faction to exile in Hanoi when the Vietminh rounded up UIF supporters in the south to place them on a Polish ship bound for the north in accordance with the Geneva agreement. Both Vietnamese governments recognized the independence and neutrality of Cambodia at Geneva, and North Vietnam evacuated bases in Cambodia that had been occupied during the war against the French. Thus, about half of the KPRP leaders were in North Vietnam. Some entered the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The rest either stayed in Cambodia to form the Pracheachon (People's) Party in 1955 or remained underground.

Starting in 1953, a younger generation of Communist Party members returned to Cambodia from their studies in France to join the Communist movement. Among these were Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and Saloth Sar, the latter known later as Pol Pot. Khieu Samphan joined the three in 1957. These young coffeehouse intellectuals had little in common with former ICP members, who were close to Ho Chi Minh, whom they attacked for selling out their country at Geneva. The four decided to portray their Khmer comrades as longtime Vietnamese collaborators; their aim was to gain support from the next generation of Cambodians.

Saloth Sar taught school in Phnom Penh, performed kitchen duties at meetings of the Vietnamese-dominated underground Communists (Becker 1986:91), and bided his time. He left the country on a government scholarship but flunked his exams when he spent much time in extracurricular activities with the Communist Party of France, so his scholarship had been cut off and he returned home with animosity toward the Sihanouk government for interrupting his studies.

Later in 1954 the South-East Asia Collective Defense Conference convened at Manila to sign a collective security treaty for the region. In order not to compromise the Geneva accords, Indochinese states were not invited to Manila but received guarantees in a protocol to the treaty. In 1955 the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed. Sihanouk at first passively allowed Cambodia to repose under formal SEATO protection, but he subsequently denounced the organization in public and refused to yield to US pressure to join the organization. Later that year, alarmed at the growing US presence in the region, he attended the first conference of nonaligned nations at Bandung.

Because Cambodian independence had arrived, former Khmer Issarak leader Thanh returned to Cambodia and pledged his loyalty to Sihanouk from the jungle in 1954, offering to do so in person. When the Prince refused to see him, he founded the insurgent Khmer Serei (Free Khmer), which later became a favorite of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In 1955 Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit.

So that he could obtain a popular mandate, no longer appearing as a French proxy, he formed a new political party to contest elections, which were held as stipulated in the Geneva accords. His Sangkum Reaster Niyum (People's Socialist Community) Party, which renounced SEATO guarantees, won handily after ruthlessly harassing other parties and stuffing ballot boxes in 1955 and thereafter. Sihanouk went to China in 1956, accepting aid in order to build up the country. After a brief US embargo in retaliation for dealing with Beijing, Washington reconsidered and supplied some $300 million from 1955 to 1963 to the Prince (Smith 1965:22), who was busy rounding up Communist traitors. Thus, Sihanouk sought to keep his opponents, domestic and foreign, off balance. Communist Khieu Samphan, who belonged to the Pracheachon Party, decided to collaborate with Sihanouk's party so that leftist views would have a voice in Phnom Penh.

In 1954 the State of Vietnam refused to sign the Geneva accords because France would not grant it independence until elections were held throughout the country. As most Vietnamese lived in the North under DRV control, Premier Ngo Dinh Diem asked the United States for assistance. In 1956 Diem declared the independence of the new Republic of Vietnam (ROV). Aided by Washington, Diem then prevailed upon Paris to withdraw its colonial presence.

In 1957 Sihanouk complained to ICSC about increasing ROV incursions into Cambodia. Although the body ruled in his favor, it lacked power to act. Vietminh enclaves inside Cambodia, according to the United States, prompted the attacks, but no evidence ever supported these claims.

In 1960 Sihanouk's father died. Parliament named Sihanouk head of state, ending the monarchy.[4]

GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA

In 1959 the head of the KPRP defected to Sihanouk, having served as a mole since 1955. Most of the cadre was executed or dispersed due to relentless persecution by Defense Minister Lon Nol. When KPRP leaders asked for Soviet aid, they were rebuffed.

When South Vietnam refused to hold elections, as stipulated in the Geneva accords, and US military aid flowed to Saigon (Slater 1990), North Vietnam decided in 1959 to aid the Communist movement in South Vietnam, namely, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). The PRG's civilian arm, the National Liberation Front (NLF), and its military arm, the Vietcong, were established in 1960. China urged Cambodia to aid the NLF, while Moscow was more cautious, but Hanoi obtained Sihanouk's permission to use Cambodian territory (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) as a supply route to the South.

Communists in Cambodia, hopeful of DRV aid, reorganized as the Worker's Party of Kampuchea (WPK) in 1960. Saloth Sar, appointed to the

Central Committee, argued that the WPK should not await a Communist victory in Vietnam before seizing power in Phnom Penh. After the WPK's first party secretary general vanished in 1963 under mysterious circumstances, Sar replaced him.

Sihanouk's party narrowly won elections in 1962. Many opposition party candidates were elected, and the Prince appointed Khieu Samphan as secretary of state for commerce to balance his Cabinet, transforming the rival parties into a grand coalition. Sihanouk nationalized banks and foreign trade, then put his cronies in charge. In 1963, however, Sihanouk asked his Cabinet to resign after high school students in the cities demonstrated against the arrogance of government officials. Blaming the unrest on the left, the Prince drew up a list of enemies, whereupon most WPK members fled to the countryside and began to mobilize the peasants to revolt. Khieu Samphan, however, stayed on.

In 1963 Ngo Dinh Diem, ROV president, was assassinated along with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the head of ROV intelligence services. As US intelligence experts claimed that Diem's abolition of elective village councils was an open sesame for the Vietminh to take over, and Diem resisted reforms suggested by US officials (McAlister 1971:x), the two murders were viewed as executions for not being subservient enough to Washington. Sihanouk saw the handwriting on the wall and severed diplomatic relations with Saigon, then stopped US aid when he learned that the CIA was supporting the Khmer Serei. Chinese, Czech, and Soviet assistance began but hardly filled the void. China objected to Eastern bloc aid as the Sino-Soviet split widened, but Sihanouk saw no alternative.

After Diem, Washington had a major hand in selecting the heads of the ROV government. Although many officials were sincerely anti-Communist, some at the highest levels became heavily involved in profiteering from the war. Many of the profits came from the sale of heroin to Vietnamese, although ultimately the most lucrative market was to US soldiers (McCoy 1972:ch.5).

Aided by US advisers, troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) undertook border incursions into Cambodia in pursuit of Vietcong. From 1961 to 1964 the Prince called for an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality; although North Vietnam seconded the call, the United States was opposed. Cambodia then lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council, which deplored the incursions, sent a fact-finding mission, and recommended UN observer teams to clearly demarcate the border. Sihanouk rejected the proposal: He doubted that the United States would honor new borders, and he feared that Cambodia might lose territory in any redrawing.

In April 1964 US planes, flying from Thai bases, strafed two Cambodian villages. By May 1965 Sihanouk severed diplomatic relations with Bangkok and Washington and formally renounced SEATO guarantees over his non-

aligned government. Saloth Sar went to Beijing and Hanoi for the first time for support, but he left emptyhanded. China and North Vietnam were content that the Prince was looking the other way while military supplies to the Vietcong were using Cambodian territory as a conduit—while he was protesting raids into Cambodia by ROV and US troops. Beijing even stated that an attack on Cambodia would be perceived as an attack on China. Seeing Cambodian terrorism as a source of disruption of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi instructed its friends in the WPK not to oppose the Prince, infuriating Cambodian Communists close to Sar.

In 1965, after Leonid Brezhnev replaced Nikita Khrushchev, US military intelligence reported that North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva accords were increasing alarmingly. Hanoi had received backing from Moscow, which thereafter provided annual amounts of $60 billion to China's $20 billion to aid the struggle to unify Vietnam (Chanda 1986:174, 325). With the Saigon government in danger of defeat by an insurgency, strategists in Washington feared that when South Vietnam fell under the control of the North, Cambodia and Laos would be next, and Thailand would not be far behind in a row of dominoes. After a pretext in the Gulf of Tonkin, in which PAVN ships engaged US naval vessels who were aiding an ARVN attack on DRV coastal territory, US ground forces began to enter Vietnam in large numbers, with logistical assistance from Thailand.

In December 1965 Thai incursions into Cambodia prompted a complaint from Sihanouk to the UN. No follow-up action was taken, however. Then in 1968 Thailand complained about Cambodian border forays, but the two countries soon decided to leave well enough alone. In 1967, 1968, and 1969 Cambodia complained to the UN about ROV–US aggression, also without satisfaction.

Hanoi and the NLF, too busy fighting to pay attention to border disputes, gave Sihanouk the impression that Cambodia's desire to redraw the boundary would in due course be respected. In 1967, after an exchange of letters, Vietnam appeared to accept existing borders, although no accompanying map defined the meaning of this pledge; the Prince in exchange renounced Cambodia's claim to Kampuchea Krom (Chhak 1966). In 1969 the United States offered to recognize Cambodia's borders, but Sihanouk refused the offer when it appeared that his country might lose several islands and villages in the bargain. The Prince then officially recognized the DRV and the PRG, seeking to be on good terms with the likely victor. He did not expect that South Vietnam, which had become a US proxy regime, would last.

Embarking on a socialist program, Sihanouk watched as foreign investors pulled out and the economy plummeted, although French corporations continued to manage lucrative rubber plantations. To make up the deficit in the government treasury, Sihanouk increased taxes and cut the military budget. The new taxes outraged the peasants, who sold their rice on the black market in order to escape government levies that fed an increasingly

corrupt bureaucracy in Phnom Penh. The military then moved in to take over the profitable black market trade.

In 1966 the WPK, reorganized as the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), suffered defeat when conservative candidates bought victory in national elections. Khieu Samphan, nevertheless, was reelected to parliament. General Lon Nol, who asked members of his political party to disband and to join Sihanouk's party in 1955, was rewarded when Sihanouk named him premier. Lon Nol allowed the Vietcong to receive supplies from China, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union as usual, but at the price of diverting weapons to the Cambodian army to make up for the cuts in the military budget. When peasant uprisings occurred in Battambang province in 1967 and 1968, due to the military's takeover of the rice trade, the army responded by mercilessly slaughtering many innocent villagers. Sihanouk blamed Khieu Samphan and the Communists for the demonstrations and began to round up CPK members for execution.

Khieu Samphan went underground, and the CPK organized the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK). The RAK force adopted a Maoist strategy of encircling Phnom Penh. There were now more soldiers in the ricefields than oppositionists in Phnom Penh cafés, and the resentment of the peasants toward educated sophisticates provided fertile ground for building a revolution. By this time Saloth Sar had taken the *nom de guerre* of Pol Pot.

In 1969 Richard Nixon became president. The Nixon doctrine, which prescribed that Asians fight Asians in Indochina so that US troops could leave, was the latest variant of superpower war by proxy. Believing that he could end the war in Vietnam by following a more aggressive strategy, Nixon allowed the US role in Cambodia to escalate from sporadic infantry forays into Vietcong enclaves across the border to massive clandestine bombing of DRV and Vietcong bases inside Cambodia. The White House would not even tell the US Air Force of the Cambodian bombing, which began in March.

Suspicion that the Cambodian Communists were receiving aid from China, North Vietnam, and possibly the Soviet Union haunted Sihanouk. The Prince decided to reopen diplomatic relations with the United States, despite the secret bombing, when he became convinced that his fears were well founded. While protesting more than 100 US incursions into Cambodia to the UN, he told US officials that he would not object to attacks on Vietcong sanctuaries that held 50,000 troops inside Cambodia (Chang 1985:28; Shawcross 1979:70, 390). Lon Nol, meanwhile, secretly forged an alliance with the Khmer Serei and ordered all Vietnamese to leave the country.

In March 1970, when Sihanouk was on vacation in France, Lon Nol organized anti-Vietnamese demonstrations, which attacked both DRV and ROV missions, to protest continuing violations of Cambodian sovereignty

by North Vietnam and the Vietcong. The resulting turmoil gave the premier a pretext to stage a *coup de chef d'état*, although the dominant role of CIA-linked Sirik Matak later became evident when the general named him premier. A tribunal soon condemned the Prince to death for various crimes, including support for North Vietnam. Washington's response to the plot to oust Sihanouk was to take its chances with a more subservient regime (Kissinger 1982:340; Shawcross 1979:122–23). When the Prince threatened to fly to Moscow and Beijing to gain support, Lon Nol telegrammed an offer to reinstate him, but Sihanouk did not reply. While Phnom Penh rallied in support of the new government, there were pro-Sihanouk demonstrations in the provinces, where the Communist resistance increased control.

China offered to support the new regime if it would continue to allow Hanoi to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam to South Vietnam via Cambodia, as this arrangement was more practical than forging an alliance between the absent Sihanouk and the diminutive forces of Pol Pot. Lon Nol refused, demanding that all Vietnamese troops leave the country, and his forces attacked PAVN soldiers, albeit unsuccessfully. Then Lon Nol approached the United Nations, claiming that North Vietnam was engaged in aggression against Cambodia. The UN Security Council referred him to the ICSC, a Kafkesque gesture to his regime, which was widely held in disrepute. In 1972 the Front d'Union Nationale de Kampuchea (FUNK) was recognized as the representative of Cambodia by twenty-eight countries, and by 1974 the number of countries wanting to deny the UN seat to the Khmer Republic rose to sixty-two, a margin of only two votes.

Rather than invoking SEATO, which was another option open to him, Lon Nol formed an alliance with the United States, although only after 50,000 ARVN and US troops entered Cambodian enclaves to attack the Vietcong at the end of April without even clearing the action with Lon Nol. The US units left within a month, but ARVN forces stayed on for a year, moving toward the center of the country in response to attacks from the Vietcong, while North Vietnam pursued the troublesome army of Lon Nol.

The Cambodian population was aroused against the Vietnamese. Lon Nol gave an order to round them up into detention camps, which soon turned into pogroms. As there was supposed to be an alliance between South Vietnam and the new Cambodian government, the United States lodged a protest with Lon Nol. An estimated 150,000 ethnic Vietnamese fled for Vietnam at this point (Kiljunen 1984:26). Lon Nol then raised the specter of retaking Kampuchea Krom to liberate the Khmer Krom from ROV rule.

The countryside was rife with rebellion due to opposition to the US–Lon Nol–ROV alliance, which brought war to Cambodia. Two million Cambodians were homeless due to the conflict between the Communist insurgents and the Phnom Penh government (Mysliwiec 1988:xii). North Vietnam and the Cambodian Communist insurgents, at last with a common enemy, formed an alliance for the first time against the latest US proxy, the

government of Lon Nol. Although Pol Pot rejected aid offered by Hanoi, North Vietnam agreed to serve as a conduit for aid from China to Pol Pot's RAK, which commanded fewer than 1,000 armed troops in early 1970 and then grew to 12,000 by the end of the year (Hood & Ablin 1987:xxx), although still greatly outnumbered by Lon Nol's army. Some 1,500 Cambodian Communists, who left for Hanoi in 1954, returned at this point to join the RAK; their subsequent assassinations were part of a campaign by Pol Pot to purge Cambodia of "Vietnamese minds in Khmer bodies" (Hood & Ablin 1987:xxxv). Certain of eventual victory, Pol Pot refused to establish a joint command with his new allies, Hanoi's army, and RAK forces even fired upon PAVN soldiers during a joint attack on Lon Nol's troops on one occasion in late 1970. Pol Pot thought North Vietnam was in Cambodia for its own purposes and refused to serve as its proxy. Another incident of this sort occurred in 1971, although Pol Pot claimed these actions were "mistaken" (Kiernan 1980a:36). In 1972 the RAK organized a popular demonstration against Vietnam in Kompong Cham province.

Meanwhile, agreeing to an offer of exile from Chou Enlai, Sihanouk flew to Beijing to form the FUNK as a government in exile. At the invitation of Kim Il Sung, the Prince agreed to spend time each year in North Korea as well. Hanoi then asked Beijing to forge an alliance between the Prince and Pol Pot's insurgents in Cambodia, so DRV Premier Pham Van Dong flew to Beijing to ask Chou Enlai to persuade Sihanouk, while another North Vietnamese diplomat, Pham Hung, approached Pol Pot's representative in Beijing to arrange the unlikely coalition (Chanda 1986:66). Neither Cambodian leader wanted to serve as a proxy.

China then granted the Prince's request to host the Conference in Solidarity with the Indochinese People. Sihanouk, the Polpotists, Lao Communists, the NLF, and North Vietnam attended, thereby creating the illusion of an alliance among equal partners under FUNK. The Prince agreed to tape a message calling upon Cambodians to resist the Lon Nol government. Hanoi then used the tape to recruit a proxy Sihanoukist army known as the Khmer Rumdo (Liberation). Two months later the Prince backed out of FUNK in favor of an exile Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK), in which he took the role of head of state. Whether in FUNK or GRUNK, which were both headquartered in Beijing, Sihanouk was beginning to serve as Pol Pot's proxy. The RAK, meanwhile, persuaded the Cambodian peasantry to fight to overthrow Lon Nol, whom they identified as a collaborator with US bombing, so that Sihanouk would return to power (Sihanouk 1980:35).

KHMER REPUBLIC

In an effort to consolidate power, the new regime declared Cambodia to be a republic in October 1970.[5] Lon Nol was named president, whereupon

China and North Vietnam broke relations, although the Soviet Union retained its embassy. The Khmer Republic launched an attack on PAVN troops in mid-1970, but by early 1971 its air force was largely destroyed, and most of the army was defeated by mid-1971. Lon Nol then declared a state of emergency, suspending the new constitution to confront the insurgents. After massive student demonstrations against the increasingly corrupt government in 1972, he decided to rig elections to stay on as president.

Washington realized that the future of the Khmer Republic was precarious. During negotiations to end the US role in Vietnam's civil war, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger asked Hanoi to prevail on the Communist insurgents in Cambodia to settle with Lon Nol, whom the United States would also restrain. The supremely confident Pol Pot rejected the idea of an alliance with a US proxy.

The Paris peace accords of January 1973 officially ended US military involvement in Indochina. Another International Commission of Control and Supervision was set up to monitor the implementation of the agreement. Pol Pot considered the agreement to be yet another Vietnamese betrayal of the Cambodian revolution. Under Article 20 both North Vietnam and the United States were required to remove their troops from Cambodia and to stop military aid to the country. Beijing urged this provision in the Paris accords, hoping that the United States would replace Lon Nol with Sihanouk, as Chou Enlai preferred to deal with the Prince. Pol Pot's emissaries, in Paris to monitor the final peace negotiations, refused to see Sihanouk. Although the US government promised in the Paris accords to heal the wounds of war by assisting the DRV's postwar reconstruction, Washington soon argued that Hanoi was aiding the NLF, contrary to the agreement, so the United States had no further obligation to abide by the agreement. Although foreign soldiers left Indochina and PAVN troops evacuated Cambodia, US bombing resumed twelve days after the ink on the Paris agreement had dried. Washington wanted to reduce Hanoi's support for the NLF and deluded itself into believing that PAVN troops were aiding the Cambodian Communists. Washington hoped that more tons of explosives dropped in a year on Cambodia than on Japan during all of World War II (Kiljunen 1984:179) would compel the Cambodian resistance to come to terms with Sihanouk, an aim shared by both Hanoi and Chou Enlai, who distrusted Pol Pot (Kissinger 1982:353). When Lon Nol realized that North Vietnam was no longer aiding Pol Pot's forces, he showed his lack of understanding of the situation by offering a cease-fire to the resistance.

Pol Pot evidently reasoned that if Vietnam could emerge from a decade of devastation with a victory, so could Cambodia, even though the acreage for rice planting dropped from six million to one million due to US bombing (Becker 1986:34).[6] Meanwhile, in control of half of the population, RAK leaders set up self-sufficient security zones in which they abolished money and private property, banned interzone travel, collectivized land, directed

rice planting during nonbombing hours, proscribed traditional Khmer customs, and required political study sessions. While receiving ammunition from Hanoi (Nguyen 1978:10), RAK units attacked PAVN base camps inside Cambodia in 1973 as well as the Sihanoukist Khmer Rumdo. After January 1973, when Hanoi and Washington came to terms at Paris, Vietnam cut aid to the RAK forces, infuriating Pol Pot.

US military aid to the incompetently led Khmer Republic was only $1 billion, compared to nearly $160 billion spent on the war in Vietnam (Becker 1986:183). In August 1973, when the truth of the secret bombing emerged, Congress intervened to cut off funds to the air war in Indochina. The Soviet Union then tried to support Pol Pot in order to forestall the possibility of a victorious PRC proxy in Southeast Asia, but Moscow moved too late. Despite Chou's preference to have Sihanouk return to rule Cambodia, Kissinger unrealistically insisted that the Prince negotiate with Lon Nol. When Mao's widow was briefly in ascendancy in Beijing, Pol Pot asked China for more aid and then moved to purge FUNK of Sihanoukists. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing urged President Gerald Ford in December 1974 to drop Lon Nol so that Sihanouk could return to Phnom Penh before the Communist resistance seized power, but Kissinger was opposed. In early 1975 RAK units launched independent attacks to drive PAVN troops out of "Kampuchea Krom," explaining to a startled North Vietnam that these aggressive moves were errors of unruly lower-level officers.

In March RAK forces launched a final offensive against Phnom Penh. Lon Nol escaped on April 1. His defense minister, Sak Sutsakhan, assumed power. A few days before victory the Soviet Union recalled its ambassador from Phnom Penh, but it was too late. Although Ford appealed to Congress for more aid to the Lon Nol regime so that a coalition government of the warring parties could be negotiated to stop the civil war, no such funds were voted. By April 11 Kissinger finally realized that Sihanouk's return to Phnom Penh was imperative, but he could not persuade Khmer Republic leaders to cable the Prince until April 16, offering to transfer power back. Kissinger was trying to negotiate a coalition between the Prince and the Communist forces, but Sihanouk would not listen. Although RAK forces agreed to a cease-fire with the Khmer Republic, Pol Pot violated the agreement and marched into an unprepared Phnom Penh on April 17, thirteen days before Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City. The war in Cambodia had caused only 600 battlefield deaths (Kiljunen 1984:30). Three months later, Saloth Sar revealed that he was Pol Pot, but the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was still a secret; the revolutionaries insisted that they were nationalists first.

Phnom Penh was overcrowded with most of the war refugees, who were politically suspect since many Cambodians had escaped areas previously under Communist control. The new rulers expanded the wartime security zone system to the entire country, moving two-thirds of the population

(Kiljunen 1984:33) into self-sufficient collective farms in six zones. RAK units forcibly and immediately evacuated all cities; the pretext was that US bombing of Phnom Penh was expected, so the move was supposed to be temporary. Those who objected, including defrocked Buddhist monks, were executed on the spot. Soon, word of genocide leaked out. Priceless treasures from the national library and museum were removed to provide a place to care for draft animals. The country was cut off from the rest of the world; the communication system was largely in ruins. News leaked out only in dramatic dribbles. To the average Cambodian a new authority, *Angka* (the organization), was in charge; there were no governmental structures in the conventional sense outside Phnom Penh. Hanoi then established relations with Phnom Penh for the first time since 1970, when its embassy was sacked by Lonnolists.

The Paris accords committed Hanoi to accept two Vietnams. China discouraged Hanoi from action to unify the country. But the PRG gave opposite advice, and war in Vietnam resumed.

While North Vietnam was busy trying to overthrow the ROV government, the new Cambodian regime seized disputed territories from Vietnam, including islands off the southern coast. Before the North triumphed over the South, a few PAVN soldiers were still operating from enclaves inside or near Cambodia. The new government in Phnom Penh cabled Hanoi, requesting that the Vietnamese be recalled. When the ROV regime fell, Hanoi responded that PAVN troops had been withdrawn inside Vietnam, so they were already home. A border clash ensued, due to orders of one of Pol Pot's subordinates, who was reportedly reprimanded, and an apology went to Hanoi. As the Cambodians wanted to clarify the border question, Vietnam called for negotiations. A meeting in June 1975 showed that both sides had strong views on the border dispute, and the opportunity for a friendship treaty was missed: Hanoi was willing to agree to a land border proposed by Phnom Penh but wanted to discuss the sea boundary more carefully. In August Party Leader Le Duan returned an island that had been occupied in error in the confusion over maritime boundaries in order to show good faith. Phnom Penh's diplomats, following a position adopted during Sihanouk's reign, insisted on total acceptance of their position, while Vietnam wanted more conventional negotiations (Heder 1979:163; Smith 1965:154–55).

A few days after the victory in Phnom Penh, a RAK unit stormed the Soviet embassy. Diplomats were bound and handed over to the French embassy, where a mounting number of distressed persons collected in anticipation of possible repatriation. A remaining Soviet attaché was recalled in mid-1977.

In May the Kampuchean navy seized the US container ship *Mayagüez*, accusing it of spying. US naval vessels then shelled targets on the Cambodian mainland, frightening the new government into believing that the city of

Phnom Penh itself might be subjected to wanton bombing. Washington secured the release of the ship through the intervention of China. US bombing so damaged the RAK airforce and navy that Vietnam easily retook the disputed islands. The adventure left forty-one Americans dead and fifty wounded (Lewis 1976).

The first in a series of RAK border attacks on Thailand came at Surin province in June 1975. The fighting was incidental to a mass exodus of Cambodians fleeing the country. Relations with Thailand soon improved through the intervention of China (Poole 1976:27).

In August, Beijing decided to provide $0.2 billion in annual economic and technical aid to the new Cambodian government, roughly matching an amount allocated to Vietnam. About 20,000 PRC advisers were in Cambodia by 1978 to provide technical assistance (Chanda 1986:18; KIC 1982:25). Hanoi, meanwhile, was seeking aid from France and Japan to assert equidistance in its foreign relations. The Soviet Union's application for a consulate in Ho Chi Minh City, for example, was denied. Beijing spurned requests for additional assistance from Hanoi and cut food aid one month later. Vietnam nonetheless refused to tilt toward the Soviet Union, which even halted supplies for an interval in 1977. Party Secretary Le Duan went to Phnom Penh in August to sign an economic cooperation agreement, in keeping with the principle of proletarian internationalism, but he was rebuffed. China normalized relations with Thailand and began a campaign in Southeast Asia against Soviet hegemonism.

Sihanouk briefly visited Phnom Penh in the fall of 1975, agreeing to serve as president of the new regime. After a twelve-nation tour, he returned as "head of state for life" to witness profound changes in his country.

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

On January 3, 1976, a new constitution changed the name of the Phnom Penh government to Democratic Kampuchea (DK), though *Angka* remained in place in the provinces.[7] In April, after an election for the new legislature, Sihanouk refused to remain head of state and then lived under house arrest at the royal palace. Khieu Samphan, chairman of the State Presidium, was the head of state. Pol Pot became premier except for a brief period in the fall, when he stepped down for reasons of "health." There were still factions vying to take charge of the victorious revolution, and Pol Pot did not assume full control until 1977 (Mysliwiec 1988:3). When he took over, three types of enemies were rounded up—capitalists, feudalists, and imperialists. The "capitalists" were shopkeepers and traders. The "feudalists" were Buddhists, intellectuals, and the royalty. The "imperialists" included ethnic minorities (Chams, Chinese, Europeans, Thais, Vietnamese) who dressed or spoke differently from the Khmer, as well as alleged agents of the CIA, the Soviet KGB, or the Vietnamese (Heder 1990a; Munty 1988; Snapp 1977).

Members of these three groups were ultimately hunted down and killed, as they did not conform to the new order. Cambodia was to have two classes—Party members and peasants, the "true Cambodians." All would speak Khmer. According to Haing Ngor (1987), DK leaders regarded other races as parasites.

Apologists for Democratic Kampuchea believe that the aim of Pol Pot's radicalism was to rationalize agriculture and to provide discipline to an easygoing people (Chomsky & Herman 1979a:ch.6). If the mighty Khmer Empire could prevail with hand-dug irrigation systems, the country did not need foreign aid, according to DK logic. People even replaced draft animals. Families were separated, and masses of workers were moved to areas of supposed labor shortages. Those who objected constituted a fourth category of "traitors" for execution on the spot, as portrayed in *The Killing Fields*.

Implementation of the purges was left to RAK zonal commanders, such as the infamous Ta Mok. Regional commanders lacked precise instructions on how to proceed. Many in authority simplified their task by taking extreme measures instead of following due process of law, a concept foreign to the Cambodian tradition of justice. The categories expanded, and enemies inside the RAK army and the CPK were discovered in due course. The DK government asked all ethnic Vietnamese, even those who had been living in Cambodia for several generations, to leave the country; by the fall of 1975 some 150,000 ethnic Vietnamese had fled to Vietnam (Chanda 1986:16; Evans & Rowley 1984:86; Kiljunen 1985:55). To soothe DK hostility, Hanoi returned thousands of Chinese and Khmer refugees from the Lon Nol regime, only to have them disappear into the killing fields as well (Chanda 1978a:20). It is thought that Pol Pot eventually planned to kill all Cambodians over the age of twelve so that there would be no memories of the past (Criddle & Buttman 1987).

In February 1976 representatives of Laos and Vietnam issued a joint statement, establishing a "special relationship." Although that is apparently all that Hanoi had in mind, Pol Pot paranoically interpreted the move as an assertion of Vietnamese hegemonism (Chanda 1986:200; Simon 1978:20). DK and PRC representatives signed a secret military agreement during the same month.

Later in 1976, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh articulated a DRV good neighbor policy. Expressing an interest in joining ASEAN, he assured countries in the region that Vietnam did not intend to export revolution.

Since Pol Pot wanted to recover territories long abandoned to neighboring countries (Burchett 1981:158 n37; Kiernan 1980b; Sihanouk 1980:3, 65; Vickery 1984:ch.4), DK propaganda invited the Khmer Krom to revolt. Vietnam was willing to redraw frontiers that were cartographic exercises of the French imperialists, but only through negotiations.[8]

In April 1976 the RAK initiated border raids against Vietnam, ostensibly to evict Vietnamese from enclaves once used to infiltrate South Vietnam

that were allegedly still occupied by PAVN troops. In April Hanoi requested another meeting between the two countries; when they met again in May, they failed to resolve outstanding border disputes and adjourned *sine die*. Hanoi refused to evacuate areas in dispute until new borders were agreed upon, while Phnom Penh would not negotiate unless Vietnam retreated to a line drawn by France in 1939. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong went to Beijing and Moscow in June in order to search for a diplomatic solution to the border dispute with DK. China refused to mediate, announcing in October that it had already signed an agreement for military aid to Phnom Penh in February (Chanda 1989b:27).

When Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City, the Provisional Revolutionary Government was the legal authority in the southern part of Vietnam, not Hanoi. The two Vietnams filed separate applications for UN membership in 1975. Indeed, China and the United States let Hanoi know that they preferred two Vietnams. In July 1976 this anomaly was removed when the two Vietnams were formally unified into the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Nonetheless, DK spoke at the UN General Assembly a few weeks later in favor of SRV's admission, and Hanoi made no public comments on ongoing disputes that might anger Phnom Penh.

After the RAK attack on Thailand in June 1975, Bangkok decided to neutralize the situation through negotiations; trading relations were established as a result. During 1977 RAK forces launched about 400 brief border incidents on Thailand; when they tapered off, again at China's suggestion, the focus shifted to Vietnam. Since Vietnam had 615,000 soldiers to DK's 90,000, the principle emerged that thirty Vietnamese should be killed for every Khmer (Phnom Penh Home Service 1978:2).

DK petitioned ASEAN for membership in early 1977, but the request was deferred (interviewee #47). China suggested RAK restraint toward Vietnam in the spring of 1977, but there were more attacks and counterattacks. Premier Pham Van Dong went to Moscow in April 1977 to obtain support, but he had a cool reception. When key Politburo member Le Duc Tho joined him the following month, the Kremlin warmed up to Vietnam's plight. In May, Vietnam secretly shelled Cambodia from the air to demonstrate resolve. When Democratic Kampuchea proposed in June that both countries pull troops one kilometer back from each other, Hanoi wanted instead to resume border talks. Neither gave in, and incidents continued. Vietnam then joined the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the International Investment Bank, bodies related to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon), and Soviet aid to Hanoi increased sixfold to $2.6 billion (Becker 1986:359–60; Heder 1981c:60), putting the SRV economy back on its feet (ADB 1990:119). In July, Laos and Vietnam signed a treaty of cooperation. PRC Prime Minister Huang Hua then gave Phnom Penh a green light to conduct purges and to make war on Vietnam (Hua 1977:77–79). In August, shelling during a RAK attack deep into Tay Ninh

province reached within ten miles of Ho Chi Minh City (interviewee #132); this was one of several incursions in 1977 and 1978. In September 1977, when Pol Pot visited Beijing, China asked Pol Pot to reveal himself as the country's leader and then shipped more arms, assuring him of support against Vietnam (Burchett 1981:ch. 10). In October, Phan Bien went from Hanoi to Beijing to hold discussions with DK embassy representatives, who refused to meet with him.

Party Secretary Le Duan went to Beijing and Moscow in November, finding that China had no interest in negotiations on either the Cambodian-Vietnamese or Sino-Vietnamese border disputes. At this point some 500,000 Vietnamese were fleeing their homes along the Cambodian border, fearing that they would fall victim to such common DK atrocities as beating unto death, disembowelment, and dismemberment.[9]

Beijing rebuffed Hanoi's plea to restrain Phnom Penh in November. Laos offered to mediate, but Phnom Penh refused. Accordingly, Vietnam decided to map a strategy to avoid a feared two-front war with Cambodia and China.

When anonymous threatening leaflets showed up under the doors of the *Hoa* (ethnic Chinese in Vietnam), an exodus of 160,000 Chinese "boat people" followed, constituting about one-third of the *Hoa* (Chang 1982:213–18). Infuriated, China stepped up Vietphobic propaganda and suspended all aid projects to Vietnam, although there were no PRC reprisals against murders of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia by Pol Pot. A PAVN raid on Cambodia in December showed that there were limits to Hanoi's patience. At the encouragement of China (Barnett 1987:109), DK suspended relations with the SRV on December 31, 1977, when a raid by PAVN troops reached the Mekong River. Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in early 1978, when China warned that PLA troops might attack (FEER 1979:154).

In January 1978, after a public call for negotiations with Phnom Penh, Vietnam sent yet another envoy to Beijing to discuss a diplomatic solution to problems with DK. A PRC diplomat then went to Phnom Penh, returning convinced by DK propaganda that Hanoi was trying to set up an Indochinese federation. In February, Vietnam proposed a cease-fire, a mutual withdrawal of five kilometers from the border, and negotiations for a treaty to recognize existing borders; copies of the proposal were sent to the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations. In March, Vietnam brought its proposal to the UN Security Council, where China blocked its consideration (Burchett 1981:207 n36). Phnom Penh still demanded that PAVN troops withdraw from the disputed territories before any negotiations could begin. A DK peace offensive then ensued. Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun accepted an invitation to visit Phnom Penh in March 1978. Pol Pot told Upadit that he expected a major PAVN offensive, but that the RAK army was fully prepared.

Plots against Pol Pot's life as well as against the regime were uncovered

in 1977 and 1978, including one by regional commander Heng Samrin. In May 1978 Pol Pot gave orders to slaughter thousands of so-called Vietnamese collaborators—ethnic Vietnamese, all who could speak Vietnamese, and any of their friends; 200,000 Vietnamese are estimated to have been killed in the roundup (Burchett 1981:152; Etchison 1984:192; Shawcross 179:386–87).[10] Ieng Sary, DK foreign minister, was exempted, although he is half Vietnamese. Refugees soon poured into Thailand, with testimony about the ongoing genocide of non-Khmers and those resisting forced collectivization. At least 100,000 more ethnic Vietnamese and 50,000 Khmers escaped to Vietnam (Etchison 1984:193),[11] where they reported on the horrors of the "killing fields" genocide of an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants, including about 20,000 CPK cadres and their families.[12] Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, among these refugees, told Hanoi about DK Vietphobia and regrouped to overthrow Pol Pot.

SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach visited Thailand in mid-1978 to give assurances of Vietnam's peaceful intentions in the region. His only hint that Hanoi was contemplating an invasion of Cambodia was a confident statement that Vietnam could handle the DK threat.[13] At this time nineteen of RAK's twenty-three infantry divisions moved to the border with Vietnam, and DK radio broadcasts warned residents of Ho Chi Minh City that they would soon be overrun by the undefeated RAK (Burchett 1981:203 n36; Can 1978:35; interviewee #8). The Vietnamese population begged for military protection. There was a serious food shortage in the southern part of Vietnam at the time, so the border attacks and resulting relocations of residents inflicted serious hardship on the population, fueling criticisms in the south of the legitimacy of rule by Hanoi.

Having turned down an invitation to belong to CMEA since 1975, Hanoi finally agreed to join in mid-1978 as a signal to Beijing and Phnom Penh. As a result, in July the PRC terminated all aid to Vietnam, and in August PLA units moved into position along Vietnam's northern border, believing that the Soviet Union would back down in its support for Vietnam. Sino-Cambodian perceptions of SRV pretensions to regional hegemony were the mirror image of the Soviet-Vietnamese view of PRC expansionism. However, when DK Defense Minister Son Sen went to Beijing for support in case of a PAVN offensive, he discovered that China was in no mood for a war that might involve the Soviet Union. PRC instructors for the RAK army left in early January 1978. China then told DK leaders that it would not intervene on behalf of Cambodia if Vietnam attacked but would instead deliver a "lesson" shortly thereafter (Chanda 1986:260–61, 325).

Washington referred the DK–SRV border dispute to the UN Security Council in October, prompting DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary to go to the UN to distribute a document, the *Black Paper* (DK 1978), in order to deflect attention from worldwide charges of DK aggression and genocide. RAK border incursions slackened, and Sary invited UN Secretary-General Kurt

Waldheim to go to Cambodia to investigate the charges. DK–SRV tensions were well known to Waldheim, who visited Hanoi but not Phnom Penh. Vietnam did not expect the UN to handle the border war in a satisfactory manner, as the real culprit was China, which would use its veto. The organization's effectiveness, always limited when superpowers were on opposite sides, had reached a nadir in the field of peacekeeping (Haas 1986). Besides, Hanoi was arming a dissident Cambodian group to overthrow Pol Pot. In October and November, Vietnam sought to persuade Prince Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, to abandon his teaching duties at Aix-en-Provence University so that he could join the resistance forces to rescue his father. Ranariddh declined (Chanda 1986:336).

Discouraged by unsuccessful efforts to normalize relations with Washington, Vietnam agreed in November to sign a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union that had been drafted nearly six months earlier. The price of this alliance, which Vietnam then had to stomach, was the right of the Soviet military to use Cam Ranh Bay, Danang Air Force Base, and other military facilities in the country. Soviet arms and oil were to be exchanged for Vietnamese rice and other goods. Yet another consequence of the pact was that the US government thenceforth classified Vietnam as a Soviet client state.

KAMPUCHEAN NATIONAL UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION

In September 1978 influential Politburo member Le Duc Tho, who had seen the tragic conditions in Phnom Penh during a visit the previous year, met DK defectors and agreed to help them reclaim their country from the genocidal Pol Pot (Shaplen 1986:282). On December 3 Heng Samrin announced the formation of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS). KNUFNS was led by seven DK defectors, three former Khmer Issarak, and four independents; only one of the fourteen had been trained in Vietnam (Kiernan 1982; Vickery 1984:203).[14] An army of 17,500 was recruited from 150,000 Cambodian refugees who had fled to Vietnam after Pol Pot came to power (Donnell 1980:21; Niehaus 1979:91).

With war imminent, some two weeks later China and the United States urged Waldheim to reopen negotiations with Vietnam, but the initiative came too late. Aware that a SRV attack was near, China pressured Pol Pot to release Sihanouk from house arrest on December 23 so that he could go to Beijing in order to provide assistance in the diplomatic field (Becker 1986:438).

While the PLA and RAK armies were already firing on Vietnam, some 92,000 PAVN soldiers entered Cambodia with KNUFNS volunteers on December 25 (Gough 1986:65). The original plan was to push to the Me-

kong River. When PAVN forces encountered unexpectedly little resistance, being welcomed as liberators and saviors, reinforcements arrived. PAVN then gassed up tanks to flush the RAK out of Cambodia.

Hanoi assured Bangkok that the PAVN operation in Cambodia aimed to remove a hostile regime and thus was not directed at Thailand. Prince Sihanouk also noted that Vietnam responded to ample DK provocation (Schier & Schier-Oum 1985:91). On January 3, 1979, DK leaders called on the UN Security Council to meet, but Phnom Penh fell by January 7, 1979. A People's Revolutionary Council was formed the following day to supersede the former Pol Pot regime. More than half the peasants in Cambodian villages, meanwhile, identified DK cadres, who were brought to justice (Heder 1980:72, 75).

Some 50,000 RAK troops retreated toward the Thai border (Kershaw 1980:183), although not all reached sanctuary. DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary flew to Bangkok on January 11, presumably abandoning a lost cause. Remaining in exile in Beijing and refusing an SRV invitation to head the new government in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk admitted that Cambodians "applauded the Vietnamese action" (1980:107).

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

On January 11 the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was officially proclaimed. Heng Samrin was named president. Among the seven members of the Central Committee of the new Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), only Heng Samrin and Hun Sen were former CPK cadre (Chanda 1986:450 n48). Samrin was KPRP general secretary.

We interrupt our story temporarily at this point. During the spring, while Cambodians returned to their homes and searched for relatives, a famine emerged in the country, since the retreating DK army took a quarter of the rice harvest and slaughtered draft animals rather than leaving them to the enemy (Mysliwiec 1988:11). An international relief effort then began. Millions of Cambodians were reportedly near starvation. Although the aid appeared to have humanitarian motives, there was more to filling Cambodian ricebowls than satisfying the pangs of hunger of an exhausted people, as we shall see.

Geostrategic policies toward the new regime were then formulated in capitals outside Indochina. As a country relying on its own devices, Cambodia might have achieved some stability in due course. As a pawn on a global chessboard, Vietnam's entry into Cambodia changed the situation. The superpowers felt compelled to choose sides as long as PAVN troops remained. While external powers resuscitated the RAK, Vietnamese proceeded to kill Cambodians, and *vice versa*, becoming entangled as proxies with financing from outside the country. US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's characterization of the conflict as a "proxy war" on *Face*

the Nation (Becker 1986:394) in early 1979 was a frank admission of a reality that he and others constituted as new policies went into effect.

THE CHESSBOARD

When Vietnam decided to pursue a military option, the opening game on the chessboard proceeded smoothly. Soon, new actors became involved, and the board was choked by a complex middle game, with no end in sight.

Accordingly, our task is to reconstruct why a Cambodian bloodbath continued—as well as to identify how some actors tried to bring about peace. This part of the book has provided an historical background. In the next section we trace the development of the conflict after PAVN troops entered Cambodia, the deadlocked period after 1978 through the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) of 1981 and the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982. Peace plans that emerged after 1979 focus the discussion in the next part of the book, with a final chapter on the abortive Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) of 1989. The post-Paris era occupies the following section, culminating in subsequent efforts to forge a peace agreement. We then draw conclusions and implications from the study.

NOTES

1. The term "Khmer" usually refers to the dominant ethnic group in Cambodia. "Cambodia" and "Cambodge" are Europeanized spellings of "Kampuchea," a country with several ethnic groups, including Chinese, Chams (Muslims), Khmers, Malays, and Vietnamese. "Kampuchea," in turn, is a modernized version of "Kambuja," the Khmer name first used in the tenth century. In this book I will use specific names of regimes by their actual titles, referring to the country itself as Cambodia.

2. For sources of the following narrative, see Chandler (1983a) and Hall (1968:chs. 5, 24, 36, 37, 44).

3. I have refrained from using the term "Khmer Rouge" as a blanket term in this book as a result. Instead, I will refer to the Pol Pot clique either as "Polpotists" or by the formal title in each historical era.

4. For sources on the remaining sections of the chapter, see Becker (1986) and Chanda (1986).

5. An authoritative source for the following narrative is Kiernan (1985).

6. Kissinger argued that the congressional cutoff in US bombing in 1973 somehow strengthened Pol Pot; he obviously learned little from the failure of the TNTphiliac policy in Vietnam.

7. The following is based in part on Vickery (1984).

8. For Vietnam's position on the border question, see SRV MFA (1978).

9. Sources are Evans & Rowley (1984:179); Foreign Languages Publishing House (1979:21); Nguyen (1978:13); SRV (1978:81); Son (1979:47); McCormack (1980:107).

10. At least 50,000 Chams were killed or starved, according to Hawk (1987:

127). Other affected minority groups were Buddhists, Chinese, and Thais, reducing the minority population from 10 percent in the 1960s to 3 percent by 1979, according to Mysliwiec (1988:112–3). See also Kiernan (1990) and McCormack (1980:107).

11. The PRK estimate is 268,000. Some 450,000 ethnic Vietnamese lived in Cambodia as of 1970. See also McCormack (1980:107) and PRK (1985b:62).

12. This is the US CIA (1980) estimate. The PRK (1985b:7) estimate is 3.3 million, but this figure probably includes deaths due to natural causes. The Finnish Inquiry Commission estimated 100,000 executions (Kiljunen 1984:31). Kiernan (1982:167) accepts 500,000 executions. Ieng Sary admits to "upwards of 30,000 from deprivations or executions" (Becker 1981:43). The residual amounts are from 500,000 to 1 million deaths due to disease, overwork, and starvation, so the count is inexact. There were 200,000 orphans (Manuel 1990a:F2).

13. Interview with Upadit Pachariyangkun, December 25, 1989.

14. The exception, Pen Sovan, was later purged. Hun Sen became regimental commander when his superior refused to carry out brutal attacks on civilians ordered by Ta Mok, whereupon Hun Sen himself defected as well.

Part II

OPENING GAME

2

PROXY WAR

THE PROXY WAR

When Phnom Penh fell to KNUFNS–SRV forces on January 7, 1979, RAK troops were in retreat. DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary went to Bangkok on January 11, but he was not abandoning a lost cause. On January 13, according to press reports, two senior Chinese Politburo members[1] flew secretly to Thailand to meet Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan to cut a deal that would ally Bangkok with the Cambodian resistance.[2] Thailand subsequently served as a conduit for PRC aid to Pol Pot; Kut Island was one transshipment port. An account was set up at the PRC embassy in Bangkok. Authorized DK leaders could draw up to $5 million at a time, with an initial limit of $80 million per year to purchase supplies (Chanda 1986:348; Weatherbee 1989:10). As PAVN troops marched to victory over most of the country, Prince Sihanouk spoke from Beijing against the Vietnamese "invasion" without allying himself with the Polpotists.

On January 18, Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping arrived in Washington. If we believe a report by journalist Elizabeth Becker, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski convinced Deng to revive the RAK (Becker 1986:440).[3] The US government was officially neutral in the war, according to President Jimmy Carter.

Attention then turned to the United Nations, where Democratic Kampuchea was the incumbent in the Cambodian seat. Petitions before the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in mid-1978 accused the DK regime of genocide, but no report had yet emerged. The UN Security Council was called into session in early January 1979. Although Sihanouk pleaded for a UN force to intervene, his view lacked support. The Soviet Union vetoed a resolution demanding Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, so a diplomatic deadlock emerged early. Thailand made a plea later in January to deny the Cambodian seat at the UN to the new PRK, arguing that the

General Assembly should not accredit a regime installed by force. A majority of countries in the UN upheld this view in 1979 and thereafter (see Appendix 1). Rather than being congratulated for ridding the world of an Asian Hitler, Hanoi was accused of violating the UN Charter by trying to settle a bilateral dispute with force. UN delegates refused to acknowledge Vietnam's earlier pleas to the UN Security Council as well as abortive efforts to obtain PRC and Lao mediation. The UN also condemned Hanoi for exercising the right to defend itself against DK attacks, just as the world body had reacted to Israeli preemptive strikes in the past. The UN was an association of nations that placed primacy on protecting national sovereignty; it was not a court of justice.

Vietnam claimed to be in Cambodia on a temporary basis only and that it would leave as soon as the PRK could defend itself (NYT 1979d), but there was little to corroborate such a pledge. Instead, most of the world saw a victorious PAVN massed on the Thai border. A Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) was to be trained, although this would take time, since the country lacked ablebodied young people after a decade of disease, starvation, and war. Residents returning to Phnom Penh expressed profound gratitude for being rescued by Vietnam from the terror of Pol Pot, but the situation in the countryside was more ambiguous. PAVN's presence was depicted as an invasion, and the PRK was branded a puppet regime. Pol Pot's RAK reorganized, recruiting on the premise that foreigners should leave Cambodia.

China hoped that Sihanouk would serve as a symbol to unite the Cambodian people in order to keep Vietnam at bay, but the Prince refused an immediate bilateral alliance with Pol Pot in 1979. Negotiations for a coalition between the resistance factions began in 1979 and continued until 1982, when the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea brought together the factions of Sihanouk and Pol Pot with a third group, democratic but non-Communist and nonroyalist, headed by Son Sann, onetime premier under Sihanouk.

Before PAVN's military action in Cambodia, the United States was contemplating normalization of relations with Hanoi. Afterward, Washington broke off these discussions. The US trade embargo of North Vietnam, which began in the 1950s, remained in effect after Vietnam's unification, so no new bilateral sanctions could be imposed by Washington. Australia, Denmark, France, and Japan responded to US requests to suspend aid and trade in order to force Vietnam to leave Cambodia, whether Pol Pot returned to power or not. Sweden temporarily suspended aid in 1979, then resumed assistance shortly thereafter at a reduced level.

When Hanoi and Phnom Penh began negotiations on a treaty of friendship to sanction the presence of PAVN "volunteers" in Cambodia, China felt that mere diplomatic moves and economic sanctions were insufficient against Hanoi. Beijing decided to deliver a Confucian "lesson" to Vietnam in the

form of a major border incursion by the People's Liberation Army between mid-February and mid-March 1979. The Soviet Union then mobilized on the PRC northern border. PAVN showed considerable skill against a force of at least 65,000 PLA soldiers, and the border war was a standoff, although some 21,000 lives were lost (Buszynski 1980:839; Chanda 1989b:28; Small & Singer 1982:95). China left 500,000 troops along the Lao–SRV northern border as a warning that another "lesson" might be necessary to a misbehaving Vietnam. Several Soviet naval vessels set sail for Cam Ranh Bay shortly after the PLA attacked Vietnam. Hanoi left 500,000 soldiers along its border, and 60,000 PAVN troops entered Laos to protect that country's border with China in accordance with provisions of the Lao-Vietnamese treaty of 1977, as Beijing decided to aid insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the Vientiane government (Alagappa 1989b:18; Chanda 1989b:9).

In the confusion some 750,000 Cambodians fled for Thailand (Hood & Ablin 1987:xliv).[4] Bangkok mobilized to defend the country against the advancing RAK, firing on the armed refugees in some instances, then agreed to set up temporary camps when international agencies offered to pay subsistence costs for refugees awaiting resettlement elsewhere or for Cambodians who preferred to live at the border. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) immediately helped those seeking resettlement. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) fed the refugees and border settlers, as well as starving peasants inside Cambodia, after funds were raised from various international sources, including the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and Oxfam. Afterwards, the border camps took on a lure of their own: Blackmarket profits drew peasants away from a productive life in the ricefields, and adolescent males used the camps as bivouacs between military actions launched against positions of the PAVN and KPRAF armies. As more Cambodians preferred easy food and money to harsh rural life in the middle of a war zone, the border camps increased in size.

New armed units were formed among the refugees. In 1979 Pol Pot regrouped his forces as the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). Also in 1979, Son Sann formed the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), later the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Army (KPNLA). Sihanouk then launched the Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) in 1979. MOULINAKA was absorbed by the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCIPEC) in early 1981. FUNCIPEC's military arm, the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS), came into existence in 1981, when Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh, agreed to command the force. Neither ANS nor KPNLA measured up, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the disciplined forces of NADK or PAVN. As of 1983,

ANS had 3,000 troops and KPNLA commanded 9,000, compared to NADK's 30,000 and PAVN's 150,000 (Thayer 1983). PAVN forces later made various forays into Thailand to break up the base camps of the resistance, but the Thai army repulsed PAVN incursions each time.

After the PLA incursion into Vietnam, the Soviet Union began regular shipments of supplies to Cambodia and Vietnam. An average of twenty ships were docked each day at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet military also moved fourteen bombers and fourteen fighter aircraft to Danang Air Force Base and a dozen smaller facilities in Vietnam (Awanohara 1990b), as well as the Ponchetong airport at Phnom Penh. The port of Kompong Som, Cambodia, was soon operated by personnel from the Soviet bloc, which provided increased aid to all three Indochinese countries. China supported the three factions of the Cambodian resistance. All parties were convinced that time was on their side, so they were prepared to persevere. They were following the *realpolitik* theory of world politics, namely, that whatever advanced the interests of the state was right. But might could not be right for everyone. *Realpolitik* theory was an argument for genocide in Cambodia.

OPTIONS

After PAVN troops entered Cambodia, several options existed. The default option in any policy analysis is to *do nothing*. This is what most of the world did while genocide was taking place. The Cambodian situation was too far away and too complicated, so most countries exercised this option until the annual UN vote on the Cambodian question, when they were pressured to adopt a position.

The policy that ensured a protracted conflict was to *commit troops*. The Thai military rushed soldiers to the Cambodian border, although they were no match for PAVN, so Bangkok used the military option only to fend off border incursions. Each Cambodian faction applied military force, hoping to prevail over the opposing side. China, having used aggression against Vietnam in 1979, indicated that another "lesson" might follow. Vietnam continued to supply troops to Cambodia, and the number soon doubled. The three Cambodian resistance factions continued a military struggle against PAVN and the nascent KPRAF. But this Palestinization of the border was only possible to the extent that outside aid arrived.

Support allies was the next policy put into effect. What started as a border war between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam in 1975–1978 became a Cambodian civil war after 1978 in which China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States eventually provided military aid, along with several countries in the region—Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. A proxy war was in progress.

PRK legitimization was yet another option. If the new government in

Phnom Penh lasted, it might gain support from the people, such that the resistance forces would face defections and NADK morale would decline irreparably. Civilian aid from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam aimed to restore the economic infrastructure for a population once quartered into communal ricefields by Pol Pot. Civilian advisers from Vietnam staffed PRK ministries, which otherwise lacked sufficient Cambodian expertise. Much of the educated Cambodian population disappeared during the reign of terror, so Soviet bloc universities offered free tuition to qualified Cambodians seeking higher education.

With Democratic Kampuchea as the sole alternative to the PRK in 1979, international public opinion remembered Pol Pot's genocide, so something had to be done to *legitimize the resistance*. In 1982 China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the United States finally prevailed upon Sihanouk and Son Sann to join Pol Pot. Sihanouk accepted the CGDK presidency, Son Sann became premier, leaving Khieu Samphan as vice president and foreign minister and, thus, CGDK's senior representative at the UN. Polpotist wolves thus remained in the UN, dressed in CGDK sheep's clothing after 1982.

ASEAN and UN resolutions served as *condemnations of Vietnam* and its Cambodian ally. Rather than attempting a compromise, both organizations regularly called upon Vietnam to withdraw troops from Cambodia, with no concern that NADK forces might reinstitute the "killing fields" all over again. In contrast, neither body condemned earlier RAK and later PLA aggression against Vietnam, both unprovoked.

Coercive diplomacy against Vietnam was another option. Washington urged embargoes and cutoffs in aid and trade to Cambodia and Vietnam. Although faithful US allies stopped economic transactions at first, neither the PRK nor the SRV were important aid or trade partners.

Many countries clamored for Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia despite the likely genocidal consequences to the Cambodian people. In 1977 Hanoi exhausted all efforts to negotiate with Pol Pot directly. In 1978 mediation proposed by the SRV failed, so Vietnam believed that it was merely going to the next logical step to defend its legitimate interests. A *negotiation* option remained, but the situation was polarized. Countries that rejected other options converged on negotiations as their preferred policy but were checkmated, since the contending parties initially wanted to fight, not talk. By 1981 there was a consensus in the United Nations to hold a conference to explore this last option, but without the PRK present. The abortive International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) resulted.

In this part of the book we explore the rationale of each key country's policy toward Cambodia. We cover the period up to the ICK of 1981, the formation of CGDK in 1982, and continuing policies to pursue economic and military warfare through the 1980s.

NOTES

1. According to Chanda (1986:348), the two were Han Nian Long, deputy foreign minister, and Geng Biao, secretary of the PRC Central Military Commission.

2. Sources attesting to the meeting are Chanda (1986:348), Piao (1980), and Shawcross (1979:258). Upadit Pachariyangkun, foreign minister at the time, says that Kriangsak denied that any such meeting took place. Interview, December 26, 1989.

3. Brzezinski subsequently denied making this statement (interviewee #86).

4. Some refugees fled areas still controlled by Pol Pot. See Kiernan (1982), Mysliwiec (1988:10), and Vickery (1987:298).

3

CAMBODIA

A DIVIDED CAMBODIA

In early 1979 there was a new government in Phnom Penh. About 500,000 refugees entered Thailand, seeking resettlement. Another 250,000 preferred to remain on the border, awaiting peace before returning to Cambodia (Hood & Ablin 1987:xliv). Some 500,000 wandered home from DK zones of confinement. Democratic Kampuchea then organized NADK. Prince Sihanouk, in China, insisted at first that he would not cooperate with Pol Pot. Son Sann recruited a force of perhaps 3,000 soldiers, whereas Sihanoukist forces appeared in 1981; the two factions formed the non-Communist resistance (NCR). A joint command structure began to evolve in order to confront an army of PAVN "volunteers," which grew to nearly 200,000 (Kiljunen 1984:27). The contending factions agreed on two points—a desire for a unified Cambodia and a recognition of the need to reach that goal by serving as a proxy for an outside power.

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Pol Pot spent most of his career as a revolutionary trying to root out Vietnamese influence in Cambodia. In 1954, when his faction was the only revolutionary group unrepresented at the Geneva Conference, Hanoi agreed to cease support for his insurgency as a condition of French withdrawal and recognition of the DRV government. In 1973 there was a peace settlement for every country in Indochina but Cambodia, which was massively bombed after Hanoi unsuccessfully pursued a US suggestion to get Pol Pot into a coalition with either Lon Nol or Sihanouk. In speaking of these Soviet and Vietnamese "betrayals," Pol Pot revealed that he was so singleminded in his objectives that he did not discern a larger strategic reality at work.

Perhaps Pol Pot was most personally embittered over having to perform kitchen duty for the Vietnamese-dominated underground Communist movement in Cambodia during the 1950s and 1960s. Cambodia's revolution was to take a back seat to Vietnam's triumph, according to Hanoi, since a Vietnamese victory would unlock liberation for all Indochina. Hanoi's Vietphilia caused Pol Pot to become Vietphobic.

The Communist resistance in Cambodia was continually rebuffed when it sought aid. If Pol Pot resented lack of help from Ho Chi Minh, he took no action to merit reciprocation. Although he was a favorite of Mao Tsetung, in 1965 Pol Pot refused suggestions from Beijing and Hanoi to cooperate with Sihanouk in order to advance the Vietnamese revolution. In 1970 China was willing at first to play ball with Lon Nol instead of Pol Pot, and Beijing only switched sides when the new Cambodian regime refused to leave the Ho Chi Minh Trail unmolested.

At the same time, Pol Pot prided himself on achieving victory without much outside assistance; he even refused aid from Hanoi in 1970. The persecution of Vietnamese by the Khmer Republic was followed by RAK assassinations of Cambodian Communists who returned from exile in Vietnam during 1970. When Vietnam approached FUNK, urging an alliance to include Sihanouk, Pol Pot suspected Hanoi's motives.

Remembering Sihanouk's purges of Communists in the 1960s, Pol Pot's representatives in Beijing infiltrated and controlled FUNK by the end of 1970. After the Prince formed GRUNK as a royalist alternative, Pol Pot refused to ally with Sihanouk. In 1973 he realized that a visit by the Prince would boost RAK morale, so Sihanouk toured areas controlled by the guerrillas. China supported both FUNK and GRUNK, but in due course there was a tilt toward Pol Pot, as he gained control over the countryside. The victory in 1975 was on behalf of FUNK.

Pol Pot's forces first fired on PAVN troops in 1970 to show that RAK forces would not ally with Ho Chi Minh. To the astonishment of Hanoi, attacks were repeated. In 1972 ARVN officers secretly agreed to share military intelligence and to aid the RAK pursuit of PAVN troops in Cambodia (Quinn 1989:205). "Mistakes" of RAK guerrilla commanders served as a dress rehearsal for "errors" of zonal commanders soon after Democratic Kampuchea came to power.

Upon assuming power, the CPK adopted a united front strategy, wooing Sihanouk to return as president of the new regime. When the Prince assumed the role as head of state, his longtime friend Chou Enlai was dead. Democratic Kampuchea soon had no use for Sihanouk, who was placed under house arrest.

In 1975 RAK troops attacked Thailand and Vietnam, as well as the US merchant ship *Mayagüez*. China urged Pol Pot to capitulate to the Americans and to befriend the Thais. Only Hanoi, which encouraged an undefined "special relationship" with Phnom Penh and Vientiane, seemed vulnerable.

DK and PRC leaders interpreted any "special relationship" as a Vietnamese bid to establish hegemony through an Indochinese federation.

Although the irredentist aims of Lon Nol were useful propaganda for staying in power, Pol Pot actively pursued the objective. Playing the "China card" in the struggle to reclaim Kampuchea Krom was supposed to impress upon Hanoi the need to withdraw from territories held by Vietnam for several centuries. Pointing to an apparent DRV understanding with Prince Sihanouk a decade earlier, Democratic Kampuchea claimed that Ho Chi Minh had pledged to respect "existing" frontiers with Cambodia. When Vietnam appeared to repudiate this pledge, Phnom Penh argued that Hanoi was mendacious. Border talks broke down when DK negotiators demanded that PAVN troops leave disputed territories before a border agreement could be established. Pol Pot refused negotiations, as he felt that Cambodia had given up too much territory in the past; he was firm on no more territorial concessions to Vietnam.

Why did Pol Pot miscalculate, having provided Vietnam with myriad provocations? Why did Pol Pot fail to anticipate that Hanoi would move against its irritating neighbor? The hypothesized factors include diversion from domestic unrest, the "China card," groupthink, irredentist aims, Pol Pot's rural subordinates who misinterpreted instructions, a belief in RAK invincibility, and strategic considerations for maintaining DK independence.[1] The best answer, of course, would come from Pol Pot himself. According to his victory speech in Phnom Penh in 1977, Cambodia's revolution was truly indigenous; its superiority was demonstrated when it defeated the United States in less than half the time required by Vietnam. According to Sihanouk, Pol Pot wanted to take his country back to the glory of the Angkor civilization (Playboy 1987: 66). The plan to kill thirty Vietnamese for every Khmer would ultimately succeed, Pol Pot evidently surmised, through Khmer determination and supermasculinity, as well as Vietnam's exhaustion from more than three decades of war. Stephen Heder (1990a) concludes, based on Tuol Sleng confessions, that the strategy was to carry the fighting to Vietnam through brutal, daring raids; this would keep Hanoi busy inside its own territory and thus forestall PAVN aggression in Cambodia itself. But Pol Pot forgot to listen to his own propaganda: If Vietnam truly wanted to assert hegemony over Indochina, Democratic Kampuchea was providing an unambiguous pretext for the world's fourth largest army to do so.

Because Vietnam resisted establishing a firm relationship with the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China increasingly saw the geostrategic advantages of encircling Vietnam with Democratic Kampuchea as its proxy, Pol Pot felt free to conduct border raids against a stronger army, and then he attracted more PRC aid when Vietnam responded. The upward spiral of escalation between the two neighboring Indochinese countries reached a critical level in mid-1978. By this time large numbers of ethnic Vietnamese

had entered the mass graves of Cambodia's killing fields. The *Black Paper*, Democratic Kampuchea's answer to charges of genocide, merely confirmed suspicions around the globe that Pol Pot was insane, an Asian Adolf Hitler. But the world did not see that Hitler's arguments for the *Anschluss*, as well as for the incorporation of Sudetenland and Danzig into the Reich, resembled the quest to annex Kampuchea Krom, where Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and other associates of Pol Pot were born. In any case, Pol Pot felt that he had a score to settle with Vietnam.

Although PAVN forces were welcomed by the Cambodian people as the drive to the Mekong proceeded from December 25, Pol Pot did not leave Cambodia in defeat. He regrouped his soldiers to overcome yet another historical instance of an invasion from Vietnam. Ieng Sary's mission to Bangkok on January 11 was the first in a series of steps to ensure that Beijing would continue to supply his troops and that the Thai government would allow a "Pol Pot Trail," which mostly operated in the Gulf of Siam within Thai territorial waters.[2] Both China and Thailand agreed to do so within a very few days. Authorized personnel began to draw upon $80 million per year for weapons supplied by China; in comparison, the US allotment to the resistance factions started at about $4 million per year (Chanda 1986:402).[3] Aid to the non-Communist resistance from France, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States was often resold to NADK and thus served as indirect contributions to NADK. Similarly, an estimated 80 percent of the food provided by the Red Cross and UN agencies to Cambodian refugees was auctioned off to the highest bidder (Asiaweek 1980). NADK was the best-financed resistance force, so humanitarian objectives were subverted by the realities of food as a scarce commodity awaiting distribution. In 1981, rather than continuing to keep Pol Pot's troops alive, the Red Cross and some UN agencies refused to distribute any more food to the border settlers.

NADK lacked international respectability, so China pressured Pol Pot to make amends with Sihanouk. Khieu Samphan wrote a contrite letter to the Prince in July 1979, begging to cooperate, but this did not work. In August, Democratic Kampuchea reorganized as the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea. Under pressure from China, which sought to legitimize an odious ally in order to avoid lowering its own prestige, Pol Pot resigned as premier in December 1979. Khieu Samphan took over as head of the government-in-exile when Sihanouk refused the position (Etchison 1984:198). A new political program emerged in 1980, with a "liberal democratic system" replacing the socialist constitution of 1976. A vague admission of mistakes of the past emerged, but in 1984 a captured document advocated that "all establishments of political, cultural, economic and military power should be wiped out" (DK 1985; Kiljunen 1984:28), and reports of peaceful passengers ambushed by the NADK on the train going from Phnom Penh to Battambang continued (FEER

1984:143). In 1981 the Communist Party of Kampuchea was officially dissolved; the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) was formed in its place. Son Sen, former DK defense minister and deputy premier, became NADK commander-in-chief in 1985 when Pol Pot reportedly retired. Pol Pot then became president of the Higher Institute for National Defense and subsequently resigned in 1987 to remain in the institute as a scholar on military affairs (Karniol 1989b:922; Mysliwiec 1988:xi).

To break the will of the Cambodian people to support the new PRK, Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK) propaganda poured invective on Vietnam in daily radio broadcasts. Hanoi was accused of occupying Cambodia, imposing a federation, and turning the Phnom Penh government into a proxy, although the PDK campaign conveniently failed to note that the resistance had itself become a proxy of China in a contest between superpowers. Cambodians in border camps, accustomed to a decade of Vietphobia under two regimes, responded by rallying to the patriotic NADK army, which grew to 30,000 by 1983 (Heder 1981a:5; Kiernan 1982:184). PAVN was thus unable to root out the perpetrators of the killing fields, who reverted to the role of guerrilla commanders. Thailand provided sanctuary to resistance forces and their families close to the border, and a flood of refugees from areas controlled by DK forces poured into Thailand, eager to be repatriated from a country that promised no future other than indefinite warfare.

PRINCE SIHANOUK

The sagacity of Norodom Sihanouk was well established in 1953, when he coaxed France into granting independence to Cambodia. Through pressure at the Geneva Conference of 1954, Ho Chi Minh accepted Sihanouk's neutralized Cambodia, and Hanoi complied with the Geneva accords by withdrawing aid from the Cambodian resistance. The Prince used outsiders to win an internal struggle for power without becoming anyone's proxy, then in 1955 he stepped down to prove that he did not owe his position to the French and won in reasonably free elections.

To the chagrin of some Western countries, Sihanouk followed a policy of nonalignment instead of joining SEATO. In time, he tilted in one direction or another to preserve maximum autonomy for Cambodia, and he received US support to suppress domestic dissidents. In 1966, when conservatives won in local elections, Sihanouk tried to form a "countergovernment of the left" with Khieu Samphan. The following year, in the wake of the Battambang revolt, Sihanouk ordered mass arrests and massacres of leftists. Although Sihanouk considered the Vietnamese revolution to be primarily nationalist, he saw Communist insurgents in Cambodia as agents of Beijing or Hanoi (Chanda 1986:61). In 1969, the year of the secret US bombing, the Prince felt that it was useless to object to US raids inside Cambodia; he

believed that TNT might weaken his domestic enemies, although he protested US atrocities in public for the sake of appearances.

In 1970, when Lon Nol seized power, the Prince accepted China's offer of sanctuary. He found Chou Enlai to be the one powerful friend in the world on whom he could rely. Although he knew that China was interested in Cambodia primarily as a counterweight to a troublesome Vietnam, the Prince subscribed to the familiar Asian *realpolitik* maxim that "the enemy of your enemy is your friend." Sihanouk formed FUNK as a broad coalition on which to base a revolution against Lon Nol. When the Prince lost control of the organization, he bolted to announce GRUNK as a royalist alternative.

After Pol Pot's victory in 1975, Sihanouk decided to abandon his suspicions of the new rulers, whose reforms impressed him, at least on paper. After he returned to Cambodia later that year, however, he soon found himself under house arrest. By 1978 five of his children and fourteen of his grandchildren lay in the killing fields. He was doubtless unaware that Hanoi sought to enlist his son Ranariddh to give the Sihanouk name to the Khmer-Vietnamese liberation army that entered Cambodia at the end of 1978.

When Democratic Kampuchea was about to fall, Pol Pot let the Prince escape to Beijing. In January 1979 Sihanouk went to the UN in New York to plead Cambodia's case. Under the thumb of DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, he condemned Vietnam's invasion in strident language. Although he toyed with the idea of an empty seat for Cambodia, he asked to have the defunct DK regime retained in Cambodia's seat at the UN. After US Ambassador Andrew Young arranged Sihanouk's escape from a DK guard to a New York hospital, Deng Xiaoping agreed to afford proper protection to the Prince, who then returned to Beijing. China agreed to pay his bills. Sihanouk refused to head the PDK despite considerable PRC pressure, stating even in 1988 that "one has to be either naive or an idiot to believe that the [Polpotists] of the 80s can be different from the 70s" (Cambodian Information Office 1988). Accordingly, Khieu Samphan became the new PDK premier. One of the Prince's sons, Norodom Narindarapong, was a member of the PDK (Stone 1989f:9), so there was a division in the royal family.

In mid-1979, when Sihanouk contemplated the possibility of a government-in-exile in Paris, the French government refused to grant him a visa to do so. He then formed MOULINAKA. When In Tam, Lon Nol's former premier, agreed in 1981 to command a pro-Sihanoukist force, the result was ANS. FUNCIPEC started in 1981 as a political party to supersede MOULINAKA.

In August 1979 Sihanouk found a second generous benefactor. The Prince accepted an invitation to live in Pyongyang, as he was at odds with the PRC's belligerent policy, which brooked no negotiations. In North Korea he could distance himself from China in order to remain open to alternative policies. At the same time, he did not alienate himself from Beijing, and his

wife Monique launched a profitable business venture in the Chinese capital (interviewee #76).

The Prince readily affirmed that Vietnam had indeed protected Cambodia from extermination by Pol Pot, and in early 1980 he even contemplated joining the PRK (Chandler 1983b:150; Kiernan 1982:186–87). Although the Prince announced that he was retiring from politics, he began to draw up one peace plan after another. He cared neither for the Polpotists nor for the Vietnamese. Believing that his motives were altruistic, he imagined that he was Cambodia's only genuine patriot. Whereas the PDK and PRK were both clients of outside powers, he cast his lot in accordance with an Asian sense of loyalty based on reciprocity (Playboy 1987:80). The PRC and North Korea were willing to let him live like a monarch in exile, an offer that no other country tried to match, although Malaysia and Singapore were ready to provide more modest accommodations if he sought an alternative refuge (Nation 1983).

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

When the PRK came to power, steps were taken to gain international recognition. As there was no diplomatic representative abroad, the United Nations debate proceeded without a personal presentation of PRK views. A telegram from Phnom Penh charged that Sihanouk could not represent Democratic Kampuchea at the UN, as that government no longer existed. But delegates in New York were being asked to rule on a charge of Vietnamese aggression, so mere pieces of paper with statements on behalf of an alleged aggressor state were ineffective.

The new rulers formed the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, which enrolled many opportunists seeking to advance their careers (Heder 1990b). The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council was temporarily the top government body. Party and non-KPRP members were appointed to positions in the government, with the aim of rebuilding a country once traumatized by terror. Lacking trained personnel, the new government could only establish itself in the larger towns at first. Prominent DK leaders were tried *in absentia* during August 1979. Pursuant to a constitution adopted in early 1981, elections were held in spring 1981 for the new National Assembly, which in turn appointed Pen Sovan as premier, Hun Sen as foreign minister, and Heng Samrin as head of state in his role chairing the Council of State. Although Heng Samrin was evidently around when some DK acts of barbarism were committed under his command, Hun Sen claims that he twice risked his life by disobeying orders rather than carry out DK-mandated atrocities (Allman 1990:230). Opponents of the PRK nonetheless accused both men, who broke with the Polpotists, of being unacceptably tainted; these same opponents instead backed the NCR, whose leaders had not broken with Pol Pot.

The PRK signed a bilateral treaty with Vietnam on February 18, 1979. Hanoi promised that for twenty-five years it would come to the aid of the PRK if ever the latter came under attack. On March 22, after China withdrew from its military engagement with Vietnam, the PRK signed a friendship treaty with Laos.

Aid exceeding $100 million went from Vietnam to the PRK each year until 1988 (Silber 1986:112). The Soviet Union reopened its embassy in Phnom Penh, and relations with the Eastern bloc nations expanded. The Soviets began to provide about $100 million in yearly aid, a small amount compared to their allotment to Vietnam, but enough to match the combined funds allocated to the Cambodian resistance. Cuba provided arms as well (Hood & Ablin 1987:li; Lao 1984:156). The PRK had an annual trade deficit of $100 million, so Soviet aid consisted largely of credits (Australia 1990:28).

In 1980 India became the first non-Communist country to reestablish an embassy in Phnom Penh. Indian officials then saw the Tuol Sleng detention facility, with its barbaric instruments of torture, ghoulish walls of photographs, and surreal "confessions" of persons executed. No other non-Communist governments joined India during the decade, however.

Although Australia and the United Kingdom withdrew recognition from Democratic Kampuchea, they failed to establish ties with the new Phnom Penh government. The PRK announced in 1984 that it had information about US soldiers missing in action in Cambodia during the period of US intervention in Vietnam's civil war (Chanda 1990), but Washington did not respond. The US policy of isolating the PRK was even more stringent than the one applied to Vietnam, where US academics and private voluntary organizations were still allowed to visit.

The Pol Pot regime had moved Cambodians from their homes to the countryside to grow rice. When Democratic Kampuchea lost power, masses of Cambodians trekked to see their families again. In the euphoria over being freed from totalitarian control, the peasants did not realize that the retreating DK army had taken away much of the rice crop. As the granaries were bare, various sources reported that Cambodia was suffering a severe famine in mid-1979, one that threatened to starve the entire Khmer race (NYT 1979a; Shawcross 1984:128). An international relief effort was initiated by private voluntary organizations, including the International Committee for the Red Cross and Oxfam. Several UN agencies wanted to aid, but Thailand and the United States insisted that some food should go to the refugees and border settlers. The PRK regarded much of the charity as aid disguised to revive Pol Pot's forces. In addition, the PRK feared that foreigners coming from countries with official opposition to PAVN presence in Cambodia would use their positions to undermine the legitimacy of the new regime before it had a chance to establish itself. Accordingly, Phnom Penh insisted that Soviet bloc help was sufficient. UNICEF wanted to provide

assistance, but the UN Security Council had just condemned PAVN aggression and refused to seat the PRK, so Phnom Penh insisted on exclusive recognition before allowing UN aid. When Oxfam agreed to provide aid to the PRK and not to the Cambodians at the border, the PRK held out for a similar deal with other agencies. Through the intervention of several well-wishers, including Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, ICRC and UNICEF eventually provided aid to women and small children in both areas of Cambodia. While most of the emergency relief (half from the Soviet bloc, including Vietnam) reached the needy rural population, enough went into the ricebowls of DK-controlled camps, and Pol Pot's NADK was sustained through a critical period (Mason & Brown 1983; Mysliwiec 1988:14–15, ch. 2; Shawcross 1984:110, 126; Vickery 1987).

By early 1980 Foreign Minister Hun Sen claimed that 250,000 Cambodian refugees had returned from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, but his requests for UN aid on their behalf were denied (Shawcross 1984:311).[4] At least 56,000 ethnic Vietnamese and Vietnamese-speaking Khmer soon crossed the border from Vietnam to return to their homes (PRK 1985a:14). By 1983 about 175,000 Vietnamese had moved to Cambodia, compared to the 450,000 or so who lived in the country before 1970.[5] One impetus for this migration was the desire to return home. A second motive was to make money in a land that had insufficient numbers of farmers and merchants —but not to obey orders to colonize issued by a calculating SRV government, whose regulations the migrants were evading (Charney & Spragens 1984:82; FEER 1984:144).

Some 2,000 SRV advisers arrived to help in rebuilding the country's economic infrastructure (S. Quinn-Judge 1983).[6] About 500 Eastern bloc experts did so as well. Cuba and North Korea sent advisers (Chanda 1981a:25; van der Kroef 1980: 479), and East Germany helped to organize the police force. The PRK was hardly a Soviet-style regime, however. Although officially socialist, the economy bore a resemblance to the wartime economies of Britain and the United States; building socialism was a professed but largely unimplemented objective (S. Quinn-Judge 1983).[7] Pol Pot's rule discredited socialism in Cambodia, so the role of the Marxist-oriented leaders was to help rather than to actually manage the country (Brown 1989:75).

Allegations surfaced about Vietnamizing the curriculum of the PRK school system or otherwise turning Cambodia into a colony of Vietnam, but these have been deemed "farfetched" by some observers (Huxley 1986). In fact, PAVN commanders required soldiers to speak Khmer (interviewee #45) and to avoid entering the towns in the daytime. At the same time, Cambodians were deferential to Vietnamese in view of the assistance provided at a time of need.

In 1980 the foreign ministers of the three Indochinese countries met in the first of a series of semiannual sessions, known as the Conference of the

Foreign Ministers of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam. This body is also known as the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference (IFMC), but Vietnam did not want to use the word "Indochina" in order to counter the impression that the trilateral "special relationship" involved anything more than regular consultation and coordination (Haas 1989a:176–79). Laos and the PRK, meanwhile, discouraged Hanoi from evolving a more formal structure to IFMC, such as a secretariat. Bilateral committees of cooperation were established instead.

Families were allowed to sell goods either to the government or on the open market. No taxes were levied until the mid-1980s, as there was no administrative structure to collect them.

PRK human rights violations in the early 1980s, although less severe than those documented for the Pol Pot regime, painted an unpleasant picture of a regime that claimed to be a sensible alternative to the murderous Pol Pot (AI 1987; LCHR 1985). The PRK sought to legitimize itself, but this program was carried out more by anti-Polpotist propaganda than by a public relations campaign to sell the PRK. As Heng Samrin and Hun Sen had been DK military officers, the PRK reminded the population of the evil "Pol Pot clique," not the entire former leadership. Evidence of PRK independence of Vietnam was difficult to detect in the early years. Cambodia and Vietnam signed border agreements in the early 1980s, reverting to boundaries drawn by the French in 1927 that favored the position of Vietnam (Monjo 1983; Pradhan 1985: 207).

KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Son Sann, a member of the Khmer Issarak in the late 1940s, was named premier by Sihanouk after independence. The Prince discharged him in due course, but he remained in the country. When Lon Nol came to power in 1970, Son Sann refused to go along, appealing to Sihanouk to form a third force lest the RAK insurgency take over. The Prince replied that Son Sann should be hung, so the two remained enemies throughout the Khmer Republic and Democratic Kampuchea regimes. Son Sann went into exile in Paris, organizing overseas Cambodians. Meanwhile, remnants of Lon Nol's troops joined the Khmer Serei in 1975 but were held at bay by Pol Pot. In Tam, Lon Nol's premier, went to Sihanouk in September 1979 to form a coalition, but the Khmer Serei was divided on the question of support for the Prince.

When PAVN troops entered Cambodia in 1978, Kong Syleah merged several of the Khmer Serei. Sak Sutsakhan, the Khmer Republic's last ruler, formed a pro-US force known as the Khmer Sar (White Khmer). In time Sak became a US citizen. Using these contingents, Son Sann decided once again to form a third force. In January 1979 he flew to Bangkok, recruiting

Dien Del to command the remaining members of the former Khmer Serei, which was augmented by some Cambodian recruits from France in February. By September the KPNLAF was officially formed; it reportedly grew from 3,000 to about 15,000 by the mid-1980s (Becker 1986:441; Thayer 1983). Sihanouk was asked to head the army but declined, preferring diplomacy on an independent basis.

Meanwhile, General Dien Del feuded with the braintrust of KPNLF, whom he claimed was interfering with military strategy. Son Sann's colleagues complained that the general would not cooperate with ANS because he considered FUNCIPEC to be corrupt and incompetent (Vickery 1984:251). Although the differences were patched up from time to time, the effectiveness of the faction was compromised. More US aid went to Sak's army than to the one commanded by Dien Del. The strength of the KPNLF was that it was the only one firmly committed to democratic principles, although views ranged from left to right. When the KPNLF later cooperated with PDK, In Tam and others defected to the PRK rather than aiding the odious Pol Pot (Kiernan 1982:188).

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Three independent factions of the Cambodian resistance competed for aid from 1979. Pol Pot's forces got the lion's share from China because it had the discipline and the numbers to be effective. The United States initially had little overt interest in the KPNLA, which obtained token amounts of aid from China. US support came secretly in 1979, then openly in 1985, when Washington discovered that public opinion would support nonlethal aid to the NCR.

China quickly realized that support for Pol Pot's faction was unacceptable elsewhere in the world, even after Khieu Samphan took over as PDK premier. Accordingly, Beijing sought to build a coalition between FUNCIPEC, KPNLF, and PDK; but this required concessions from leaders who distrusted one another. ANS, KPNLA, and NADK troops even fought with each other as early as 1980, although afterward they began to coordinate their battle plans (Karniol 1989b). Saying that it would be political suicide to ally with Pol Pot (Becker 1989b), Sihanouk turned down Ieng Sary's proposal for a merger in early 1979. When the Prince convened a seminar in September 1979 at Pyongyang, In Tam became secretary general of a new Confederation of Khmer Nationalists, but MOULINAKA soon superseded the organization. China and the United States gave no support to these efforts, preferring to back PDK in the UN. Son Sann also refused to combine forces with Sihanouk in 1979.

Later in 1979, US policy suddenly changed. Washington applied pressure on member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand: Unless ASEAN helped to forge a tripartite coalition, US covert aid to the NCR would be cut (Hood & Ablin 1987:lv). Singapore mentioned the possibility of a united front at an ASEAN meeting, and Indonesia and Thailand agreed to draft papers to discuss how such a coalition might function. In 1980 ASEAN agreed in principle on a tripartite coalition. China was asked to prevail upon Pol Pot; Indonesia was to approach the Prince; Singapore and Thailand were to ask Son Sann to join.

Singapore hosted a tripartite conference in September 1981, when a tripartite committee was set up to draft terms of a coalition government. Beijing convened a second meeting in March 1982. China offered Sihanouk the top position in the coalition as well as military aid to ANS; this tempted the Prince, who then got Khieu Samphan to agree to a multiparty system in a postwar Cambodia, although Sihanouk had to drop the condition that NADK should be disarmed after CGDK came to power (McBeth 1982; Samphan 1982). Son Sann joined only after China promised artillery to the KPNLA (Tasker 1982a:11). Kuala Lumpur was then the site for a meeting at which CGDK's existence was proclaimed in mid-1982.

Prince Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sann formed an Inner Cabinet (Australia 1990:23). There were five CGDK ministries. Samphan headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was his party's exclusive responsibility. The remaining ministries were tripartite, with three heads in charge. The ministries were in charge of education, culture, and sports; economy and finance; health and social affairs; and national defense and interior. Each ministry had three directors-general, with directors in charge of subdivisions. The tripartite ministries had jurisdiction over the border camps controlled by each coalition partner, administering different curricula, budgetary procedures, health programs, and the like. The tripartite ministers met together as needed in the form of a Coordinating Committee. Although CGDK decisions were to be made by consensus, PDK retained the right to withdraw from the coalition whenever the arrangement seemed ineffective, whereupon PDK would resume the UN seat.

China stated that it did not want the Polpotists to dominate the coalition but did nothing to prevent this from occurring (Chanda 1982a, 1982b:13). PRC aid thenceforth went to all three resistance factions, although mostly to the NADK, which was the strongest and best-led army. Indeed, FUNCIPEC and KNPLF were largely paper organizations. ANS and KPNLA were nearly phantoms of the imagination of those who wanted to support NADK aggression without appearing to endorse Polpotism. As Pol Pot was associated with the CGDK, even Sihanouk believed in 1983 that the coalition would fail; he was "90 percent" sure that the PRK would eventually achieve legitimacy (Chanda 1983c:13), and he called upon the PRK to join the coalition, an option that was unpalatable to both the PDK and the PRK. When ASEAN asked PDK to remove Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Ta Mok in 1984, China said "no" (Awanohara 1984a:17).

With the Prince in charge of a broad political coalition, soldiers could be recruited by the three resistance forces on the basis of both opposition to Vietnam and support for Sihanouk, who was still a charismatic symbol of Cambodian independence. Young men in border camps, with no expectation of being repatriated to a new country, were attracted to a life of adventure with good pay and regular food. In a similar situation nearly two decades earlier, the United States had organized a proxy army in South Vietnam in the mistaken belief that the local inhabitants were "fighting Communism" rather than merely trying to survive in a poor country by joining the side offering the best incentives. Now the objective was to restore Sihanouk to power through the barrel of Pol Pot's guns, although NADK forces occasionally attacked the ANS and the KPNLA. When the Prince threatened in November 1984 to resign from CGDK as a result, the attacks slackened. CGDK was a façade: NADK defectors reported that the agreement was merely a personal matter between Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, and Son Sann (Beckaert 1985a).

The formation of CGDK ensured that war would continue. Ambassadors of Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Mauritania, North Korea, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Thailand, and Yugoslavia went to a site just inside the Cambodian border to present their credentials to Sihanouk one day as if to legitimize CGDK. Vietnam would be denied a victory, the interests of the superpowers would checkmate each other, and still more Cambodian lives would be lost over an indefinite period. No one evidently contemplated the mathematical certainty that more deaths multiplied by an infinite number of years would yield the end of the Khmer race. If the Cambodians could not cooperate, the world might ultimately ask, why should others care about the survival of the country? The Khmers would not be the first race in history to disappear. What mattered to most countries was the ongoing world power struggle in which Cambodia played the role of pawn.

CAMBODIAN OPTIONS

All four factions committed troops, although the PRK army could rely on the PAVN army. The two sides attempted to legitimize their positions through propaganda of various sorts. Condemnation of Vietnam was a primary propaganda strategy of the resistance factions; Pol Pot's atrocities were cited by the PRK. CGDK was willing to negotiate with Vietnam but not with the PRK, so the Phnom Penh government was unable to pursue a negotiation option during the early part of the civil war.

NOTES

1. Sources include Becker (1986:300, 302), Heder (1981b:6), Burchett (1981:ch. 10), Etchison (1984:196), Chanda (1986:83), Vickery (1984:ch. 4), Kiernan (1985:415), Sihanouk (1980:3, 4, 38, 65, 85, 92), Pike (1978).

2. Interview with Upadit Pachariyangkun, December 26, 1989.

3. In addition, NADK derived revenue from gem miners, who entered NADK-controlled territory from Thailand by paying a fee (Erlanger 1989h).

4. Kiernan (1982:176) accepts a figure of 135,000. Kiljunen (1984:31) estimates 400,000 refugees returned from 1979 to 1981.

5. Sources include Fraser (1985:6), Monjo (1983), Osborne (1978:256), P. Quinn-Judge (1983).

6. Field & Hiebert (1990:9) claim that there are 200,000 employees of the Phnom Penh government, which governs eight million people.

7. In 1990 the Cambodian government decided to consider abolishing the anachronistic word "socialism" from its constitution.

4

VIETNAM

VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKING

For nearly a thousand years, until 1428, Vietnam struggled for independence from a hegemonic China. Vietnam's defense against the powerful Khmer Empire was assured when the Cambodians also had to fight against the Thais. The dominance once imposed by China on Vietnam could not be reproduced by Vietnam in Cambodia because Thailand stood ready to move in case the Vietnamese grew too strong. Whereas Bangkok had sent troops three times to Vietnam during the past 300 years, the first time the shoe was on the other foot came in 1979. France's arrival on the scene also checkmated Vietnamese ambitions to achieve hegemony over its eastern neighbor. But the French dealt with the Vietnamese, whose universities date back many centuries, as the most advanced ethnic group in all of Southeast Asia. From the 1880s, France hired hardworking Vietnamese for colonial government service and plantation employment in Cambodia. By 1970, nearly a century later, some 450,000 ethnic Vietnamese called Cambodia their home (Huxley 1986:168). After 100 years of struggle for independence against France, Vietnam was confident of ultimate victory during two decades in which the United States tried to stick its finger into an overflowing nationalistic dike.

This long history of vigilance nurtured a diplomacy that proceeds from a position of strength. When Vietnam is weak, it kowtows. When strong, it is unyielding. When there is ambiguity, Vietnam sees negotiation as a marketplace in which to trade. When victorious, it shows generosity and does not gloat. When Vietnam suffers defeat, it readjusts its objectives to be more realistic and increases its resolve to prevail in the long run. International relations are analogized to family relations: One protects one's own interests before thinking of larger considerations. This Confucian operational code of diplomacy resembles that of many non-Confucian countries.

In similar Confucian terms, China expected Vietnam to be grateful for decades of aid when its southern neighbor emerged victorious in 1975. Hanoi was instead seeking to be treated with more respect—as a virtuous David against the barbaric American and French Goliaths. Cambodians saw things in the same way: Sihanouk and Pol Pot wanted Cambodia to be treated in an equalitarian manner, not as a younger brother, since Cambodian independence was also sustained against great odds, sometimes despite Hanoi's indifference.

A newer element in Vietnamese diplomacy is Marxism, with a tension between separate roads to socialism and proletarian internationalism as guiding principles. Ho Chi Minh, whose father resigned from the Vietnamese government rather than work under the French, learned about Karl Marx while he was a student in France, where he was a founding member of the French Communist Party in 1920. Returning home from his studies, he stopped in the Soviet Union and China. As he placed his country ahead of international considerations, the Cominterm asked him to form the Indochinese Communist Party in 1931. When Ho formed the Vietminh, in which Communists joined non-Marxists to struggle for independence against the French, there were no ethnic Khmers in the ICP. Ho's goal remained liberation of Vietnam before Cambodia and Laos. In 1951 the Comintern asked Ho to dissolve the ICP so that three separate national movements could grow independently; the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP) then emerged.

Although Vietnam took measures to encourage the Cambodian Communist movement to become more self-sufficient (Kiernan 1980a: 30–34), the terrain of Indochina is such that Vietnam could not have been unified without using the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Cambodia and Laos. Indochina, in the view of General Nguyen Vo Giap, was a single battlefield. A corollary was that Indochina constituted an economic whole, with interdependent parts (Chanda 1986:120). The history of Indochina's revolutions demonstrated a unity to Hanoi that translated into an expectation of intimate cooperation after new regimes came to power in 1975. When freed from US meddling in its internal revolution, Giap and others reasoned, Vietnam could support revolutions in its two neighboring countries and then establish a "special relationship" when they succeeded.

Unwilling to await a Vietnamese victory, Pol Pot had sufficiently solidified his position to challenge North Vietnam as early as 1970, although he provided an "undisciplined subordinate" alibi for RAK shooting on Vietnamese troops. The Laotian revolution was closely integrated into Ho Chi Minh's struggle, so Vientiane agreed to ally with Hanoi in 1976, whereas only Democratic Kampuchea wanted to opt out of a special relationship in the Indochina region.

While Vietnam sought to oust the Western powers, friendly guerrilla movements and neutral regimes in Cambodia and Laos were considered

indispensable for victory. The DRV withdrawal of former ICP members from Cambodia in 1954, frustrating as it was to Pol Pot, was a show of Hanoi's good faith at a time when the United States was threatening to take over as the principal Western power pledged to guarantee the independence of non-Communist Indochina. Vietnam did not want to antagonize Washington in 1954, so its troops evacuated territories in Cambodia that had been occupied before the Geneva Conference. If Vietminh remained in Cambodia under various disguises (Gurtov 1975:52), they played little role for more than a decade.

According to the Geneva accords of 1954, elections in Vietnam were to determine the wishes of the nation in 1956. Ho Chi Minh was an overwhelming hero in the North and South, so there was no doubt in Washington on the outcome of such an electoral exercise. The failure to hold elections and the establishment of the US-allied ROV narcocracy showed Hanoi that Americans were determined to violate the dignity of a proud civilization.[1] North Vietnam had pledged at Geneva to respect an independent state in South Vietnam; a puppet state was what they saw instead. SEATO was seen as an international guarantee for a bastard Republic of Vietnam.

Aided by China and the Soviet Union, Hanoi sufficiently recovered from the fight against France by 1960 to be in a position to move the Vietnamese revolution southward. Since Washington urged Saigon to violate the Geneva accords by opposing free elections, Hanoi felt free to move supplies through neutralized Laos and nonaligned Cambodia to aid the NLF. Cambodia and Laos, like Sweden in World War II, allowed the flow of arms across their territories in the expectation of staying out of the war. Full-scale US involvement came in 1965, when aid flowed in significant quantity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. While Beijing and Moscow diverged in policy, Hanoi received aid from both and stayed out of disputes between the two Communist giants. Soviet aid was three times as much as PRC aid; this should have presented no problem, since contributions from each were made according to relative economic capabilities, but during the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s Soviet aid bound for Vietnam was intercepted in China.

Hanoi at first refused to discuss border questions with Cambodia on the grounds that such matters mostly involved the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam. In 1967, however, the DRV and the NLF finally agreed to the existing border as a condition of Hanoi's diplomatic recognition by Phnom Penh. Since the agreement contained no map, Ho Chi Minh assumed that further negotiations would follow victory in the war to liberate South Vietnam.

While the Ho Chi Minh Trail was open, Hanoi did not consider support for the Cambodian Communists to be important. When the Prince condoned US bombing in 1969, Vietnam responded by trying to aid the Communist resistance in Cambodia, and Cambodian Communist freedom fighters exiled to Hanoi since 1954 were encouraged to fight alongside the RAK forces.

Sihanouk then tried to play the "US card" against Hanoi, as did his successor Lon Nol.

After Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk, the UN General Assembly refused to respond to the new Cambodian government's accusation that North Vietnam was guilty of aggression against Cambodia, since Lon Nol's regime barely had the votes to remain seated at the UN. The Khmer Republic's Vietphobic campaign inside Cambodia established a policy consistent with Pol Pot's thinking. Hanoi decided to create the Sihanoukist Khmer Rumdo as an alternative to the troublesome RAK. Even so, in 1973 Vietnam urged RAK leaders to form a united front with the Prince. When Hanoi stopped aiding RAK forces, in order to live up to the spirit of the Paris accords of 1973, China was able to call the shots in Cambodia by providing Pol Pot sufficient exclusive support to topple Lon Nol. Hanoi urged China to back Sihanouk because of doubts about RAK's reliability. PAVN troops remained near the Cambodian border to help the NLF after 1973, so they were easy targets for Vietphobic Lonnolists and Polpotists. Hanoi did not want to fight Pol Pot, an ally of China, when the primary objective was to liberate the South. In 1975 South Vietnam fell under NLF control, assisted by PAVN troops, shortly after Pol Pot marched into Phnom Penh.

By the early 1970s, Vietnam was disturbed that proletarian internationalism had been abandoned by Sino-American and Russo-American détentes, as well as by Sino-Soviet hostility. When Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi decided to continue a policy of equidistance between the major powers rather than taking sides, thereby disappointing both Beijing and Moscow. In 1975, for example, Vietnam turned down a request by the Soviet Union to use Cam Ranh Bay on a regular basis. Vietnam received aid from Australia and France and was the first socialist country to join and receive aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). During a tour of four ASEAN countries in 1976, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh explained that Hanoi wanted to join ASEAN. While the Chinese began to cut assistance to "ungrateful" Hanoi, they poured money into Democratic Kampuchea, yet Vietnam maintained its equidistance despite pressure from the Soviets.

Upon assuming power, the RAK navy immediately attacked islands claimed by Vietnam. The new Phnom Penh government also sought to open the issue of the land border between the two countries. An era of colonial rule, when boundaries are drawn for the convenience of the outside power, is likely to be followed by disputes concerning the line of demarcation between former colonies. Although peace had come, most PAVN troops were recalled—although some remained along the border (Heder 1978:18). Having lost so much blood in enclaves of Cambodia inhabited largely by Vietnamese, Hanoi was surprised when Pol Pot's regime demanded that PAVN troops leave areas in dispute. The DRV refused, insisting on negotiations, as many disputed territories were inside Vietnam on maps in Hanoi.

For Vietnam, withdrawal before negotiations meant putting the cart before the horse. Fanciful claims were presented at joint meetings in 1975 and 1976, but there was no spirit of compromise. Hanoi refused to remove its troops until the issue was resolved, while Democratic Kampuchea persisted in attacks and incursions to drive the Vietnamese out of what Phnom Penh considered Cambodian territory, although the area in dispute was small. To present a united front against Democratic Kampuchea, the two halves of Vietnam finally merged in mid-1976, when the Vietnamese Worker's Party reverted to the Vietnamese Communist Party.

When Hanoi could no longer accept Phnom Penh's explanation that repeated military attacks against Vietnam were in error, border issues receded in importance, and the foreign ministry undertook a complete reappraisal of bilateral relations. Vietnam could not remain idle while it was a victim of irredentist aggression fueled by China. When Beijing turned down SRV pleas in June and November to mediate, Hanoi concluded that the PRC was in collusion with Pol Pot to dismember Vietnam and to Khmerize a territory that had cost 1.2 million lives over a quarter of a century (Small & Singer 1982:93).

Hanoi then joined the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the International Investment Bank, two Soviet bloc organizations, as a sign of a tilt toward Moscow. A major PAVN counteroffensive in December 1977 cemented the alliance between Beijing and Phnom Penh, instead of bringing Pol Pot to the bargaining table, as had been hoped. On December 31, Phnom Penh told SRV embassy officials to pack up and leave.

Early in 1978 the SRV launched a peace offensive, including an appeal to India, the Nonaligned Movement, and the United Nations. Hanoi published a detailed refutation of the charge of Vietnamese hegemonism, with excerpts from key statements in which Vietnam affirmed its respect for the independence of Cambodia and Laos (SRV MFA 1978). Hanoi again rejected Phnom Penh's familiar demand for Vietnam's withdrawal from the disputed territories, followed by a conference. Vietphobic propaganda from Beijing prompted the departure of ethnic Chinese "boat people" from Vietnam. Then, when Hanoi joined CMEA, China terminated all remaining aid projects.

Until mid-1978, Vietnam was careful not to issue statements critical of either China or Democratic Kampuchea. Maintaining proper verbal conduct was synonymous with proletarian internationalism and keeping the door open for diplomacy. Hanoi soon learned from Cambodian refugees Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, and others that Pol Pot was committing genocide against ethnic Vietnamese inside Cambodia as well as autogenocide against the Khmer peasants. On June 21 the Vietnam News Agency issued a verbal broadside, accusing Democratic Kampuchea of genocide and China of complicity with the aim of hegemony in Southeast Asia (VNA 1978). Soon the two neighboring regimes responded in kind, and the door for diplomacy

closed. Hostilities resumed by the end of the summer, and Soviet bloc military aid began to flow to Vietnam.

To allay fears about the emerging Hanoi-Moscow axis, Premier Pham Van Dong visited Thailand, apologizing for past SRV aid to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and expressing support for ASEAN. Thailand was polite but was not interested in a proposed nonaggression pact. The premier gave no clue of any difficulty with Pol Pot, although he warned Bangkok of PRC hegemonic ambitions. Dong missed an opportunity to discuss the possibility of regional action against Pol Pot with Indonesia, whose military wanted to develop good relations with their opposite numbers in Hanoi.

Although Vietnam finally dropped demands for reparations in the last half of 1978 during negotiations to normalize relations with the United States, US negotiators dragged their feet on normalizing relations as the year ended, preferring instead to develop a strategic relationship with China. Hanoi's blunder, holding out for US aid, resulted in its continued isolation.

Meanwhile, residents of Ho Chi Minh City were hearing gunfire from Cambodia. Phnom Penh radio issued threats that the RAK would take Kampuchea Krom back from Vietnam (interviewee #8). More Vietnamese civilians and military personnel died in battles with RAK forces from April 1975 to December 1978, Vietnam claims, than died in fighting the French for independence (interviewee #67). Many of the 30,000 casualties were civilians, who were butchered to death (Lindgren, Wilson & Wallensteen 1989:6).[2]

Doves and hawks in the Hanoi Politburo urged negotiations at some points and action at other times, so Hanoi failed to project a clear policy on Cambodia (Shaplen 1986:290). Vietnamese leaning toward the Soviet Union, such as General Giap, differed from those who were more sympathetic to China, including Foreign Minister Trinh (Chakraborti 1985:26–27). When the internal policy debate concluded, a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Vietnam was announced in November. (Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, a Sinophile, defected to Beijing in mid-1979.) A growing number of refugees, including former RAK officers, constituted another group pressing for a particular policy toward Cambodia. During 1978 a band of Cambodian refugees and "volunteer" Vietnamese trained together in preparation for a possible attack to oust Pol Pot. Hanoi tried but failed to get Prince Sihanouk's son Ranariddh to lend support, as Vietnam wanted to restore Sihanouk as head of state (Playboy 1987:73).

The SRV decision to attack Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978 is somewhat of a puzzle.[3] A primary factor was self-defense, as there was an escalation in conflict between the two countries, who were becoming proxies in the Sino-Soviet dispute, beyond their ability to reverse the momentum for war. An increased strategic relationship between China and the United States threatened to weaken Vietnam even further in the context of a Sino-Kampuchean encirclement. Secretly deciding upon a preemptive strike to

sweep RAK forces from Cambodia, Hanoi openly called for the overthrow of Pol Pot. China's mid-1978 renunciation of the use of force to intervene on behalf of Democratic Kampuchea did not bring DK diplomats to the conference table. In Hanoi, the opprobrium of being labeled a Soviet client state and the niceties of international diplomacy were secondary considerations to the survival of Vietnam itself. Ridding the region of a genocidal regime was a secondary factor, according to Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Co Thach (Shaplen 1986:282; Shawcross 1984:70–71). Hanoi had genuine humanitarian concerns in mind, nevertheless. Complaints by ethnic Vietnamese refugees and tales from erstwhile RAK commanders about cold-blooded massacres had a profound impact on SRV officials. Unlike the overthrow of Uganda's Idi Amin in 1978 by Tanzania, a neighboring state in Africa, Vietnam could not rely on a regional forum in which to obtain a fair hearing before unseating a madman. The effort to improve relations with ASEAN came too late. A third possible motive, Hanoi's need to redeem its honor after years of public humiliation by DK rhetoric in NAM and UN organs, made sense to Sihanouk (1980:92). Vietnam's lust to dominate Indochina, Pol Pot's reading of the invasion, was a fourth interpretation. A number of statements by Vietnamese persons can be cited to support this Vietphobic theory, although they do not represent a consensus behind government policy, which reiterated in April 1978 that it had abandoned the idea of a federation in 1951.[4] If Hanoi truly wanted to achieve hegemony through an army of occupation, it could have annexed Cambodia without allowing the PRK to form. Vietnam chose a more moderate course.

It appears that Hanoi expected only to advance as far as the Mekong River (Chanda 1978a). Later, when Cambodians rejoiced at PAVN's arrival, Hanoi was encouraged to annihilate RAK remnants. PAVN's troop strength in Cambodia increased from 92,000 to perhaps 200,000 by 1981 so that the army could defend its positions while preventing the Polpotists from returning to power. To its surprise, Vietnam was condemned in the United Nations. Hanoi thought that the right of self-defense would be recognized, particularly against the genocidal Pol Pot. Hanoi's sneak attack was ill-coordinated with diplomacy, however. Having neglected to solicit support for the action in Cambodia among PAVN's friends in Indonesia beforehand, Jakarta was unable to cite mitigating circumstances within ASEAN while Singapore and Thailand mobilized an international campaign to vilify Vietnam.

Before the United Nations, Hanoi argued that the PRK should occupy the Cambodian seat, as the new government was in control of the country, Vietnam was in the country at the invitation of the lawful government, and the situation was "irreversible." To rule otherwise, Hanoi insisted, would involve the UN in an intrusion into internal Cambodian affairs. Nonetheless, the UN credentials vote reseated the DK regime, which commanded only a few encampments inside Thailand. Vietnam said that PAVN volunteers would withdraw from Cambodia when the PRC threat to Vietnam ended.

Hanoi knew that the allied powers used the removal of a genocidal regime as a justification for occupying Germany in 1945 until a new government could emerge. Vietnam claimed a similar right, but its argument was ignored.

In the White Book, issued on October 4, 1979, under the title *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last Thirty Years* (SRV MFA 1979b), Hanoi cited the 1954 sellout by Chou Enlai at Geneva and similar betrayals, and it identified PRC hegemonism as a culprit in the Cambodian civil war, charging in effect that the DK regime was Beijing's proxy and that China assaulted the Cambodian people by encouraging genocide. On November 10, Radio Hanoi justified PAVN action by arguing that a civil war had been already in progress inside Cambodia before Vietnamese soldiers entered and that the genocidal Pol Pot regime forfeited its right to rule under international law, which declares genocide as a crime against all humanity (Radio Hanoi 1979). Vietnamese "volunteers" were claimed to have entered Cambodia without direction from Hanoi.

In any case, Vietnam had a right to defend itself against attack. Having exhausted peaceful means for resolving the conflict, Hanoi's long tradition of being forced to solve disputes by war evidently prevailed as a justification for its unusual Christmas present to Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk (1980:64) essentially concurs with the judgment that Vietnam acted in self-defense as well as with the humanitarian aim of stopping ongoing barbarism. Unrefuted analyses based on international law have come to the same conclusion (Hannum 1989; Hawk 1987; Kiljunen 1984:ch. 7; Klintworth 1989).

Former RAK officials who broke with Pol Pot took charge after PAVN troops entered Phnom Penh. Hanoi at first pretended that none of its million-man army (IISS 1984:111) was inside Cambodia. Instead, the victory was credited entirely to the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation. Condemned in January by the UN Security Council for aggression, Vietnam refused to withdraw its troops or to discuss PRK legitimacy. When asked how long PAVN would remain in Cambodia, Hanoi answered that they would depart when the new government could build an army to handle the Pol Pot threat (NYT 1979d).

PAVN commanders hyperbolically told subordinates in 1979 that they were to march to the Thai border to take over every square inch of Cambodia (interviewee #27).[5] This almost occurred. But the mop-up operation stalled. Pol Pot's resistance forces were not washed away by the Vietnamese tide. Hanoi, having mastered the art of guerrilla warfare, then had to play cat to the Cambodian resistance mouse.

During the latter part of 1979 General Giap urged that all PAVN troops be withdrawn by 1980. When the Politburo decided otherwise, Giap was removed as defense minister to serve as minister for science and technology. He was dropped from the Politburo in 1982 (Hiebert 1990h), although he retained his deputy premier status.

Premier Pham Van Dong flew to Phnom Penh on February 16, 1979, to

negotiate a friendship treaty with the PRK similar to the one concluded earlier with Laos. Under the terms of the agreement, signed on February 21, the PRK could call upon Vietnam to provide military assistance for twenty-five years. The PRK did so immediately, and the PAVN military operation was thus justified on a treaty basis after the fact.

One day after negotiations began on the PRK–SRV treaty, China launched a major attack on Vietnam. China and Vietnam differed on at least two issues—sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea and the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. In 1974 there were about 100 border incidents, and the number rose to 400 in 1975 and 900 in 1976 (Swank 1983:5–6). These attacks did not occasion military escalation, but they continued through 1978. When the PLA attacked Vietnam on the pretext of punishing Hanoi for its intrusion into an indigenous civil war, Vietnam drew the conclusion that China had assigned high priority since 1975 to achieving hegemony in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, Hanoi pulled out all stops to contain China and drew nearer to the Soviet Union than before. One month later, after several Soviet ships set sail for Cam Ranh Bay, China ceased its aggression and offered to negotiate differences with Hanoi. Phan Hien went to Beijing, but he found that the PRC did not want to discuss specific measures to prevent another border, instead preferring to lecture about the vice of "hegemonism." The White Book was then prepared. Although Phan Hien said that he was willing to continue discussions for five or more years (Chang 1985:101 n33), China broke off negotiations. Hanoi reasoned that it had to live with its northern neighbor, so their mutual grievances had to be settled some day in order to bring peace. When the Sino-Vietnamese border war subsided, PLA and PAVN troops remained in positions along the frontier. Tying up 500,000 PAVN troops along the Chinese border and an additional 60,000 PAVN soldiers in Laos, the PRC rejected Vietnam's call for a cease-fire.[6]

Civilian experts, although badly needed in Vietnam, helped the new Cambodian government to rebuild its infrastructure after a decade of intense war and genocidal upheaval. SRV aid to the PRK exceeded Soviet aid, although much of the latter was probably recycled from the estimated $2 billion in annual assistance to Vietnam (U.S. ACDA 1989:112; Silber 1986:112). The longer the advisers remained, the more it appeared that the PRK had become a client state of Vietnam.

To feed PAVN soldiers, Cambodians were asked to supply extra fish and rice; some of these sources of food went to Vietnam (Becker 1986:444). While the PRK was supposed to be building up its own army, PAVN drafted more than 10,000 Cambodians to build defenses, including a wall along the border with Thailand (Becker 1986:444). In short, there are grounds for believing that Vietnam increasingly became unpopular and felt unwelcome. In any case, PAVN commanders ordered their troops to stay out of the towns, and the country was never "Vietnamized."

Although Hanoi insisted that PAVN troops were in Cambodia at the invitation of the PRK and the people of the country, that their presence was a "private affair," sanctions were imposed on Vietnam. Western countries and Japan suspended aid projects, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank loan disbursements were frozen. A policy of "bleeding" Vietnam went into effect, so Hanoi became increasingly dependent upon the largesse of Moscow. Sweden continued to provide aid, although at a reduced level for the reason that the socialist economy of Vietnam limited the country's capacity to absorb development aid in an efficient manner. Soviet aid, however, produced a period of strong economic growth in the early 1980s (ADB 1990:119).

Hanoi believed that it was trying to establish a Cambodia that could stand on its own, while the Americans, the Chinese, and the Thais preferred a Cambodia that would serve as a proxy for their interests. Vietnam would not abide hostile regimes or weak buffers in Cambodia or Laos (Turley 1986:185), but other countries regarded its troops in Cambodia and Laos as armies of occupation.

If the PRK appeared to be an SRV proxy, Hanoi's army of liberation became a proxy for the PRK. The presence of PAVN uniforms in due course prompted additional recruits to join the new Cambodian resistance movement in order to expel intruders who should go home where they belonged. Hanoi wanted the KPRAF to assume most of the burden for the war by 1985, but this did not occur, as the Phnom Penh government was content to let the Vietnamese do the fighting. SRV leaders became increasingly perplexed as they realized that the PRK was unable or unwilling to share more of the responsibility for defense so that the war could be Cambodianized.

PAVN forces crushed ANS in 1982–1983. A 1983–1984 dry season offensive dealt a severe blow to KPNLA, and PAVN captured regional headquarters of NADK. In 1984–1985, NADK was on the wane. Vietnam defeated enemies of the PRK, but they kept popping up again thanks to outside support.

VIETNAMESE OPTIONS

Hanoi's commitment of troops to support the PRK kept the conflict going, although General Giap opposed what in due course appeared as an occupation force. PRK legitimization was a major objective of Vietnam's diplomacy. Hanoi refused to deal with Sihanouk, who promised a neutral Cambodia if he were restored to power, until the Prince agreed to negotiate with the new government in Phnom Penh. When Vietnam received UN officials to discuss negotiated solutions to the conflict, the response was that the road to solving the problem had to start in Beijing, where the original

plot was hatched and the existing situation was allowed to remain stalemated.

NOTES

1. McCoy (1972) also presents evidence of CIA involvement in the heroin traffic.
2. Burchett (1981:151, 156) estimates 31,000 casualties, some 1,000 more than what Hanoi apparently accepts.
3. See Elliott (1987:67) and Spragens (1981:10).
4. Singapore's opening address to the Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989 provides a litany of references for the "Indochina federation" thesis. Compare with Chakraborti (1986:8–9), Desai (1980:226), and SRV MFA (1978a).
5. This informant was living in Cambodia at the time, and he reports what Vietnamese soldiers told him when they reached his house.
6. Some 200 Soviet advisers also went to Laos, according to *Bangkok Post* (1979:3). See also *London Times* (1982).

5

CHINA

CHINESE POLICYMAKING

China has often viewed its contemporary role as a continuation of the Middle Kingdom, acting as a benign protector that took no plunder as the preeminent Asian power over the centuries. At the same time, the imperative of Chinese *realpolitik* is to keep its many borders secure. Various measures were taken to keep Vietnam humble over the centuries, including invasions. Cambodia was seen only as a possible counterweight to a Vietnam that might be too assertive. The Middle Kingdom never came to Cambodia's assistance at any time, but the imperial court on occasion warned Vietnam not to go too far in encroaching on its eastern neighbor, which always respected Beijing's dominant role in the region. Although it became culturally Sinicized during a millennium of Chinese rule, Vietnam resisted political control by its big neighbor. Cambodia feared neither cultural nor political domination from Beijing, which thus could play the role of generous big brother to Phnom Penh.

Before and during World War II, Chiang Kaishek's Republic of China opposed French colonial rule. The ROC army withdrew from northern Vietnam in 1946 in exchange for French *quid pro quos*, but the ruling Kuomintang Party believed that all Asian countries should receive independence in due course.

There was no change in this pro-independence policy when Mao Tsetung's armies established the People's Republic of China in 1949. The United States refused to allow the PRC to sit in the United Nations, and it put an economic embargo into effect. Other Communist countries welcomed the PRC victory, but diplomatic isolation hindered Beijing from playing a more cooperative role in the world community. Mao perceived that the struggle for national independence in Indochina was as important as the international class struggle against world capitalism. China supported many Asian Communist par-

ties, expecting in return that budding movements for independence would succeed and then would return the favor by according China a leadership role in Asia.

Mao recognized Ho Chi Minh's government in 1950 before the Soviet Union did so. China thought that Vietnam could not have won independence without PRC aid of 4,000 tons of weapons per month from 1950 to 1954, and Beijing even believed that Marshall Ye Jiangying, not General Giap, masterminded the Dienbienphu victory (Deron 1990: 16), although Giap in fact abandoned the use of Chinese "human wave" tactics for conventional artillery bombardment. The PRC aided Ho's Vietnamese liberation movement with an expectation that Vietnam would be a faithful ally, while Ho assumed that Beijing would accord an equalitarian respect to a country that struggled against the imperialist French and, later, the Americans. The expectations of both China and Vietnam were unmet in later years.

At the Geneva Conference of 1954, PRC Foreign Minister Chou Enlai insisted that Vietminh forces and allies pull out of Cambodia, thereby recognizing Sihanouk's royal government, which Beijing accepted as a nonaligned nation. Chou feared that Cambodia and Vietnam would become US bases in due course, so Cambodian neutralization was a strategic objective. Ho complied. Chou also sought two Vietnams, which would pose a lesser threat to China than one.

China was one of the first countries to aid Sihanouk's newly independent Cambodia. The two countries signed a treaty in 1956, followed by economic assistance. Beijing, of course, was seeking to break out of diplomatic isolation, and in 1958 Cambodia became the first non-Communist Southeast Asian country to exchange ambassadors with the PRC. The two countries signed another bilateral treaty in 1960, and in later years Beijing supported Cambodia over South Vietnam in regard to conflicting territorial claims (Ambekar & Divekar 1964:35).

During the 1960s relations between China and the Soviet Union cooled considerably. Mao wanted Southeast Asia to unite against Moscow. In 1963, when Soviet bloc aid arrived in Phnom Penh to fill the void that arose from Sihanouk's break in relations with Washington, Beijing objected but adjusted to the reality that Sihanouk wanted merely to balance his external donors to maintain his country's autonomy. To up the ante, China backed the Prince's abortive call in the early 1960s for an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality, and PRC military aid went to Phnom Penh for the first time.

In 1965, US aid to South Vietnam increased dramatically. China refused at first to aid Pol Pot, believing that Sihanouk posed a more effective challenge to the expansion of US influence into Cambodia. Mao wanted the war in Vietnam to bleed the United States, and he provided one-third of the Soviet contribution to Hanoi (Chanda 1986:174, 325). Beijing even pledged to defend the Prince's government if US troops dared to cross into Cambodia, although the commitment was never honored.

Beijing did not object when Sihanouk's defense minister, Lon Nol, siphoned off PRC weapons bound for Vietnam. When Sihanouk accused China of stirring up unrest in Battambang during 1967 and 1968, Beijing was greatly disappointed. China was also displeased when Sihanouk allowed the United States to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1969, but by then Beijing had decided to aid Pol Pot.

There were two views of the Cambodian Communists in Beijing. Pol Pot's ideology was closer to that of Mao's of the Cultural Revolution. Sihanouk's neutralism appealed to Chou, who was also Vietnam's best friend in Beijing. In 1970, after Sihanouk took up exile in China, Chou could not decide at first whether to support a shaky alliance between Pol Pot and Sihanouk or instead to offer support to the Khmer Republic if it would simply keep the Ho Chi Minh Trail open. When Lon Nol's uncompromising anti-Communism became clear three weeks after the coup deposing Sihanouk, Beijing broke relations with Phnom Penh and resolved to topple the Lon Nol regime. The Prince at first agreed with China to ally with the CPK, then demurred. Beijing thereafter supported both rival Cambodian factions, FUNK and GRUNK. In 1973, when US bombs again made target practice of Cambodia, Chou hoped that the destruction would bring the two Cambodian factions together, but they held out. Chou then urged Hanoi to allow the Cambodian revolution to succeed on its own terms. He appealed to Vietnam, promising more aid, but this never occurred, as he died in 1976.

One of Washington's aims in its growing détente with China after 1972 was to isolate Vietnam, which ultimately came to terms with the US government in the Paris accords of 1973. At Beijing's suggestion, one article of the Paris agreement called upon PAVN troops to leave Cambodia and Laos; another provision insisted on the right of self-determination in South Vietnam. China wanted the United States to install Sihanouk in Phnom Penh in 1973, and Beijing discouraged Hanoi from launching its final offensive on Saigon in 1975. During efforts to normalize relations with the Philippines and Thailand in 1975, China urged the two US allies to retain US bases in order to counter Soviet power in the region (Porter 1978:210).

PRC leaders did not appreciate Vietnam's policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet struggle. Beijing's warnings against Moscow's hegemonism awakened Vietnamese memories of Chinese hegemonism over a millennium. Beijing evidently thought that PRC sacrifices on behalf of the Vietnamese revolution, including the aid of some 300,000 Chinese soldiers, technicians, and workers from 1964 to 1971, would be recognized on liberation day in 1975 by having Hanoi side with Beijing against Moscow (Chang 1985:129, 162). Vietnam remembered that Red Guards stopped the flow of Soviet aid in the 1960s and that Beijing's waltz with Washington came as a betrayal and a shock that adversely affected terms at Paris.

Boundaries were yet another matter in dispute between China and Vietnam. In 1959, ARVN forces occupied some of the Spratly Islands to the

astonishment of Beijing; Hanoi was silent on the matter. In 1974, with Mao's widow in the ascendancy, China occupied the northern Paracel Islands and claimed all the disputed South China Sea islands, defying claims of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam. In early 1975 Hanoi attacked ROV troops on the Spratlys and asserted a claim over the Paracels; this move appeared to contradict an interpretation of a pledge by former Premier Pham Van Dong in 1958. Deng Xiaoping, then PRC vice prime minister, agreed to hold talks on the dispute in 1975—but they were acrimonious, and China renewed its claim.

In need of funds to reconstruct a country heavily bombed for nearly a decade, Hanoi asked Beijing for more aid after its victory in 1975. China translated the request as Vietnamese ingratitude, while lavishing Democratic Kampuchea with aid. Hanoi received less than it asked for in 1975, then learned that no new PRC aid would be approved after 1977 because SRV leaders would not openly oppose Soviet hegemonism. When Soviet bloc aid began to pour into Vietnam, China cut back again. In mid-1978, after Hanoi joined CMEA, Beijing cancelled all aid, some seventy-two projects in all (Porter 1978:210), and closed the border to trade.

Beijing urged Vietnam to show moderation toward Democratic Kampuchea, but this option receded due to the increasingly aggressive military posture of the DK government, emboldened by the appearance of an alliance with China during Pol Pot's triumphal reception in Beijing in September 1975. China pretended to mediate in the border dispute between DK and SRV in 1975 but gave up in late 1977, when PLA military aid rushed to Phnom Penh. About 10,000 PRC advisers assisted DK's army (Burchett 1981:149 n36). In 1978 China seemed determined to leave Vietnam no option but to seek reliance on the Soviet Union, then to accuse Hanoi of serving as a Soviet proxy. Beijing was behind DK efforts to seek a détente with Thailand in 1978, as on November 5 Deng went to Bangkok to ask permission to fly military aid through Thai airspace to Cambodia, assuring the Thais that DK intentions were peaceful.

Yet another issue of contention between China and Vietnam was over the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam (the *Hoa*), whom Paris promised to protect when France returned to Indochina after World War II. When Mao's revolution succeeded in 1949, most Chinese in Vietnam held ROC passports. Beijing insisted that PRC passports should be issued instead, but Hanoi was unwilling to force repatriation. In 1955 North Vietnam signed an agreement with China, providing that *Hoa* could eventually become Vietnamese citizens with the right to vote in elections but that they were exempt from military service; this was to be implemented by 1961, but Hanoi later demurred. During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards urged the *Hoa* to bring revolution into the streets of Vietnam. In 1975 Beijing was angry when Hanoi forced the *Hoa* to become DRV citizens instead. Refusing to acknowledge responsibility for spreading malicious rumors over PRC radio

after 1975, PRC leaders saw the flight of ethnic Chinese "boat people" from Vietnam as a form of aggression against China. In 1977, for example, a large-scale exodus of *Hoa* was blamed on SRV terrorism, prompting a suspension of more aid projects. In 1978 Beijing called upon the *Hoa* to resist Soviet hegemonism and even announced that PRC ships were sailing to Vietnam to pick up the latest "boat people."

China was aware of the possibility of a PAVN attack on Cambodia in 1978 or 1979, and some 250,000 PLA soldiers went to the border with Vietnam in August 1978 (Chanda 1989b:28). PRC leaders indicated that they would not immediately open a second front to aid Pol Pot in case of an attack by Vietnam, although border skirmishes occurred from 1975 to December 25, 1978. Then, when the PAVN attack came, Beijing made only mild protests to Hanoi and kept recently arrived PLA troops idle on the border with Vietnam.

Reasons for the seeming encouragement of Pol Pot and the obvious failure to deter the PAVN attack on Cambodia have never been clear (Chanda 1986:328–29). One school of thought is that Beijing wanted Vietnam to put the embarrassing Pol Pot out of business so that the PRC could aid a beleaguered proxy, who could be forced to change its policies, rather than back an unpopular independent regime. A second view is that China wanted to make Vietnam increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union, so that Hanoi would in time loathe Moscow as much as did Beijing. In support of the first thesis, observers note that Deng rebuked Ieng Sary in early 1979 for Pol Pot's extremist policies. The second interpretation is consistent with the fact that China was immediately ready to make a deal with Thailand, thereby gaining another ally against Moscow, in order to supply the Polpotists in early 1979. Conflicts inside the PRC leadership are a third source of explanation for the lack of clarity of policy during a critical period. A fourth explanation is that Washington's displeasure over the impending PLA move caused Chou Enlai to bargain for a mere "lesson" while negotiations over normalization with the United States were in progress. A fifth possible explanation is that China clumsily tried but failed in an exercise of deterrence; Beijing hoped to send a signal to Moscow, but the USSR did not direct Vietnam to back down. Support for theories four and five is that Beijing only agreed to drop US ties with Taiwan as an obstacle to normalization of relations between China and the United States in December after the formation of KNUFNS (Chanda 1986:330). China obviously had an exaggerated Sovietphobia and did not realize that Hanoi was making its own decisions, using Cam Ranh Bay as bait to get Soviet support against PRC hegemonism. Moscow agreed to be Vietnam's proxy, rather than the other way around, but Beijing was oblivious to these nuances.

Within the UN Security Council, China argued the case against Vietnam's intervention into Cambodia and carried the day, but it did not have to answer for its unprovoked aggression against Vietnam in February and

March. After Deng persuaded Sihanouk to return to Beijing for a second period of exile in 1979, China continued its previous dual track policy toward Cambodia—bankrolling the Prince while giving financial support to NADK forces.[1] So that PRC supplies would reach DK forces through Thai territory, Beijing agreed to Bangkok's price—a commission on arms transfers, a cessation of aid to the CPT, and Chinese oil and weapons at cut-rate prices (Shawcross 1979:126). Beijing also promised Bangkok to administer a second "lesson" to Vietnam, if needed, to safeguard Thai sovereignty (Shawcross 1984:126).

After PAVN troops entered Cambodia, President Jimmy Carter (1983:208–9) objected when Deng tried to clear the idea of a border war with Vietnam. Brzezinski (1983:411), however, "winked." The United States gave Beijing the impression that their bilateral strategic relationship assigned China a strong military role in the region. As US military supplies and training increased to the People's Liberation Army, China had no doubt that it was in an entente with the United States (Harding 1989). After PLA troops went on alert on the northern border of Vietnam in early February 1979, an offensive occurred from mid-February to mid-March, then was called off when PAVN held off the attack and the Soviet Union indicated that it would not remain idle while an ally was under attack. China publicly reserved its option to administer another "lesson," referring to its aggression in Confucian terms. In 1983 the PLA conducted small-scale attacks on Vietnam while the PAVN army was on the offensive at the Thai border; the aim was to remind Hanoi of the possible consequences of efforts to end the Cambodian stalemate by military means. Border incidents continued through 1987.

What were the aims of Beijing's punitive action against Hanoi? One purpose was to test the strength of the new Sino-American strategic relationship (Chen 1983:85–89). A related objective was to show that China was not a paper tiger, whereas reliance on the Soviet Union was an illusion. The main purpose of the month of warfare, however, was to tell Hanoi that SRV hegemony over Cambodia and Laos would not be tolerated (Bonavia 1979:12). PLA units were left along the border to divert enough PAVN soldiers so that Hanoi would be unable to eliminate the Polpotist army (Nations 1985b; UPI 1985). The strategy of "punishing" Vietnam soon shifted to "bleeding" both the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Draining Hanoi of resources, according to Beijing, would hasten the equivalent of the previous US Waterloo in Vietnam (Chanda 1979; Das 1980:15; van der Kroef 1982:1019).

China depicted Vietnam's entry into Cambodia as part of a Soviet drive for world hegemony. A similar Soviet intervention in 1979 into Afghanistan lent some credence to this view. But the PLA attack on Vietnam in 1979 served to increase, not decrease, the Soviet presence in Vietnam. The PRC demand for Hanoi to pull troops from Cambodia seemed contradictory: If

PAVN units left Cambodia, they could be redeployed on the China border for a coordinated Soviet-Vietnamese advance.

The PRC's use of force complicated SRV options instead of narrowing the range of choice. PAVN forces entered Cambodia because of PRC support for aggression by a proxy, Pol Pot. Additional PRC aggression against Vietnam merely served to vindicate Vietnam's original decision, based as it was on the assumption that Beijing sought hegemony over Southeast Asia.

China's military option, in other words, boomeranged (Jencks 1979). Repairing the loss of face for such an inept decision required even more self-delusion. US support for Beijing on Cambodia flattered the Chinese into believing that they were playing the role of regional superpower with the blessing of Washington. Vietnam's action, thus, served to cement the PRC–US strategic relationship. That US leaders had been treating China as a proxy did not dawn on Congress until the 1989 massacre near Tiananmen Square; otherwise, President George Bush's effort to discourage sanctions seemed inexplicable (Pear 1990b). But it was also true that the United States was a PRC proxy insofar as policy toward Vietnam was concerned.

In late 1979 Beijing widened secret support for Thailand into public support for all ASEAN countries in the event of further Vietnamese aggression. Calling for a united front in the region, China was trying to ally itself and the rump DK elite with ASEAN. Beijing sought to resolve every outstanding dispute with ASEAN governments, who could not at first stomach a diet of Polpotist *dim sum*, but who were pleased when China pledged to stop aiding Communist resistance forces inside their countries. The policy of aiding insurgencies still applied to Cambodia and Malaysia, so there was only a selective abandonment of the PRC policy of subversion in Southeast Asia.

China's support for Pol Pot was unpopular in the world, so Beijing sought to weld an alliance between Democratic Kampuchea and the non-Communist Cambodian resistance, a "plot aimed at continuing support for Pol Pot," according to Sihanouk.[2] In 1979, when Sihanouk escaped from the clutches of DK guards in New York, Deng Xiaoping offered to defray the Prince's expenses at the former French legation building in Beijing. In 1980 China offered to provide funds for MOULINAKA if Sihanouk would agree to ally with NADK, but the Prince held out. In 1981 Deng made an offer that Sihanouk could not refuse—aid to the ANS and assurances that the aim of the coalition was a nonaligned Cambodian state ruled by the Prince. Beijing assured ASEAN in 1981 of support for a tripartite Cambodian coalition in which the PDK element would not be allowed to dominate (FEER 1981:20). More arms went to the NADK, however, as the other forces were merely starting to build from scratch. The weapons bore the imprint "made in China," reminding NADK fighters that they were fighting as proxies (Son 1979:47). Beijing thereby set the stage for an ASEAN–designed CGDK in 1982.

Thus, China maneuvered itself into partnership with ASEAN. After CGDK formed, Beijing went into the background, allowing ASEAN to play the leading role in opposition to the abnormal situation in Cambodia that China had in part created.

Beijing's analysis was that the solution to the quagmire in Cambodia was to be found in Moscow. The appropriate strategy for resolving the situation was to isolate both the Soviet Union and Vietnam so that they would find other priorities and leave Southeast Asia as the PRC sphere of influence. China could wait for centuries, if necessary. PRC machinations were not clear outside Southeast Asia, however, as Beijing appeared to defend a small country under attack by a large aggressor.

It was thus in Cambodia that socialist countries for the first time were at war with one another. Capitalist countries could stand on the sidelines while exporters of revolution bled each other, China included. Gone were PRC claims to advance Marxist idealism and proletarian internationalism.

Beijing would not listen to pressure that demanded Pol Pot's removal from the PDK leadership (Chanda 1984b), refusing entirely to perceive that genocide had occurred in Cambodia. If Pol Pot had such a bad record, China asked, why were Cambodians willing to sign up in large numbers to serve in his army? That some Cambodians might be coerced, or were eager to enjoy a life of excitement and free food, did not seem unusual in PRC statecraft. China's hostile moves against Vietnam would in time form a pattern of aggression that would erode its influence in the world, which would wake up one day to learn that Pol Pot's protector would not hesitate to engage in a minigenocide of its own near Tiananmen Square, followed by show trials and political repression not seen in the world for many decades.

CHINESE OPTIONS

Beijing's principal policy was to back CGDK allies. Most aid went to the NADK. After trying the option of committing troops to do battle on the SRV border in 1979, the military option remained but was downplayed. China did not attempt to legitimize Pol Pot but instead campaigned for Sihanouk, who could then argue the case more persuasively. Beijing condemned Vietnam and championed sanctions. The PRC refused to become involved in peace negotiations in the early period of the war, believing that the Soviet Union was at fault for bankrolling both the PRK and the SRV.

NOTES

1. Compared to the $80 million given to NADK, Chinese aid to ANS and KPNLA was initially about $270,000 annually (Buszynski 1987:773).

2. Radio station WBAI, July 20, 1982, reporting an interview of Sihanouk by Wilfred Burchett on January 9, 1980.

6

THE SUPERPOWERS

SOVIET POLICYMAKING

Karl Marx saw a world capitalist class exploiting a world proletariat. A Communist victory in one state meant that world capitalism had begun to decay. When the USSR emerged from the Russian revolution of 1917, however, consolidation of power had immediate importance. The principle of proletarian internationalism came later, when the Communist International sought to help other movements in their independent efforts to overthrow. In 1931 the Comintern assigned Ho Chi Minh responsibility for liberating Indochina. When World War II ended, Communist Party leader Joseph Stalin was able to give more than moral support to indigenous Communist movements in other countries, as the Red Army had already overrun several countries in Eastern Europe before entering Berlin.

Stalin supported the Kuomintang army of Chiang Kaishek as the most effective fighting force against Japanese imperialism on mainland Asia during the war, but afterward Soviet support shifted to Mao Tsetung's People's Liberation Army. Ho Chi Minh's declaration of a Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945 also went almost unnoticed in Moscow, which did not set up an embassy in Hanoi until a year after Beijing did so. In 1951, when the Soviet Union finally decided to aid the insurgent Ho, the Comintern insisted that Cambodian and Laotian movements separate from Ho's efforts.

Soviet assistance to the victorious Vietminh garnered a seat for Moscow at the Geneva Conference of 1954. Instead of backing a continuing revolution in Indochina, post-Stalinists were encouraging a thaw in the cold war. Accordingly, the Kremlin agreed to pressure Ho to withdraw aid and troops from the Cambodian resistance and South Vietnam in exchange for France's veto of the proposed European Defense Community (Porter 1980:247). In 1962, at the Geneva Conference on Laos, the USSR even unilaterally pledged that it would not allow North Vietnam to use Lao

territory as a transit point for aid to NLF insurgents in the South. Soviet economic aid flowed to North Vietnam, but Moscow left Cambodia as Vietnam's sphere of influence.

Leaving the future of Cambodia to Vietnam was not the most clever way of pleasing Pol Pot, whose identity was unknown to Moscow for several decades. In 1959 the Kremlin turned down Sihanouk's request for aid in view of the policy of leaving Indochina to Hanoi. The Prince was unable to attract Soviet bloc assistance until 1963, when he severed diplomatic relations with the United States.

During the 1960s the increasing rivalry between China and the Soviet Union complicated relations between the Kremlin and Indochina. Chinese Red Guards intercepted Soviet aid for North Vietnam. In 1965 the Kremlin outbid China as Hanoi's principal supporter, but the amount was only enough to confine Hanoi's attention to the unification of Vietnam. Moscow feared that a stronger Vietnam, which had a significant pro-Chinese faction, would later side with Beijing (Zagoria 1967:127). In 1968 Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev proposed an Asian collective security scheme to contain China. Neither Cambodia nor North Vietnam wanted to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and only India signed up in anticipation of war with US-backed Pakistan.

When Lon Nol came to power, the Soviet embassy remained in Phnom Penh, although FUNK and GRUNK were mobilizing a campaign to deprive the Khmer Republic of diplomatic representation. After the Prince's ouster, Moscow rejected his plea in Moscow for assistance, since he was a royalist and therefore a reactionary, according to Marxist theory.

The Sino-Soviet split had become so serious by 1970 that Moscow was opposing PRC foreign policy even when it meant extending diplomatic recognition to the US-backed Lon Nol regime. The Soviets broke relations with the Khmer Republic only one month before Pol Pot's armies marched into Phnom Penh. Beijing and Moscow both tried to restrain Hanoi's final offensive in 1975, fearing that their influence in the region would erode while Vietnam grew stronger, but there was nothing that either country could do to reverse historical forces that had been in motion for so long.

When Communist revolutions succeeded in Indochina during 1975, Moscow cancelled all debts to Vietnam but hoped to reduce aid to the region (Porter 1981:78). Vietnam expected funds from the United States to engage in reconstruction, as promised during the Paris negotiations. When the US Congress refused, Hanoi went to Beijing and Moscow, hat in hand. Although two Soviet ships docked at Cam Ranh Bay soon after the victory in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam refused to grant the Soviet Union a permanent naval base. Hanoi's search for aid from Western countries and Japan during 1976 angered the Kremlin, which felt compelled to compete by providing a substantial commitment. Moscow turned down Hanoi's request for a steel mill in 1976, considering the project too expensive for a country not yet in its orbit.

Brezhnev wanted to extend Soviet influence to Southeast Asia in order to encircle China. In exchange for Soviet aid, Hanoi felt required only to support Moscow in UN voting. In 1976, when Premier Pham Van Dong sought a diplomatic solution to the border dispute with Democratic Kampuchea, the Kremlin pointed out that Vietnam was free to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—and that Soviet ships looked forward some day to docking at Cam Ranh Bay on a more regular basis. Vietnamese leaders did not want their country to fight a war of independence, only to become a Soviet proxy, so they refused to denounce China. In 1977, however, numerous high-level visits between Hanoi and Soviet bloc nations took place, while the war with Democratic Kampuchea heated up.

Upon achieving victory, Democratic Kampuchea terrorized diplomats in the USSR embassy in Phnom Penh and refused to allow the Soviet Union to reopen its embassy thereafter. The remaining DK attaché from Moscow was recalled in May 1977. From 1975 to 1978 the DK government rounded up KGB agents, real or imagined, for execution.

Since the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict was between socialist countries, Soviet leaders saw events as artifically contrived by PRC strategic thinking, not as a result of underlying historical forces. Accordingly, Moscow moved to redress the balance of power, hoping to create conditions for resolution of the conflict, and encouraged Vietnam to eliminate the Pol Pot menace.

As the crisis between Hanoi and Phnom Penh escalated, Vietnam finally joined CMEA and negotiated—but did not sign—a bilateral military agreement with Moscow in mid-1978. By November, Hanoi ran out of options and signed the bilateral pact, thereby opening the country to a Soviet military presence. When PAVN troops entered Cambodia, the Soviet Union had approved in advance, justifying Hanoi's move in terms of self-defense and human rights.

China's sneak attack on Vietnam was the first test of the SRV–USSR alliance. Moscow did not send ships in its Pacific fleet to Cam Ranh Bay in anticipation, as the Kremlin did not want to appear aggressive. Moscow expected a quick victory by Vietnam in Cambodia, with minimum need for USSR involvement. When the PLA intervened, the Soviet Union responded by mobilizing one million troops on the border with China, while dispatching ships to Cam Ranh Bay; these were restrained measures, according to US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (1983:414). Beijing had the Americans inform the Russians that the "lesson" would last only twenty days, so the Kremlin issued a stern warning to China, reassuring Hanoi. But with Soviet forces in Vietnam, Sino-American strategic cooperation increased.

With China prepared to bankroll Pol Pot's forces, using Sihanouk as a trump card, the USSR was ready to live up to its role as the leader of the socialist world by sending various forms of aid to both the PRK and the SRV. Much of the latter assistance went to the war in Cambodia. When

the war turned into a contest between proxies of Beijing and Moscow, Soviet leaders let Hanoi know that it considered PAVN border incursions into Thailand to be too provocative. The Soviet Union tried to keep as low a profile as possible in order to minimize its unpopularity in the region.

In July 1979 the PRK and the USSR inked agreements for commercial cooperation and nonreimbursable aid; some 85 percent of PRK trade was with the Soviet Union (Hiebert 1990d:61). When Heng Samrin journeyed to Moscow in early 1980, agreements were signed for cultural and scientific cooperation and economic and technical assistance, but the PRK never joined CMEA. Economic aid to the PRK, worth $134 million in 1980, rose to $180 million by 1987; this compared with $2 billion in Soviet aid in 1980 and $3 billion by 1989 to Vietnam (Hiebert 1990f; Pradhan 1985:200). Military aid to the PRK rose from $100 million in the early 1980s to $350 million in 1987, considerably more than the amount China provided the resistance (US ACDA 1989:78). The 1987 allotment consisted of tanks and other military hardware in anticipation of a PAVN withdrawal.

The PRK and the USSR issued joint policy declarations on various subjects including disarmament, dismantling military blocs, and settling international conflicts through peaceful means, but Moscow did not insist on an alliance with the PRK. The Kremlin did not want to overshadow Hanoi's special relationship with Phnom Penh (Pradham 1985:6, 200). Nevertheless, Soviet technicians quietly managed the port of Kompong Som and rubber plantations in the southern part of Cambodia, and they provided project aid in the fields of agriculture, construction, power, and transport. The number of personnel was 2,000 compared with 8,000 Soviet experts estimated in Vietnam (Chanda 1981a).

In 1981 China laid down preconditions for normal relations with the Soviet Union. One requirement was to stop aid to Vietnam that supported military operations in Cambodia. Moscow wanted to be considered a trustworthy alliance leader, so it put support for Vietnam above the objective of normalizing relations with China during the early 1980s, refusing to discuss Cambodia or Vietnam with Beijing since these were "third countries."

US POLICYMAKING

There are at least two diplomatic traditions in US history. One is a moralistic strain, which supports international law, peaceful resolution of international conflicts, and self-determination of peoples. A *realpolitik* tradition emphasizes that international change requires the use of muscle to advance commercial and strategic interests as well as idealistic aims. The two traditions are often fused. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, declared the Americas to be within the US sphere of influence, with Washington presumably ready to back its claim with force, without regard for the wishes

of the peoples of the continent south of the Rio Grande River. Beginning with Harry Truman, presidents in the cold war era extended the Monroe Doctrine to other parts of the world on behalf of anti-Communist ideals, lumping Western European democracies and various US-supported Third World military dictatorships into the category "free world," again without consulting the local populations. Whichever tradition dominates, Americans tend to downplay historical factors in the belief that destiny has called the United States to remake the world in the image of the "rags to riches" success story of the first new nation.

Meanwhile, foreign policy tends to be formulated in Washington without much input from the American people. Embassies that collect information around the world give the executive branch an edge over the legislature in any country. In a democracy the inevitable public outcry against mistaken *realpolitik* sometimes undermines the credibility of pompous Metternichian diplomacy—a situation particularly exacerbated in the United States, where one branch of government sometimes restrains another when one attempts to be a bull in the world's china shop, unpredictably taking extreme punitive measures against countries who dare to disagree in some small way with US policy.

Accordingly, in Washington there have been two schools of thought regarding Cambodia. One is that the United States should have good relations with all governments. A second view is that Cambodia is a small fish in a big pond, to be treated in the context of an ongoing world power struggle. The latter position has prevailed wherever Washington has applied cold war criteria, even when no such perspective is relevant, ignoring the historical forces operating within a country. The domino theory, which likens states to woodblocks aligned in a row, has motivated Beltway decision-makers regarding Southeast Asia far more than an appreciation of the reality of nationalism. Until middle-class hegemonism arises in the domestic politics of Southeast Asia, the United States will tend to view the region as developing but not developed enough to be respected on the same basis as European democracies.

US support for Ho Chi Minh toward the end of World War II was based on the desire to defeat Japan. Washington rebuffed Ho's efforts to maintain ties thereafter, supported France's effort to recapture Indochina on the assumption that there would be a transition to eventual independence, but refused to back France's scheme of a set of associated states in Indochina as a crude reimposition of colonialism. Indochina, according to US observers, was worse off in 1945 than in 1845; the French, President Franklin Roosevelt concluded, should be replaced by a UN trusteeship. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who wanted to regain Britain's empire, vetoed the idea.

At the beginning of the cold war, Washington began to see maps blotted with a disturbing shade of red, then repeated Britain's error in the American

war of independence. As William Pitt, London's foremost opponent of the war pointed out, no firepower on earth can "conquer a map" when the aim is to capture the hearts and minds of the people. When France might have needed military assistance in Vietnam, US troops were bogged down in Korea. In 1951 the DRV was removed from most-favored-nation privileges for siding with China and North Korea. In 1952, when Sihanouk went to Washington to enlist support for an independent Cambodia, he received a lecture from future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he should support France in the fight against Communism. The Prince's argument, that French colonial rule was the most potent recruiting theme for the Indochinese Communist movements, was rejected. In 1953 the new administration of Dwight Eisenhower aided the French in an effort to stop Communism in Vietnam, but the support came too late.

After the Geneva Conference of 1954, Washington took over protection of South Vietnam from France but reluctantly tolerated nonaligned Sihanouk's rule. After Congress banned food-for-peace aid to the DRV in 1954, the State Department closed its consulate in Hanoi in 1955, which dated back to the era of French colonial rule. Dulles drafted the SEATO treaty to serve as a legal basis for subsequent US military intervention in Indochina (Sulzberger 1964). The US government escalated support for the Republic of Vietnam on this pretext in 1965, although the text of the treaty contains no clear obligation (Haas 1973:267–69). Despite the implicit US threat to deny aid to Cambodia unless Sihanouk agreed to join SEATO, the Prince campaigned against SEATO protection during elections held in 1955. Afterward, Sihanouk agreed to US aid, but when China topped the US commitment in 1956, Washington suspended its assistance in protest and then decided to build up the Cambodian military while secretly aiding the insurgent Khmer Serei. In the final accounting, US aid exceeded PRC and Soviet aid (Chang 1985:21).

Eisenhower knew that Ho Chi Minh was popular throughout Vietnam. Since the Geneva accords of 1954 required elections, Dulles urged Saigon to refuse to abide by the agreement. The US public would not support sending troops to South Vietnam so soon after the demoralizing stalemate in Korea from 1950 to 1953. Eisenhower instead approved covert aid for South Vietnam on the grounds that if Saigon fell, so would all of Southeast Asia and ultimately Japan in due course. US aid, in turn, prompted Hanoi to support the resistance movement in the South (Slater 1990). Eisenhower was unaware of the deeper nationalistic forces at work.

President John Kennedy was willing to "pay any price" to defeat Communism. After the abortive effort to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba, a more sophisticated strategy was devised for South Vietnam. Evidence of CIA involvement in the assassination of ROV Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 alerted Sihanouk to the reality that Washington preferred proxy, not independent, rulers. When the Prince shortly thereafter found out about

Yankee support for the Khmer Serei, he cancelled US aid. ARVN attacks inside Cambodia, calculated to make him more submissive, provoked the prince to renounce SEATO protection. When he severed US diplomatic ties in 1964, he became known as the "red prince," but the military cadre built up in Cambodia with US aid remained.

President Lyndon Johnson campaigned against Republican candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 with a pledge not to involve the United States in a war in Indochina. Goldwater recommended bombing North Vietnam, a move seen as reckless by the US electorate, who returned Johnson to office. The gradual escalation of US aid to Vietnam under Kennedy and Johnson meant that inevitably a pretext might be found to enter Indochina. In 1964 Johnson found that pretext. He alleged that a PAVN naval vessel attacked a US ship in the Gulf of Tonkin, although the truth later emerged that the ship was acting in self-defense. Johnson slapped an export embargo on Vietnam as well (Yu, Pregelj & Sutter 1989).

When Congress voted to commit US troops to Vietnam's civil war in 1965, a primary justification was to contain the influence of China. With the Ho Chi Minh Trail in full operation, Washington misjudged the nationalistic ambitions of Vietnam and failed to understand that anti-Communism was not the top priority of the good citizens of the South. Dangling money in front of poor Asians was a recruiting vehicle for ARVN as well as the Saigon cronyocracy/narcocracy that the United States was thenceforth pledged to defend (McCoy 1972:ch. 5), yet the US army pushed ARVN aside as an army of racial inferiors (Sheehan 1988). When Washington asked its SEATO allies to join in the struggle, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand obliged. South Korea also sent troops. US military operations soon expanded into Cambodia, which Washington considered to be a sideshow, where North Vietnam and the Vietcong maintained enclaves in Cambodia to subvert South Vietnam.

In 1969 Richard Nixon became president. Having campaigned to pull US troops from Vietnam, Nixon's doctrine articulated the principle that any future US military role in the world would serve to supplement efforts of indigenous armies to hold back Communism. In Southeast Asia this meant returning combat to the South Vietnamese army. Nonetheless, US operations in Cambodia escalated into the 1969 bombing that was secretly directed by Nixon to shorten the war. Congress in 1970 reacted to limit the US role in Cambodia but the US embassy in Phnom Penh directed bombing until 1973 in violation of this law. The American people expressed outrage that Cambodia, a country that had never harmed the United States, was a victim of so much destruction, whereas Nixon felt that numerous violations of Cambodian neutrality by North Vietnam justified the bombing. Nixon also noted that the Prince permitted some US military operations inside Cambodia in 1969, as they attacked enemies of his regime, but he never approved of indiscriminate bombing. Sihanouk (1973) obviously drew the line at gen-

ocide, a term he subsequently applied to US military strategy in Indochina as a whole.

Nixon (1978) was in the dark as to what was going on. His imagination went out of control when he later sought to justify his action by claiming that the Communist resistance in Cambodia was highly organized by 1970, that there was a firm alliance between Hanoi and Pol Pot, that the Lon Nol era brought peace, and similar errors of fact (Hovey 1977). Despite some cooperation with Sihanouk in 1969, the CIA established ties with more reliable proxies in Phnom Penh, then pretended to be surprised when Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk in 1970. Subsequent aid to the Khmer Republic lined the pockets of a clique in command of an untrained army that could only spray bullets, not pinpoint targets.

Nixon thought that détentes with Beijing and Moscow would force Hanoi to capitulate. In the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, Nixon sought to play the "China card" against the Soviet Union so that DRV aid to the Vietcong would dry up. Two separate Vietnams were to be maintained, according to the declaration. Both China and the United States wanted Vietnam to be kept weak, but they failed.

National Security Council (NSC) Adviser Henry Kissinger, Nixon's primary source of information about foreign affairs, was also out of touch with realities in Cambodia. He underestimated Sihanouk's charisma, asked Hanoi to pressure Pol Pot's forces to arrange a cease-fire with the Khmer Republic, urged Chou Enlai to bring Sihanouk and Lon Nol into an accommodation that was acceptable to neither Cambodian leader, rebuffed French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's advice to drop Lon Nol when there was a chance for the Prince to resume power, approved massive bombing of Cambodia without an apparent strategic goal, frantically sought to build a fanciful Pol Pot–Sihanouk coalition to replace Lon Nol, and was too late in prevailing upon Phnom Penh to beg Sihanouk to return to power (Shawcross 1979:260–64). Kissinger, in turn, received advice from diplomats including John Gunther Dean, US ambassador in Phnom Penh, who wanted US support for Lon Nol to end in March so that "pro-PRC Communists" would take over before "pro-DRV Communists." Dean's recommendation was based on the disingenuous belief that Sihanouk was pro-Chinese, while Pol Pot was pro-Vietnamese.[1]

Reflecting on the era of US involvement in Southeast Asia under Nixon and Kissinger, Sihanouk later stated, "They demoralized America, they lost all of Indochina to the Communists, and they created the Khmer Rouge" (Shawcross 1979:391). Despite efforts of Kissinger and others to account for this series of fiascoes, the impression remains that anti-Communism and assumed US omnipotence deluded Beltway decisionmakers. Indeed, White House contempt for public opinion on Cambodia was one of the proposed charges in articles of impeachment prepared to drive Nixon from office. The domestic disillusionment over Vietnam greatly contributed to a growing

drug culture, a distrust of government, and a sense of national humiliation over defeat.

The US response to Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 was to continue economic embargoes. ROV funds in US banks were frozen.[2] Nonetheless, President Gerald Ford talked about a "great national reconciliation" over Vietnam, a $1 billion aid package to Vietnam, and normalization of relations with Hanoi later in the year. By 1976, an election year, he dropped this rhetoric because of congressional opposition in light of PAVN's victory over South Vietnam in apparent violation of the Geneva accords.

When the new Cambodian regime's navy began to assert itself, several islands claimed by Vietnam were seized. In the midst of these operations, the RAK navy confronted the US merchant ship *Mayagüez*, which was forced to surrender; its crew was placed under arrest. Ford responded by having US airforce and naval units shell the coast of Cambodia, while mounting an effort to rescue the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of Beijing, the crew and ship were released. But the US military personnel were called for duty from bases in Thailand, and the US government did not ask Bangkok for formal permission to use Thai airspace and territorial waters. Infuriated, the Thai public demanded a closing of US bases and a shutdown of SEATO, which closed its doors on January 1, 1977.

The US embassy in Phnom Penh was evacuated in 1975, but onetime CIA collaborators remained in the country. Democratic Kampuchea began to search for these individuals, who endured the confessions, torture, and executions that were meted out to other alleged enemies of the regime. Information about human rights abuses leaked out slowly, but not definitively enough for Washington to respond.

When Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency in 1976, he vowed that there would be no more Cambodias or Vietnams. Ford's election plans nosedived after he pardoned Nixon, so he could not pardon Vietnam as well.

Shortly after taking office, Carter dispatched Leonard Woodcock to Vietnam as a special representative to proceed with negotiations to normalize relations with Vietnam. Woodcock went to Hanoi, but he received no reply to a request to go to Phnom Penh. As a US mission remained in Laos, he went to the DK embassy at Vientiane in order to obtain approval for a trip to Phnom Penh, but he encountered a locked door that refused to open. Democratic Kampuchea considered the United States to be aggressive and imperialistic, unworthy of serving as an interlocutor. Nonetheless, Washington eased travel restrictions to the land of Angkor Wat, and a shipment of DDT went from the United States to Cambodia in order to help in insect eradication (interviewee #40), although it is not known whether the gift left the transshipment port of Hongkong.

The Ford administration cleared the way for inaugural visits of the World

Bank to Hanoi in 1976 and 1977. Carter granted licenses for $5 million of private humanitarian aid to Vietnam (Lewis 1977:A13). In 1977 the US delegation, having vetoed Vietnam's application for UN membership in 1975 and 1976, allowed the SRV to join the United Nations. Secretary of State Cryus Vance (1983:450) noted that Hanoi was trying to maintain equidistance between China and the Soviet Union.

Democratic Kampuchea preferred to follow its own path. As events unfolded, Carter became aware of the genocide in progress in Cambodia. Although human rights were a cornerstone of his foreign policy, he took no action beyond condemning the regime as "the world's worst violator of human rights," referring the matter to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and asking the UN Security Council in October 1979 to discuss the Cambodian-Vietnamese border war (NYT 1978).[3]

NSC Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had bigger fish to fry. He wanted to normalize relations with China in order to show muscle to the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Vance, on the other hand, wanted to improve US relations with all countries in the world; this included Vietnam, which the NSC adviser considered to be of peripheral importance. The thesis that Vietnam could be independent of both the PRC and the USSR, a development that both Beijing and Moscow feared, was brushed aside when Brzezinski persuaded Carter that Vance was "soft" on Vietnam. The NSC adviser evidently wanted to push Hanoi into the arms of the Soviet Union so that he could play the "China card" against Moscow while accusing Hanoi of being the latest Soviet client state, yet another example of a recurring US penchant for geopolitical masturbation.

In May 1978 Brzezinski (1983:207, 345) went to Beijing with instructions from Carter to "facilitate the emergence of an independent Cambodian government that enjoys the support of its people." When he returned from China, however, Brzezinski espoused Deng Xiaoping's vision of Democratic Kampuchea as a victim of Soviet-Vietnamese aggression.

In August 1978 peacenik Senator George McGovern offered an unexpected proposal that an international force go to Cambodia to stop the ongoing genocide. Rather than considering the idea with care, the State Department responded the following day, without apparent deliberation, that the proposal was not under consideration by anyone.[4] McGovern's suggestion, in other words, was rejected out of hand. Carter was using human rights performance as a screening criterion to apply to potential aid recipients. Since Democratic Kampuchea received no US assistance, there was no immediate way in which to apply sanctions against DK human rights violations. Although a trade embargo was applied, the DK regime was not engaging in international commerce.

Vietnam had been insisting on US reparations before allowing a normalization in relations. An angry Congress prohibited any such aid. When Vu Hoang, a senior Foreign Ministry official, hinted during midsummer

1978 that Vietnam would drop the US aid precondition—doubtless realizing that the clock was ticking on a contemplated surprise attack on Cambodia—the concession came too late. China was on the verge of agreeing to full normalization with the United States. As Beijing objected to Washington's referral of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border war to the UN Security Council, it appeared to Brzezinski that Deng might balk if Washington agreed to establish relations with Hanoi before Beijing. Despite public pressure to make PRC–US normalization conditional on an end of PRC aid to Pol Pot, Brzezinski in effect capitulated to Beijing.[5] With SRV–US relations on a back burner, Hanoi signed up with Moscow, and the situation polarized.

History fails to record any specific benefit that the United States derived by playing the "China card" in late 1978 or thereafter. If the aim were to contain Moscow, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Cam Ranh Bay during 1979 proved that the power play had no deterrent effect and may instead have been an incentive for a probing Soviet role in Asia.

Although rumors were rife in Thailand during 1978 that Vietnam was planning to invade Cambodia (interviewee #40), there was little that Washington could do. In early 1979 US Defense Secretary Harold Brown (1979:7) condemned Vietnam's attack on Cambodia as "minor league hegemonism," echoing China's rhetoric. Carter initially declared the United States to be neutral in the dispute among contending Cambodian factions. China urged Washington to support all the resistance factions (Porter 1988a:816), but the initial US policy was to back Bangkok, which feared an aggressive military force on its borders. When Washington contemplated aiding its ally, Thailand, the Soviet Union assured US officials that Vietnam's aim was to eliminate Pol Pot. Eager to confront the Kremlin at every opportunity, Brzezinski talked Thailand into volunteering as a US proxy against Vietnam by serving as a conduit for PRC aid in order to keep Pol Pot's forces going so that Hanoi would be denied a victory (interviewee #10). The US public would never permit an open alliance with Pol Pot, Brzezinski (1983:440) reasoned, but China and Thailand could be more pragmatic (Becker 1986:440). Hence, NADK became a PRC and a Thai proxy, a US proxy twice removed. Clearly, geostrategic considerations outweighed human rights factors regarding Cambodia.

Sihanouk went to the UN in January 1979 to focus the debate on PAVN aggression, and then escaped from DK security at his hotel in New York. The US government offered to host Sihanouk as a guest but was relieved when he agreed to return to Beijing under the care of Deng Xiaoping, who argued that the Prince could serve as a symbol to unite the Cambodian people more effectively than the discredited forces of Pol Pot. Washington was eager to play the "Sihanouk card," too, in view of the aversion to what Americans called the "Khmer Rouge."

Since the embargo on Vietnam remained in effect after 1975, the Carter

administration could only respond to Hanoi's entry into Cambodia by canceling normalization talks. A similar embargo continued against the PRK, a regime described as "Vietnam-installed." US allies, while maintaining their embassies in Hanoi, stopped all aid to Cambodia and Vietnam. Washington and its closest allies had enough votes in the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to freeze disbursements on loans to both countries.

Brzezinski believed that he was the one who persuaded China to keep Pol Pot going when DK troops were nearly annihilated in early 1979, as a way to counter the Russians (Becker 1986:440). The Russian-baiting Brzezinski (1983:17, 410) admits that he "winked" when the PLA attacked Vietnam for a month during early 1979. Carter had urged Deng to reconsider the proposed aggression on pragmatic grounds, as Vietnam might get sympathy if attacked unprovoked, but he never suggested that China's "lesson" to Vietnam would be intolerable. When the PLA proceeded, the US response was to register moderate disapproval, calling for the withdrawal of China from Vietnam as well as Vietnam from Cambodia. Washington also urged the Soviet Union to join in exercising restraint over the situation. Three months later Vance proposed SRV-US discussions on Cambodia, arguing that Washington was driving independent-minded Vietnam into the arms of the Soviet Union; his idea died when Brzezinski suggested clearing it with the Chinese, knowing their views on the subject. The United States thus became China's proxy in regard to Cambodia.

Rosalynn Carter, the president's wife, visited the Cambodian border of Thailand during 1979 to investigate US aid to the famine in the war-torn country. After her trip she urged increased US support for private emergency aid. Those who have studied the relief effort with care have concluded, nevertheless, that specific US efforts were undertaken to ensure that NADK soldiers were fed at a time when the real need was to save more ordinary peasants (Mason & Brown 1983:110, 126; Vickery 1987). Operation USA quietly provided $7 million in relief aid to Cambodians under PRK rule from 1979 (Kyodo 1990), but Washington initially denied licenses to other nongovernmental organizations to provide aid in Cambodia and Vietnam.

President Carter supplied some covert aid to the NCR in 1979, but he denied Sihanouk's request in 1980 for funds to help raise an army of 10,000 (Clymer 1990:1). In late November 1980, before President-Elect Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, former CIA official Ray Cline of his transition team established contact with the Pol Pot forces (LA Times 1980).

When Reagan took office in 1981, his rabid anti-Communism was manifest in a policy of confronting Moscow around the world to roll back Soviet victories since World War II (Haas 1983). A vilification of Vietnam as a Soviet proxy, and thus as a part of the "evil empire," could serve to justify increased military spending. The Cambodian conflict provided a pretext for Reagan to vent fury on Hanoi, victorious in the war with the United States, by "bleeding Vietnam white."[6]

The first sign of a change in US policy was an increase in military aid to Thailand after 1980. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that Vietnam would ultimately cry "uncle" when Soviet spending failed to keep up with Sino–US outlays (Alagappa 1989b:23; Chanda 1981b). Although Bangkok claimed not to be involved in the war directly, the increased shipment of weapons to the Thais was available for resale to the Cambodian resistance, as PRC aid gave NADK funds to make such purchases (Smith 1979). After CGDK was formed, US annual covert aid to the resistance grew from $4 million to perhaps $10 million (Chanda 1986:402; Erlanger 1989a; Tran 1990).[7] The secret funds were administered by a Working Group set up in 1981, presumably to service NCR forces (interviewee #57). The aid amounts were fungible; that is, sums earmarked for a particular type of aid were provided to Singapore and Thailand to spend without subsequent US accountability audits on how the money was actually used. Weapons made in Singapore and Taiwan under Belgian and US license, respectively, then went into the hands of Pol Pot's allies (Schanberg 1990), who could resell for profit. In this manner US aid could go to NADK through untraceable conduits. The Working Group formally consisted of the defense and foreign ministers of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, together with senior US State Department officials. In practice, senior officials from all countries, including CIA staff, attended regular meetings to receive requests from either ANS or KPNLA for weapons (ABC-TV 1990:6). Arms flowed after reviews of battle plans. The CIA shared intelligence derived from surveillance satellites and other sources at Working Group meetings. In addition, Congress appropriated about $500 million each year for the transfer of excess nonlethal supplies of Defense Department stocks and transportation costs for the shipment of donated lethal aid from nongovernmental sources (US House 1990:152). Known as the McCollum program, this aid began as a conduit for supplies to the resistance in Afghanistan and was later extended to Cambodia.

In 1985 Representative Stephen Solarz, chair of the House Committee on Asia and the Pacific, argued that the NCR needed more help to serve as an alternative to the two Communist factions. Accordingly, Congress voted $5 million in overt aid to the NCR. Although lethal aid was approved, the Reagan administration sent only nonlethal items (boats, rice, salaries of soldiers, training, travel, uniforms, vehicles), and the full amount was not spent (Clymer 1990:3; Lewis 1989; Stone 1990e:2; Sutter 1988). As Solarz later admitted, "this distinction between lethal aid and nonlethal assistance is a distinction without any substantive difference" (Stone 1989b:14).

Thus, Washington increasingly became an ally of Pol Pot by dint of support for his allies. Brzezinski did so knowingly. To avoid embarrassing questions, both the Carter and Reagan administrations pretended not to take a leadership role regarding Cambodia. Haig said that he was merely backing the countries of ASEAN as one of the "six pillars" of his Asia-

Pacific security policy. Accordingly, no queries needed to be addressed to Washington concerning Cambodia; they should be directed instead to ASEAN. If the ASEAN Lola wanted to back Pol Pot, that is what Lola got—although US officials would theatrically walk out of conferences when PDK delegates spoke. Washington, meanwhile, sought to influence ASEAN's policy through the leverage of PRC pressure and US aid. ASEAN countries, in turn, asked Washington to do more to balance Chinese aid levels. US military exercises with ASEAN countries began, including even nonaligned Indonesia. The strategy was to control the situation without appearing to do so. The US government first pretended to be a junior partner with ASEAN and China on Cambodia, then a supporter of Sihanouk. Washington never questioned the feasibility of ASEAN's or Sihanouk's strategies in the early 1980s.

Washington's policy requires an explanation to account for such perfidy. One reason for US policy was the "Vietnam syndrome," a term applied to the reluctance of the American public to support foreign adventures of any kind, particularly in Southeast Asia. Any renewed aid to fight Vietnam would evoke a public outcry. Appearing to have a passive policy was seen as a plus, muting domestic criticism and debate. Covert aid, thus, might blow up in Reagan's face unless the public could first be conditioned to accept a return to CIA mischief as normal diplomacy. Therefore, Reagan's support for the terrorist Contras in Central America during the 1980s provided a model for action in Cambodia and succeeded in weaning the public away from a reluctance to use force, even when it violated international law. Nonetheless, congressional Democrats hampered the Contras, and NCR aid was modest.

A second explanation was that Beltway foreign policy experts were eager to trip up Vietnam, a country that not only defeated the United States but also threatened US allies such as Thailand, thereby exposing the weakness of Washington's containment and deterrence policies worldwide. Cambodia was to be Vietnam's Vietnam, according to this punitive outlook, which yearned for the day when the United States was once the world's economic benefactor and balancer of power against aggressive Stalinism. The United States, according to this view, wanted to be a bully in the world's schoolyard, unpredictable yet powerful, with a score to settle with Vietnam over its ignominious defeat. A profoundly emotional Washington appeared to terrify countries around the world into voting for DK representation at the United Nations. Even if they abstained, poor countries perceived that they risked cuts in US foreign aid. On the other hand, the Reagan administration was eager for progress on negotiations to identify American soldiers missing in action (MIAs) in Vietnam, so US involvement in Cambodia never threatened Vietnam.

A third explanation was the complexity of the situation. Experts and lay persons alike were lost in a maze of conflicting claims and unfamiliar actors. Public opinion played almost no role, leaving Cambodian machinations to

a bellicose yet inattentive president and a confused but subordinate Department of State. China thus led US policymakers by the nose, appealing shrewdly to Sovietphobia and Vietphobia rather than to a profound analysis of long-range options for the United States in Southeast Asia. The third explanation meshed well with the idea that Southeast Asia was not of strategic interest to the United States. Although a superpower by definition has worldwide interests, the decision to peripheralize Indochina was premised on the primacy of the Soviet threat for world domination, which China alone could counter as a landbased power. As noted previously, US policy toward Cambodia resulted in an expansion of Soviet power to a Vietnam that initially wanted to maintain equidistance between all the major powers of Asia, including China—but this was a subtlety almost unknown in Washington.

When asked to explicate US policy toward Cambodia during the early 1980s, the standard State Department response was that the United States wanted the people of Cambodia to exercise self-determination. The PAVN military presence prevented free elections, so it should be removed. The PRK should be denied legitimacy, even to the extent of voting to seat the Pol Pot faction in the United Nations from 1979 to 1981. Meanwhile, Washington worked to forge a coalition between Sihanouk and Son Sann, thereby creating an entity called the "non-Communist resistance." Hence, a fourth explanation of US policy toward Cambodia seems plausible: As a superpower, Washington is accustomed to creating reality, not adjusting to it. The solution in Cambodia was to bring about a stronger NCR to ward off Pol Pot, the PRK, and Vietnam. The low probability that such a reality could be brought into existence did not matter to US policymakers.

An important American cultural value has been expressed in Thomas Paine's maxim, "We have it in our power to make the world again." Whereas the new world envisaged by Paine's contemporaries was one in which international law would provide justice to all nations, the world sought in the era after World War II was one that would successfully confront a Communist empire by protecting US hegemony in a "free world." Too often, this policy entailed suppressing democratic aspirations: Consider Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, and elsewhere (Chomsky & Herman 1979b). Beyond the objective of toppling the PRK to install the NCR was the reality that US policy sustained the Polpotists in Cambodia. The fourth explanation for US policy, thus, flowed from wishful thinking rather than strategic analysis.

After 1985, the Reagan administration emphasized its support of the NCR and the desire to bring Sihanouk back to head a new government in Cambodia. The viability of the NCR was never questioned. That a victory for the NCR was impossible without a coalition with the NADK was never admitted. There was no initial candor that a NADK–NCR victory over the PRK would turn the NADK loose to annihilate the NCR. Washington could

not make a strategic assessment that the NCR was almost nonexistent militarily; it wanted to stonewall until a pro-US opportunist came to power in Phnom Penh by any means whatever. Support for the NCR, therefore, was a figleaf for a policy of keeping Polpotism alive and well until something better emerged. Having already been accused by Sihanouk of committing genocide in Cambodia during the Lon Nol era, Washington had too much blood on its hands to single out Polpotism as an evil to be eradicated.

SUPERPOWER OPTIONS

The two superpowers were primarily involved in supporting proxies in Southeast Asia. Sending troops to Cambodia was out of the question, although Soviet military advisers were quite visible at the Phnom Penh airport during most of the war, and they inhabited military bases in Vietnam. The Soviet Union sought to legitimize the PRK; the United States went to bat for the NCR. Washington condemned Vietnam for doing in Cambodia what the US government itself had done in Vietnam, and then it imposed economic sanctions on the PRK and the SRV. Washington stopped diplomatic negotiations with Vietnam on most subjects except efforts to identify the remains of American MIAs. Although both the Soviet Union and the United States professed to favor negotiations, neither country took any open leadership in this regard, leaving the matter to be handled by the Southeast Asian countries most directly involved.

NOTES

1. According to a telegram from Dean. John McAuliff reports that this communication was uncovered through a Freedom of Information Act request in 1989.
2. Laos, however, escaped these reprisals.
3. I addressed a letter to President Carter in September 1989 to clarify these points, but I later learned that he lacked time to look up documents concerning his policy toward the Pol Pot regime.
4. *New York Times*, August 22, 1978, pp. 76–77; *New York Times*, August 23, 1978, p. 41. Due to a newspaper strike, these articles appear untitled on microfilm.
5. The pressure came from Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, for example: *New York Times*, August 30, 1978, p. 90.
6. The quotation is from Reagan, who explained US policy to Sir Robert Jackson in 1981. Interview with Sir Robert Jackson, January 23, 1990. On support for NADK, see Lee (1982).
7. Prince Sihanouk has acknowledged the existence of US lethal aid to the NCR (ABC-TV 1990:3).

7

ASEAN

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS

When the Sukarno period of Indonesian confrontation toward Southeast Asian countries ended in 1965, the new regime of President Suharto decided to adopt a good neighbor policy. In 1967 Foreign Minister Adam Malik flew from Jakarta to Bangkok to discuss the possibilities of a regional organization with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. The result later that year was the establishment of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed initially of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In 1984 newly independent Brunei joined ASEAN.

ASEAN began as a project of foreign ministers; its goals were primarily political (Haas 1989a:ch. 7). The five original countries wanted to act together as a bloc in order to advance interests of the region and to attract foreign assistance that would unite rather than divide the countries. During the era of US intervention into the Vietnamese civil war, the Philippines and Thailand provided bases for the United States, while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were members of the nonaligned movement. The Khmer Republic, Laos, and South Vietnam were present at some ASEAN meetings as observers before 1975; Sihanouk's government was not.

In 1971 ASEAN foreign ministers issued a fundamental joint statement, known as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which pledged the Southeast Asia should be neutralized from superpower politics, so foreign bases were temporary and should be ultimately withdrawn. The superpowers were called upon to guarantee a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. While warfare continued in Indochina, ASEAN considered the situation abnormal and sought a lasting peace for the region. ASEAN countries wanted non-Communist factions to prevail, but not at the price of having superpowers perceive the region as proxy cannon fodder.

As events unfolded under Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot, ASEAN did not want to become too involved. When PAVN swept across Cambodia, heading for the Thai border in early 1979, ASEAN had to take a stand. Although each country's policy had different objectives, a consensus quickly emerged that aggression by larger states on smaller states, for whatever reason, should be not allowed or rewarded. PAVN should return to Vietnam, whereupon free elections should be held under international auspices to select leaders of a new, if vaguely conceived, government of Cambodia. Because multilateral military cooperation is not allowed within the framework of ASEAN, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand provided only bilateral military assistance to the NCR. The nuances in policies of the ASEAN countries merit some attention, as they later diverged in important ways.

THAI POLICYMAKING

Thais have prided themselves on maintaining a foreign policy that balances outside forces, bends with the wind as needed, such that it is the only Southeast Asian country to escape colonization and imperial rule. Although Siamese territory was ruled by the Khmer Empire some centuries ago, the Chakri dynasty eventually annexed much of western Cambodia; but Vietnam would not permit further advances. When Vietnamese suzerainty became unbearable, Siam returned to Cambodia in order to keep Phnom Penh independent but pliant, even if this meant leaving the country aflame. France at first allowed Bangkok to rule the Angkor and Battambang provinces of Cambodia, then took them back. During World War II Bangkok seized both provinces, but the return of French colonialism meant surrendering the two provinces to Cambodia after the war, when Siam was renamed Thailand.

Thailand regarded Cambodia as a buffer that might keep Vietnam at a distance. During the restoration of French colonialism Bangkok provided sanctuary to members of the Khmer Issarak, who sought to overthrow the proxy Sihanouk monarchy. In 1956 Cambodia complained to the ICSC about the Khmer Issarak on Thai territory, and in 1957 Phnom Penh cited nine violations of Cambodian neutrality by the Thai army (Van Ginneken 1983:28). Bangkok and Phnom Penh took a dispute over ownership of a temple at the border of the two countries to the International Court of Justice in 1962; when the court favored Cambodia, Thailand withdrew in an honorable manner.

Thailand hosted SEATO's secretariat in 1955. Later, US military bases in Thailand supplied airplanes that rained TNT on Cambodia and Vietnam during the era of US intrusion into Indochina's civil wars. After complaining about Thai border incursions during this period, Sihanouk decided to limit his foreign disputes and patched up relations with Bangkok. Thai troops went into Vietnam during this period as well. Relations improved under the Khmer Republic, which welcomed US aid coming from Thai bases. The

student revolution of 1973, which brought democracy to Thailand, steered the country toward a détente with Hanoi, especially after the Paris accords. Communist victories in Indochina during 1975 posed a challenge to Thai foreign policy, which had long maintained friendly relations with all countries and now had to come to terms with a new reality in the region that was directly contrary to Bangkok's preferences. Within several years some 500,000 refugees from Cambodia and Laos escaped into Thailand, and 75,000 "boat people" from Vietnam landed in Thailand (UNHCR 1989b). Lao refugees fled to northeastern Thailand, where much of the population speaks Lao and where the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was strong. When the local people heard horror stories about Lao Communist rule, the CPT lost support almost immediately, and its remaining cadres surrendered by 1983.

In 1975 Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan protested to Washington for failing to ask permission to fly US warplanes through Thai airspace during the *Mayagüez* incident. He then arranged to pull Thailand out of SEATO, thereby ending the organization but not the Thai–US military alliance. After brief border incidents occasioned by an exodus of more Cambodian refugees into Thailand, Beijing persuaded Bangkok to return weapons brought by fleeing Lon Nol forces to the new DK government.

In 1976 a military coup toppled the democratic Thai government, and a militant anti-Communist, Thanin Kraivichien, was installed as prime minister. Yet another coup in 1977 brought to power Kriangsak Chomanan, who pursued a policy of equidistance between China and Vietnam. Diplomatic relations with Hanoi were established, although the opening of embassies did not come until 1978, as Vietnam initially made harsh reparations demands on its former wartime foe.[1]

Meanwhile, Democratic Kampuchea challenged the border with Thailand. Increasing DK incursions in 1977 caused the Thais to protest. Premier Pham Van Dong went to Bangkok in mid-1978 to inform Thailand that Hanoi was facing DK atrocities. He assured the Thais that Vietnam was no longer aiding the CPT, and he urged Bangkok to be wary of the PRC role in backing an aggressive Democratic Kampuchea. Vietnam proposed a Thai-Vietnamese nonaggression pact to deter China, but such an agreement would be a mild form of military alliance. Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun took note of Vietnam's peaceful overture, but he was suspicious of the intentions of Communist countries, and he declined a nonaggression pact because the two countries lacked a common border. The effect of this Thai-Vietnamese contact, which resulted in the opening of embassies in 1978, was to abandon any hope of non-Communist Cambodian insurgents to gain international support in order to regain power in Phnom Penh. Since Upadit knew that Vietnam planned to deal with DK aggression, Pham could interpret Bangkok as preferring to let Hanoi take unilateral action. In hindsight, this was a serious blunder for the Thais, who clearly could not

persuade the US government to back any more aggression in Southeast Asia, even against Polpotist genocide.

Later in 1978 DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary went to Bangkok, also to improve relations. He assured Upadit that border incursions would not recur, and he invited the Thai foreign minister to Phnom Penh to discuss the reopening of the Thai embassy. Upadit was one of the few diplomats to visit Cambodia's capital, with its eerie silence. Soon tours of Cambodian temples were being run by the Erawan Travel Agency, a business enterprise operated by the family of Upadit's predecessor, Chatichai.

When PAVN troops reached the Thai border in 1979 after a successful blitz of Cambodia, Thailand mobilized to defend itself. Hanoi assured Bangkok that the operation was aimed solely at the forces of Pol Pot, and Thailand declared itself neutral in the civil war into which Vietnam had intruded. Bangkok initially allowed the Soviet Union to enter Thai airspace en route to Vietnam, but this stopped later. Thailand also agreed to allow PRC supplies to reach NADK forces inside Cambodia, much as Nazi Germany passed through Sweden to subdue Norway during World War II.[2]

Thailand did not abandon ZOPFAN when it allowed PRC and US arms to transit Thai territory to the Cambodian resistance. Bangkok's rationale was that both countries were there because of the Soviet-Vietnamese threat. When the threat receded, China and the United States would depart.

As refugees began to pour into Thailand, the army initially fired to prevent Pol Pot's army from crossing the border to reach safety; there was a fear that such a large influx would pose a security problem. Bangkok agreed to accept refugees and border settlers only when the United Nations promised to provide assistance on terms acceptable to Thai interests. Bangkok insisted that aid go to all camps, including those with Pol Pot's soldiers (Shawcross 1984:128). Thailand considered itself to be the frontline state, so its needs had priority in collegial decisionmaking within ASEAN on the war in Cambodia.

Official neutrality regarding the civil war meant that Thailand did not want to favor one faction over another. Although Bangkok preferred the removal of Pol Pot, this was a matter left to the Cambodians (Chulalongkorn 1985:36, 49–50). Bangkok was not neutral concerning PAVN troops, however, and both Beijing and Washington assured support in case of an invasion. The PRK was considered a SRV proxy that had to be opposed so that a *bona fide* Cambodian buffer could be established instead.

In January 1979 Upadit called for a meeting of ASEAN to denounce Vietnam's invasion as contrary to international law. ASEAN then took the case to the United Nations, demanding PAVN's immediate withdrawal.

Bangkok insisted that there was no Thai policy to bleed Hanoi (Chulalongkorn 1985:54), as that would ensure PRC domination of Southeast Asia. The Thai military would supply the Cambodian resistance indefinitely

until the SRV threat to its border subsided, but it also collected commissions on resale of arms and nonlethal supplies that were estimated to be as high as $100 million each year from all sources combined (Economist 1989a).[3] Thais in due course were admitted into NADK-controlled territory inside Cambodia to mine gems at a fee of $780 per fortnight; the proceeds were another source of NADK income (Economist 1989b). When China offered to cut prices for oil and weapons from China by as much as 50 percent, while US aid skyrocketed, Bangkok cooed (interviewee #86; Weatherbee 1989:20). Meanwhile, Thai-manufactured goods made their way to Cambodia and Vietnam despite an embargo directed from Washington. By the mid-1980s, Thailand was making about $3.7 million in annual profit from trade with Cambodia alone (Tasker 1990a:50).

In 1980 Prem Timsulanonda became prime minister. The new foreign minister, Siddhi Savetsila, despised politics and believed that his mission was to restaff the ministry with honest, nonpolitical bureaucrats (interviewee #131). In a break with the tradition of fluidity in Thai foreign policy, he steadfastly sought to contain Vietnam and would brook no compromise. One of his earliest goals was to bring the three Cambodian resistance factions into a single coalition. One of Prem's first foreign trips was to Beijing, where he urged the formation of a tripartite body that would exclude Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan. Thailand needed a figleaf over its Cambodian policy of support for Pol Pot. As Prem could threaten to cut off supplies to Pol Pot's forces unless a coalition formed, Bangkok had a major role in siring the birth of CGDK in 1982. The Thais, however, preferred an independent if savage Cambodia under Pol Pot to a more humane client state of Vietnam on its border.

The Thai government allowed secret PDK camps inside its borders; although they would not qualify for humanitarian aid, their presence was based on the need to expel Vietnam from Cambodia—although of course PAVN troops remained precisely because Bangkok propped up Pol Pot, a point that was never seriously considered by the Thai government. Whenever PAVN forces entered or shelled Thai territory to blow up supplies or in hot pursuit of resistance forces, Bangkok rushed troops to the site so that the aggression would not spill over into Thailand. One or two major PAVN incursions occurred each year until 1985, whereas the PRK recorded several thousand Thai violations of its airspace, land, and sea frontiers. Army Chief of Staff General Arthit Kamlang-ek admitted in early 1984 that a Thai airplane twice bombed NADK ammunition depots inside Cambodia after their capture by PAVN units (PRK 1985b:38). Prem even boasted in 1985 that such aggressive action was justifiable "to defend our sovereignty" (Xinhua 1985).

The continuing failure to analyze how to resolve the conflict revealed a basic weakness in Thai foreign policy, which was bending to fit China's geostrategic aims and the continuing US effort at reestablishing a pseudo-

SEATO, thereby undermining ZOPFAN. Other countries, as a result, had to solve Thailand's problem—to unravel the complexities of the situation in order to restore peace to the region. Indonesia took the lead in searching for a way out of the impasse.

INDONESIAN POLICYMAKING

The first colony in Asia to gain independence through war, Indonesia defeated the Netherlands in a struggle that took at least sixty years, an experience the Indonesians regard as similar to Vietnam's struggle for independence from France. Sukarno, the first leader, ruled in a country with a strong military, ready to suppress separatist movements as they arose. Although Bangkok maximized its freedom of maneuver by simultaneously allying itself with dominant powers that had differing interests, Jakarta chose the path of nonalignment and hosted the inaugural conference of nonaligned nations at Bandung in 1955. Sihanouk and Sukarno became friends at Bandung.

As Southeast Asia's largest country, Indonesia could claim to be a dominant military power, controlling the major sealanes between the Atlantic and the Pacific. While Western maps show a body of water called the Indian Ocean, in Jakarta the charts read "Indonesian Ocean" to reflect geostrategic realities as perceived by the government. Accordingly, Indonesia views the major powers outside the region—China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States—as the greatest potential threats to Southeast Asian autonomy. Vietnam is not on the list. The memory of PRC support for an indigenous Communist uprising in Indonesia in 1965 supports the view in Jakarta that China is the main military threat in Southeast Asia, a perception shared in Hanoi.

After General Suharto toppled Sukarno in 1965, Indonesia severed relations with China. The nonalignment policy remained, but Jakarta was wary of Beijing and only began to consider normalizing relations with China in 1989.

In 1967 Foreign Minister Adam Malik was primarily responsible for the formation of ASEAN, which became the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. The payoff of ASEAN's formation was that the member countries agreed thenceforth to settle their differences peacefully. ASEAN was a vehicle to attract more external investment, as the region promised a stability lacking elsewhere in the Third World. Malik's vision proved correct, and ASEAN has become a model for Third World cooperation.

Although Indonesia unsuccessfully tried to train Muslim Vietnamese to support the US defense of the Saigon regime (interviewee #36), Jakarta later sought to mediate between Hanoi and Washington, but to no avail. Indonesia was one of the ICSC countries to monitor implementation of the Paris accords of 1973. Increasing cooperation between Jakarta and Washington

quietly reached a point where Indonesia participated in US-sponsored military exercises in the central Pacific during the 1980s without compromising its own policy of nonalignment.

When PAVN troops entered Cambodia at the end of 1978, Indonesia initially regarded the action as a matter of Vietnam's self-defense. With PAVN at the Thai border in early 1979, Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja agreed that the security of Thailand was a primary consideration, that Vietnam's occupation of another country was a violation of international law. Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1976 deprived Jakarta of the moral high ground, however.

At the same time, Mochtar was suspicious that the real intention of Beijing was to weaken Vietnam so that China would become the dominant power in Southeast Asia. Indonesia saw that ASEAN would ultimately prove to be a more reliable friend for Hanoi than Moscow, which Jakarta wanted to keep out of the region. Indonesia thus prevailed within ASEAN to condemn China's border aggression against Vietnam, as that was the major impetus for Soviet ships to begin making regular visits to Cam Ranh Bay.

From the beginning, Mochtar argued that Thailand was engaging in a risky policy by relying too much on China, that Vietnam had legitimate security needs, and that a compromise should be negotiated to promote ZOPFAN, not more war in the region. The Indonesian Defense Ministry, which lacked a formal role in ASEAN, opposed the implications of ASEAN's pseudoalliance with China and argued the case for a separate peace with Vietnam, even if this meant recognizing the PRK. Suharto's compromise was a middle position between the extremes of backing either side in Cambodia: Jakarta would play along with ASEAN while pursuing a negotiated settlement. Initially, Jakarta served as informal "interlocutor" between ASEAN and Vietnam.

Indonesia's peace ambitions did not impress Thailand, but in December 1980 Vietnam blundered by claiming the Natuna Islands, for which Indonesia had already planned oil exploration (van der Kroef 1980:489). Accordingly, Mochtar backed ASEAN's strategy of forming a coalition of Cambodian resistance factions. An envoy flew from Jakarta to Pyongyang in 1981 in order to ask Sihanouk to make common cause with the Polpotists and the KPNLF. After CGDK formed, Indonesia provided some humanitarian aid to ANS and KPNLA forces (Shim 1989:37). In due course Jakarta soon saw CGDK as a contrivance used to prolong the war and thus to frustrate a peaceful settlement. Instead of openly trying to dissuade Thailand from a misguided policy, Indonesia relied on consensus building within ASEAN to shift the focus of concerns from confrontation to negotiation.

MALAYSIAN POLICYMAKING

Most of the peninsula of Malaya, under British rule at the beginning of World War II, fell to Japan in 1942. The Communist Party of Malaya

(CPM), primarily a Chinese-supported insurgency from the 1940s, made Kuala Lumpur suspicious of Beijing's motives in Southeast Asia. Britain's lingering presence as a colonial power doubtless helped the CPM to recruit support, so the Federation of Malaya decided to join the nonaligned movement after its independence in 1957. Malaya became Malaysia in 1963, when London decided to transfer sovereignty over Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore to Kuala Lumpur. Sabah and Sarawak, however, were portions of the island of Kalimantan (called Borneo by Westerners), and Sukarno mobilized Indonesian troops, threatening to reclaim them for Indonesia. Philippine mediation and a UN plebiscite averted war, and the population voted to join Malaysia.

After Suharto took over in Indonesia in 1965, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur became close allies. They share a common language, common frontiers, similar views on policies toward the superpowers, opposition to PRC-supported insurrection, and a desire to insulate the region from outside influences. Malaysia followed Indonesia's lead in joining ASEAN, and it was Kuala Lumpur's Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie who first articulated the principles underlying ZOPFAN.

After PAVN troops entered Cambodia at the end of 1978, Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn increased the government's military budget, fearing that the row of Southeast Asian dominoes might begin to fall into his lap. Malaysian military exercises increased (Haas 1989a:ch. 3), and Kuala Lumpur provided training to the NCR along with some small arms (Sutter 1988:3) purchased from Britain. If the Malaysian Defense Ministry appeared more short-term in its thinking than the Foreign Ministry, both argued that China and the Soviet Union should stay out of the region. They opposed bleeding Vietnam, which could serve as a buffer between the PRC and Southeast Asia. The CPM remained in jungle hiding places across the Thai border, so Kuala Lumpur needed Thai cooperation for purposes of internal security. Rather than disagreeing with Bangkok on an issue of importance to Thailand, Kuala Lumpur moderated views within ASEAN discussions.

In January 1980 Foreign Minister Tunku Ahmed Rithauddeen became the first ASEAN foreign minister to fly to Hanoi after PAVN entered Cambodia; his aim was to open a dialogue. Kuala Lumpur reluctantly supported the idea of CGDK, coming into line after it hinted that it might stop voting for the PDK to occupy the Cambodian seat at the United Nations in 1981 (Tasker 1982b). In 1982 Kuala Lumpur was host to the meeting that launched CGDK, indicating that Malaysian objections had been met. Ghazali pleaded in vain with Khieu Samphan to drop Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and such odious field commanders as Ta Mok. Despite misgivings about ASEAN's policy, Kuala Lumpur worked rather quietly on the Cambodian question, thereby keeping ASEAN sailing along as smoothly as possible.

PHILIPPINE POLICYMAKING

Although the Philippines obtained independence before Indonesia and Malaysia, US bases remained. After 1946, Manila followed Washington's policies enthusiastically, in part due to a struggle with the apparent Communist influence over the Huk rebellion of the 1950s. The pro-American tenor of the country's leaders after 1946, when a more independent foreign policy might have been possible, is symbolized by the fact that the Philippine flag has red, white, and baby blue colors, yet even today the darker, US shade of blue flies from flagpoles throughout the nation. Philippine leaders ardently sought to locate SEATO headquarters in Manila, near Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, but did not object when Bangkok, a city closer to Indochina, was selected instead. The umbilical relationship also affects US embassy thinking. During negotiations on terms governing an agreement to maintain Clark and Subic in 1990, embassy personnel were openly threatening to close all Philippine consulates in the United States and to deny multiple-entry visas by Philippine family members to visit their relatives in the United States in retaliation for any termination of the US military presence (interviewee #126).

Indonesia and Malaysia considered themselves to be key members of NAM, whereas the Philippines and Thailand were aligned states. Manila supplied troops to fight in Vietnam alongside the United States, fearing that a parallel Communist insurgency might be emboldened by the example of an independent-minded, indigenous Vietnamese revolution. The Philippines also had a territorial dispute with Vietnam, claiming some of the Spratly Islands under the name Kalayaan Islands. Normalization of relations with Hanoi came in 1977, when President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice Premier Pham Van Dong agreed not to allow their countries' territories to be used for aggression against each other (Straits Times 1978). Unlike Thailand, with its standoffishness toward Vietnam, the Philippines was thus willing to conclude a nonaggression entente with Vietnam.

In 1979 the Philippines joined ASEAN's opposition to Vietnam's entry into Cambodia. Longtime Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo chose not to play a prominent role in the matter. The Philippine Foreign Ministry employed generalists, not specialists, and Indochina was thus virtually *terra incognita*. President Ferdinand Marcos pretended to be independent of Washington from time to time, notably refusing to allow US aircraft to launch attacks on North Vietnam from Philippine soil, but he wanted a US presence in his country to heighten the morale of government forces, which were struggling to contain increasing threats to establish Marxist rule on the part of the New People's Army (NPA). Opposition to the NPA and Vietnam's role in Cambodia, hence, was subsumed under a policy of anti-Communism. Marcos never considered that cronyocracy, political repression, and US bases were the NPA's principal recruiting vehicles.

As the political mood of the country became increasingly anti-Marcos during the 1980s, US bases began to symbolize Philippine dependence. Filipinos wanted to get rid of Marcos, who in turn clung to power with an unexpected longevity due to firm support from Reagan. The policy on Cambodia, a concern remote from the Philippine people, was to go along with ASEAN, a grouping of regional allies that was above criticism in Manila.

SINGAPOREAN POLICYMAKING

In 1942 Japan seized the British colony of Singapore, almost without a battle. The CPM was active in Singapore as an opponent of Japanese rule. After the war, socialist Lee Kuan Yew contested elections in coalition with the CPM. When Lee's party won, he embarked on a program to outclass all opposition through eloquent speeches about a new Singapore. But the CPM remained strong. In a referendum during September 1962, Singaporeans voted to join the Federation of Malaysia as a new state, effective September 1963; this enabled Lee to have Kuala Lumpur take the heat when Malayan police rounded up CPM leaders in Singapore during February 1963 (Too 1989). Kuala Lumpur leaders, however, soon discovered that the new federation's parliament was sharply divided between parties representing Chinese and Malay communities. Singapore became an independent state in 1967, when the government in Kuala Lumpur decided to expel the state of Singapore from the federation to ensure electoral dominance in Malaysia by the indigenous Malays.

At the center of Southeast Asian sealanes, Singapore has one of the highest per capita incomes in Asia, due in large part to its role as a regional *entrepôt*. Singapore joined ASEAN so that it would not be left out of regional cooperation. The island state has derived some additional trade and investment through the increased attention to ASEAN countries, and often Singapore goes along with aspects of ASEAN that have marginal economic payoff.

As a small country, Singapore lacks credible strategic defenses of its own, although it trains pilots to fly sophisticated aircraft and keeps its younger males on standby alert after compulsory military training. Singapore is not enthusiastic about ZOPFAN, since Lee considers that his country's security depends on keeping the United States alert somewhere in the region. This difference from other ASEAN partners remained beneath the surface until 1979, when PAVN troops stayed in Cambodia after routing Pol Pot's forces.

Singapore would have held the balance of power within ASEAN regarding Cambodian policy, had there been a system of majority voting, in view of the split between Indonesia/Malaysia and the Philippines/Thailand. But Lee's virulent anti-Communism placed the country's views even farther to the right of Bangkok. The Cambodian civil war was what just what Prime Minister Lee needed to impress Washington not to forget that there are small countries in Southeast Asia worthy of being defended.[4] Although

Tommy Koh, Singapore's ambassador to the United Nations and later to the United States, showed initial unhappiness in being instructed to support Pol Pot, in time he became one of the most outspoken proponents of ASEAN's policy of condoning a strong DK presence to oppose PAVN forces.

After Lee went to Beijing in 1980 to forge a coalition of Cambodian resistance factions, he returned with a determination to keep the Polpotists as a vital element in forming CGDK. He even persuaded Thailand, which was considering dropping Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Pol Pot from the coalition, to maintain support for the PDK. In 1981 Singapore hosted the first of three conferences to negotiate an agreement for the coalition, and in 1982 Singapore made its first shipment of arms to the resistance, reportedly with CIA funding (Lee 1982). Later, Singapore kept supplies flowing regularly to ANS and KPNLA with funds provided by the United States.

ASEAN POLICYMAKING

The ASEAN position position favored Thailand's interpretation of events, but not to the exclusion of Indonesia's outlook. Bangkok portrayed itself as sitting under the Damoclean sword of Vietnam, while Indonesia noted that Chinese hordes were already mobilized on the northern border of Southeast Asia. ASEAN gained support at the UN for resolutions to denounce Vietnamese aggression and to favor a new Cambodian state through free elections. Intense lobbying by ASEAN urged that the defunct DK regime remain seated in the UN. ASEAN's success froze the PRK out of many important international bodies where its case could be articulated. The Mekong Committee and UN Development Program, for example, could not provide aid to the PRK, although Vietnam obtained assistance from both agencies. The PRK was denied a seat in the Colombo Plan and the World Bank, and the Philippine government would not allow the PRK to send representatives to the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank in Pasay City. In 1980, when Vietnam wanted to attend a meeting of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), a PDK representative was already in the room when the SRV ambassador arrived. Hanoi withdrew from SEAMEO shortly thereafter, further intensifying the polarization of the region.

ASEAN OPTIONS

Beijing needed ASEAN's support to supply the NADK. Accordingly, China sought to resolve all outstanding disputes with ASEAN countries in order to show good faith. ASEAN then found itself in a pseudoalliance with China against the Soviet Union, which had no quarrel with countries of the region.

Although many observers claim that Cambodia held ASEAN together,

this view is contrary to the facts. The coalition between Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, and Son Sann saved ASEAN from going in different directions. Some members of ASEAN were happy to serve as proxies for China and the United States, but others were not. ASEAN policy was based on the need to limit Vietnam's influence in the region, but in time the PRK grew stronger. An SRV-aligned Cambodia would not serve as a buffer, so the question was whether to get PAVN to leave Cambodia before or after the Phnom Penh government could stand on its own feet. If before, Pol Pot could return to power; if after, the PRK might serve as an SRV puppet. The way out of this dilemma was to cultivate a coalition and to maintain a stalemate. Vietnam's presence in Cambodia was the pretext for ASEAN's policy of confrontation, yet PAVN remained because ASEAN kept the Pol Pot threat alive. If a few more Cambodians died in the process, this did not matter to the militant Filipinos, Singaporeans, and Thais. A slow genocide could continue, as far as most ASEAN countries were concerned, if Vietnam could be blamed. ZOPFAN went into cold storage.

The consensus within ASEAN was to condemn Vietnam and not to legitimize the PRK, but that was all the countries could agree upon. Only Thailand committed troops. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand provided material support to the resistance forces. Malaysia's jungle warfare training school was used to train the NCR forces. Although Indonesia was unhappy about Polpotists in the resistance, the thrust of ASEAN actions conveyed the impression of unanimous support. ASEAN countries officially imposed trade sanctions on both Cambodia and Vietnam at first, but smuggling occurred anyway. Indonesia pursued the negotiation option, with some additional efforts by Malaysia in search of a peaceful resolution of the conflict at the conference table.

NOTES

1. One demand was that Thailand scrap US bases as a condition of normalization of relations. The tone of the demands was especially objectionable (interviewee #82; van der Kroef 1982:1017).

2. Upadit has denied that Thai territory was a conduit for PRC aid to the NADK in international waters. He feels that Chinese junks smuggled weapons. Interview, December 26, 1989.

3. One estimate was that each year $3.5 million was pocketed from US covert aid, while 10 percent ($0.35 million) was embezzled from US overt aid (Chanda, 1988c).

4. I am indebted to Gareth Porter for this point.

8

OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

FRENCH POLICYMAKING

France, with a long tradition as a dominant power in Europe, regards its world role as a mission. Similar to other European powers with imperial ambitions, France had three aims in Asia: God, gold, and glory (Winks 1963). The spread of Christianity, the pursuit of commercial profit, and the fulfillment of France's destiny to bring the rest of the world up to its high level of civilization—including human rights—were the three main factors motivating initial policy in Indochina.

France's role in Indochina during the nineteenth century tilted toward commercial interests, leaving internal politics to indigenous rulers at first. Colonial administrators later began to impose the will of Paris over the subject peoples. French corporations, such as Michelin, backed up by police brutality, worked Vietnamese to the bone, thereby demonstrating eloquently that capitalist exploitation went hand in hand with colonialism.

Paris cavalierly drew the colonial boundaries of Indochina so that Vietnam got territory that was once Cambodian, thereby providing a later *causus belli* to Democratic Kampuchea. After installing Sihanouk as a teenage monarch in 1940, France responded to his pleas in 1945 to be reinstalled and then gave him a degree of autonomy in 1946. Although Paris recognized Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an independent state in 1946, this occurred with a popular front government in power. When conservatives controlled parliament later the same year, DRV recognition was rescinded. War with the Vietminh resulted.

Paris fought to retake Vietnam in 1946 for several reasons. The reassertion of French colonial authority was an effort to revive a glory that might erase the indignity of Nazi and Vichy rule during World War II. As the cold war began, France was the only Western country actively seeking to prevent a Communist victory. After Mao's triumph in 1949, Paris saw itself as the

standard-bearer against an aggressive China, Vietnam's ally. France granted full independence to Sihanouk in 1953, so the Cambodian Communists were aced out of a role at the Geneva Conference in 1954. The military defeat at Dienbienphu was a bitter experience for France, which became a full partner in SEATO.

French participation in SEATO over the years serves as an indicator of how Paris regarded the region (Haas 1989a:ch. 4). The only French troops that remained in Indochina after 1954 were training officers, who provided technical assistance to Cambodia and Laos as a service under the vague banner of SEATO. Paris wanted to retain commercial interests in both halves of Vietnam, but Washington frustrated the French by backing pro-US Ngo Dinh Diem as ROV premier and by making SEATO militantly anti-Hanoi. In 1961 Paris cast the lone dissenting SEATO vote against a resolution pledging to defend Thailand when the Pathet Lao threatened to attack. In 1962 France withdrew its remaining military personnel from the region, and French civil servants were recalled from the SEATO Secretariat as their work agreements expired. Whereas Washington thought that it could succeed in Vietnam where Paris had failed, the French were skeptical. After 1963 Quai d'Orsay supplied "observers" instead of persons of foreign minister rank at SEATO meetings. From 1964 to 1966 France attended SEATO Council sessions but refused to vote. Although it was absent thereafter, France paid SEATO assessments until 1974, but by then the organization had already cut back expenses drastically.

In 1964 President Charles de Gaulle suggested that Indochina be neutralized rather than fall farther into the abyss of war. The US government ignored de Gaulle, and the idea was never seriously evaluated in Washington at the time. In 1971 de Gaulle's neutralization policy provided a basis for ZOPFAN.

After Lon Nol came to power in 1970, France was a preferred destination for Cambodian leaders and refugees leaving the country in exile. The name "Sihanouk" became a household word in the country. While Quay d'Orsay refused to allow the Prince to set up a government-in-exile in Paris, French businesses remained in Indochina until Communist regimes triumphed in 1975, and they were eager to return to reclaim and upgrade their investments in industries such as hotels and natural rubber when conditions improved.

In 1979, after Vietnam removed Pol Pot from power in Cambodia, France abstained in the UN on the question of which Cambodian delegation to seat; there was strong domestic opposition to recognizing Pol Pot. Paris, at first unimpressed by Sihanouk's maneuverings, refused to recognize CGDK, yet it regularly voted for UN resolutions that condemned Vietnam and asked for free elections in Cambodia. Believing that it was the destiny of France to be Indochina's major link to the West, Paris aided both Vietnam and the NCR (Chanda 1983b).

AUSTRALIAN POLICYMAKING

As a distant dominion to which England sent some of its convicts, Australia finally was granted independence in foreign policy in 1940. Australians perceived themselves as an outpost of Europe, and their foreign policy advanced strategic interests that Canberra could not possibly defend, thereby necessitating a policy of external alliances.

When Cambodia became independent in 1953, Australians knew very little about the country. In the words of Gareth Evans, who became foreign minister in 1989, they were "blissfully ignorant."[1] Canberra was not at the Geneva Conference in 1954, but Australia was a charter member of SEATO. Indeed, Canberra had been seeking a Pacific security pact as far back as the 1930s. Having experienced Japanese aggression at Darwin during World War II, Australians were determined to ensure their security through mutual defense arrangements. Indochina was not central to Australian perceptions, however, and SEATO was organized to guarantee non-Communist Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, not Australian sovereignty.

While Washington was contemplating a policy toward Vietnam in the early 1960s, Foreign Minister William Casey discouraged the United States from military involvement. In 1964 an internal study in the Australian government predicted that China would act cautiously during the next decade (Edwards 1989), but this was obviously contrary to the US perception. When US troops went to Vietnam, Canberra wanted to show loyalty to Washington, which might reciprocate in case a more urgent danger later confronted Australia. Similar to Singaporean strategic thinking, Canberra wanted a US military presence in the region rather than a future situation where decisionmakers in distant Washington might be reluctant to defend Australia. Canberra thought that active support for the United States would imply full partnership in a global relationship. Officially, the justification offered by Prime Minister Robert Menzies for sending Australian troops to Vietnam in 1965 was "forward defense." Canberra perceived that the only buffer between a powerful, expansionist China and the rest of Southeast Asia (including Australia's closest neighbor, populous Indonesia) was Vietnam. This row-of dominoes logic then syllogized that since China was aiding North Vietnam, Australian lives had to be committed to South Vietnam to contain Mao's ally, Ho Chi Minh.

Upon the election of Gough Whitlam as prime minister in 1972, Australian soldiers left Vietnam. Whitlam also sounded the death knell of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which South Korea had formed in 1966 as a consultative forum of foreign ministers from anti-Communist countries in the region (Haas 1989a:ch. 5). Whitlam even threatened to withdraw from SEATO but reconsidered when Washington raised the possibility of abandoning ANZUS, the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States that provided Australia with Pentagon military in-

telligence, specialized military training at US facilities, and discounts on purchases of US military hardware (Haas 1989b:ch. 4). In any case, the concept of "forward defense" had been dealt a mortal blow when Australian troops left Vietnam. In 1973 Australia agreed to serve on the ICSC set up to monitor the Paris accords.

After Malcolm Fraser replaced Whitlam in 1975, Canberra decided to launch a modest aid program to Vietnam, but its Cambodian embassy was vacated. As a regular participant in ASEAN's "dialogue partner" conferences, Australia was sympathetic to the prevailing views in the region when PAVN troops entered Cambodia and reached the Thai border. Canberra voted to allow Democratic Kampuchea to keep the Cambodian seat in 1979 and 1980 and followed the US suggestion to suspend all aid to Vietnam as a sanction against Hanoi's aggression. Australian businesses remained free to trade with Vietnam, however, but few did at first.

In 1980 there was an outcry over the country's vote in the UN on Cambodia. Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock resigned over the policy of accrediting the defunct DK regime, whereupon the government decided to withdraw recognition from Democratic Kampuchea, incurring the displeasure of ASEAN, which argued that this move might be misinterpreted as being soft on Vietnam. Australia then abstained in 1981 and 1982 on which Cambodian delegation to seat in the United Nations, but cosponsored ASEAN-backed UN resolutions that overwhelmingly called for PAVN troops to pull out of Cambodia.

JAPANESE POLICYMAKING

The rise of Japan from isolation in the mid-nineteenth century to the role of current economic superpower is a marvel of world history. To attain economic power for a land without natural resources, Japan needed to export. In the early part of the twentieth century many markets in Asia were closed to Japan, however. China allowed Japan and Western countries to trade only through a few ports. European countries controlled their colonies and refused access to Japan, which sought in vain to establish the principle of racial equality at the League of Nations. To open markets in the region, Tokyo proposed a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pan-Asiatic Conference at Nagasaki in 1926. As this proposal required Asians to accept Japan in a role of economic dominance in the region, there was a negative response. War seemed the best option to some Japanese during the worldwide depression of the 1930s.

Japan entered Indochina in 1940 as an ally of Vichy France. Vichy sought to break up the Khmer Issarak independence movement in 1941, but Tokyo slyly gave its leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, safe conduct to Japan. In 1945, with France overrun by Allied armies, the Japanese government dissolved the Vichy-backed regimes in Indochina, placing Thanh in charge of Cambodia

as Tokyo's proxy ruler. When Japan's brief colonial role in Southeast Asia ended, the Free French arrested Thanh.

After the military occupation of Japan ended in 1952, Tokyo focused on economic reconstruction at home. The first prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, declared that his country would be an economic rather than a political actor in world politics. In the 1960s Indochina played a minor part in what Prime Minister Eisaku Sato called Japan's "Asian diplomacy," which saw Tokyo as the economic facilitator of Asia. At the same time, there was no peace treaty with the Soviet Union, which occupied four islands in the Kurile chain just north of Hokkaido, and Japan adopted an anti-Communist foreign policy.

When US military support for South Vietnam escalated dramatically in 1965, President Johnson was pleased when Japanese aircraft transported US troops and ammunition to Vietnam. Tokyo demonstrated its willingness to attend to the economic needs of Southeast Asia, in order to prevent the spread of Communism, by putting up starting capital for the Asian Development Bank. In addition, Tokyo agreed to convene the first in a series of annual Ministerial Conferences for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia (SEAMCED), which identified projects for technical assistance funding (Haas 1989a:ch. 6). Cambodia was eligible for ADB loans but did not become involved in SEAMCED projects until the formation of the Khmer Republic. In 1973 North Vietnam opened an embassy at Tokyo, and Japan's embassy in Hanoi was ready for occupancy in late 1975. In 1975 SEAMCED collapsed, proving that its unstated aim was to head off Communist victories. Although South Vietnam joined ADB, the Japanese-dominated bank allowed Hanoi to take Saigon's place as the successor Vietnamese government. Democratic Kampuchea never sent delegates to meetings of ADB. The PRK avoided ADB meetings, lest its credentials be challenged, as expected.

Although modest Japanese aid projects were undertaken in unified Vietnam, beginning in 1976, the DK government was not receptive to Tokyo's overtures to provide similar aid. In 1977 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda promised more aid to Vietnam so that there would be a non-Communist alternative to SRV reliance on Eastern bloc nations. There were four major projects at amounts totaling approximately $68 million, and approximately $37 million was promised in 1978 on Vietnam's assurance that its membership in CMEA was more economic than political. Fukuda even offered to mediate disputes between ASEAN and Vietnam, but there was no follow-up. In early 1978 Hanoi agreed to repay approximately $71 million in debt owed by the former Saigon government; the terms were for a repayment period covering twenty-six years.

PAVN's entry into Cambodia in late 1978 was a shock to Tokyo.[2] When the United States urged countries to boycott Vietnam in retaliation, Tokyo dutifully but reluctantly canceled aid in early 1980, although the actual

impetus was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Japan joined the United States in vetoing SRV applications for new ADB and World Bank loans as well as disbursements on existing loans. Tokyo went along with ASEAN's policies toward Cambodia, and Ieng Sary went to Japan in 1979 to secure commitments for Japanese aid to be funneled through UN agencies, appealing to Tokyo's desire to end Soviet occupation of the four Kurile Islands as a grievance equivalent to Vietnam's control of Cambodia.

ASEAN's policy of confrontation toward Vietnam did not mesh well with Tokyo's preferred role as economic superpower of Asia. Although it suspended development aid, Japan sent some $3 million in emergency relief to Hanoi in 1983. Trade with Vietnam continued, despite the US call for an embargo, and Japanese business executives in due course went to Phnom Penh to survey prospects for investment and trade. Japan imported several primary products from Vietnam, notably coal and seafood; Vietnam bought machinery. In 1976 Vietnam exported $119 million to Japan; by 1978 the amount doubled. Imports lagged behind, so that Tokyo could collect repayment on debt.

Although Japan followed the lead of ASEAN and the United States, it tried to separate international economics from international politics. Tokyo felt that a more business-oriented Indochina would emerge in due course. As Japan abandoned the earlier policy of military adventure after World War II, so there was an expectation that Vietnam would be more likely to reconsider its policies if the door for economic opportunities remained ajar.

BRITISH POLICYMAKING

The United Kingdom left Indochina to the French sphere of influence during the division of Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then it helped Paris to reconquer Saigon in 1945. When Mao aided Ho Chi Minh, the British realized that they should not jeopardize their position in Hongkong, which would expire by 1997, by aiding the French to stay on in Vietnam. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden argued that the French desire to hold onto Vietnam was "the wrong war against the wrong man in the wrong place." Although London attended the Geneva Conference in 1954, its role was relatively passive, and Britain ended up as cochair of the ill-fated ICSC.

Whitehall joined Australia in de-recognizing Democratic Kampuchea in 1980, but on the UN credentials vote UK delegates supported the seating of the Pol Pot delegation. The British government stopped official aid to Vietnam without disrupting trade relations, which were negligible.

In 1985, when the United States provided the NCR overt aid for the first time, the UK Ministry of Defence did so secretly. A special forces unit trained ANS and KNPLA soldiers to attack enemy installations in hit-and-run units

of six persons, a technique subsequently attributed to NADK operations (Karniol 1989c; Pilger 1989). This brought Britain into an active role in Cambodia for the first time. Meanwhile, UK government aid continued to Oxfam, which provided humanitarian aid to the Phnom Penh regime.

POLICYMAKING OF OTHER WESTERN-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Other Western-aligned countries took two actions. One was to vote in the UN for a withdrawal of PAVN troops from Cambodia. The second action was to stop aid to Vietnam.

Canada's major role in the region was as a member of both ICSCs, but it refused to get involved further. Many Cambodian refugees settled in Canada, forming interest groups opposing the PRK, and most Canadians opposed any cooperation with the forces of Pol Pot.

New Zealand, a loyal SEATO ally, provided troops to Vietnam but withdrew them in 1972, following the logic of Australia. Wellington's policies tended to echo those of Canberra.

Soldiers of *South Korea* arrived in Vietnam during 1965. Seoul felt obligated to aid a victim of Communist aggression. Since North Vietnam was an ally of China, there was a fear that Beijing might also encourage North Korean aggression. Subsequently, Seoul sought to transform the multination commitment to South Vietnam into a more permanent Asian and Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO), but other countries in the region saw an APATO as too provocative. Seoul then organized ASPAC, which folded in 1972. In accordance with the Paris accords, South Korean troops left South Vietnam in 1973. Seoul, which was not a member of the UN, did not have enough trade with Hanoi for a boycott to have any meaning.

SOVIET BLOC POLICYMAKING

After Stalin's army marched to Berlin to meet the Western allies, a new division arose in Europe between East and West. The foreign policies of the people's democracies of Eastern Europe fell in line with Moscow's preferences.

Eastern bloc countries had little contact with Indochina until 1954, when Poland was selected to serve on the first ICSC. Eastern bloc aid to Vietnam accompanied Soviet assistance thereafter. Poland and Hungary were members of the ICSC set up in 1973.

In 1963, when Sihanouk sought to replace US aid with assistance from other sources, Czechoslovakia seized upon the opportunity. Anti-Communist Lon Nol stopped Soviet bloc aid, and anti-Soviet Pol Pot also kept Eastern European countries out of Cambodia.

The situation changed after 1978. A delegation from Phnom Penh went

to East Germany, Hungary, and the Soviet Union in February 1979, resulting in an exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet bloc. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, defense ministers of Czechoslovakia and East Germany visited Cambodia in 1982. In the following year the PRK defense minister journeyed to several Eastern European countries. Trade delegations from Eastern Europe visited Cambodia, starting in 1982. East Germany signed an agreement to train members of the police. Eastern European aid was estimated to be one-fourth of the Soviet amount (Hiebert 1990f). This would mean from $500 million to $750 million annually.

Romania was the only CMEA country that decided not to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRK. Although it voted to seat the DK delegation in 1979 and 1982, Bucharest otherwise refrained from voting on the Cambodian question in the United Nations, refusing even to abstain, as it argued with some justification that UN resolutions were divisive, not constructive.

Although both are in the Soviet orbit, Cuba and North Korea are officially members of the nonaligned movement. Havana sent arms, while Pyongyang provided technical assistance to the PRK. North Korea also gave Sihanouk a large residence with all expenses paid.

POLICY OPTIONS OF OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Aligned countries supported their respective sides in regard to Cambodia, but only a few countries sent military aid. No aligned country committed troops to the conflict. Each country sought to legitimize its favorite Cambodian faction. Several Western countries dissociated themselves from the Pol Pot faction by withdrawing recognition from Democratic Kampuchea to back Sihanouk and Son Sann. Western countries and Japan stopped aid to Vietnam, but France resumed economic assistance in 1982. Trade slowed, but only Japan derived benefit. Australia and France, as we shall see in the next section of this book, vigorously pursued the negotiation option, although not immediately in 1979. North Korea aided the Communist PRK as well as the royalist Sihanouk.

NOTES

1. The section is based in part on Evans (1989a).
2. This section is based in part on Awanohara & Morrison (1989) and Kesavan (1985).

9

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

After India's independence in 1946, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and many other Asian leaders found that the United Nations neglected the economic needs of poor nations and focused instead on the cold war between the First (Western) and Second (Soviet) Worlds. The last straw for India was UN support for a force in Korea, commanded by US General Douglas MacArthur, which advanced to the Yalu River instead of stopping at the border between North Korea and South Korea, as would be expected if the UN Command followed UN Charter principles of halting breaches to the peace.

Accordingly, India encouraged a group of Asian nations to form the Asian Relations Organization (ARO), which began in 1950 as a nongovernmental body (Haas 1989a:ch. 3). But ARO was too limited in relation to the larger objective of organizing the non-Soviet and non-Western Third World as a nonaligned movement. Accordingly, Indonesia hosted the inaugural Conference of Nonaligned Nations at Bandung in 1955. Sihanouk, eager to find an alternative to membership in SEATO, attended the conference and subsequent NAM meetings until 1970, when Lon Nol came to power. DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary resumed Cambodian participation after 1975. NAM saw itself as a supplement to and a bloc within the UN. Nonetheless, when Vietnam lodged a complaint over DK aggression at the Belgrade conference in July 1978, Democratic Kampuchea asked NAM to expel Vietnam as a member. The chair of the NAM Political Committee refused to act on either proposal (Burchett 1981: 161).

UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COMPLAINT

In mid-1978 the UN Commission on Human Rights received a documented complaint from the governments of Australia, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States that the DK government was engaging in genocide. The matter then went to the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which commissioned a study, with the intention of submitting a report to the full Commission. However, the dramatic events in Cambodia at the end of 1978 and the early part of 1979 occurred before the findings could be presented.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

Democratic Kampuchea asked the United Nations to condemn Vietnam's aggression in early 1979. On January 9, Heng Samrin telegrammed the president of the Security Council, pointing out that the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea was in full control of the country, so a UN meeting to hear from the deposed DK regime would intrude into the internal affairs of a member state in violation of the UN Charter. The Security Council, in receipt of a complaint from Democratic Kampuchea that a lawfully constituted member of the United Nations was under unprovoked attack, began a debate on January 11. The newly proclaimed PRK then wired the Security Council that Kampuchea's new foreign minister was on his way to participate in the debate.

Sihanouk arrived in New York on January 9 to speak for the DK regime. Comparing Vietnam's entry into Cambodia with the Nazi invasion of France, he called for a UN force to expel PAVN soldiers. But no foreign minister arrived from Phnom Penh. Instead, on January 14 a third PRK telegram protested that any decision by the Security Council would be considered invalid. The new government in Phnom Penh claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the country, alone able to accredit Cambodian representatives to speak before the United Nations. On January 15 a majority of the Security Council supported a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign (Vietnamese) troops, but the Soviet Union cast a veto. A similar resolution met the same fate one month later. NAM members on the Security Council (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Zambia) voted both times to condemn Vietnam's invasion.

When China attacked Vietnam in early 1979, Hanoi asked the Security Council to meet, but there was no condemnation of China for its later apparent *Schadenfreude*. Two months after the border war ended, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim went to Beijing, where he heard Deng Xiaoping threaten to attack Vietnam again, if needed, to stop Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia (Straits Times 1979). When the Sino-Vietnamese

border quieted down, later border tensions were of no interest to UN delegates.

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

In March 1979 the head of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities reported to the full Commission on Human Rights. Charging that the DK record was "the most serious that had occurred anywhere in the world since Nazism," the report concluded that "autogenocide" had occurred (UNCHR 1979).

The DK regime was no longer in control of most of Cambodia when the report was presented. The UN Security Council had already decided to support the DK regime, accusing Vietnam of violating the UN Charter. The Commission, with the DK regime as an observer, was thus unable to proceed on the genocide and autogenocide charges and instead called for self-determination in Cambodia. Similar resolutions were adopted each year after 1979. PDK supplied the only Cambodian delegate during that decade, and the prevailing view was that the Commission should not divert attention from Vietnam's illegal aggression and occupation of Cambodia (Hawk 1990). Human rights charges against the former DK regime were deferred, Vietnam was condemned instead, and there was no further action on genocide in Cambodia. There the matter has rested.

NAM MEETINGS DELIBERATE

As both the DK and PRK regimes subscribed to nonalignment principles, they claimed to represent Cambodia at NAM meetings. On June 4, 1979, the ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Nonaligned Nations met at Colombo. DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary and his PRK counterpart, Hun Sen, were present. The body allowed Ieng Sary to sit but not speak, while Hun Sen remained outside (Chanda 1986:377). During deliberations on a NAM policy toward Cambodia, there was no consensus in regard to either the question of representation or a policy toward the ongoing war. No reference to Cambodia appeared in the final communiqué of the meeting on June 9.

Fidel Castro was the host of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Nations, which opened on September 3 at Havana. Democratic Kampuchea sent Khieu Samphan, and the PRK dispatched Hun Sen, but neither was allowed to enter the conference hall. The delegates were split on the question. Yugoslavia led the opposition to the PRK (Shawcross 1981: 71). Since Cuba preferred the PRK, a position that lacked majority support, Castro exercised the prerogative of the chair to declare the Cambodian seat vacant. The conference referred the matter back to the

Coordinating Bureau for study, with a report requested for the seventh NAM summit, to be held in 1983 at New Delhi.

A compromise statement on Cambodia emerged in the Political Declaration issued from the Havana meeting. The statement said that there was a need for a de-escalation of tensions, a comprehensive political settlement, a withdrawal of foreign troops, an end to external coercion and subversion, a dialogue toward peace, and a respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the region. This Solomonlike formula offered a basis for a negotiated solution, and it was accepted by Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Vietnam's offer in 1980 to withdraw its troops, if China and Thailand would stop aiding the forces of Pol Pot, was a response to the NAM declaration.

New Delhi was the first NAM country to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRK (Chakraborti 1985). The reason given was that the Phnom Penh government had "effective control" of the country, although opposition to Polpotism and fear of China loomed large in the parliamentary debate on the matter (Thakur 1979). Although NAM was unable to act with clarity in 1981, a conference of NAM foreign ministers at New Delhi changed the wording of the 1979 statement to imply that Vietnam was more culpable than China. ASEAN's view had prevailed.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES

The Security Council did not have the power to cancel the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea. That was up to the General Assembly, where the rule is that an incumbent delegation retains its seat in case of contested delegations until an affirmative vote seats a rival claimant.

In September 1979, when Vietnam claimed that its "volunteers" were in Cambodia at the request of the PRK, a credentials vote was held. After considerable lobbying by ASEAN, DK got 71 votes, PRK 35, and there were 34 abstentions (see Appendix 1). Secretary of State Vance (1983:126–27) claims that he wrestled with the US vote for weeks, then concluded that Washington could not desert its allies to side with the Soviet bloc on the issue. In the same year Afghanistan retained its seat despite the entry of Soviet troops. Tanzania removed Idi Amin of Uganda, also in 1979, yet the new Kampala government was not questioned, although it consistently abstained on the Cambodia vote. The UN came down hard only on Vietnam. In 1980 the margin widened to 90–26–26. In 1981 several Western European governments threatened to bolt, but the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea calmed this storm. After 1982, Vietnam decided not to contest DK credentials.

In November 1979 the General Assembly adopted a resolution similar to Security Council actions earlier in the year. According to the resolution, all parties were to cease hostilities and to settle their disputes peacefully. Viet-

nam was to withdraw its troops, followed by free elections. The vote was 71–35–34, and the margin widened each year thereafter (see Appendix 2). A second vote in November, passed by a 91–21–29 vote, asked states and international organizations to send only emergency aid to the PRK; this became the legal basis for a boycott of most of Cambodia for a decade.

A hard core of support for the PRK came from the Soviet bloc—Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukraine, and Vietnam. Initial NAM supporters of the PRK included Albania, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, India, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Seychelles, South Yemen, and Syria. When CGDK formed, Grenada, Guyana, Mozambique, and the Seychelles switched their votes.

Many countries abstained on the credentials question but voted to condemn Vietnam after CGDK emerged—Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, the Netherlands, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Zambia. Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, North Yemen, Panama, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vanuatu continued to abstain through 1983.

Fourteen countries abstained initially, then voted with the majority within a few years—Bahrain, Burundi, Central African Republic, Dominican Republic, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Mali, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Zambia. Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, North Yemen, Romania, the Seychelles, St. Christopher and Nevis, and South Africa failed to vote on the question during most of the decade.

UN AID FLOWS

One implication of the General Assembly vote was that Democratic Kampuchea qualified for UN aid. A second implication was that the Phnom Penh government obtained only emergency aid from the UN, not development aid.

In 1975 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began to set up offices in Southeast Asia to service out-migrants from the new Communist regimes in Indochina. To feed and otherwise provide subsistence to the refugees, UNHCR worked with FAO, ICRC, UNICEF, WFP, and the World Health Organization (WHO). In the same year UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim assigned Sir Robert Jackson, under-secretary general, responsibility for coordinating the various international agencies. Despite the dramatic publicity given to the Vietnamese "boat people," Cambodian refugees outnumbered Vietnamese (UNHCR 1989a). During the DK era some 400,000 Cambodians fled to Thailand, for example (Mysliwiec 1988:10).

About 5,000 Cambodians left in the first three months after Pol Pot was overthrown, some 300,000 fled from DK-controlled territories because of famine, and nearly 500,000 left to escape the war. By 1980 the total swelled to 1.2 million Cambodian refugees (Kiernan 1982:175; interviewee #50; Mysliwiec 1988:10). The Orderly Departure Program, set up in 1979 by UNHCR, resettled about 300,000 Cambodians outside Southeast Asia by 1981 (UNHCR 1989b).

In 1979, according to observers of the Christian Conference of Asia, only 10 percent of the rice crop was planted due to the war and the effort of Khmers to return home from labor camps established by the DK regime (NYT 1979a). Pol Pot's army plundered rice reserves and slaughtered draft animals as it left the country. Because of conflict within UN political organs in regard to recognizing the PRK, initial famine relief came from countries in the region and from private voluntary organizations, such as ICRC and Oxfam. After Rosalynn Carter's inspection at the border, her husband applied pressure on the UN to act. Following urgent meetings of UNHCR and WHO in Geneva, FAO and WFP in Rome, and UN headquarters in New York, Jackson's mission was clarified in 1980. His position was retitled "Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Coordination of Kampuchean Humanitarian Assistance Programs" under the Office of Humanitarian Affairs on Southeast Asia.

In mid-1981, pursuant to the International Conference on Kampuchea, Waldheim named Ilter Turkmen as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Cambodia. Turkmen was seconded from Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later that year M'hamed Issaafi replaced Turkmen; Issaafi was seconded from Tunisia's foreign ministry. Then on January 1, 1982, Undersecretary Rafeeuddhin Ahmed took over responsibility. A task force aided Ahmed in connection with other aspects of the Cambodian conflict, including good offices for negotiations.

Phnom Penh justifiably feared that border settlers were being integrated into the command structure of the NADK, so Heng Samrin would not allow international agencies into the heart of Cambodia until they first signed an agreement to provide aid exclusively through the PRK government. Oxfam agreed to these conditions, but UN agencies could not in effect recognize the PRK when the General Assembly had instructed them otherwise. In September 1980, when the Phnom Penh government dropped its demand to be the exclusive UN aid recipient, UNHCR set up a Cambodian program, and food went from UNICEF and WFP to Phnom Penh.

During the first two years of the emergency food program, some $664 million came from Western sources (Charney & Spragens 1984:85). One estimate was that the amount allocated to relief inside Cambodia was slightly higher than the amount allocated to the border regions and resettlement camps (Goldwater 1984:168). The principal food donors were Europe, Japan, and the United States.

In 1981, after some migrants returned spontaneously to Cambodia, the nature of the UN aid operation changed. There was no famine any more. Although millions were still in a dependent state, aid was greatly reduced. The UN focus shifted to projects designed to help women and children. At the border, the category of "refugee" became more sharply distinct from that of "border settler," being that the latter hoped to return home when war ended. Refugees became the responsibility of UNHCR, which moved resettlement camps farther from the border.

ICRC and UNICEF wanted to serve the subsistence needs of the refugees, but the two agencies preferred to leave problems of the border settlers to other agencies. They had seen how their supplies, including even a tractor,[1] were carried away by NADK forces to further the war, and they refused to fuel the war. Thereafter, ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, with greatly reduced budgets, continued relief aid inside Cambodia in areas controlled by the PRK because they believed that the Phnom Penh government was not using the assistance for military or political purposes. But when UN headquarters insisted that the PRK was the only Third World country to be denied development aid, FAO pulled out of Phnom Penh and concentrated its attention instead on the border settlers.

In January 1982, with UN agencies going in separate directions, the UN Secretary General set up the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) as a new vehicle for coordination of operations. Winston Prattley, UNDP Regional Director in Bangkok, was named UNBRO Director to administer the program, which reported to Jackson, the Special Representative. UNDP then financed FAO development aid and WFP weekly distributions of food.

In 1983, when the General Assembly declared the emergency inside Cambodia to be over, Jackson was relieved of his duties, although he judged that the process of emergency relief had hardly ended and national rehabilitation had scarcely begun when he retired that year (Jackson 1988:iv). The vote meant that the ASEAN–Sino–US political agenda prevailed over humanitarian needs (Morello 1984:39). Some UN staff quit in protest. While UNICEF was spending at the level of $5 million annually (84 cents per person) inside Cambodia, UNBRO was dispensing $60 million ($200 per border settler) (Stone 1989c:8).

The camps, meanwhile, came under control of the three Cambodian resistance factions—FUNCIPEC on the north, KPNLF on the northwest, and PDK on the west of Cambodia along the Thai border. Although there was understandable controversy regarding allegations of the feeding of resistance soldiers on furlough, UNBRO estimates that less than one-tenth of the food actually went to combat-ready males; cuts in distribution occurred in times of marked abuses (interviewee #51). Because of the adverse impact of the refugee camps on nearby Thai settlements, UNBRO responded to Bangkok by providing similar programs, involving child care, food, and sanitation, to adjacent villagers.

NAM AND UN OPTIONS

Security considerations were predominant in NAM and UN bodies. Few countries wanted to "reward aggression," although the situation was such that chastising one aggressor meant condoning another. A secondary factor, a need not to jeopardize sources of foreign aid by voting contrary to the preferences of donors, was muted but more evident in the UN than in NAM. Human rights concerns were of lesser significance; the full extent of Polpotism was not fully appreciated until later. As information about DK genocide emerged, the CGDK figleaf over Polpotism was sewn together, making UN resolutions on Cambodia even more attractive than ever.

Later NAM meetings issued a diluted compromise statement and kept the Cambodian seat vacant. China and the aligned nations, who ignored NAM declarations over the years, disagreed; they preferred to keep Cambodia at war for their own purposes, and their conflictual approach prevailed at the United Nations.

Both NAM and UN deliberations sought to legitimize allies. Neither side could persuade the other to vote for peacekeeping forces or sanctions. Most countries wanted to do nothing and squirmed over being forced to vote at the UN on the question. NAM was more negotiation-oriented than the UN, but this changed somewhat after the International Conference on Kampuchea of 1981.

NOTE

1. Interview with Sir Robert Jackson, January 23, 1990. See Jackson (1988).

10

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA

In 1979 the General Assembly merely authorized the UN Secretary-General to explore the possibility of an international conference. By 1980 the UN resolution insisted on such a meeting in order to design a "comprehensive political settlement" that would include a withdrawal timetable, guarantees against reentry of PAVN troops, and a UN-supervised election in Cambodia. All conflicting parties and other countries concerned with the solution of the problem were to be invited to the conference.

Vietnam, outvoted on the UN resolution, proposed a regional conference between ASEAN states, Burma, and Indochinese states instead. We shall see later in this book that the idea of a regional conference eventually gained support within ASEAN, whence a genuine peace process followed.

The International Conference on Kampuchea convened at New York from July 13 to 17, 1981. ASEAN wanted the PRK to attend, but China, backed by the United States, prevailed in excluding the Phnom Penh government and steered the meeting away from disarming the four armies so that DK morale could be maintained (Pradhan 1985:195). Although India, Laos, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Eastern European countries boycotted, some seventy-nine countries attended. The European Community (EC), KPNLF, and FUNCIPEC sat as nonvoting observers. The Khmer People's Revolutionary Party asked for permission to attend ICK on a nonvoting basis; this request was denied. Sihanouk boycotted ICK, which he implied was a kangaroo court designed to convict Vietnam instead of reaching a compromise (Chanda 1986:389). Austrian Foreign Minister Wilfred Pahr, who had good working relations with UN Secretary-General Waldheim, was elected ICK president; his appointment signaled a desire among some countries to apply the Austrian model of neutralization to Cambodia.

During the debate a predictable tone pervaded the speeches of countries most directly involved. Canada, Gambia, Maldives, New Zealand, Sweden,

Tunisia, and West Germany called attention to the barbarity of the DK regime as an alternative to the PRK, but they would not accept genocide as a valid pretext for Vietnam's invasion. Sweden spoke against Vietnam's military action, disapproved of China's "lesson" to Vietnam, and castigated countries that were providing military support to the Pol Pot forces. These voices were muffled, however.

ASEAN, wanting to conciliate Vietnam, put forward a draft that recognized the "legitimate concerns of neighboring states of Kampuchea" and provided for disarmament of the Cambodian armies as well as UN-supervised elections to decide who would rule in a postwar Cambodia (Chanda 1986:387). China would not sign a document that implied DK or PRC complicity in aggression or in any way undermined the status of Democratic Kampuchea, which continued as a member of the United Nations and should therefore organize new elections and maintain an army once restored to power. During a working group meeting UN Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore had an acrimonious exchange with his PRC counterpart, Lin Qing, about the absurdity of the expectation that Pol Pot would abide by mere legal guarantees.

Ronald Reagan, who took office as US president some six months earlier, did not have the fervor toward human rights of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. The US role at ICK, as it turned out, was perfidious: Although US delegates Secretary of State Haig and his deputy, John Holdridge, walked out during Ieng Sary's address, they sent Holdridge's subordinate, John Negroponte, to pressure ASEAN to adopt China's position, even asking heads of the Philippine, Singaporean, and Thai governments to compel their foreign ministers to knuckle under (Chanda 1986:389; Shawcross 1979:356). The result was a division that prompted France to propose a compromise. Instead of a provision about disarming the warring factions, France offered vague references to measures that would prevent a disruption of elections. Instead of an interim authority, the final resolution stipulated "appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order." Instead of ICK being a body for continuing negotiation, a smaller body was set up to maintain contact on an *ad hoc* basis (van der Kroef 1982:1018–19).

ICK issued a declaration and adopted a resolution. The declaration enunciated the principles of respect for the territorial integrity of Cambodia and of noninterference and nonintervention in its internal affairs. The conference then agreed that a comprehensive political settlement would involve a cease-fire by all parties, withdrawal of PAVN troops under UN supervision, free elections under UN supervision, and a neutralization of Cambodia. Actions of ICK were affirmed by the General Assembly in October 1981 by a vote of 100–25–19, the widest margin so far.

The ICK resolution set up an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Thailand. Belgium, Nepal, and Peru were added by 1983. The Ad Hoc Committee was to advise

the UN Secretary-General and to recommend that the ICK President reconvene ICK in case of a negotiation breakthrough. Representatives from the Ad Hoc Committee then formed missions to visit various countries to promote a dialogue. The first mission, composed of Belgium, Malaysia, and Senegal, visited Belgium, France, and West Germany in early July 1982. Later venues were Argentina, Australia, Austria, China, Finland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. In 1987 one member of the Ad Hoc Committee went to Pyongyang to meet Sihanouk. But there were no trips to Hanoi or Phnom Penh. The Ad Hoc Committee made annual reports to the General Assembly on its missions. The UN Secretary-General, who had personal contact with many heads of state concerning Cambodia each year, assigned Rafeeuddhin Ahmed to have additional consultations. Reports on these activities went to the General Assembly each year as well.

ICK met only once, although it could have reconvened. It provided authority for additional efforts at quiet diplomacy by groups of countries, thereby keeping the UN informed on matters under negotiation in the region.

ICK condemned Vietnam without also passing judgment on the prior aggression and genocide of Pol Pot or on China for a calculated act of aggression against Vietnam. Rather than premising a peace plan on a comprehensive analysis of an intricate set of actions and reactions over several years, the text presented a one-sided solution. The pursuit of a "comprehensive" solution was thus Orwellian doublespeak. The proxy war could continue as before.

ICK was not a genuine initiative for peace; instead it further polarized the conflict. In the following decade the UN and ICK played roles secondary to a peace process, which grew primarily within Southeast Asia. We now turn to an examination of attempts to bring peace to Cambodia that finally resulted in conferences where measurable progress was achieved.

Part III

MIDDLE GAME

11

PROXY PEACE

CONFRONTATIONAL PEACE PLANS

Efforts of outsiders to dictate terms of peace to Cambodia have consistently failed. For example, in 1953 France elevated Prince Sihanouk to power in order to alleviate its own military troubles in Vietnam by pulling the rug from underneath the guerrilla movement for Cambodian independence. Neither objective was achieved: Independence forces resented French-installed governments and fought on.

Subsequently, Sihanouk tried to balance outside pressures but fell. Lon Nol sought an alliance with the United States, while the Communist movement relied on China. Pol Pot's internal and external insecurities led to the "killing fields" and the war with Vietnam.

After trying to get Pol Pot to negotiate, China and Laos to mediate, and the United Nations to deliberate on the border war, Vietnam concluded that it could not stop Pol Pot's aggression through diplomacy. Hanoi's fallback plan was to ally with the Soviet Union and then to launch a counteroffensive as far as the Mekong. When Khmers enthusiastically greeted PAVN as the savior of their country, the Vietnamese advanced up to the Thai border, whereupon Thailand mobilized support, China attacked, and a stalemate ensued.

After a new government was set up in Phnom Penh, Hanoi sought to buy time for the PRK by holding Pol Pot's forces at bay until new leaders could first rebuild the devastated country, then later the PRK could recruit an army to handle any remaining resistance. Meanwhile, resistance forces had to be built from scratch with the aid of external sources. NADK started with a residual army, the RAK. ANS and KPNLA were created as non-Communist alternatives to the KPRAF and PAVN. Because an SRV-dominated Indochina was geostrategically unacceptable to China, Pol Pot, Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the United States, condemning Vietnam was the

initial ASEAN and UN peace strategy. In early January 1979, Thailand's Foreign Minister Upadit summoned his ASEAN counterparts to respond to the presence of PAVN troops on the Thai border. ASEAN's concern was to obtain a PAVN pullout, subsequent elections, and a neutral Cambodia. China initially encouraged Thailand to refuse to negotiate with Vietnam, demanding instead that PAVN troops withdraw, followed by a political settlement that would restore Pol Pot to power. Although a majority of the UN Security Council called for a total PAVN pullout from Cambodia, the Soviet Union vetoed this one-sided peace plan, which overlooked the fact that a genocidal regime would simply return to power, more eager than ever to annihilate Vietnam.

Lacking an army, Sihanouk could not return to power through the barrel of a gun, and he did not want to ally with Pol Pot. He received no replies to letters addressed to SRV Party Leader Le Duan, however. In February 1979 he called for a Geneva conference on Cambodia to bring the conflicting parties together, minus the PRK. Although Senator Edward Kennedy supported the idea (NYT 1979b), China evidently did not want to air its complicity with Pol Pot's aggression in public, and Vietnam considered the new situation "irreversible." Soon ASEAN began to push for an international conference, despite PRC preferences, and in 1980 China agreed to ICK, although only if it excluded the PRK. When ICK took place in 1981, it served as a forum for vituperation, not compromise.

Increasing the cost of Vietnam's stay in Cambodia was the next strategy for peace. China's military "lesson" from February to March 1979 aimed to weaken Vietnam's hold on Cambodia. The United States called for a worldwide aid and trade embargo on Cambodia and Vietnam.

PLA troops pulled back when PAVN forces weathered the onslaught, and ASEAN and the United States registered official if mild displeasure at China. In May UN Secretary-General Waldheim went to Beijing and Hanoi on a peace mission, learning that China fully reserved the option to attack Vietnam again as long as PAVN troops remained in Cambodia, while Hanoi was ready to withdraw if Beijing would stop aiding Pol Pot (NYT 1979c).

Under PRC pressure, DK leaders proposed a coalition with Sihanouk, but the Prince would not agree to cooperate with his erstwhile tormentors. Instead, the Prince called for a UN peacekeeping force and a vacant seat at the UN until the Cambodian question could be resolved. In August Democratic Kampuchea renamed itself the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea. By December, with Sihanouk refusing the presidency of the Front, Pol Pot resigned as head, and Khieu Samphan became the new leader.

When NAM met in June, there was no consensus on Cambodia. In September NAM urged all external parties, China as well as Vietnam, to remove themselves from the Cambodian conflict, followed by a peace dialogue without preconditions. Hanoi agreed, but Beijing refused. The UN General

Assembly called for PAVN to withdraw from Cambodia, followed by free elections. The UN would not acknowledge China's role in inciting DK aggression, in attacking Vietnam, or in continuing to aid Pol Pot's plan to reconquer Cambodia.

THE ASEAN–IFMC DIALOGUE

In January 1980 the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam began a series of meetings, articulating new peace plans twice each year.[1] Denied a direct, face-to-face meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers, IFMC could at least engage in a paper dialogue while ASEAN reached its own consensus.

Vietnam was initially willing to sign bilateral nonaggression pacts with ASEAN countries. Bangkok's allies subscribed to Upadit's rejection of this idea on the grounds that the problem was conflict in Cambodia, not future aggression by Vietnam.

When the annual Malaysia-Indonesia ("Malindo") summit convened in March at Kuantan, Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and President Suharto agreed that the solution to the Cambodian problem lay in stopping external aid to the competing factions so that Southeast Asians could decide without superpower meddling. The rest of ASEAN, however, rejected this so-called Kuantan Formula, which appeared to concede Cambodia to Vietnam in order to evict the Russians from the region. Instead, ASEAN's plan had three planks—Vietnam's withdrawal, free elections, and a neutral Cambodia. Even Thach initially refused to embrace the Kuantan Formula, claiming that Vietnam was already independent of the USSR.

Indonesia and Malaysia went along with the ASEAN consensus on the condition that there would be a channel of communication with Hanoi. Jakarta feared that China had become the new regional superpower. Benny Murdani, Indonesia's head of military intelligence, then flew to Vietnam in May to open a separate dialogue. Hanoi did not want a separate peace, however, and was holding out for PRK legitimization as a solution.

In July the PRK proposed setting up a demilitarized zone along the Thai border. IFMC outlined the idea of a safety zone: Only PRK troops would be allowed in the zone on the Cambodian side of the border, while only Thai troops would be on the other side. Vietnamese and Cambodian resistance forces would pull back beyond the safety zone, thereby removing the refugee camps from the border.

In August ASEAN rejected the proposed safety zone, saying that the conflict was inside Cambodia, not between Thailand and Vietnam. ASEAN countered with the idea of a UN-supervised demilitarized peace zone inside Cambodia, with UN observers along the Thai frontier. Thach rejected this idea, since for Vietnam the problem was support for the resistance forces operating from sanctuaries on Thai territory (AFP 1980). Secretary-General

Waldheim visited Bangkok and Hanoi later in August, but he found no give and take on these proposals that might lead to a compromise.

In October Thach announced at the UN that Vietnam was willing to have "immediate discussion" with ASEAN on the basis of current ASEAN and IFMC proposals, including the Kuantan Formula. Malaysian delegates told Thach in private that they were eager for a dialogue but were outvoted within ASEAN (van der Kroef 1981).

After Australia and Britain rescinded recognition of Democratic Kampuchea in 1980, Sihanouk was under increased pressure to join a coalition with the Polpotists. The result was the establishment of the CGDK by 1982.

ASEAN wanted to convene an international conference on Cambodia, a proposal originated by Sihanouk in 1979. China initially opposed the idea, demanding that PAVN troops leave Cambodia first, but in December 1980 PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nian Long waived this condition. China was ready to accept UN-supervised elections after the PAVN withdrawal and thus appeared to abandon Pol Pot (van der Kroef 1981:516).

In January 1981 IFMC proposed two meetings instead—a regional conference followed by an international conference. An ASEAN–Burma–Indochina regional conference at Ho Chi Minh City would draw up a treaty on peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The projected international meeting, to include the five permanent members of the Security Council, would then guarantee the regional treaty. To prepare for the first session, which thus would exclude China, IFMC suggested that an ASEAN representative could meet a Laotian diplomat, who would represent IFMC. Phoune Sipaseuth, foreign minister of Laos, journeyed to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to elicit views on this proposal. When he learned that Vietnam's refusal to discuss any troop withdrawal was a stumbling block, the IFMC revised the plan later in 1981, and PAVN withdrawal became an agenda item for discussion at the proposed regional conference. In April Vietnam offered to remove PAVN from Cambodia if Thailand would stop aiding NADK enclaves along the Cambodian border and China would sign nonaggression pacts with the three Indochinese countries (Richardson 1981). Interpreting the latest IFMC proposals as mere propaganda, ASEAN said that all states involved should meet together, but in fact no ASEAN state was willing to negotiate with, and thus recognize, the PRK.

ASEAN's call for an international conference came to fruition when ICK convened in July 1981. Beforehand, in June, ASEAN spelled out what it meant by a "comprehensive political settlement." The main components included a UN-supervised PAVN withdrawal, UN peacekeeping forces in Cambodia during a disarming of the warring Cambodian factions, dismantling of the PRK, and free elections to select a new government.

When ICK convened, Hanoi refused to attend because of the exclusion of the PRK. Vietnam would not be placed in a position where it was forced to speak for another sovereign state, and it resented the implication that

the PRK was a mere proxy of the SRV. Even Sihanouk realized that a demand for PAVN withdrawal, followed by free elections, would not ease the situation. Subsequent one-sided UN resolutions, based as they were on the ICK peace formula, threw down a gauntlet before the PRK and SRV governments instead of an olive branch.

In September Indonesia's Murdani, newly promoted to the position of army chief of staff, made another trip to Hanoi. Here he agreed with his SRV hosts on the need to pursue a regional rather than an international peace process (Straits Times 1981). His trip was the first clue that ASEAN was quietly abandoning the hard line of the ICK and the accusatory rhetoric of the UN. ASEAN's traditional *modus operandi* was to build bridges, not to burn them.

In October Lao Foreign Minister Phoune presented a seven-point peace plan to the UN General Assembly. The gist of the proposal was a "standing body," with one representative from ASEAN, one from IFMC, and Burma as a tiebreaking third member, to hold regular and extraordinary meetings in order to resolve regional conflicts. All aid to the Cambodian resistance was to end as well. As the Lao plan entailed recognizing the PRK indirectly, it was stillborn.

In January 1982 IFMC, supported by the Soviet Union, repeated its call for an international conference on Southeast Asia in which ASEAN, the four Cambodian factions, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, India as NAM chair, and the UN Secretary-General would meet to discuss terms of a settlement of the Cambodian conflict. When ASEAN turned down the IFMC initiative, Japan suggested a meeting in 1982 involving ASEAN, the IFMC, and the five permanent members of the Security Council. Although the UN's Ahmed and Vietnam's Thach accepted Toyko's proposal, ASEAN refused to talk to the PRK in any forum.

In February Vietnam announced that it was willing to put the removal of PAVN from Cambodia on the agenda of a conference involving ASEAN, Laos, and Vietnam. Hanoi was no longer insisting upon recognition of the PRK. When the only response was a call from Beijing to undertake a partial pullout, about 25,000 soldiers withdrew during the rainy seasons of 1982–1983 and 1983–1984, although some fresh troops arrived as replacements.

In March Thach agreed to internationally supervised elections to select a new Cambodian government. In July Sihanouk announced a plan for a neutral Cambodia. Neither proposal was taken seriously, although Thach sought Siddhi's assistance in mediating Vietnam's dispute with China. When the two met at the end of July, the Thai foreign minister kindly noted that Hanoi would be more successful in negotiations if it would tone down its accusatory rhetoric to discuss in a more friendly manner, a point that Thach took to heart (Interviewee #126).

China, expressing disbelief that PAVN would ever leave Cambodia, offered a five-point plan in October. The proposal included an end to Soviet

assistance to the PRK, cessation of anti-Chinese policies in Vietnam, a timetable for a complete PAVN withdrawal, a neutralized Cambodia, and internationally supervised free elections.

A summit conference of the three Indochinese heads of state in July 1983 announced an eventual PAVN pullout. China, pleased with the information, pledged to do something to ease tensions each time a significant withdrawal occurred, such as reducing aid to NADK, but Beijing later attacked Hanoi for mere theatrical withdrawals followed by secret replacements of soldiers (BDS 1982). China asked for a timetable for a complete PVN evacuation, whereupon Vietnam requested a timetable for cessation of PRC aid to NADK (AFP 1983:K2). Neither obliged the other.

Next, Hanoi received some exploratory visits from two Western foreign ministers. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson flew to attend the annual ASEAN–European Community ministerial conference at Bangkok in early March, then went on to Hanoi, although nothing developed. After the electoral victory of the Australian Labor Party, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden flew to Hanoi, believing that the strategy of isolating Vietnam was counterproductive and that a genuine peace process could be launched. Although the talks were preliminary, Hayden returned home to learn that ASEAN and the United States were upset that Canberra was showing independence.

A NAM summit occurred later in March at New Delhi. There was little change in NAM's policy toward Cambodia. While at the meeting, Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad Iskandar accepted Thach's proposal for a Five (ASEAN) Plus Two (Laos and Vietnam) conference. After the summit, Thach visited Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila to widen support for the idea. But neither China nor Thailand agreed, even though Hayden later favored the meeting.

Each year during the rainy season, PAVN forces pulled back thirty kilometers from the Thai border until the terrain became more passable. As Bangkok thought that this tacit cease-fire was a good idea, in June 1983 Thailand's Siddhi persuaded Indonesia's Mochtar to propose a permanent demilitarized zone to Hanoi with a UN observer team posted along the border. IFMC then responded in July, suggesting a demilitarized zone (thirty kilometers wide in later restatements of the proposal) on both sides of the Cambodian-Thai border under international supervision (later defined as a peacekeeping force). Border camps were to be moved away from the frontier, and there would be a repatriation program when peace returned to Cambodia. IFMC endorsed the NAM peace plan as well as ZOPFAN and again proposed a "5 + 2" conference. However, when Indonesian diplomats laid the IFMC plan on the table for ASEAN discussion in July, the response was negative. The familiar reason was that Bangkok should decide what to do inside its own territory; it was Vietnam that did not belong in Cambodia.

Most countries restated their positions in 1984. In July Shintaro Abe,

Japan's foreign minister, proposed massive aid to Cambodia and Vietnam if both countries would agree to PAVN's withdrawal, an international peacekeeping force (with some financing from Japan), and internationally supervised free elections. Specifics of the settlement were not the issue, however. The problem was that the parties most deeply involved in the conflict refused to negotiate with one another. Sihanouk hinted to French government officials during August that he might be willing to talk to Hun Sen, who in turn agreed to do so in September, but China vetoed the talks. Then the Prince threatened to resign from CGDK, complaining that the resistance had no peace plan of its own.

In September ASEAN formalized its proposal as the Appeal for Kampuchean Independence. Then, by the end of 1983, ASEAN suggested a zone-by-zone PAVN withdrawal under international supervision (Richardson 1983). IFMC's views on NAM, ZOPFAN, and the "5 + 2" conference proposal were ignored.

During 1984 IFMC outlined five options regarding Cambodia. One was a continuation of the armed conflict, with the risk that China might unleash a second "lesson." The second option was a global solution, based on the withdrawal of all foreign soldiers, an end to external intervention in the affairs of countries of the region, and establishment of ZOPFAN, consistent with the NAM formula of 1979 and Laos' seven-point plan of 1981. A third scenario envisioned a safety zone on both sides of the Cambodian-Thai border under an international control body. A fourth alternative, also partial in nature, was to encapsulate the conflict—an end of PRC aid, no more Thai protection of resistance bases, and a PAVN pullout. The fifth option was to embrace both ASEAN and IFMC principles in order to prevent escalation of the conflict; that is, to begin a dialogue and a peace process. This analysis, the most eloquent and compelling statement so far on a scenario to end the deadlock, was ignored and unreported outside Indochina.

The major event regarding Cambodia in 1984 was not in the field of diplomacy. It was the release of *The Killing Fields*, a film that brought the horrors of everyday life in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978 to the attention of the world. After the film gained notoriety, public pressure in the West mounted to bring about a peace process that would exclude Pol Pot.

At this point Stephen Solarz, who chaired the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives, went to Hanoi to ascertain whether Vietnam would allow a coalition between the PRK and the non-Communist resistance. As PAVN forces had crushed the NCR in major offenses over the previous two years, and Sihanouk had long refused to talk to Hun Sen despite Hanoi's urging, the idea appeared unrealistic to Thach. Solarz went home to persuade Congress to vote overt aid, lethal and nonlethal, to the NCR in order to apply more pressure on Vietnam. By mid-1985 Congress authorized the appropriation.

NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS

During 1985 ASEAN and IFMC began for the first time to respond seriously to each other's peace plans. In January Vietnam first linked a PAVN withdrawal from Cambodia to exclusion of the "genocidal Pol Pot clique," free elections in Cambodia with the presence of foreign observers, and an "international form of guarantee and supervision" for implementation of a peace agreement. Although China and Thailand were still against direct negotiations with the PRK, in February Mahathir began to coax the CGDK and IFMC into a common forum, such as "proximity talks," where all ASEAN, Cambodian, and Indochinese parties could be present for informal discussions but no party would be required to talk to another. This formula had already proved useful in the search for a settlement on Afghanistan. Later in February, when UN Secretary-General Xavier Perez de Cuellar visited Hanoi for the first time, Thach blurted out that everything was negotiable except for the survival of the Polpotists (Beckaert 1985b). Australia's Hayden and Indonesia's Mochtar visited Hanoi in March, when Thach indicated that he welcomed an informal "cocktail party" among the contending parties as a method for promoting dialogue. USSR Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposed an Asian security conference in May, but nobody was listening to Moscow on Cambodia at that time.

ASEAN then appeared to drop an insistence on a role for the UN in a Cambodian settlement (Richardson 1985). When ASEAN foreign ministers met again in April, there was a consensus to call for proximity talks, with the possible aim of forging a quadripartite Cambodian consensus, but only if PRK representatives were part of the SRV delegation. As Vietnam responded by insisting on the exclusion of the PDK from the CGDK delegation, the proposal for proximity talks foundered. Also in April, Sihanouk threatened to resign from CGDK so that he could negotiate a separate peace, but he demurred when PDK leaders assured him that they were seeking a powersharing arrangement to restore him as head of a postwar Cambodian government. In June Vietnam declared that a total withdrawal from Cambodia would be completed by 1990. In July ASEAN called for CGDK–Vietnam negotiations, but in August IFMC rejected any solution that would include the Polpotists.

During the dry season of 1984–1985, a concerted PAVN offensive wiped out most resistance bases and attempted to seal the border with Thailand, thereby almost imposing a military solution. Hanoi again announced that it would withdraw all its troops by 1990. Indeed, hardly any military operations took place after 1985. China was trying to reciprocate with Soviet moves for tension reduction at this time as well (Duiker 1986:104).

Starting in 1986, new peace plans began to emerge with important concessions.[2] In March a CGDK eight-point peace plan mentioned the idea of a quadripartite unity government, an international peacekeeping force, a neu-

tral and nonaligned Cambodia, and an international control commission. The concession was to allow a role for the Hun Sen faction, but the proposal had a booby trap—an insistence on dissolving the PRK while keeping NADK in place. In April ASEAN endorsed the CGDK peace plan. Phnom Penh responded with a proposal, relayed in October to Beijing by Vietnam through the Austrian mission to the UN, in which the PRK agreed to talk to the PDK, implying some acceptance of powersharing by all four factions. In July Gorbachev agreed to put Cambodia on the agenda in normalization negotiations with China. In August, when China endorsed the ASEAN–CGDK peace plan while promising to cut aid to NADK as PAVN withdrew, Sihanouk agreed in principle to see Hun Sen, but only after talking first to an SRV representative. In December the Swedish ambassador to Algeria offered to host talks between Hanoi and Sihanouk, but Vietnam insisted that the Prince should first negotiate with Phnom Penh.

In Early 1987 Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu offered his good offices to Vietnam in order to set up quadripartite intra-Cambodian talks. When the PDK declined, Vietnam proposed that Hun Sen, Son Sann, and Sihanouk meet at Sihanouk's residence in Pyongyang. PDK vetoed this initiative as well.

Retired French diplomat Jean-Jacques Galabru and his wife Kek Galabru, whose father was the Prince's legal aide Pong Peng Cheng, flew to Phnom Penh in early 1987 in order to get a meeting between Hun Sen and Sihanouk on track (interviewee #74). In May, Sihanouk took a one-year leave of absence from CGDK so that he could act on his own, as PDK would not let him meet Hun Sen in his role as CGDK president. Nonetheless, when a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official suggested on behalf of Vietnam in July that the two hold talks, the Prince first agreed, then backed out.

In June UN Secretary-General Xavier Perez de Cuellar unveiled a four-point plan, including a partial PAVN withdrawal that could become a complete pullout later, a cease-fire, national reconciliation between the four factions, and free elections. The PRK and the SRV rejected the plan, which affirmed the legitimacy of the PDK; the PDK and PRC were likewise opposed to any role for the PRK.

In July Indonesia's Mochtar went to Ho Chi Minh City in order to invite Vietnam to a meeting with ASEAN and all four Cambodian factions (but not a cocktail party, as Mochtar was a Muslim). Thach agreed, provided that PDK was a part of Sihanouk's delegation and that Vietnam would participate after the four Cambodian factions first held discussions—two sessions instead of one. Mochtar and Thach agreed on this format. Later that month, ASEAN foreign ministers insisted that Hanoi speak for the PRK in a single meeting, perceiving that Vietnam was trying to maneuver the proposed conference to accept the premise that the conflict in Cambodia was primarily a civil war. Hanoi objected to this new format, and the

meeting was called off. Vietnam's position was that problems internal to Cambodia should be discussed among Cambodians: The role of external countries was not to dictate a solution but rather to guarantee one reached by representatives of the Cambodian people.

During midsummer the "seven sages," former Cambodian premiers and cabinet ministers exiled in France, wrote letters to all the principals, urging negotiations. The Prince was the first to respond, agreeing to meet Hun Sen if he would request an "audience" with His Royal Highness. In September the PRK agreed to the idea of designing an interim quadripartite authority as a vehicle to effect a reconciliation, thus making a concession that DK officials—other than Pol Pot and Ieng Sary of the "Pol Pot clique"—could play a role in a negotiated settlement. Thailand's Siddhi then went to Beijing and Pyongyang to discuss peace proposals with Deng and the Prince, respectively.

In October Hun Sen released a five-point peace plan. Key features were a "neutral and nonaligned" Cambodia and a quadripartite National Reconciliation Council (NRC) to hold elections for a constitutional convention. Lower-ranking PDK leaders could be part of the quadripartite body. The plan did not agree to dismantle PRK, as NADK might then take advantage of the anarchy to seize power. Hun Sen opposed disarming the PRK army for the same reason. As for an international control commission, he was suspicious that it would turn out to be as ineffective as all such bodies had been in Indochina since 1954. Hun Sen invited Sihanouk to head the NRC and to merge ANS with KPRAF in order to defeat NADK. Hun Sen also welcomed Son Sann to join a new tripartite coalition. Hun Sen's plan was the most important breakthrough so far, as it suggested that Phnom Penh was acting independently of Hanoi.

THE HUN SEN–SIHANOUK DIALOGUE

Quai d'Orsay finally succeeded when the Prince agreed to see Hun Sen in France. The two met outside Paris in December 1987 and January 1988, becoming more sensitive to similarities and differences in their views. On both occasions Hun Sen asked Sihanouk to return to power as head of state (Stone 1989e: 18). There was agreement on using the PRK civil service as the basis for a transitional government, disarming NADK, and phasing out PAVN troops, although Sihanouk knew that Pol Pot would oppose all but the latter point (Porter 1988b:128–29). When Sihanouk concluded that they had made as much progress as they could bilaterally, he recommended that a regional meeting be held. It was then up to ASEAN to schedule the cocktail party or some equivalent. Vietnam sweetened the pot in May 1988 by announcing a partial withdrawal of 50,000 troops by the end of the year and a complete pullout by the end of 1989 if China would agree to stop NADK aid.

JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETINGS

ASEAN then relabeled proximity talks as the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), which was scheduled for mid-July 1988. Just before the meeting, China proposed a peace plan with safeguards that might prevent the Polpotists from returning to power—a freeze on troop strength, international supervision of a PAVN pullout and Cambodian elections, and a quadripartite interim government set up during PAVN's withdrawal. The plan reversed the previous PRC insistence that Vietnam depart before a transitional arrangement was in place. A few days later, UN Undersecretary Ahmed went to Phnom Penh to offer Secretary-General Perez's latest plan, which differed from China's in asking for disarmament of the four Cambodian armies and international guarantees for the nonreturn of Pol Pot to power.

On the eve of JIM I, Sihanouk (1989a) released a three-stage plan, similar to one he had issued in February 1988. In the first stage there would be a cease-fire. In stage two a UN peacekeeping force would supervise PAVN's withdrawal and a disarmament of the four Cambodian armies. In stage three the UN force would supervise the integration of all four Cambodian forces into a single army, with Sihanouk as supreme commander. One objective of the Prince's plan was to allay fears that any party would cheat on the agreement. The second aim was to test the PDK, as it would be isolated if it opposed the Prince.

The three plans served as backdrops to JIM I. Leaders of ASEAN, the four Cambodian factions, Laos, and Vietnam flew to Jakarta's international airport, then took ground transportation to Bogor, a city closer to the airport than Jakarta. Although Sihanouk instead motored to Jakarta, he did so as the guest of President Suharto. Having resigned from CGDK to dissociate himself from the PDK, he wanted to remain above factional squabbling, and his son Ranariddh was FUNCIPEC's representative. Just before JIM I convened, the Prince invited all four factions to his guest house, where he lectured them on the future of Cambodia as if he were already an autocratic head of state (interviewee #42). As he acknowledged again in January 1989, the PRK could not be dismantled completely. From a practical point of view, few Cambodians outside the country were willing to fly to Phnom Penh to join in a truly quadripartite administration, so the "national reconciliation government" would have to start with the PRK, then expand when volunteers arrived in due course (Chanda 1988e). He was urging a CGDK–PRK merger instead of mutual dissolution, contrary to his earlier peace proposals (Richburg 1988).

When JIM I's first session opened, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was in the chair. Vietnam's conception won out at JIM I, where the agenda consisted of two phases—an internal Cambodian discussion, followed by a roundtable with all countries. As the first meeting of the four Cambodian factions ever, JIM I provided an opportunity for each side to state its po-

sition. While Vietnam's Thach had long urged separating the Cambodian problem into internal and external aspects, CGDK insisted that there was no "Cambodian problem" but rather a "Vietnamese problem" that could only be solved by having Hanoi remove its presence from Cambodia. Three of the Cambodian factions favored a PRK-proposed quadripartite NRC. Khieu Samphan attended but did not make a statement, lacking PDK authorization to comment on Sihanouk's latest peace plan. China failed to supply any instructions to the PDK delegation other than to observe and to report (Lindahl 1988). Although no joint statement emerged, in deference to Samphan's objection, Alatas issued a Consensus Statement in which he announced that JIM I agreed to form a Working Group composed of senior officials from all JIM countries with responsibility to draft alternative texts for a negotiated agreement.

While the PRK was offering an unconditional amnesty to CGDK officers and soldiers who would return to civilian life, in June and October NADK forcibly transferred some 16,000 persons from border camps in Thailand to Cambodian villages under its military control. China provided fresh supplies of arms for these "recruits." The NADK remained China's pawn, so when a peace plan finally emerged from Khieu Samphan in November, proposing that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council guarantee an interim quadripartite government, it was out of the mainstream of the peace process because it envisaged a PAVN withdrawal before a cease-fire, but left NADK intact. Sihanouk noted that the plan made no provision for preventing Pol Pot from returning to power, although limits on the power of the PDK were implicit in accepting an interim quadripartite government.

After JIM I, Vietnam began to think of a precise date for troop withdrawal. Hanoi wanted to leave by mid-1989; Phnom Penh preferred March 31, 1990 (interviewee #5; Lindahl 1988). Hanoi continued recalling civilian advisers from PRK ministries during 1988, and by the end of the year they were all gone (interviewees #105, 106). Rumors from Beijing by mid-1988 suggested that China was ready to abandon Pol Pot, who might have to consider living a life of permanent exile (Becker 1989c:171). A Sino-Soviet meeting in August accelerated yet another dialogue. The Soviet Union was willing to drop support for Vietnam's role in Cambodia in order to improve relations with China. By November, PRC Prime Minister Li Peng offered to decrease aid to the NADK as PAVN troops thinned out in Cambodia (Wang 1988: 14).

July elections in Thailand brought a new coalition to power. Chatichai Choonhavan became prime minister, and he soon spoke of improving relations with neighboring countries and turning "battlefields into marketplaces." In August, Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Noboru Takeshita talked to Sihanouk. England expressed concern that Pol Pot might return to power. Japan offered aid. In September, Chatichai accepted Ha-

noi's view that a negotiated settlement should include an international control body, not a peacekeeping force.

After JIM I, Sihanouk mooted the idea of an empty Cambodian seat at the United Nations (Beckaert 1988). The reward for his independence was that China stopped subsidizing his airfare (interviewee #17), then NADK attacked ANS troops—and by the end of August the Prince abandoned the empty seat option. When he rejoined CGDK, his stipend was resumed. The General Assembly again called for Vietnam to leave Cambodia, adding to the resolution a caution that the country should not return to "universally condemned policies and practices," thereby delivering a belated if oblique reprimand to Pol Pot.

The PDK boycotted the first session of the JIM Working Group in October. When the rest signed a joint communiqué, a new tripartite coalition appeared to be emerging—without the PDK. The second session, with PDK present to block progress, met for two hours in December. Thailand had nothing new to offer, and ASEAN lacked a definitive position to advance the peace process, although the Working Group discussed parameters for a future peace settlement.

Quai d'Orsay next invited leaders of the four factions to hold talks in France during November. Only Khieu Samphan failed to attend; instead, he sent Ok Sakun, the Cambodian ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris. When Hun Sen objected that protocol required Samphan to attend, the discussion was tripartite, and Deng Xiaoping warned Sihanouk not to sign anything without PDK approval (Keomanivong 1988). Although Sihanouk conceded that the PRK administrative structure should remain in place, he insisted that all political leaders step down in a transition. Whereas Hun Sen refused to dismantle the PRK at any level, PRK Prime Minister Li Peng prevailed on Khieu Samphan to accept a lesser role for the PDK in an interim quadripartite government (Chanda 1988e:17). The Prince then offered a five-point plan—a definite PAVN withdrawal date, simultaneous dissolution of CGDK and PRK, internationally controlled elections, an interim quadripartite government, and an international peacekeeping force. Samphan joined the three in December, and a tripartite working commission became quadripartite. The dialogue ended when the Prince insisted that the body adopt his five-point plan or he would withdraw FUNCIPEC participation.

Beijing, assured by Moscow, began to take seriously Hanoi's pledge to withdraw completely from Cambodia. As 1989 began, Dinh Nho Liem, a deputy foreign minister of Vietnam, went to Beijing to talk to his counterpart, Liu Shuqing, in pursuit of a Sino-Vietnamese détente. Subsequently, both sides withdrew troops from their common frontier and trade resumed along the border, but Beijing required Hanoi to back down on Cambodia before there would be further progress on détente.

Siddhi also boarded a plane in January. In Hanoi he agreed to the idea

of retaining both CGDK and PRK, with Sihanouk to head a provisional national council to oversee the transition to a new Cambodia. Siddhi and Thach agreed to one international control mechanism (not two) for both election supervision and peacekeeping. At the end of the month Chatichai invited Hun Sen to visit Bangkok. The Thai prime minister was ready for a separate peace with the PRK if all else failed, although the two primarily discussed Thai commercial opportunities in a postwar Cambodia.

Sihanouk began 1989 by dropping insistence on his five-point peace proposal, no longer asking for a dismantling of the PRK before internationally supervised elections. In February, after CGDK met for the first time in eighteen months, he reverted to a hard line.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze went to Beijing in February, informing his PRC counterpart Qian Qichen that the USSR, favoring an "effective international control mechanism" to oversee a settlement, would be delighted to stop aiding Vietnam militarily (Delfs 1989). A single international body for supervision was not what China wanted. A second body would be needed for peacekeeping, according to Beijing.

JIM II convened at Bogor in February. Resignaholic Sihanouk resumed his role as CGDK president before the meeting but did not even go to Indonesia. Although Khieu Samphan spoke on several occasions, shook hands with Hun Sen,[3] and proposed a UN force of only 2,000 to monitor a cease-fire, there was no major breakthrough at the meeting. JIM II concluded with a Consensus Statement, which called upon the four Cambodian parties to work out a set of agreements for an "independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral, and nonaligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation."

VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT

In 1985 Vietnam said that its troops would leave Cambodia in 1990—earlier if NADK forces disarmed first. By the end of 1988 PAVN forces were already out of Laos. At JIM II Thach announced that a PAVN pullout would occur by September 1989 if external countries agreed to stop aiding the Cambodian combatants. China was still insisting on a PAVN withdrawal timetable. Sihanouk (1989b) indicated that he would not see Hun Sen again until such a timetable was made public. Then on April 5 IFMC announced that PAVN soldiers would leave unconditionally by September 30. IFMC also proposed a lightly armed international control commission of 600 persons, composed of personnel from Canada, India, and Poland, with representatives from JIM and the UN Security Council, to supervise a transition to a neutralized Cambodia. The three Indochinese countries opposed a UN force, and they noted that Phnom Penh had the right to "call on other countries to give assistance" after September if "foreign interference continued" (Tasker & Chanda 1989:11).

The announcement meant that the world had six months to work out an international agreement for peace in Cambodia. Otherwise, a civil war might resume and Pol Pot could be in Phnom Penh by the end of 1989. France, which had been calling for an international conference in Paris during 1988 as an alternative to the JIM process (FEER 1988), finally succeeded in inviting nearly twenty countries to discuss an international guarantee to peace in Cambodia at a meeting to open on July 30. Sihanouk opted for Paris, as he felt that the French government would be sympathetic to his interests, and his preference was honored by the countries involved (interviewee #25).

External suppliers of military aid then made provisions for arms shipments in case the conference failed. Britain, France, and the United States took steps to aid both ANS and KPNLA (Chanda 1989d; FEER 1989f; Field, Tasker & Hiebert 1989:16): The aim was to strengthen the NCR. There was no contingency plan in case NADK defeated the KPRAF and then later overwhelmed ANS and KPNLA. China aided the NADK with supplies estimated to last as long as six years (Atkins 1989). The Soviet Union agreed to serve as the PRK's principal military backer, if need be, after September. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai, fearing that there would be a resurgence of fighting, opposed these efforts to escalate the level of military aid when there was a need to create an atmosphere of de-escalation, and Australia's Prime Minister Hawke agreed (Hiebert 1989c; Richburg 1989e:A22). Solarz suggested that the UN set up a trusteeship for Cambodia, but his idea seemed too extreme (Ottaway 1989). The ANS, attacked by the NADK on a few occasions in early 1989, tacitly decided not to fight the KPRAF; KPNLA was also too weak to mount an offensive (Brown 1989:79; Nation 1988). The NCR lacked any effective political organization inside Cambodia in case there were elections or either entity were asked to contribute personnel to the quadripartite government that they favored diplomatically.

Every country appeared to prefer peace. They key question, however, was "Peace on whose terms?" The countries would learn the answer when they arrived in Paris for the opening of the long-awaited international conference on July 30.

OPTIONS

The era of peacemaking began in 1979, when Sihanouk tried to convene a Geneva conference. While the military option remained, the main question for diplomacy was "Who would negotiate with whom about what?" Peace plans that emerged before the Paris Conference on Cambodia identified many alternatives to a negotiated, political settlement. Differences arose over several distinct issues.

The first issue was whether to have an opinion at all. Most countries in

the UN did not take a *do nothing* view. They voted for the ASEAN–Sino-American peace plan from 1979 onward.

The second bone of contention was who would be allowed to attend a peace conference. PRC insistence on *exclusion of the PRK*, backed by ASEAN and US allies, prevented serious negotiation at the ICK in 1981. Fruitful negotiations became possible when Sihanouk agreed to meet Hun Sen in 1987, whereupon the PRK and its friends agreed to drop *exclusion of the Pol Pot faction* as a precondition to negotiations.

A third issue was over external aid to the Cambodia factions. *Conditional encapsulation* was the policy that support for the resistance would be cut off to the extent that Vietnam reduced its troops and other military aid, or vice versa. Hanoi at first refused an early withdrawal, since China gave no sign of reducing aid and the NADK forces remained combat ready. Then Beijing promised to calibrate its reduction in support to the extent of Vietnam's de-escalation. The *unilateral withdrawal* option envisaged cessation of all such assistance without conditions. On April 5, 1989, Vietnam adopted this policy, but China and the CGDK refused to believe that it would be implemented, except cosmetically. As a consequence, PRC and USSR arms shipments went to both sides before Paris, with Britain, France, and the United States holding future aid in reserve in case PCC failed. The Soviet Union made its future arms support conditional on China's next chessmove.

A fourth issue was powersharing among the four Cambodian factions. All parties agreed that Cambodia should be an independent country. The sticking point was the transition to that status. China and CGDK insisted on a simultaneous dismantling of both CGDK and the PRK, with the formation of a new *quadripartite government* consisting of four defense ministers, four foreign ministers, and four heads of all other government ministries, each with a veto over the actions of the other, with Sihanouk as the head. Hun Sen preferred a *quadripartite council* to arrange elections, with Sihanouk as president, while day-to-day affairs would be handled by the existing PRK civil service. Both bodies were to operate temporarily until elections for a constitutional assembly were held, a new constitution was approved, and subsequent legislative elections determined the composition of the new government. Hun Sen and Sihanouk appeared to converge on the latter option two months before Paris. A third powersharing option, pursued by Hun Sen, was for *Sihanouk to join the Phnom Penh government*, forsaking the Polpotists; presumably the KPNLF would go along with Sihanouk. The *UN trusteeship option* was merely a brainstorm of Solarz. The US government supported the quadripartite government option, and other allies of the warring parties favored the interim arrangement proposed by whichever side they backed.

Demobilization of armies was another issue. Originally, the PDK wanted the NADK to reconquer Cambodia. By mid-1988 the China–CGDK plan

envisaged *four garrisoned armies* to be demobilized later. Hun Sen insisted on the *disbanding of military forces*, with international guarantees so that no Cambodian soldiers would retake power by force. Allies of the four factions fell in line.

All sides envisaged international verification of a cease-fire, cessation of outside aid, and an orderly election process. Proposals surfaced for an *international peacekeeping force* and an *international supervision commission*. China and the CGDK needed a peacekeeping force, as they wanted four garrisoned armies and feared that PAVN soldiers would merely put on Cambodian uniforms after September. A civilian supervision body, appropriate for a disarmed Cambodia, was proposed by Cambodia and Vietnam.

The status of the international body was itself in dispute. Vietnam preferred an *ad hoc body*. Other countries preferred a *UN peace organ*. Because the UN seated the CGDK, its credibility was suspect among the PRK and its allies.

Coercive diplomacy was another option. The United States still urged a worldwide aid and trade boycott of the PRK and SRV. Most US-aligned countries followed this policy with respect to Cambodia, the victim of aggression, but trade with Vietnam eventually picked up, and France, Sweden, and UN agencies resumed aid to Hanoi.

After a period of initial confrontation and hostility, an atmosphere of good faith in negotiations and unexpected concessions awakened a peace process after 1984. The premise of the Paris Conference on Cambodia was that an intra-Cambodian settlement would come first, followed by an international guarantee of that agreement. This meant that a resolution required the superpowers to drop their proxies. They would have to find somewhere else to play on the global chessboard.

NOTES

1. Much of the discussion in this section is based on texts of ASEAN and IFMC communiqués.
2. For extended analyses see Becker (1989c) and Porter (1988a, 1988b).
3. I am indebted to Hediana Utarti for this point.

12

CAMBODIA

CHANGING PRK POLICYMAKING

After 1979 most of Cambodia returned to normal. Peasants returned to ricefields, where they occasionally unearthed mass graves, in an effort to feed the country again. Khmer culture was revived. The PRK proceeded to establish its legitimacy and grew more secure. To assert increased independence of Vietnam, it had to act on its own behalf, but it lacked interlocutors.

With assistance from Eastern bloc nations, Oxfam, the Red Cross, and some UN and Western private voluntary organizations, the agricultural sector was restored. One Oxfam worker referred to the "miracle of recovery" in describing the new situation, including progress in education and health, for a population that was two-thirds female (Mysliwiec 1988:14–16). Phnom Penh again became a city with museums and shops.

Most fighting at the border was left to the Vietnamese army; the few young men still alive in the country were exempted from military combat. When Hanoi announced a partial pullout in mid-1982, the black market price of the riel doubled in a single day (Davies 1983:15). In accordance with the SRV decision to pull out combat forces by 1990, Vietnam trained a corps of officers for a volunteer PRK army. In 1983 the PRK organized a military draft for the first time, aiming to reach 25,000 soldiers for the new Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces and 100,000 for the local and provincial militia (Lao 1984:156), but PRK officials granted exemptions for as little as $23 per year (Jones 1989). Vietnam predicted that the new army would be in "full control" of the situation in due course (Beckaert 1983), but KPRAF remained very much a junior partner until 1989. In the mid-1980s the PRK declared an amnesty policy, whereby resistance soldiers could return to their families without fear of arrest; within

a year, they could apply to join the KPRAF. Those who broke with the resistance were even eligible to run for office.

In 1982 Pen Sovan, the regime's only *bona fide* Vietphile, was replaced as premier for being too dictatorial, although his later ostracism suggested that he was too much of a Sovietphile (Kiernan 1982:171n). When his successor, Chan Si, died in 1984, Hun Sen became premier, although he retained the foreign ministry portfolio (except during 1987 and from 1990). Hun Sen's innovative diplomacy, such as acceptance of the NAM plan for peace in 1983, can be interpreted as an effort to assert independence from Vietnam (interviewee #76), but the new development was not immediately recognizable. Few knew that his deputy prime minister, Kung Sam Ol, was an agricultural economist educated at the University of Georgia. Many Cambodians allied with either FUNCIPEC or KPNLF could not swallow collaboration with the Polpotists through CGDK, and in due course leaders of regimes prior to Democratic Kampuchea returned to work for the PRK. Tie Banh, who led a guerrilla force from the Thai border after defecting from the RAK in 1974 (interviewee #124), joined as PRK defense minister. Hor Nam Hong, onetime DK ambassador to Cuba, became deputy foreign minister, then foreign minister in 1990. In Tam withdrew from KPNLF when the CGDK formed, because the coalition included PDK; he then became a member of the PRK parliament. Hun Sen, while inviting Sihanouk to return after 1984, sought to consolidate his power among the technocrats, although he was kept on a leash by the KPRP (Heder 1990b).

In 1985, when membership on the KPRP Central Committee expanded, nearly 40 percent consisted of those who joined after 1978; members with ties to Vietnam declined to 8 percent (Vickery 1989). By 1988 the new members held nearly half the ministerial positions and an even larger number of subministerial and provincial leadership posts. Hun Sen eclipsed figurehead Heng Samrin because of various economic reforms, from 1986; within three years 70 percent of the economy was estimated to be in the private sector (Klintworth 1989:89–90; Manuel 1990c:A8; Stone 1989f:9). Hun Sen was more of a capitalist than Sihanouk, and human rights were observed more by the PRK than in any previous period of Cambodian history. Still, there was an inadequate PRK presence at the village level, leaving fertile ground for PDK infiltration throughout the countryside.

Up to 1985 no Western tourists had entered the country for a decade. The situation eased in 1986, and by 1988 some 3,532 tourists from outside the Soviet bloc visited one or more of the 182 temples and 1,040 monuments in the country (Chongkittavorn 1989a). Japanese tourists were most numerous, followed by French, Italians, and West Germans. Angkor Wat and Phnom Penh hotel rooms could not accommodate more than a few visitors at any one time. Chinese investors in Singapore (Hiebert 1990d:62, 10) expressed interest in refurbishing the empty high-rise known as the Cambodiana Hotel, whose construction was interrupted during the Pol Pot era.

When the PRK proposed a demilitarized or safety zone in 1980, there was no response from Thailand. The PRK was denied representation at ICK as well. External powers assumed that Vietnam was in charge of PRK foreign policy.

Hints of PRK willingness to negotiate with the PDK in 1986 startled Sihanouk into believing that something new was occurring. The Hun Sen peace plan of 1987, premised as it was on outflanking the PDK by forging a FUNCIPEC–PRK alliance, unquestionably broke the logjam in the Cambodian peace process in that it called for a nonaligned Cambodia. After PRK propaganda stopped attacking the Prince, referring to him in public by his royal title, and Heng Samrin extended his respects to the Prince through French intermediaries (Playboy 1987:71; Porter 1988a:820), Sihanouk agreed to negotiate with Hun Sen. The Prince was asked to serve as president of a quadripartite National Reconciliation Council, which would organize elections until a new constitution was written. Hun Sen urged the Prince to merge ANS with KPRAF so that they could eliminate NADK in order to bring peace to Cambodia. The PRK premier made the same offer to Son Sann; although they did not meet each other until JIM I. At the same time, Hun Sen was firm that the PRK would not be dismantled, since that might produce a chaos in which the NADK could take power. Hun Sen opposed a unilateral disarming of the KPRAF for the same reason. Although favoring an international peacekeeping force, Hun Sen cautioned that a latter-day ICSC might doubtless be so ineffective that NADK could take advantage and return to power. Hun Sen agreed to negotiate with all but the top eight leaders of the "Pol Pot clique," a list including the name of Khieu Samphan (Chanda 1988b).[1]

In anticipation of peace, Phnom Penh experienced an economic boom in 1988, which continued throughout 1989 (FEER 1990b:105). A ten-year dawn-to-dusk curfew was formally lifted in Phnom Penh during April 1989, although in August 1988 my USIRP group dined at a well-lit restaurant in the heart of Phnom Penh, which otherwise had regular blackouts at dusk. All military commanders from Vietnam left during 1988, and the last civilian technical adviser was said to have departed in March 1989, although supervisors may have remained (Chanda 1981a:25; Kiernan 1982:94). Vietnamese merchants were in the country to make money more easily than in overregulated Vietnam, such as repairing used motorbikes smuggled from Singapore for resale in Ho Chi Minh City, causing some resentment among Cambodians and a further desire to recapture full independence (Hiebert 1989b; Swain 1989).

At JIM I Hun Sen repeated his previous plan, which envisaged a quadripartite NRC. After the meeting, Phnom Penh television first broadcast a picture of Khieu Samphan (interviewee #2), a hint to the country that national reconciliation was near.

In August Phnom Penh closed the office of economic and cultural co-

operation with Laos and Vietnam (FEER 1989d:28), ending IFMC as a body that appeared to impose Vietnam's will on Cambodia. Eastern bloc nationals continued to operate the airports, the seaport of Kompong Som, and the rubber plantations. There were still not enough trained Cambodians to run the country. Only peace could change the situation.

During the summer PAVN forces pulled back from the border to give the KPRAF a chance. After performing miserably, PAVN troops returned to the front line in September (Fain 1989). Even so, Phnom Penh was predicting that the KPRAF would ultimately prevail over NADK, which was suffering increasing defections (Economist 1989d; Lindahl 1988; Munty 1988; Swain 1989).

In January 1989 Hun Sen flew to Bangkok as the personal guest of Prime Minister Chatichai. The PRK premier offered Thailand concessions in fishing, gemstone mining, and logging. PRK economic reforms, including floating the national currency and decollectivizing agriculture, prompted him to explain the new policies by going into the provinces in order to boost his popularity with the people (Carey 1989:13).

In January the Prince told Hun Sen that further negotiations required a definite PAVN withdrawal date and several changes in the PRK constitution. When Hun Sen shook hands with Khieu Samphan at JIM II in February, a settlement appeared close. Responding to Sihanouk's demand for a timetable, IFMC in April gave the date of September 30. A national reconciliation election appeared to be around the corner. Responding to the Prince's objection that the name of the country was "Cambodia," the PRK dissolved on April 30 to become the State of Cambodia (SOC). Hun Sen was ready to ask Sihanouk to join the SOC as head of state, repeating offers that had been rebuffed in 1987 and 1988 (Stone 1989e:18).

As the Paris conference approached, Hun Sen said that he would be happy to form an interim organ with PDK officials, minus the Pol Pot clique (Beckaert 1989h). They would first have to denounce the policies of Democratic Kampuchea and dissociate themselves from Polpotism. As a former DK military officer, he had followed that route a decade ago. To show that the SOC was not out for blood, the death penalty was abolished. Even Pol Pot need not fear that his clique would be executed for past crimes. Then in early July, on the eve of PCC, the SOC parliament declared a policy of "permanent neutrality," indicating that the government was contemplating abrogation of its military pact with Vietnam.

CHANGING CGDK POLICYMAKING

Prince Sihanouk was at first more eager for diplomatic action on Cambodia than for military action. He realized that Vietnam had saved his country from genocide, but he did not want SRV domination of his native land. In 1979 he wrote to Party Secretary Le Duan to suggest negotiations.

When he received no response, he attacked the PRK for selling out to Vietnam and refused to see Hun Sen and the other "Quislings." At the same time, he remained on the PRC payroll even when France, Malaysia, and Singapore offered to defray his expenses. After calling in vain for a Geneva conference and a vacant Cambodian seat at the UN in 1979, he witnessed a more confrontational diplomacy, then agreed to head CGDK. He began to see himself as the personification of Cambodia; the people were his children, and he was their father.

Sihanouk's seemingly volatile behavior of resigning from CGDK, then rejoining, only to resign again, was often interpreted as the sign of a wily strategist. A different view was that he was a high school dropout so traumatized over the years that he had become either brainwashed and coerced by the Polpotists or so suggestible that he had become a Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde, changing his position to agree with his latest interlocutor (Cambodia Trust 1989). He decreasingly acted as the strong leader that Cambodia needed in its hour of peril, instead appearing as a teddy bear that pleased everyone, threatened nobody, but kept the peace process moving by doing something unexpected that led to reassessments by the other parties.

In 1982 Sihanouk announced a plan for a neutralized Cambodia, but nobody listened. Frustrated over the lack of diplomatic progress, Sihanouk threatened to resign from CGDK on several occasions from 1982 to 1984, pointing out that CGDK had no realistic plan for peace. Accordingly, in 1985 the PDK agreed that the aim of the struggle was to restore the Prince to head a liberal democratic regime in Phnom Penh. Pol Pot instead resigned in September as NADK head; there were rumors that he was terminally ill, although he only had malaria and remained very much in charge (AFP 1986; Allman 1990:159; Chanda 1989b:21; Crossette 1986; Karniol 1989b; Magistad 1988).

After 1985 the armies of the resistance were disunited, operating only in small groups, unable to control any important town or village. Hanoi had nearly secured a military solution, such that the KPRAF might take over a mopping-up operation. Some 300,000 refugees in border camps, who had spent nearly a decade waiting for peace, began to drift home, although camp leaders prevented many from doing so (Economist 1989b). The three resistance factions had become little more than mercenary forces held together by external aid.

Open leadership clashes, defections, and desertions to the PRK plagued KPNLF. In Tam defected to Phnom Penh in 1982. In 1985 Abdul Gaffar Peang-Meth and Hing Kunthon were dropped from the KPNLF leadership for urging, at the suggestion of the United States, more collaboration with ANS (Wolf 1985). During 1986 General Sak Sutsakhan rejected the leadership of General Dien Del, and the KPNLA split into two factions. Son Sann interceded to name Sak commander-in-chief, then in February 1989 KPNLF named Son Sann KPNLF commander-in-chief while KPNLA reaf-

firmed support for General Sak as commander-in-chief, with Dien his deputy in the position of chief of staff. Although efforts were undertaken to patch up differences between the two commanders, KPNLA remained in disarray in the period leading up to the Paris conference, in part because the differences were rooted in class distinctions (interviewee #27).

In 1986 General Teap Ben of the ANS was also sidelined. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Sihanouk's son, then became ANS commander-in-chief. Although virtually unknown inside Cambodia, Ranariddh soon emerged as the leader of FUNCIPEC because his father resigned on so many occasions that he left the details to his son. Ranariddh's physical resemblance to his father was an asset in this subtle transfer of power.

The first detailed CGDK peace plan emerged in March 1986, differing from the later PRK plan in demands for dissolving the PRK and KPRAF, leaving the resistance armies in place, allowing a quadripartite government to take over sovereignty, and establishing an international control commission to verify implementation.

Sihanouk, acknowledging openly that the CGDK peace plan was a sham and that the KPNLA consisted of "pirates, smugglers and bandits" (Chanda 1987:117; Porter 1988b:126), grew impatient. After an NADK attack on ANS in 1986, he went on leave from the CGDK in May 1987 so that he could negotiate with Hun Sen. Since NADK refused to disarm, the Prince devised a three-stage disarmament plan that would create a quadripartite national army as PAVN troops gradually left. Next, he agreed to meet Hun Sen in December 1987 and January 1988, thereby launching the intra-Cambodian dialogue sought for so long by both Hanoi and Phnom Penh.

The Prince rejoined CGDK in February 1988. As he did not want to be merely an equal participant at the initial JIM, in mid-1988 he resigned—for the first time—as CGDK president. With his resignation, he forfeited about $50,000 per month in salary and an equal amount in personal expenses and staff (FEER 1990m). For the public, his reason for resigning from the CGDK presidency was to "weaken and isolate" the intransigent PDK (Flynn 1989). As a nonmember of CGDK, he could articulate his own views. An unstated reason was that his faction was squabbling. He was chagrined that those who favored the NADK military approach, including his son Ranariddh, had become dominant (Chanda 1989e; interviewees #25, 76), while his wife's lucrative boutique in Beijing gave her no nostalgia for Phnom Penh, where she would have to return to a more Spartan lifestyle (interviewee #76).

Preferring to remain above the bargaining, Sihanouk lectured JIM I participants on the need for peace and reconciliation but left FUNCIPEC negotiations to his son. Ranariddh, however, would not permit a PRK–CGDK merger; if his father was weary of war, he was not.

Although NADK continued terrorist actions throughout Cambodia, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea tried to organize cadres in the villages of the countryside after 1986 so that the Polpotists could control the outcome

of an internationally organized election. Presumably, voters under NADK control would be instructed to vote for Sihanouk, as PDK propaganda had long stressed that the fight was to restore the Prince to power (Lindahl 1988). China insisted that the PDK play a minor role in an interim quadripartite government, and Khieu Samphan reportedly bowed to PRC pressure (Hiebert 1988b; Magistad 1988). After having been quiet at JIM I, the PDK boycotted the Working Group in October, showing that the Polpotists had little interest in peace.

Yet another NADK attack on ANS came in July after the Prince stated that the Cambodian seat in the UN should be declared vacant until the peace process concluded. He conceded that Hun Sen would be no "stooge" after PAVN troops left Cambodia (Beckaert 1988:126). Without CGDK backing, however, he lacked a power base; he soon rejoined CGDK so that he would not be outside the peace process (Porter 1988b:126 n5). In December the Prince torpedoed the quadripartite working commission in Paris when it refused to swallow his five-point plan. In January 1989 he dropped the demand for dismantling the PRK, only to make it again in February.

Twists and turns of Sihanouk's policies left most observers dizzy. Although he did so ostensibly to advance the peace process by forcing concessions from one or another side, many observers saw that statements in PDK rhetoric were being issued in his name. His main dilemma was that he did not know whether the PDK or the PRK would prevail; his vacillations reflected a desire to be on whichever side appeared to be stronger at the time.

While the PDK began to boast that never before in history had a combatant offered to share power with its adversary to end an armed struggle (interviewee #99; Richburg 1988), the loopholes in the PDK peace plan of November 1988 further undermined the credibility of the Polpotists, who were asking PAVN to pull out before NADK demobilized. In December Khieu Samphan appeared to get in the mood of the peace process by supporting Sihanouk's five-point peace plan. In February 1989 he attended JIM II and shook hands with Hun Sen.

In 1987 Thailand closed one of the refugee camps under UN protection. The PDK then forced the displaced Cambodians into their camps (Mysliwiec 1988:xiii). By early 1989 some 51,000 Cambodians were in PDK-controlled camps assisted by UNBRO, while 60,000 were in "secret camps" not aided by UNBRO (Straits Times 1989b; US House 1989:72, 142). From June to October 1988 NADK augmented its strength through the forcible recruitment of some 16,000 soldiers from these camps (Chanda 1989c: 36). In answer to persistent charges that genocide disqualified Polpotists from playing a role in a future Cambodia, PDK responded that both PRK and SRV authorities should be put on trial for ethnocide. Moreover, Pol Pot fully intended to wreak vengeance upon "Vietnamese collaborators" if he returned to Phnom Penh (Asia Watch 1989; Beckaert 1989a:291). Sihanouk

noted that the PDK peace plan was hardly adequate: A UN force of 2,000 could neither supervise PAVN's withdrawal, forestall a civil war, nor prevent the return of genocide to Cambodia. Then, on the eve of the Paris conference, four top PDK leaders—Ta Mok, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith—resigned from the CGDK so that they would not have to be bound by any agreement signed by Khieu Samphan at the meeting. They believed that the SOC would collapse when PAVN left Cambodia, so they preferred to fight to regain power despite the outcome of the Paris conference (Karniol 1989b:920).

CGDK had fallen apart. The rest of the world, meanwhile, increasingly perceived that the PRK was a credible, moderate government.

CAMBODIAN OPTIONS

All four factions agreed to commit troops, and none favored encapsulation. After the PRK implied in 1986 that it might negotiate with Khieu Samphan, in due course Sihanouk met Hun Sen in December 1987. Khieu Samphan and Son Sann made the dialogue quadripartite at JIM I.

After 1986, when the four factions were devising transitional arrangements, CGDK was adamant about dismantling the PRK to establish an interim quadripartite government. Phnom Penh agreed to an interim electoral council with all factions represented but preferred a tripartite government, with Sihanouk and Son Sann playing a role with the SOC. The eventual CGDK plan of 1986 called for garrisoning all Cambodian forces, followed by their demobilization, with the UN performing peacekeeping and supervising functions. SOC's 1986 plan favored disarming all soldiers, obviating peacekeeping, and having an international body other than the UN supervise compliance with a negotiated settlement. Whereas Hun Sen was ready to compromise on having a UN organ handle the peacekeeping, he waited in vain for a concession from CGDK to accept the idea of an interim electoral council.

The PRK opposed economic sanctions imposed on itself and the SRV, but CGDK was, of course, in favor. All four groups recognized that they were mere pawns, depending on other countries to decide their fates.

NOTE

1. The eight are Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Khieu Pommary, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith.

13

VIETNAM

CHANGING VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKING

Hanoi initially said that its "volunteers" entered Cambodia at the request of the Cambodian people. PAVN aid would end when so requested by the PRK. The root cause was China, Party Secretary Le Duan informed UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Nonetheless, other countries perceived that the SRV was establishing a puppet regime. Hanoi was surprised when the UN failed to listen to the argument that Vietnam was engaging in self-defense and was responding to a humanitarian plea to end genocide.

During and after the border "lesson," in which PAVN forces successfully stood up to PLA aggression, China called upon Vietnam to negotiate. For a year the two countries conducted discussions in Beijing, but PRC representatives used the talks to chide Hanoi for being ungrateful for China's help in triumphing over France and the United States, a paternalism that rankled Vietnam even more than the specific issues in dispute. Beijing wanted Hanoi to renounce Soviet support and to leave Cambodia, but China had no leverage on either account and instead argued that one socialist state should not intervene in the affairs of another after having done so by border attacks on Vietnam. Thus, the PRC refused serious dispute resolution on terms relevant to Vietnam's security concerns despite Hanoi's willingness to proceed toward a settlement.

Vietnam had good memories of Sihanouk, who kept the Ho Chi Minh Trail in operation during the war for unification. When Sihanouk wrote to Communist Party Secretary Le Duan in 1979, the Prince seemed to have become a has-been. Despite many efforts to entreat Hanoi to negotiate on behalf of Phnom Penh, Vietnam insisted that the future of Cambodia was up to the Cambodians. The SRV considered the situation in Cambodia "irreversible" because it would not tolerate a return to DK rule.

Vietnam's decision to convene IFMC was an effort to force the world

community to deal with the PRK as an equal of Laos and Vietnam, while adversaries thought that IFMC acted as a *de facto* federation imposed on Cambodia and Laos. Thereafter, IFMC accepted ZOPFAN and tried to engage ASEAN in a dialogue through semiannual communiqués, but ASEAN never even admitted that IFMC existed. Hanoi hoped in vain that countries in the region would provide a face-saving formula so that PAVN troops could leave a fully legitimized PRK that would pose no further threat to Vietnam.

In 1980, on behalf of IFMC, Foreign Minister Thach toured Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to explain that the entire conflict, including China's "lesson" of 1979, showed that Beijing wanted to dominate Southeast Asia. Vietnam, he said, was aiding the region by keeping China in check. Repeatedly asserting that Hanoi lacked hostile intentions toward Thailand (SRV MFA 1979a:K1), whose protection of border camps kept the resistance alive, Thach offered to guarantee the Thai border and to demobilize if NADK did likewise. Bangkok preferred an independent Cambodia for that purpose and wanted a UN force to interpose itself inside Cambodia without regard to NADK. When Indonesia's Murdani explained the Kuantan Formula to Dung Van Tie, Vietnam's new defense minister, he heard that Hanoi remained in Cambodia because of China, not the Soviet Union. PAVN would withdraw when the PRC stopped aiding NADK.

Although Vietnam would not agree to UN mediation because of the vote against seating the PRK, Thach invited Waldheim as a personal mediator in August. Thach told the UN in October that Vietnam was ready for a dialogue, but Thailand refused.

In 1981, with General Giap no longer in charge of the army that he wanted withdrawn, Thach offered to pull out of Cambodia if Bangkok stopped protecting NADK enclaves on the border or if China signed nonaggression pacts with the three IFMC countries. Instead of an international conference on Cambodia, as voted by the UN, Vietnam wanted a regional meeting so that China could be kept out of discussions. Alternatively, a new regional organization—with equal representation for ASEAN and IFMC, and with Burma as a mediator—was yet another effort to get IFMC recognized as a bloc. While other countries were trying to force Vietnam to negotiate for Phnom Penh, Hanoi suggested that Laos speak for IFMC. When the UN barred the PRK from attending ICK, Vietnam boycotted the kangaroo court, as Sihanouk nearly described it.

The problem with the ASEAN–UN–ICK formula for a "comprehensive political settlement" was twofold. First, the UN was involved; having condemned Hanoi and awarded the UN seat to Pol Pot, the world organization was seen as biased. Second, the proposed solution was not comprehensive. There were no provisions for China to stop meddling in the affairs of Southeast Asia or for the nonreturn of genocide to Cambodia.

In 1982 Vietnam stopped insisting on having the PRK at a conference,

proposing instead that ASEAN meet Laos and Vietnam. In 1983 IFMC agreed to the NAM plan for peace, which included internationally supervised elections and eventual PAVN withdrawal. Also in 1983, Thach dropped the condition that PAVN troops would leave either when the PRC stopped aiding Pol Pot or Thailand ceased support for the resistance armies, promising a unilateral withdrawal by 1988 or 1993. These concessions were not greeted with world praise, however.

Hanoi accepted Bangkok's proposal for a demilitarized zone between Cambodia and Thailand, although with policing by an international body other than the UN and a removal of resistance enclaves from the border. When Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi later appeared to renege on the offer, Hanoi realized that the time for serious negotiations was still far off. ASEAN's zone-by-zone withdrawal proposal later in 1983 was seen as an open sesame for NADK to fill the vacuum.

Vietnam then planned attacks to crush the resistance bases militarily. Based on the time required to build the KPRAF from scratch, a study by the SRV Defense Ministry in 1982 estimated that PAVN could leave by 1990 (Chanda 1983a:15).[1] Hanoi announced unilateral withdrawals of its troops in stages, beginning in June 1982, indicating that it wanted to leave. Although Vietnam awaited assurances from China and Thailand that there would be no return to Pol Pot rule before providing a timetable for complete PAVN withdrawal, no such reciprocity occurred. While Hanoi viewed its partial pullouts as a gesture of good will, Bangkok and Beijing perceived that troops were being rotated, not withdrawn.

In 1984 Thach welcomed Japan's peace plan and favored direct talks between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, although he would not endorse Solarz's fanciful plan for an NCR–PRK coalition because that was a matter for Cambodians to decide. Indonesia and Malaysia mooted "proximity talks" between ASEAN, the four Cambodian factions, Laos, and Vietnam in 1985, but Thach would not attend when ASEAN clarified attendance to include the PDK but not the PRK. Then, in 1985, Hanoi responded to persistent calls for a comprehensive peace plan. Declaring 1990 as the date of complete unilateral PAVN withdrawal, Vietnam conceded international supervision of free elections after PAVN left. Everything, according to Thach, was negotiable except the return of Pol Pot.

In 1986 CGDK's eight-point plan insisted on PRK dissolution, contrary to Hanoi's objectives. Hanoi rejected Sweden's proposal for Sihanouk to meet Thach in 1986, as Vietnam refused to negotiate on behalf of the PRK, a sovereign state. When Hanoi hinted in 1986 that it would accept a role for the PDK in a transitional arrangement, the "cocktail party" was scheduled for 1987, only to be cancelled when Bangkok again reinterpreted the invitation as having the PRK sit as part of the SRV delegation. UN Secretary-General Perez's peace plan of June 1987 failed to impress Thach because the proposal accorded PDK an equal position in the transition.

Hanoi did not expect a ten-year assignment in Cambodia (Beckaert 1989b:4; Chanda 1989b:17). Our tour group in 1988 encountered Vietnamese people who were as bewildered by the stalemate on the battlefield as were their leaders in the world of diplomacy. The aid embargo organized by the United States began to hurt more as each year went by, and the economy stagnated due to hyperinflation when rice production fell short of demand (ADB 1990:119). In 1985 IMF stopped repaying an earlier IMF commitment of $162 million, lacking US dollars (IP 1990o). While the price of natural rubber was soaring on the world market, Hanoi was tied to a barter agreement that exported the commodity to the Soviet Union in exchange for economic assistance. Since Vietnam imported more than it exported, some 100,000 guestworkers went to Eastern Europe to make up part of the trade deficit (ADB 1990:124). Although Soviet aid helped to reconstruct the war-torn country, by the mid-1980s the quality of that aid fell short of expectations, and the humiliation of having a foreign power in an economically dominant role increasingly began to sting. Soviet state industrial managers had merely replaced French plantation owners.

With the Soviet economy languishing as well, Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev hinted less aid in the future. Gorbachev wanted détentes around the world, and Soviet diplomats began to take a much keener interest in the peace process involving Cambodia so that Moscow could normalize relations with Beijing. In early 1988 SRV leaders were startled when Moscow responded to an aggressive PRC in the Spratly Islands by implying that Vietnam should settle such matters bilaterally with China. Later the same year Gorbachev proposed, without consulting Hanoi, to abandon Cam Ranh Bay if the Americans would pull out of bases in the Philippines (Duiker 1989:4). These Soviet moves sharply differed from Vietnamese expectations.

Compared to the major transition in Moscow's leadership, Hanoi's policies changed less dramatically. After the death of Sinophobe Le Duan, moderate reformist Nguyen Van Linh (known as "little Gorbachev") became party secretary at the plenum of December 1986. Since Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in the world, the party could not blame the worldwide aid embargo alone but instead agreed that a major share of the blame was incompetence in managing the economy. The economic policy adopted by the Party Congress in 1986 was *dôi mói*, translated as "renovation" or "new thinking." Ministers in six economics portfolios were sacked. Pham Van Dong resigned as premier in 1987. Vo Van Kiet succeeded him temporarily until Do Muoi was elected in 1988. Although the model for economic reform appeared to be Hungary, and many reforms were modeled after China, Vietnam wanted to follow its own path.[2] As the country needed foreign investment, parliament adopted a liberalized investment law in 1988. In order for the law to be fully implemented, it was necessary for a new reform-minded governor to take over the state bank in 1989.

French firms decided to renovate hotels in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City,

and a French oil company signed a twenty-five-year exploration and development contract in 1988 (FEER 1990p). Western tourists increased from 7,000 in 1986 to 77,000 in 1989, when they brought $135 million in foreign exchange (AFP 1990e; UPI 1990i). In 1989 Vietnam won IMF praise as the only country in the world to adopt several voluntary reforms—a reduction of state subsidies to nonfuel industries, an end of in-kind payments to party and government officials, increased interest on bank deposits to encourage saving, and a rationalization of exchange rates that ended most blackmarket currency trading. Farmers received fifty-year leases on their land, and the private sector contributed about 65 percent of the gross domestic product (Economist 1989e; Graw 1990; Higbee 1990; Lindahl 1988; Reuter 1990e).

Meanwhile, progress occurred in relations between the United States and Vietnam. In July 1985 Hanoi suddenly turned over the bodies of six MIAs. The following month Vietnam pledged to search for more as a humanitarian gesture. Hanoi was eager to normalize relations with the United States, which might serve as a counterweight to China when the Soviets lost interest in Vietnam—although the MIA and normalization issues were kept separate by both sides. When General John Vessey, Jr., arrived in August 1987 as President Reagan's personal representative to negotiate a resolution of the MIA dispute, Hanoi discovered that it was entertaining the first US negotiator who could be trusted to stick to humanitarian and technical issues without resorting to propagandistic flourishes or meddling in Vietnam's internal affairs. Solid progress was achieved. The remains of many MIAs began to be identified with greater frequency. Although the allegation was vigorously denied by Hanoi, a defector from Vietnam, testifying before a congressional committee in 1979, alleged that a secret warehouse, containing remains of US soldiers, was gradually emptied to reward Washington's good behavior (Yu, Pregelj & Sutter 1989:5). In 1988 Washington informed Hanoi that the only impediment to full normalization of relations between the two countries was the presence of PAVN troops in Cambodia. The prize for normalization was foreign investment, not necessarily from the United States, but from Japanese commercial firms and international development banks.

In June 1988, Vietnam amended its constitution to remove phrases expressing hostility toward China and the United States, signaling a desire for better relations. At the end of the month, Hanoi announced that its military high command was being removed from Cambodia. In September the PRC responded by expressing a hope for better relations. During January 1989, Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem flew to Beijing to learn that the terms for a détente included honoring PRC claims to the Paracel and Spratly islands, an apology for misdeeds against ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, a Soviet pullout from Cam Ranh Bay, and removal of PAVN troops from Cambodia and Laos (Duiker 1989:5). Although these terms appeared to require a kowtow, there was no problem about three of the four conditions. The ethnic Chinese issue

did not prevent normalization of relations with Indonesia (Vatikiotis 1990b). Moscow had made the move on Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam withdrew troops from Laos when the PRC agreed to stop aiding insurgents (Bartu 1988:176), and Hanoi reiterated its intention to pull out of Cambodia by 1990. This left the disputed islands in the South China Sea, a matter involving more countries than Vietnam.

When 1988 began, PAVN troops in Cambodia numbered about 100,000, half the reported maximum. By spring the figure was 85,000, with an announced reduction to 50,000 by the end of the year (Chanda 1988f:16). As early as 1980 most Vietnamese military advisers left district posts in Cambodia, with 1,000 or so remaining in Phnom Penh; the rest were gradually recalled, and during 1988 most of its remaining civilian and military advisers left Cambodia (Chanda 1981a:25; Kiernan 1982: 194; interviewees #105, #106).

In early 1988 Hanoi was still linking an exact pullout date to an agreement that China would stop supplying the NADK and a guarantee that Pol Pot would never return to power. But this changed again. In early August 1988—when I learned that the PRK wanted the PAVN army out by March 31, 1990, while Hanoi preferred June 30, 1989 (interviewee #4; Lindahl 1988)—Vietnam was signaling that it would pull out of Cambodia earlier if all external parties agreed to stop aiding Cambodian factions.

During a trip to Moscow in early April 1989, Linh announced one day that PAVN troops would be withdrawn unconditionally by the end of December 1989, but the statement was retracted the next day (Tasker & Chanda 1989:10). On April 5 Hanoi moved its withdrawal date from December 31 to September 30. Party Secretary Linh told Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi in June 1989 that Vietnam's extended stay in Cambodia was a mistake (Sricharatchanya 1989b:21). Hanoi was so eager to leave that it was willing to concede a couple of Western provinces to the Polpotists, although it expected the KPRAF to prevail in due course (interviewee #25; Tasker & Chanda 1989:11). Vietnam noted that it could return if China insisted on aiding the NADK. Few read the fine print, however (Tasker & Chanda 1989:11).

On the diplomatic front, Vietnam got its way when JIM I and JIM II separated internal from external aspects. In early January 1989 Dinh Nho Liem, deputy foreign minister, flew to Beijing to begin talks to normalize relations; by springtime, anti-aircraft batteries and troops moved back from the PRC—SRV frontier (Hood 1990:986), and border trade resumed. During the same month Thailand's Siddhi visited Thach, who agreed to keep CGDK and the PRK intact under an umbrella structure headed by Sihanouk.

Vietnam's goal was to keep a friendly government in Phnom Penh; time was on the side of the PRK, it felt. Pressures from the economy and the

Soviet bloc provided few alternatives to Hanoi. Vietnam was therefore expecting that the Paris Conference on Cambodia would wrap up an era in which the people of Vietnam suffered because the noble intentions of its government had been mistrusted when they got caught up in a superpower chessgame that they had long sought to avoid.

VIETNAMESE OPTIONS

Vietnam committed troops in 1978 but repeatedly gave signs that they would be removed in due course. In 1979 Hanoi said that it awaited the formation of a PRK army. Hanoi said that either cessation of PRC aid or an end of Thai sanctuary to the NADK would prompt an immediate removal of troops by Hanoi, but neither country accepted Vietnam's idea of conditional encapsulation. A partial pullout was announced in 1982, and an eventual withdrawal was pledged in 1983. The date of 1990 for a unilateral departure surfaced in 1985. An earlier pullout, conditional on changes in Chinese or Thai policies, was reiterated from time to time, and the April 1989 announcement of an unconditional PAVN withdrawal noted that troops would return if external aid to the resistance forces resumed. Thus, conditional encapsulation remained Vietnam's policy all along.

Hanoi consistently favored constructive negotiations. Discussions in China in 1979 broke down when they turned into PRC lectures to an errant student. Although ASEAN and China sought to have Hanoi speak on behalf of Phnom Penh, Vietnam refused. The SRV would bargain with neither Sihanouk nor a PDK representative. In 1982 Hanoi proposed that ASEAN meet with Laos and Vietnam, but ASEAN refused. Vietnam engaged the good offices of the PLO and Romania in 1987 to bring Hun Sen and Sihanouk together but did not agree to meet the Polpotists until JIM I.

Vietnam backed a quadripartite interim council, disbanding of all Cambodian armies, and a non-UN international control commission. In January 1989, Thach conceded that peacekeeping functions were needed, but he opposed a UN organ before PCC.

UNDP aid projects continued, but most bilateral assistance was limited to private voluntary organizations. The desire to normalize relations with the United States after the Party Congress of 1986 was a recognition that economic sanctions had crippled the country and needed to be terminated soon. Nevertheless, Vietnam accomplished what it sought in Cambodia—a credible, pliable PRK that received aid from some outside sources. If Hanoi had a weaker bargaining position by 1989, Phnom Penh was stronger, less a proxy than a victim of superpower rivalries. Hanoi's effort at annihilating Pol Pot was better appreciated by the world in 1989 than when PAVN forces went into Cambodia in 1978, thanks to the film *The Killing Fields*.

NOTES

1. Estimates were based on the number of Cambodians of combat age and the time required to train officers, who in turn could train a new army (interviewee #67).

2. In the south, the editor of a newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City suggested that South Korea should be Vietnam's model (interviewee #9).

14

CHINA

CHANGING CHINESE POLICYMAKING

Secretary-General Waldheim learned that Beijing's perception of Soviet encirclement was a factor in peace prospects for Cambodia. Initially, China opposed a negotiated settlement, calling upon Hanoi to pull out its troops unilaterally and to renounce Soviet support. Beijing then discovered that Vietnam was a formidable military adversary. PRC "pedagogy" was a costly failure despite continued border attacks (Porter 1988a:811). China cleverly focused UN attention on PAVN's presence in Cambodia, thereby escaping culpability for egging on DK aggression as well as for attacking Vietnam.

Since PRC aid went through Thai territorial waters, ASEAN was able to moderate China's policies. By the end of 1979 Beijing was advocating PAVN withdrawal, followed by a conference. At the end of 1980 Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nian Long dropped a complete PAVN withdrawal as a precondition to attending ICK, agreeing to ASEAN's plan for free elections and a nonaligned Cambodia. In early 1981 Beijing bowed to ASEAN insistence on international guarantees for a comprehensive political settlement with UN-supervised elections, but ASEAN in turn had to agree that the Polpotists would be part of any negotiated settlement. Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang promised that China would normalize relations with Vietnam after such a settlement (Beijing Review 1981). At ICK, however, ASEAN deferred to the PRC insistence that the PDK be allowed to return to power.

With the military option a failure, Beijing focused effort on economic strangulation of Vietnam, which meant "bleeding" the Soviet Union, Hanoi's supplier, as well. But Moscow wanted better relations with Beijing. The initial coolness of the Reagan administration toward China, exemplified by arms shipments to Taiwan over protests from Beijing, ended the honeymoon period of the Sino-American normalization. PRC leaders began to pursue more independent policies (Shaplen 1986:294). In late 1981 China

told the Soviet Union that a resumption of normal Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations would require a reduction of military threats in Asia—Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a Soviet army pullback from the Sino-Mongolian border, and a cessation of aid to Vietnam until Hanoi withdrew from Cambodia. The Soviet Union then took steps to meet the first two conditions, leaving only Cambodia as a sore thumb. Since Cambodia was beyond the immediate control of the Soviet Union, one observer speculated that Beijing actually wanted the USSR to concede Southeast Asia as China's own sphere of influence (Barnett 1987).

In 1982 China unveiled a five-point peace proposal in which it asked the Soviet Union and Vietnam to get out so that a neutralized Cambodia could be established by internationally supervised free elections. There was no provision to prevent Pol Pot from returning to power.

In 1983 China approached strategic parity with the superpowers when it first tested a submarine-launched missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Thenceforth, Beijing could approach Moscow and Washington, secure that it had second-strike defense capability. China then pledged to come to Bangkok's aid in case Vietnam attacked Thailand (Bangkok World 1983).

During the same year Beijing promised to do something to improve relations each time Hanoi pulled a portion of its forces from Cambodia (PRC 1983). But when Vietnam made partial withdrawals, China refused to respond in kind, accusing Hanoi of removing tired soldiers and replacing them with fresh troops, adding up to a net nonwithdrawal.

Beijing blocked negotiations so that Vietnam would continue to "bleed," although in 1983 Thach received an invitation to the PRC national day celebration at the UN, where he was embraced warmly (van Damme 1983). China did not want the PRK to gain legitimacy, so Beijing opposed Malaysia's proposal for proximity talks. In 1984 France arranged for Hun Sen to meet Sihanouk, but China forced the Prince to back down at the last minute. In 1986 Austria offered to convene a meeting of all four Cambodian factions, and again the PRC refused, opposing any meeting with the PRK. Nonetheless, former Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang opined that Pol Pot should not dominate a new Cambodian government and the NADK should reduce its forces to the level of other factions when PAVN troops withdrew (Bangkok Post 1986b).

In 1985 PRC intelligence knew in advance that Hanoi would complete a pullout by 1990 (interviewee #35). Pretending that Vietnam's 1985 withdrawal announcement was mere propaganda, Deng Xiaoping asked for a departure timetable but would not discuss a parallel timetable for terminating aid to the NADK.

Secret diplomacy between the PRC and the SRV followed (Nations 1985a:16). According to Sihanouk, in 1986 Beijing was ready to offer "tremendous aid" to Vietnam—later estimated at $2 billion yearly (Steward

1990:24)—if it would withdraw from Cambodia, but Hanoi was wary of such promises (Crossette 1986). Deng Xiaoping then gave up on the idea of a second "lesson," as it wanted to encourage the Soviet Union to normalize relations (Bangkok Post 1986a). PLA border attacks continued, but on a smaller scale. In 1986 Communist Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang agreed that the PRK could be included in an interim quadripartite government (Bangkok Post 1986b). China still thought that Vietnam craved hegemony over Indochina, and Beijing would not tolerate a strong Soviet ally on its southern flank.

When Gorbachev spoke of a new era in Asian international politics during a speech at Vladivostok in 1986, an era of détente appeared to have dawned. China perceived that the Soviet Union was at last seeing the errors of its ways. PRC economic reforms introduced over the past decade so impressed the Kremlin, Beijing concluded, that the USSR was coming around to China's way of thinking at last. Moscow adopted the PRC doctrine of socialist noninterference. Although Gorbachev offered nothing immediate on Cambodia to impress Beijing, an announcement in 1987 promised to cut PLA forces by one million soldiers, reciprocating a similar Soviet pledge.

In 1987 China rejected the UN Secretary-General's peace plan and ASEAN's proposed "cocktail party." While Hun Sen and Sihanouk talked in January, the PLA shelled Vietnam to remind the Prince that Vietnam must leave Cambodia, but China prevailed upon the KPLNF and PDK to go along lest there be a separate peace between FUNCIPEC and PRK (Hood 1990:981). Beijing then stopped aid to ANS to bring Sihanouk back into the fold (Hood 1990:984). Beijing was gradually losing prestige over its association with Pol Pot, while the rest of the world sought peace in Cambodia, so it shifted ground and backed a new Cambodia headed by Sihanouk, with both PDK and PRK to play lesser roles (Chanda 1988a:114).

To test the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, in March 1988 PLA naval vessels occupied some of the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam. Hanoi's protest, however, received no Soviet backing. In July the Kremlin finally agreed to discuss Cambodia with the Chinese. Planning for an eventual summit meeting between Deng and Gorbachev then began in earnest. When preparatory meetings occurred later that year, the PRC was suddenly calm on Cambodia, only urging Moscow to pressure Hanoi to come up with a timetable for removing PAVN troops from Cambodia. My letter of October 6 (Haas 1988b) to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* about alternative PAVN withdrawal dates was doubtless good news in Beijing, as the response appeared to be a new interest in negotiations with Hanoi over a specific date.

China's support for the Polpotists persisted because it was the one Cambodian faction that Vietnam feared militarily. The non-Communist resistance was only useful politically. Despite repeated pressure to drop Pol Pot, Beijing refused. Although US diplomats sought to encourage China to grant asylum to Pol Pot during early 1988, Beijing denied that this option was

under consideration (FEER 1989e:100; Oberdorfer 1989b). China did not believe that the Phnom Penh government would act in an independent manner after PAVN troops left. There were too many personal ties built up over the past decade, Beijing surmised, for a mere PAVN withdrawal to satisfy PRC geostrategic objectives. China insisted that the PDK have a role in any interim arrangement toward the establishment of a new nonaligned Cambodia; only the Polpotists could checkmate PRK leaders. In other words, Beijing did not believe that Sihanouk could keep Hanoi at bay as head of a government that excluded the PDK. China also feared that the KPRAF might hold out militarily; the Polpotists would thus serve as a counterweight to prevent Cambodia's Finlandization to Vietnam when PAVN retreated.

To influence JIM I, China released a peace plan in early July that included safeguards against the return of Pol Pot to power, with a quadripartite interim government before internationally supervised elections for a new government. As there were too many contingencies involved in a peace settlement, Beijing evidently asked Khieu Samphan to attend JIM I but to make no concessions. When Samphan returned from JIM I, he informed his PRC backers that any significant PDK participation in an interim arrangement was anathema to many countries. In August, Party Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang publicly acknowledged that something should be done to prevent Polpotism from returning to power, and Samphan issued a statement suggesting that PDK agreed (Chanda 1989c:37–38; Karniol 1989a). In November Prime Minister Li Peng promised to cease aid to the resistance when there was international verification that PAVN troops were out of Cambodia; this point was made public during Sino-Vietnamese normalization talks in January 1990 (Chanda 1989b: 16; Karniol 1989a). Under no circumstances would China allow the PRK to form a temporary basis for building a quadripartite government (Pedler 1989), and Sihanouk's empty Cambodia seat option was an unwelcome concession when additional pressure was desired (Becker 1989c:172).

As early as 1981 China declared that it wanted Vietnam to be prosperous and stable but nonexpansionist (Xinhua 1981:E3). When 1989 began, a Sino-Vietnamese détente appeared to be in progress when Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing received Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Ngo Liem in Beijing for talks. Both sides subsequently pulled back their troops, estimated at half a million each (Nations 1985b; UPI 1985), from the Sino-Vietnamese border. Border trade resumed between the two countries, although PRC regulations prohibited Vietnamese citizens from purchasing more than about $7 worth of goods per trip. When PAVN pulled out of Laos by 1989, the PRC resumed full diplomatic relations with Vientiane. As there were no trade restrictions on Vientiane, Laos became the backdoor conduit for Vietnam's trade with China, which then became the SRV's second-largest trade partner after the USSR (Kazer 1990). Hanoi

would agree neither to surrender the Spratly Islands to China nor to apologize for mistreating ethnic Chinese, however. There was also a difference of opinion regarding Cambodia, since Hanoi opposed dismantling the PRK, a sovereign state. Beijing refused further Sino-Vietnamese normalization talks, appearing to await a meaningful concession from Vietnam.

Soon, Beijing startled the world by saying that Moscow could continue to use Cam Ranh Bay if it wished, since China considered that the facility was primarily aimed at balancing the US presence in the Philippines (Duiker 1989: 2). Presumably, some Chinese argued that a Soviet military presence might also serve to restrain the Vietnamese. When Moscow indicated that it would no longer aid Cambodia through Vietnam, China promised the Soviet Union in February that external aid to the resistance would be cut as PAVN withdrew (NYT 1989c).

After Hanoi's announcement on April 5 of a unilateral PAVN withdrawal from Cambodia by September 30, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was scheduled. Beijing then shipped great quantities of supplies to the NADK (FEER 1989a). Had PRC leaders agreed to stop aiding the Cambodian resistance after Paris, as they hinted earlier in the year, Pol Pot's forces would have been left in the lurch.

In the spring a group of young Chinese began to protest in Tiananmen Square. Soon joined by thousands of townspeople from various walks of life, their demand for more democracy was loud and clear. The answer from PRC leaders on April 3 was "No," but the demonstration increased. Reformer Hu Yaobang then died on April 15. When Gorbachev arrived at Beijing in May for the long-awaited summit with Deng Xiaoping, the crowd greeted him as a hero for his reforms in political liberalization. The resulting bilateral comuniqué noted agreement on an effective international control body to monitor the PAVN withdrawal, an end to external aid to the four factions, a role for the UN, and an acceptance of Paris' offer to host PCC.

Some members of the PRC leadership, including Li Peng, appeared sympathetic to the Tiananmen movement, but ultimately the verdict on June 4 was to clear the streets, with bullets if necessary. Order was preferable to chaos in a country that had fresh memories of the Cultural Revolution, although there was less empathy for Cambodians who did not want their country to return to the killing fields. After the resulting massacre had concluded, China's Cambodian policy hardened (Becker 1989a:B3). NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, in violation of a congressional ban on high-level contacts, flew to Beijing in July, delivering a personal message from President Bush to Deng Xiaoping: "I will be your friend forever." When the two visited again in December, also in defiance of Congress, Deng asked them to give his regards to "President Jimmy Carter" (Davies 1990), an indication that senility was an element in PRC intransigence on many issues. Although Jiang Zemin became the new Communist party secretary-general after the events in Tian-

anmen Square, Qian Qichen remained foreign minister and Li Peng was still prime minister when the peace conference convened at Paris on July 30.

CHINESE OPTIONS

PRC support for Pol Pot's attack on Vietnam started the war, and Beijing continued military aid to the NADK. China said that military assistance to the Cambodian resistance would end when Hanoi pulled out its troops and the Soviets stopped aiding Vietnam's role in Cambodia; but after pledging in 1983 to shut the tap on NADK aid as PAVN left Cambodia, Beijing accused Hanoi of withdrawing before cameras while supplying an equal number of fresh troops in secret.

The idea of UN verification of a PAVN withdrawal came in 1981 at ASEAN's suggestion. The only way to get such verification, PRC leaders insisted, was to set up a UN peacekeeping organ. Beijing blocked negotiations leading to a conference to set up such an organ by pressuring Sihanouk not to talk to Hun Sen. Later, PRC leaders said that the organ had to be part of a "comprehensive political settlement," a codeword for dismantling the PRK (later the SOC) and allowing the PDK to play a role in an interim government. When other countries objected that the Pol Pot clique might return to power, Beijing expressed the view that the PDK should play a lesser role in an interim government, knowing that any PDK role in governing the country would be unacceptable to Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Therefore, there was clearly a "Catch 22" in much of PRC rhetoric.

China applied sanctions against Vietnam. Troops went to the Vietnamese border in 1978, an attack began in 1979, and border incidents continued through 1987. All economic aid stopped in 1978, and trade ended in 1979. In early 1989, PLA troops pulled back, and border trade resumed. The policy of "bleeding" Vietnam thus softened, although vague hints of future aid were dangled in front of Vietnam as a promised reward for a change in Hanoi's policy toward Cambodia.

China obtained the objective of a weaker Soviet Union and Vietnam at very little cost. Beijing's most desired scenario was for Hanoi to switch allegiances from Moscow to Beijing, leaving Cambodia to the care of China. Beijing's diplomacy lacked finesse because the fate of the Cambodian people was not a foremost concern. In this respect China's policy resembled that of at least one of the superpowers.

15

THE SUPERPOWERS

CHANGING SOVIET POLICYMAKING

After the Soviet veto of the Security Council's call for Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in 1979, Moscow stood by its Southeast Asian ally.[1] The Kremlin agreed with Hanoi that Beijing was the cause of the conflict; since China was unyielding, the war would continue. In 1981 and 1982 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore demanded the recall of Soviet citizens as spies, reinforcing the impression that Moscow was a regional menace.

Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan had come to office as US president. His first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, had a plan to end the Soviet world empire (Alagappa 1989b:23; Chanda 1981b). Some two decades earlier, John Birch Society leader Robert Welch (1952:113), who accused President Eisenhower of being one of the top Communists in the United States, implied that the USSR's aim in militarization was to spend Washington into insolvency. Haig evidently decided to turn this idea on its head: The United States would so escalate the arms race that Moscow would be unable to keep up.

In March 1985, four years after Soviet efforts to match US military spending, pragmatic leadership gained control in the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While *glasnost* (open information) and *perestroika* (economic restructuring) became household words in the West, in foreign policy the term *novoe myshlenie* (new thinking) did not. Two months later, when Gorbachev proposed an Asian security conference, the invitation went almost unnoticed, although China was invited to participate. Longtime Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stepped aside, and Gorbachev brought in Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister. By November Gorbachev met Reagan in the first of several summit meetings. Then came two Gorbachev speeches on Asian-Pacific relations—at Vladivostok in July 1986 and at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988.

The general thrust of Gorbachevism was toward averting nuclear war, joining the world capitalist economy, and achieving "mutual assured security" with China and the United States. The Brezhnev Doctrine, which appeared to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was ditched. In a word, Moscow sought to end the cold war. Proposed solutions to conflicts seemed to show that the Soviet Union was the more peaceloving superpower. US alliances and quasialliances within the region were becoming anachronistic. Moscow, for example, endorsed ASEAN's Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone (SEANFZ) and signed the Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), while Washington objected to both concepts. Moscow wanted to establish an Asian-Pacific equivalent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki process), but Washington and countries of the region demurred.

Gorbachev was eager to meet all three of PRC's preconditions for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet forces pledged to leave Afghanistan by early 1989, and Moscow announced major cutbacks in troops from Mongolia and the Chinese border, leaving only support for Vietnam's adventure in Cambodia as an anomaly. Moscow realized that aid to Vietnam for a seemingly endless war in Cambodia had no genuine return on the investment. While Soviet prestige, both in Southeast Asia and the world, had suffered because of the Cambodian situation, China had developed a quasialliance with ASEAN and the United States and could command a majority for its views in the United Nations. Clearly, a détente with China and the United States was a more urgent goal than a protracted struggle to control ricefields.

Gorbachev did not at first become directly involved in the peace process. The new Soviet view was that Vietnam should not continue to await conciliatory moves from China to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Instead, resolution of the Cambodian conflict would promote détente with China. Moscow wanted to preserve the spirit of an alliance with Vietnam while paying less for the substance of the relationship.

As for the Pol Pot problem, Moscow noted that public opinion in the West wanted to prevent a return of genocide to Cambodia, whereas Western governments were aiding the NADK or its allies. This contradiction would only be resolved by bringing Cambodia onto the front page of Western newspapers, thereby redounding to the benefit of the PRK. The Kremlin viewed the solution to the problem as a revival of "national patriotic forces," namely, the coalition arrayed against proxy Lon Nol from 1970 to 1975 that included the CPK but mistakenly brought Pol Pot to power due to PRC intervention (Chanda 1988a:112).

After Soviet leaders toured Southeast Asia for the first time ever, they agreed to the idea of a comprehensive political settlement. Privately, Moscow was annoyed that Hanoi was trying to dominate Cambodia. Gorbachev

preferred to use a "carrot" policy rather than a "stick" policy, but internal economic priorities in the Soviet Union left fewer carrots for Vietnam.

Moscow was pleased when Hanoi said that it would remove its forces from Cambodia. With China pressing the USSR for a PAVN withdrawal timetable, Soviet diplomats served as a channel of communication between the PRC and Vietnam. Inquiries about pullout dates were interpreted by Western observers as forms of Soviet pressure on Vietnam, but there was little need to apply leverage on war-weary Hanoi in the first place (Lindahl 1988). At the same time, Soviet leaders made their views known to Vietnam in extremely blunt language, warning that aid for the Cambodian intervention was drying up in the wake of an unpopular adventure in Afghanistan.

In February 1988 EC President Claude Cheysson, President François Mitterand's former foreign minister, returned from Moscow, declaring somewhat hyperbolically that the Soviet Union was ready to deliver Cambodia to Sihanouk (interviewee #25). When the PRC navy moved to control some of the Spratly Islands disputed with Vietnam, Moscow released a tepid statement about the need to resolve the matter peacefully, thus failing to back Hanoi's claims. These developments showed that the distance between Hanoi and Moscow was increasing.

The Soviet Union criticized Vietnam for squandering aid and for running up a trade deficit of at least $8 billion due to economic mismanagement (Brown 1989:129). Cambodian war expenditures, according to Moscow, were going down a rathole. The bill was about $2 billion in yearly aid to Vietnam, including the salary of at least 8,000 technicians and $250,000 in rent for use of Cam Ranh Bay, while the PRK received an additional $12 million annually (Simon 1982:199). During 1988 Soviet experts began to leave both countries; they were needed at home. More than half the technical advisers in Cambodia departed, considering their aid projects to be unfruitful; this left about 1,000 in Cambodia to handle the airports, the port of Kompong Som, and the rubber plantations (Chanda 1989b).

Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk offer of September 1988 to pull out of Cam Ranh Bay, if the Americans would follow suit in the Philippines, was less a propaganda barb directed at Washington than a frank admission that Soviet policy had changed fundamentally. Clearing the remark with Hanoi in advance would have been a more diplomatic way to proceed, but that was unnecessary from Moscow's perspective, as Vietnam already was familiar with the tenor of current Soviet policy.

Deng Xiaoping would not schedule a summit meeting with Gorbachev until Cambodia was on the agenda. After the Soviets agreed to these terms in July 1988, preliminary subministerial discussions led to a meeting of the two foreign ministers in February 1989 at Beijing, where Shevardnadze agreed to the idea of an effective international control mechanism for a transitional period in Cambodia. Some 200,000 Soviet soldiers pulled back from the Sino-Soviet border, leaving about 250,000 on each side and

350,000 in reserve (Honolulu Advertiser 1990b; Quinn-Judge & Cheung 1990:13). At Beijing in May 1989 Gorbachev conceded that the UN should play a transitional role, contrary to SOC and SRV policies.

When China decided to ship arms to the NADK just before the Paris conference, the Soviet Union was shipping some 14,000 tons of Soviet military supplies to Phnom Penh in the first six months of 1989 (Lewis 1989). After Vietnam pulled out its troops, the USSR would become the principal supplier of aid to hold back Pol Pot, unless peace emerged in Paris.

CHANGING US POLICYMAKING

In June 1982 George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as secretary of state. Shultz had more interest in peace than in confrontation, but he exhibited little interest in Cambodia. A few months before, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage had been in Vietnam to open a dialogue on the matter of US MIAs. Upon his return he reported that Hanoi was eager for negotiation, and in due course results on MIAs (but not Cambodia) emerged. In 1983, when Australia's Foreign Minister Bill Hayden began to pursue a new channel of communication, Washington barked (Lincoln 1988). The similar US reaction to Japanese corporate interest in investment in Vietnam caused Tokyo to fear a US bite (Tasker 1987) in the form of protectionist retaliation (interviewee #71). The preferred US scenario was for a non-Communist Cambodia, however remote that possibility might be. At the ASEAN meeting in mid-1984 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore pleaded with Shultz to ask China to drop its policy of nonnegotiation (Porter 1988a:825), but to no avail.

At the end of 1984 Congressman Solarz went to Vietnam in order to gather additional information and to present an ingenious plan for peace. His plan was to have the PRK make common cause with FUNCIPEC and the KPNLF, thereby excluding PDK from a future Cambodia. The idea seemed unrealistic to Thach, since Sihanouk ruled out any negotiations with Hun Sen and the NCR armies scarcely existed as strategic players (interviewee #23). Nonetheless, Solarz interpreted Thach's response to his proposal as obstinacy. He concluded that Vietnam would be more willing to compromise if Congress openly aided the NCR (interviewee #24). Because the American people were still sensitive in regard to any renewed military aid against Vietnam, Washington had deferred to China, which backed the PDK, rather than seeking to build an effective NCR (interviewee #124). Nevertheless, Solarz steered an appropriation of $5 million in military aid (lethal or nonlethal) through Congress in 1985. There was a provision that such assistance did not go to NADK "directly or indirectly." But the NCR and NADK were allies, so the stipulation was disingenuous; in due course NCR aid reached NADK, with the Thai military selling to the highest bidder. If Solarz did not know the fallacies of his policy, the US State Department

did not point out the difficulties. Foggy Bottom was willing to shift ground to say it was backing an independent NCR. The reality of Cambodia increasingly eluded US officials, who pretended that the NCR could prevail, not only against the PRK but also against the PDK despite insufficient support to accomplish this objective (interviewee #74).

In 1985, the tenth year since the dramatic helicopter evacuation of personnel took place from the US Embassy in Saigon, American news reporters sought visas to go to Vietnam in order to film documentaries on progress after a decade. Washington eased restrictions on Americans traveling to Vietnam, and John McAuliff made the first of his semiannual USIRP visits with about sixteen academics and journalists. After so many years of propagandistic reporting on Vietnam in the US media, new information sources emerged. USIRP groups in due course flew to Phnom Penh for a few days, obtaining a firsthand account of the new Cambodia. By 1988 Vietnamese academics were visiting the United States, including onetime ROV premier, economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh, who had become a member of the SRV parliament and was the genius behind many economic reforms after Vietnam's Party Congress of 1986.

As 1986 began, US policy supported the Sino–UN peace plan, but Washington was opposing ASEAN's support for a quadripartite reconciliation government, as this meant according a measure of power to the PRK (Chanda 1989c:38). Strategically, Washington was backing China. Economically, Congress was quarreling with ASEAN and Japan on trade matters, as trade imbalances and balance-of-payments deficits were shrinking the value of the dollar. Psychologically, the Reagan administration was still fighting the Vietnamese enemy while trying to overcome the so-called "Vietnamese syndrome." As a peace process gained momentum, the US government could no longer control ASEAN. Accordingly, State Department personnel quietly began to consider that they should abandon the "support ASEAN" option and instead give more attention to Sihanouk as the only horse that they were willing to back in a future Cambodia. Solarz disagreed, advocating increased NCR lethal aid so that NADK would not end up as the only rider of that horse.

When JIM I opened in 1988, there was no specific US policy to prevent Pol Pot from seizing power when PAVN withdrew (Brown 1989:82–86). After Shultz indicated to ASEAN in July that Washington wanted safeguards against the return of Polpotism, the Reagan administration proposed doubling NCR nonlethal aid, but news of ongoing Thai embezzlement of that aid killed the idea (Clymer 1990:5). Instead, Congress cut military aid to Thailand (US House 1989:115) and passed a joint resolution in October 1988, calling upon the US government to bring Pol Pot and company to trial. By January 1989 the new administration of George Bush was spending the entire $5 million annual NCR allotment and was requesting $7 million

for the following year, while Congress objected that aid to Pol Pot's allies was aid to Pol Pot.

Soviet moves toward a détente had more impact on US policy toward Europe than toward Asia. Gorbachev's offer in September 1988 to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay embarrassed US negotiators, who were clinging to the doctrine of "forward defense" in order to keep Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. Although US diplomats asked their Soviet counterparts to pressure Hanoi to facilitate a peace settlement, Vietnam was changing its policy and the United States was not. Accordingly, Moscow informed Washington that Vietnam was eager to leave Cambodia to the Cambodians.

Bush's inaugural address declared that "the statute of limitations had been reached on Vietnam." The highest Asian-American on Bush's staff was Sichan Siv, a Cambodian who had escaped the Pol Pot regime, emigrated to the United States, joined the KPNLF, and had even served as a member of the CGDK delegation at the UN although he had become an American citizen. Bush's adviser on Cambodia was Karl Jackson, a former University of California colleague of Hanoiphobic Douglas Pike, a onetime State Department official in Saigon. Other key policymakers on Cambodia were Secretary of State James Baker III and NSC Adviser Brent Scrowcroft, both of whom had more interest in the larger chesspieces on the global chessboard than in the pawns. Scowcroft, an exponent of terroristic "low-intensity warfare," could continue to support the Cambodian resistance with alacrity.

In February, when the State Department objected in vain to Thai Prime Minister Chatichai's discussions with Hun Sen in Bangkok, Bush met Sihanouk in Beijing. In March FUNCIPEC leaders, meeting the new president in the White House, implored him to increase military aid to the NCR. In April, after Vietnam announced a unilateral withdrawal by the end of September, newspaper stories across the country began to warn that Pol Pot might return to power (e.g., Blumenthal 1989; Hahn 1989). Solarz, resourceful as ever, suggested a UN trusteeship for Cambodia, but his suggestion was regarded as a harebrained scheme (Ottaway 1989).

Even before France scheduled the Paris Conference on Cambodia, pressure began to mount in Washington. Sihanouk openly asked for US lethal aid so that ANS could cope with a resurgent NADK after PAVN troops departed. Vice President Dan Quayle, while touring Southeast Asia in May, revealed that Bush was contemplating covert lethal aid to the NCR, as the US government would "never" recognize the SRV-installed regime in Phnom Penh (Chanda 1989d; Richburg 1989e:22). Itching to project power, the Bush administration then called for overt lethal aid. Senator Claiborne Pell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair, next steered a 97–1 vote on an amendment that would have given nonlethal aid to the NCR on the condition that the two factions split from the PDK. In short, Pell wanted to

dissolve CGDK. After the Bush administration gave assurances that no aid would reach the Polpotists and that no funds would be disbursed unless the Paris conference failed, White House pressure on the Senate garnered support, and Quayle broke a tie vote in the Senate for the appropriation without the amendment. The aid increased from $5 million to $7 million, including an amount for training of Cambodians to handle public administration in the event of quadripartite government, although the legislation required the CIA to clear weapons shipments through Congress (Clymer 1990:6–7; Pear 1989a). On July 20 Senator Charles Robb introduced an amendment for lethal aid to the NCR. The Robb amendment passed, albeit without providing a dollar amount. The aim was to signal that US policy was firmly behind Sihanouk, who could thus afford to make fewer concessions in Paris. Although Solarz wanted the NCR to fight the NADK, for Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon the target was to be SRV and SOC forces (Becker 1989d; Sieverts 1989; Stone 1989c:8).

Baker and Shevardnadze met in Moscow in May. The two agreed that all external aid to the Cambodian factions should end in order to hasten a settlement (interviewee #64). They also favored the presence of a UN organ during the transition, something still opposed by SOC and SRV leaders. Baker conceded that the SOC could be included in a transitional quadripartite authority (Friedman 1989).

During June the US government further demonstrated its militancy by blocking the dispatch of a UNDP assessment mission to Phnom Penh, while both Vice President Quayle and Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt underscored US opposition to PDK's inclusion in an interim coalition government (Chanda 1989d:39), contrary to ASEAN's plan for an interim quadripartite government. The US view was that Sihanouk should have real power in a new Cambodia, rather than serving merely as a figurehead, although the Prince had different ideas entirely. The Bush administration, in other words, appeared to accept a tripartite option that excluded PDK.

On the eve of the Paris conference, Bush concluded that the Pol Pot faction should be marginalized (Pedler 1989b), and this principle found its way into Baker's speech when the Paris conference opened. But Washington was also urging that Cambodian factions at war should establish a unified government while foreign troops withdrew, and that normalizing relations with Vietnam would come after a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia (Yu, Pregelj, & Sutter 1989:1). US policy, as usual, tried to align morality with geostrategic considerations. Since they did not match up, Washington appeared to stumble along, hoping that there would be no urgency for a coherent policy.

SUPERPOWER OPTIONS

Neither superpower committed combat troops directly, but Soviet military advisers were in both Cambodia and Vietnam. Soviet military aid went to

the PRK (later SOC) and to Vietnam, while US military aid flowed to the NCR, then leaked to NADK. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the need for a complete encapsulation of the conflict just before PCC.

Washington asked other countries to impose aid and trade embargoes on the Phnom Penh government and Vietnam, although US academics were allowed to go to both countries and US news reporters broke through restrictions in 1985. Funds from Vietnamese expatriates in the United States were transferred into banks in Vietnam from the mid-1980s, constituting Hanoi's largest source of foreign exchange. In 1985 the Treasury Department relaxed restrictions on private humanitarian aid from US groups to Vietnam, but not to the PRK. Vietnamese academics began to travel to the United States in 1985, and Washington admitted the first visitor from Phnom Penh in 1989. Easing of restrictions resulted from pleas by members of Congress speaking for individual persons.

Regarding peace negotiations, Moscow backed Hanoi and Phnom Penh, while Washington followed China but said that it supported ASEAN. When ASEAN sought to bring all four Cambodian factions together as early as 1981, China was opposed, and US officials reined in ASEAN at ICK. US support for a conference with all four factions came only after Sihanouk accepted Hun Sen's invitation to talk in 1987. The Soviet Union, originally wanting to exclude the PDK from negotiations, went along when Hun Sen waived this precondition in 1986.

Washington was unclear about the transition to a new Cambodia. After favoring the return of the Pol Pot regime in 1979, when Sihanouk was offering an alternative, the US position was equivocal when ASEAN supported an interim quadripartite government in 1986. Moscow preferred to exclude PDK from a future Cambodia and came around to the idea of an interim quadripartite council when Hun Sen proposed it in 1987.

The Soviet Union and the United States did not get into particulars of a peace agreement until PCC; they did not float formal plans. Moscow wanted a disbanding of all Cambodian armies and a non-UN supervisory body until early 1989, while Washington backed a UN body to keep the peace and supervise elections. The Soviet Union changed just before PCC, coming out in favor of a UN organ.

Gorbachev wanted to end the deadly game of chess, but he did not want to betray an ally, so he was somewhat ahead of Hanoi and Phnom Penh in making policy changes during the peace process. Washington, in contrast, risked little and hid behind the skirts of ASEAN, China, and later Sihanouk. While the Soviet Union tried to appease ASEAN, the United States was decreasingly interested in using the organization as a figleaf for a policy that aided Pol Pot.

NOTE

1. See Marantz (1988), Thayer (1989), and Young (1988) for more details on changing Soviet policymaking.

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ASEAN

CHANGING ASEAN POLICYMAKING

ASEAN initially insisted that peace would come to Cambodia only through Vietnam's withdrawal. As this meant that Pol Pot would return to power, the likelihood that Hanoi would accept ASEAN policy was nil. Therefore, a negotiated solution had to be found. The initial division of opinion within ASEAN continued, yet consensus prevailed as the mode of decisionmaking. One of ASEAN's major achievements, as we have previously noted, was to overcome China's opposition to negotiations.

Starting in 1983, Indonesia and Malaysia pushed for a Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone (SEANFZ). By 1988, when ASEAN formally endorsed SEANFZ, the Philippines wrote the idea into its 1988 constitution. In both cases each country could decide how to interpret the concept, thereby not treading on the sensitivities of the United States (Alagappa 1989b:9), which remained opposed.

In April 1989 Vietnam again expressed a readiness to join ASEAN just two days before announcing PAVN's withdrawal from Cambodia. ASEAN noted Hanoi's interest but had more immediate priorities.

CHANGING INDONESIAN POLICYMAKING

Jakarta never wavered in seeking a peaceful solution. Due to differences between the defense and foreign ministries, a two-pronged approach continued: Both adhered to the ASEAN consensus, while probing for a compromise in discussions with Hanoi. Indonesia continued informally as ASEAN's "interlocutor" with Vietnam.

In 1980 President Suharto met his Malaysian counterpart, Prime Minister Hussein Onn, at Kuantan. This Malindo meeting established the principle that the war in Cambodia should end by implementing ZOPFAN—cessation

of outside aid to the four factions, followed by a neutralized Cambodia. By the end of the year Vietnam was warming to the idea, although Singapore and Thailand remained opposed.

In 1980 and 1981 the Defense Ministry's Murdani went to Hanoi to renew ties with the Vietnamese military, under new leadership since the replacement of General Giap. In 1982 Jakarta considered asking Washington to normalize relations with Hanoi as a step toward getting PAVN troops out of Cambodia, but the US position was just the opposite—no normalization until a withdrawal from Cambodia had occurred. Foreign Minister Mochtar was frustrated that the war was continuing because China, the Soviet Union, and the United States kept it going without regard to the interests of the region (Shaplen 1986:291).

Indonesia's efforts to forge CGDK were calculated to facilitate a negotiated settlement. To Jakarta's astonishment, the result was just the opposite: The conflict was even more prolonged, involving more complications.

In 1983 Indonesia provided good offices to Vietnam in presenting a Thai proposal to have troops withdraw thirty kilometers from the Thai border. Hanoi accepted but attached conditions that proved unacceptable to Bangkok, but at least a dialogue was in progress.

In 1984 the ASEAN foreign ministers designated Indonesia formally as "interlocutor" with Vietnam in order to carry official ASEAN proposals back and forth. Meanwhile, Murdani took ten younger commanding officers to Vietnam, where they toured the border with China to see how PAVN was on alert in case of trouble from the PLA. When Murdani returned, he shocked his colleagues by asserting that Vietnam's entry into Cambodia was justified in terms of self-defense (Awanohara 1984b: interviewee #36). In 1986 Mochtar refused to consider the genocide documentation presented by the Cambodian Documentation Commission as an element in the peace process (interviewee #101).

By 1987 Mochtar obtained agreement from Vietnam to attend proximity talks on Cambodia. When the meeting failed to take place because Hanoi would not attend without the PRK, Mochtar worked successfully to bring about the first JIM.

In 1988 Mochtar retired as foreign minister. The legalistic, consensus-oriented champion of ASEAN was replaced by Ali Alatas, who had been UN ambassador. Alatas was more of a globalist than a regionalist. In tune with Suharto's ambition to promote a higher profile for Indonesia in the world community, Alatas wanted Jakarta to be the site for a future NAM summit and he succeeded by 1991. JIM I and II made Jakarta the hub of constructive dialogue to close out the Cambodian conflict.

Because of the slump in oil prices in the 1980s, petroleum-dependent Indonesia sought to increase exports. A small amount of trade began with Vietnam, and in 1987 Indonesia extended credit to Hanoi for 300,000 tons of rice to alleviate a shortage; Hanoi paid back the loan in 1988 (Boebion

1989). In early 1989 an Indonesian firm was the first to try to establish an offshore bank in Ho Chi Minh City, but SRV red tape caused the deal to fall through. Garuda Airlines, Indonesia's flag carrier, began regular service between Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City by midyear.

Jakarta continued to work for a formula to bring peace to the region, but Alatas had to proceed step by step. ASEAN solidarity remained the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy and thus had higher priority than peace in Cambodia. At the same time, Jakarta believed that the NCR, including Sihanouk, had insufficient power to maintain order in a postwar Cambodia, so there was need for an accommodation with the PRK lest the PDK return to power (Richburg 1989e). Indonesian policies were vindicated when JIM and PCC were held.

CHANGING THAI POLICYMAKING

Prime Minister Prem, aware that he was no expert in foreign policy, delegated Cambodian affairs entirely to Foreign Minister Siddhi, with military aspects left to Army Chief of Staff Arthrit. Since all political parties supported Prem, he faced little criticism in parliament, and Thai policy ran down a single track for a decade. At the end of the road Bangkok saw a PAVN withdrawal from the Thai border, but there was no larger vision of a future Indochina.

Siddhi formulated few peace initiatives and turned down negotiations with Vietnam for nearly a decade. Thailand refused Hanoi's offer of a nonaggression pact, as it seemed to imply acceptance of SRV hegemony in Indochina. Bangkok opposed the IFMC idea of a regional security conference in 1981, preferring ICK.

In 1983 Siddhi hinted during an election speech that one way of de-escalating the situation was for Hanoi to pull its troops thirty kilometers back from the Thai border, as this was the practice during the annual rainy season. When Hanoi agreed, on the condition that Thai soldiers do so as well, Siddhi refused, arguing simplistically that PAVN troops did not belong there in the first place and that it was presumptuous for Hanoi to tell Bangkok where to put troops on its own soil. That Thailand was providing cover to Khmer factions opposing the PRK was left unaddressed, although Hanoi repeatedly raised the issue. Bangkok claimed not to want a piecemeal resolution of the conflict, but rather a comprehensive settlement that would prevent Vietnam from achieving dominance in Indochina, which in turn depended upon the consent of the superpowers. Siddhi opposed the "5 + 2" proposal of 1983, as external powers needed to be involved. He was also reluctant to talk to Vietnam, and he refused to deal with Phnom Penh.

Siddhi allowed Indonesia to extract concessions from Vietnam. When there appeared to be an agreement to hold an ASEAN—IFMC meeting in 1986, Siddhi killed the initiative, as he was not ready to sit at the same

conference table with the PRK, thereby seeming to legitimize a regime that he preferred to melt away. He was willing instead to do business with the PDK, believing that the Pol Pot leopard had changed its spots (Stone 1989a:4). In short, Siddhi was parroting PRC and PDK propaganda.

Meanwhile, Bangkok streamlined foreign investment procedures. Whereas formerly a corporation needed dozens of low-paid bureaucrats to sign approval on forms for licenses to operate a business, with obvious potential for bribery, reforms in the mid-1980s brought the number of required signatures down to six (interviewee #1). As a result, investment soared and business was booming in Bangkok. Thailand was becoming the latest newly industrializing country (NIC).

In the late 1980s, Bangkok began to derive spillover income associated with increased aid and trade to Vietnam. Thai businesses were eager to make more money in Indochina than the peanuts derived from (1) smuggling of retail goods, which already comprised one-half of all merchandise sold in Cambodia (Suksaman 1989), or (2) taking a commission to distribute supplies to the resistance provided by outside powers (Chanda 1988c:14). Benefits from the war in Cambodia were limited, as far as many business executives were concerned.[1] Although PRC investment in Thailand began, and China became Thailand's six largest trade partner (Alagappa 1989b:19), Bangkok declined Beijing's offer of military support in the event of a Vietnamese invasion and otherwise tried to keep China at a suitable distance.

Thai foreign policy experts were speaking of Southeast Asia as being composed of two geostrategic categories. Bangkok saw itself as dominant in mainland Southeast Asia, whereas Indonesia was the supreme power of maritime Southeast Asia. On this basis Indonesia supposedly deferred to Thailand as the frontline state with responsibility to contain Vietnam. Bangkok assumed that Hanoi's withdrawal was inevitable. Thailand would derive *entrepôt* trade with Indochina (interviewee #53), and Bangkok observers saw that their country would soon become the economic superpower of Southeast Asia (Erlanger 1989g). At the end of 1987 new Army Chief of Staff Chaovalit Yongchaiyut began to refer to the conflict as a "civil war" as PAVN units withdrew from the Thai border; Thai troops responded by pulling back from the Cambodian border (Thayer 1989:168–69).

After elections in July 1988, Prime Minister Prem decided to retire. A coalition of political parties named Chatichai Choonhavan as the new prime minister. In his first foreign policy statement, which came after JIM I, Chatichai enunciated his famous "battlefields into marketplaces" thesis. Although he wanted to change the direction of Thai foreign policy, Chatichai had a slim coalition. He therefore retained Foreign Minister Siddhi, who was to implement new policies, and he dispatched Chaovalit to meet Hun Sen at Vientiane in October.

In January 1989, Siddhi flew to Hanoi, where he agreed that CGDK and the PRK should be left intact under a national council of reconciliation

headed by Sihanouk. Then, when Siddhi dragged his feet after the trip to Hanoi, Chatichai proceeded with his own foreign policy initiatives. After checking quietly with Jakarta and Washington, Chatichai startled the world by inviting Hun Sen to Bangkok for private discussions in January. There was no implied recognition of the PRK, he claimed, but China was angry and the US government expressed official displeasure. When Foreign Minister Siddhi's Social Action Party criticized the prime minister, Chatichai riposted about political "dinosaurs and million-year-old turtles." Chatichai concluded that he could do business with Hun Sen (Thailand was already exporting $400,000 in goods to the PRK during 1986, for example) but that he heard only ideology from Sihanouk and the Polpotists (AP 1988; Chanda 1989e; Sricharatchanya 1989a:11). As there was no cash value to ideology, the prime minister began to make moves to break out of the diplomatic deadlock by suggesting that Thailand might cut off all aid to the Cambodian resistance (Erlanger 1989b). In May Chatichai called for a cease-fire as a preparatory step for a settlement, because he was skeptical that a comprehensive political settlement would emerge from the Paris conference (Sricharatchanya 1989a:12). He pledged to choke off aid to the NADK as soon as PAVN troops withdrew, provided that there was a cease-fire (AFP 1989a). During the same month, however, Bangkok signed another agreement with China for discounted purchases of military equipment. PAVN troops were then shelling arms caches inside the Thai border, so some observers felt that the prime minister was merely asking Vietnam to behave itself in order to gain points domestically. Later, the Thai military and the KPRAF tacitly agreed on a mutual cease-fire, with Thailand refraining from firing on KPRAF munitions depots, while KPRAF promised not to aim at Thai civilians or military targets, a sign of good will from Chatichai (Bangkok Post 1989c). The prime minister also appealed to Thais more than Cambodians in proposing that Sihanouk return to Phnom Penh as monarch, following the Thai model, since Chatichai thought it possible that the Prince would be defeated in elections within a postwar Cambodia (FEER 1989h:25). The prime minister also opposed last-minute arms shipments by the major powers to their Cambodian clients just before PCC as being contrary to the goal of extricating Southeast Asians from a role as pawns of the superpowers.

Because the ruling coalition was not a wide majority, Chatichai granted considerable leeway to various cabinet ministers. The Thai military continued to profit from the arms trade with the resistance forces, especially the better-financed Polpotists, and Siddhi went to the Paris conference with full autonomy.

CHANGING PHILIPPINE POLICYMAKING

With the Soviets at Cam Ranh Bay, President Marcos could justify retaining a US military presence, as he pointed to the Communist menace in

Indochina in order to rally the Philippine people against the New People's Army. Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo and his immediate successor, Arturo Tolentino, supported ASEAN fully on Cambodia.

The "people's power" revolution of 1986 brought President Corazón Aquino and a more independent-minded cadre of parliamentarians to office. After Marcos left for exile in Honolulu, US military facilities increasingly appeared to symbolize the obscene Marcos-Reagan axis that had maintained a dictatorship for over a decade. Aquino's first foreign minister, Vice President Salvador Laurel, equivocated on Cambodia until he resigned in 1987. His successor, Raúl Manglapus, faced a Philippine Senate with sufficient votes to veto any treaty to continue US control of military bases in retaliation against Washington's support for the Marcos dictatorship. Geostrategic considerations, such as the presence of a dozen Soviet warships at nearby Cam Ranh Bay, were of lesser importance to the Filipino élites than economic recovery from Marcos's Bangladeshization of the economy and a desire for full political independence.[2]

The Philippines ignored the US trade embargo at the end of the 1980s, and there was about $2 million of trade with Vietnam (Boebion 1989). In 1988, Philippine Airlines inaugurated regular air service to Ho Chi Minh City, primarily to provide a direct exit for Vietnamese immigrants en route to the United States. China's move to occupy some of the Spratly Islands later that year provoked similar reactions in Hanoi and Manila, as Beijing had also ignored Philippine claims on the Kalayaan Islands within the Spratly group. After Gorbachev offered to close Soviet bases in Vietnam if Washington would do likewise in the Philippines, Manglapus flew to Hanoi for a discussion of regional issues. Thach informed him that ships of any country were free to dock at the port, which was Vietnamese, not Russian. Hanoi also took advantage of the visit to declare that Vietnam was ready to sign the ASEAN treaty.

The Philippine position on Cambodia thus was inching away from the ASEAN hardliners, without moving to the Indonesia-Malaysian side, when China baffled most observers by declaring that the Soviets could stay at Cam Ranh Bay if required to counterbalance US bases in the Philippines. A Cambodian settlement, an end to Soviet use of bases in Vietnam, and an evacuation of US military personnel from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base would enable Quezon City to embark on a more independent foreign policy. The US umbilical cord could be severed completely, and NPA insurgents would be deprived of a key argument for opposing *comprador* bourgeois democracy in the Philippines.

CHANGING SINGAPOREAN POLICYMAKING

In 1981 a lone opposition party candidate won a seat in parliament after more than a decade of almost unopposed elections (Haas 1989c). The

People's Action Party (PAP) tuned up its anti-Communist rhetoric to frighten citizens into pondering the prospects of non-PAP rule. While other countries in the region were trying to design peace plans, the island republic increasingly developed a strategic relationship with the United States.[3] In 1987 hearings in Congress revealed that Singapore had been shipping radios covertly to the Nicaraguan Contras. The payoff for supporting the Cambodian stalemate, including sending covert aid to the NCR (US Embassy, Paris 1989c:5), was not only profit from weapons manufactured in the republic[4] but also a quasialliance with the United States inside the bosom of a nonaligned ASEAN.

As Singapore's trade with Cambodia and Vietnam increased due to the economic reforms in Indochina after 1986, the island republic for a time became the two countries' second-largest trade partner after the Soviet Union (McBeth & Awanohara 1979). Trade with Vietnam was about $200 million per year, downplayed as less than 1 percent of Singapore's trade (HIS 1990:65; Mahbubani 1989b), although much of the commerce was due to smuggling. An SRV trade office opened in Singapore by 1987, and investors went to Vietnam to sign contracts. The Singapore government told Hanoi that business contracts would not be honored until there was a peace settlement, demonstrating yet another form of economic pressure (Cohen 1989).

In mid-1987, Lee Kuan Yew's antediluvian view of Marxism prompted him to arrest a dozen or so Christian social workers for trying to set up organizations to help Filipino guestworkers and otherwise advancing democratic aims in a peaceful manner. Lee's justification was that forming independent organizations would inevitably lead to a bloody revolution, since the government linked organizers to Malcolm Caldwell, Eurocommunism, and Philippine "people's power" liberation theology (Haas 1989c). Caldwell had been assassinated in Democratic Kampuchea a decade earlier, Eurocommunism had been superseded by Gorbachev's abandonment of socialism in the Soviet Union, and Corazón Aquino's rise to power marginalized liberation theology, but Singapore tightened restrictions even more. Cameras were even installed in public lavatories to help in prosecuting violators of a law requiring mandatory toiletflushing. Lee thus prevailed in promoting the island's major claim to fame as the world's first prosperous totalitarian state.[5]

The government, meanwhile, took a hard line in the ongoing peace process. In early 1989, hearing predictions that US forces might be forced out of the Philippines, the prime minister offered facilities in Singapore as a new venue for US military units. Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan immediately criticized the offer, Lee downplayed its significance, and the United States read the verbiage as an invitation to hang tough in negotiations with Manila. Singapore wanted to lean on Washington for protection

against future aggression, so it urged ASEAN to negotiate in Paris from a position of strength (Balakrishnan 1989).

CHANGING MALAYSIAN POLICYMAKING

Kuala Lumpur was the first country to seek a dialogue with Vietnam.[6] Foreign Minister Rithauddeen flew to Hanoi in January 1980 to open discussions. When the top leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia reflected on Cambodia in 1980 at Kuantan, a seaside resort in Malaysia, they gave the earliest evidence of a more conciliatory approach toward Cambodia within ASEAN. Kuala Lumpur agreed with Jakarta that Vietnam should serve as a buffer between China and the rest of Southeast Asia. Although accepting Bangkok's need for a Cambodian buffer between Thailand and Vietnam, Prime Minister Onn was unhappy about having to support NADK, a Communist force, while still battling the Communist Party of Malaya cadres in the jungles. Encapsulation of the Cambodian conflict to the contending indigenous forces, known as the Kuantan Formula, was a nonstarter within ASEAN, however.

In June 1981 Mahathir took over from the ailing Hussein Onn as prime minister. Malaysia continued to pursue peace initiatives of various sorts in order to minimize the role of external powers in the region. In 1983 Mahathir had friendly discussions with Foreign Minister Thach, first at the NAM summit in New Delhi, later in Kuala Lumpur. Foreign Minister Ghazali followed up by supporting the idea of a conference involving ASEAN, Laos, and Vietnam, but excluding Cambodian representation. Ghazali also urged Khieu Samphan to retire Ta Mok, Pol Pot, and Ieng Sary from PDK leadership roles. Later, Malaysia pushed for "proximity talks," which evolved into JIM I and II.

China, whose moves to control Malaysian-claimed islands in the Spratly chain annoyed Kuala Lumpur, finally decided to cease all aid to the Malayan Communist Party, which surrendered in 1989 (Tasker 1989a). Nonetheless, Kuala Lumpur sought a policy so that ASEAN could abandon the Polpotists.

Regarding peace plans advanced before Paris, Mahathir favored an ASEAN or UN peacekeeping force, as this would keep the larger countries out of the region, but the force would have to stay around until NADK posed no further threat (Oberdorfer 1988). Indonesia thought that Malaysia's proposal for an ASEAN force was impracticable (Weatherbee 1989: 14). The Phnom Penh government should not be removed, according to Kuala Lumpur, but the PDK should be given a minor role in a compromise plan. The primary objectives of Malaysia were to relieve Indochina's isolation and to resolve a conflict that attracted the interest of too many outside countries.

BRUNEIAN POLICYMAKING

After Brunei's independence and admission to ASEAN in 1984, the tiny oil-rich state joined ASEAN but otherwise played a quiet role in the region.[7] Nevertheless, security considerations loomed large. Brunei cooperated with members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements without joining formally. Brunei was one of the countries identified during congressional hearings in 1987 as being a covert contributor to the Contras. As a small country, Brunei agreed with Singapore's objective of seeking protection from a superpower, namely, the United States. As a Moslem state, Brunei wanted to go along with Indonesia and Malaysia. The conflicting tendencies canceled each other, thereby accounting for Brunei's apparent passivity on Cambodia.

ASEAN OPTIONS

In 1980 ASEAN prevailed on China to support a neutral Cambodia with free elections and to drop Vietnam's withdrawal as a precondition to a conference. In 1981 China agreed to ASEAN's idea of an international guarantee for a Cambodian peace settlement, but ASEAN in turn had to accept the Polpotist faction as a partner in a transitional Cambodia with free elections. As CGDK's obstetrician, ASEAN often awaited positions on which the three resistance factions could agree before proceeding.

Indonesian and Malaysian officials began holding discussions with Vietnamese representatives from 1980 but never contacted the PRK bilaterally. No ASEAN country refused to negotiate with the PDK, however. Later on, Indonesia and Malaysia pressured Thailand to agree to a conference in the region in order to settle the Cambodian war through regional guarantees. Until 1986, Bangkok would not sit at the same conference table with the PRK. Vietnam consistently sought to negotiate but ran into a stone wall when the ASEAN consensus deferred to Thai preferences to keep hostilities going. ASEAN's endorsement of the 1986 CGDK plan for an interim quadripartite government, a UN peacekeeping force, and a UN control commission was its first acceptance of a PRK role in a transitional Cambodia. ASEAN also deferred to CGDK regarding details about disarming the four Cambodian armies.

ASEAN, a grouping of developing countries, had little aid to give to Cambodia or Vietnam, so an aid embargo was of little consequence. With much of the region's trade involving smuggling, Singaporean and Thai traders were quick to make profits from trade to the PRK and SRV. Travel of individual citizens was restricted until the door opened to the West in 1985. ASEAN could with good conscience claim that it was not "bleeding" Cambodia or Vietnam. The goal of the organization remained encapsulating the region from the tentacles of outside powers.

NOTES

1. Based on research reported in the draft dissertation of Komgrit Varakamin.
2. Senator Leticia Shahani, for example, has advanced nationalistic grounds for terminating US bases. When asked whether the 1971 ASEAN policy on neutralization—which states that all foreign bases are "temporary"—provided ample grounds as well, she replied that the statement was a mere "declaration." She was a senior civil servant in the Foreign Ministry at the time of the 1971 declaration as well as in 1976, when the declaration was incorporated in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Interview, September 23, 1989.
3. This section is based on Mahbubani (1989b).
4. Government-owned Charter Industries, under license from a Belgian firm, was manufacturing weapons for the resistance (Chan 1991).
5. I am indebted to Steve O'Harrow for this point.
6. This section is based on Alagappa (1989a).
7. This section is based on interviewee #41.

17

OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

CHANGING FRENCH POLICYMAKING

In 1981 Socialist François Mitterand defeated Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) party for the presidency. In order to gain favor with the electorate, he distanced himself from Communism and the Soviet Union. Once in office, Mitterand instructed his UN ambassador to vote to seat the Pol Pot regime in 1981, then backed CGDK in 1982. Nonetheless, the new president wanted to advance France's prestige in Indochina, redeeming itself for its earlier colonial role. In addition, Mitterand wanted to restore Sihanouk to power, and he invited the Prince to Paris for discussions in 1981 and each subsequent year, all expenses paid, thereby providing a channel for a peace process. In 1982 France gave emergency food to Vietnam.

In March 1983, Claude Cheysson became foreign minister. He began his diplomatic career in Hanoi, and he served as an aide to Premier Pierre Mendès-France at the Geneva Conference in 1954, so he had much interest in Cambodia. Cheysson first sought to provide economic aid to Vietnam; since Hanoi was unable to repay its past debts to Paris, the aid was reshaped into cultural and scientific cooperation. During April Cheysson met his ASEAN counterparts at an ASEAN–EC meeting in Bangkok, then flew to Hanoi. His aim was to enable Vietnam to come out of isolation. France, in turn, could relay changes in bargaining positions to the United States. In 1984 the Cabinet was reshuffled, Cheysson became EC president, and Roland Dumas became the new foreign minister. That same year France-Libertés, a PVO headed by Mitterand's wife, set up shop in Phnom Penh to provide humanitarian aid. In August Dumas persuaded Hun Sen and Sihanouk to meet each other, but China pressured the Prince to call off the talks.

In 1986 the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) party won a majority of seats in parliamentary elections. Mitterand picked Jacques Chirac

as premier. Under Chirac, ties with Sihanouk became stronger. Although the PRK had been paying taxes on the former Cambodian embassy without Quai d'Orsay's knowledge, while not permitted to occupy its facilities, the building was refurbished and presented to the Prince in 1987 for his personal use while he was in Paris (Chanda 1988e:16). Covert military assistance went to ANS; however, when the matter exploded in the Bangkok press during the Thai election campaign of mid-1988, the French government denied the report but stopped the aid (interviewees #25, 37).

In 1987 France tried again to set up direct talks between Hun Sen and Sihanouk. Jean-Jacques Galabru, a retired diplomat, set up the meeting after flying to Phnom Penh with his Khmer wife, whose father was an adviser to Sihanouk in Beijing. France was then the venue for meetings between Hun Sen and Sihanouk in December 1987 and January 1988. Paris believed that the solution was to marry Hun Sen to Sihanouk (Muskie 1990:5).

In early 1988 both Chirac's and d'Estaing's parties lost in parliamentary elections. The Socialist Party returned to power. Dumas resumed the position of foreign minister, and Galabru was named to the Council of State. In April 1989, when Vietnam announced that its troops would leave Cambodia by the end of September, Dumas offered to host the Paris Conference on Cambodia.

Nonetheless, France approved a shipment of sophisticated antitank weapons to ANS in April 1989, with the understanding that they would not go to Sihanouk's army unless the Paris conference failed (Field, Tasker & Hiebert 1989:16; Mysliwiec 1988:app. 1). France, in other words, followed the US example of bolstering the bargaining position of the Prince.

CHANGING AUSTRALIAN POLICYMAKING

After Australian voters resoundingly elected Bob Hawke as prime minister in 1983, a reappraisal of policy toward Cambodia began (Evans 1989a). The policy of isolating Vietnam, which had brought the Soviet Union into Southeast Asia as never before, was viewed as counterproductive. In May Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen offered to provide a peacekeeping force in case there was a peace settlement. Foreign Minister Bill Hayden flew to Hanoi in July to explore whether there was a basis for a negotiated settlement. Hayden also decided to drop cosponsorship of the annual UN resolution on Cambodia, while still voting in favor. The reason given was that the resolution did not condemn the genocidal regime of Pol Pot.

In 1984 Hayden proposed a "Six (ASEAN) + Two (Laos and Vietnam)" meeting at Canberra to begin a peace dialogue, but neither ASEAN nor Vietnam expressed interest. In March 1985, Hayden went again to Hanoi, learning that Vietnam agreed to the proposed proximity talks, which later evolved into JIM.

Canberra welcomed Cambodian refugees from UNHCR camps in Thailand after 1975. Soon, 120,000 Cambodians had resettled in Australia, a

larger percentage than in any other country in the world (Evans 1989a:15). Australians regarded the resettlement policy as a humanitarian duty, according to Hawke's second foreign minister, Gareth Evans.

In quiet defiance of US pressure to boycott Hanoi, Canberra resumed indirect aid to Vietnam through the UN's Mekong Committee, and Australian universities began to receive students from Vietnam under a UNDP training project (Lincoln 1988). The government allowed Australian PVOs to give development aid to the government in Phnom Penh. In 1985–1986, for example, PVOs donated some $4 million in aid to Cambodia (interviewee #69). Australian trade with Vietnam quadrupled during the mid-1980s to $20 million; this included a contract to provide overseas telephone service (Hiebert 1990g; HIS 1989:69; Lincoln 1988).

In 1986 Griffith University was host to the first of a series of annual conferences on Cambodia, bringing together journalists and scholars to discuss problems of Cambodia. This initiative provided an opportunity for Cambodians from Phnom Penh to interact with academics from the region in efforts to design a peace plan for the country.

Later in 1986 Hayden, who was uncomfortable with the CGDK figleaf over support for a grisly clique that inflicted genocide upon the Cambodian people, called for an international tribunal to try Pol Pot and his accomplices. IFMC applauded, but ASEAN and the United States were unhappy over the proposal, and that was the end of the judicial approach (FEER 1987:123).[1]

The government's comprehensive Defence White Paper of 1987, which abandoned the model of Australia as an outpost of Europe, supported a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia as a means for reducing uncertainties in the region arising from the continuing presence of Soviet forces in Vietnam (Dibb 1986). Noting that events were pointing either to peace or to a PAVN withdrawal from Cambodia and a subsequent resurgence of the forces of Pol Pot, Canberra went to the United Nations in 1988 with the aim of cosponsoring the annual resolution on Cambodia only if it contained language denouncing the barbarities of Pol Pot. When Evans left Canberra to attend PCC, he doubtless recalled backpacking in Cambodia when he was a college student, and he hoped that the Cambodians could be spared anymore superpower wrangling.

CHANGING NEW ZEALAND POLICYMAKING

Foreign Minister Brian Talboys was one of the first critics of the prevailing Western policy toward Cambodia. In 1981 he articulated the view that too much pressure on Vietnam might be counterproductive. In time, his opinion traveled across the Tasman Sea.

In 1984 New Zealanders elected David Lange as prime minister on a mandate of banning all nuclear weapons brought to port by US ships. As

a member of ANZUS (Haas 1989b:ch. 3), Wellington noted legalistically that the founding agreement said nothing about a nuclear alliance. Accordingly, in early 1985 Lange asked the US navy to certify whether the *Buchanan*, which was sailing for a New Zealand harbor, was nuclear-armed. When Washington refused to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons, Lange informed the US navy that the vessel could not enter New Zealand waters.

As a result, the United States cut New Zealand military officers from military intelligence briefings, stopped training opportunities at US military facilities, canceled discounts on purchases of US weapons, undertook to expel Wellington from ANZUS, and refused to meet with any high-ranking New Zealanders. Although New Zealand had little strategic value to the United States, Washington did not want Wellington's example to be repeated, lest its global alliance system would crumble.

This left New Zealand fearful of still other forms of reprisal, such as import duties on lamb and wool. Although public opinion in the country opposed collaboration with Pol Pot, which Washington condoned for more than a decade, Wellington fell into line on Cambodia. When New Zealand thought that it deserved a place at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, France said "No," doubtless due to friction over Wellington's opposition to French nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific (interviewee # 133).

CHANGING JAPANESE POLICYMAKING

Tokyo continued to dangle economic lollipops before Vietnam, hoping that policy changes would emerge.[2] In 1982 Japan proposed a conference involving ASEAN, IFMC, and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but ASEAN would not negotiate with the PRK. In 1984 Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe proposed major economic aid to Cambodia and Vietnam if Hanoi and Phnom Penh would agree to an international peacekeeping force, but his counterpart, Thach, recalled that a similar promise made in 1978 had never materialized.

Thach then visited Tokyo, where the two countries agreed to cooperate more closely at the nongovernmental level through academic and cultural exchanges. Vietnam was disappointed that more substantial aid was being held up until PAVN troops withdrew in the context of a comprehensive political settlement. After the Vietnamese Communist Party Congress of 1986, when Hanoi encouraged investment from capitalist countries, Tokyo quickly got the message. Visiting Japanese corporate executives explored various possibilities, finding the workers disciplined and industrious, working at wages averaging $10 per month. Exports to Japan rose from $118 million in 1979 to $179 million in 1987; imports by Vietnam increased from $48 million to $144 million during the same period.

Contracts for nearly 100 small investment projects were signed by 1987,

a fact that annoyed ASEAN, although Japan's annual trade of $250 million was less than one-half of ASEAN's volume (interviewee #4; Tasker 1987). When Tokyo offered to extend credit for a major project drawn up by Nissho Iwai, ASEAN reacted negatively. Similarly, Honda had all but decided to open a motorbike assembly factory in Ho Chi Minh City, but ASEAN and the United States pressured the company to cancel the project (Hiebert 1988a). The form of US coercion was a US Senate resolution condemning the investment, while not also criticizing Singapore or Thailand, both of which had about as much trade with Vietnam as Japan. Honda, fearing further US protectionism, decided for strategic reasons to locate a plant in Southern California instead. In 1988 Tokyo resumed aid to the Mekong Project for a $50,000 project that would benefit Vietnam.

In July 1988, Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno offered to provide funds for a peacekeeping force and personnel for international supervision of elections. Despite Japan's desire for peace in Cambodia, Tokyo bowed to US suggestions to nix a proposed UNDP assessment mission scheduled to visit Phnom Penh in June 1989 (FEER 1989b). When Japan went to Paris, its principal interest was in plans for the economic reconstruction of Cambodia. Japan's delegates were reported to have worked harder than anyone at the conference (interviewee #26). One of their main interests was the expansion of electric power generation, a key element in the future industrialization of Thailand and Vietnam. As a country that formerly waged a costly and foolish war, Japan thought that the solution to the Cambodian conflict was the promise of a more prosperous future for all.

CHANGING BRITISH POLICYMAKING

Among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain was the least involved in Cambodian matters. Prime Minister Thatcher followed the US policy lead. She was slightly miffed when Washington failed to reciprocate during what London called the Falklands (rather than Malvinas) War of 1982. British military intelligence officers did not want to suffer the same fate as New Zealand, losing access to information in retaliation for a deviation, however minor, from US policy (interviewee #74). London wanted to be regarded as a team player. For example, Whitehall refused a visa to a PRK official invited to London by a member of parliament for an unofficial visit in the spring of 1988 (interviewee #73; Pedler 1989:21).

British public opinion was against the genocidal Pol Pot. Oxfam, which derives a substantial contribution from the British government, increased humanitarian aid to the Phnom Penh government in the 1980s. When Mrs. Thatcher went to the refugee camps in Thailand during August 1988, she observed that "The Vietnamese must go, but we must not allow the return of the terrible Pol Pot regime in their place" (Bangkok Post 1988:4). There

were no signs of a policy to implement this objective, however. From 1985 to 1989 British military officers trained the Cambodian resistance in techniques of hit-and-run commando raids that were later reported as trademarks of NADK strategy (Munro 1990; Pilger 1989), and in May 1989, London was ready to provide lethal military aid to the NCR in order to bolster the bargaining position of Sihanouk and Son Sann at the Paris conference, following the lead of the United States (FEER 1989f).

CHANGING EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICYMAKING

The arrival of *perestroika* meant that Eastern Europeans had less interest in Indochina; there were plenty of problems at home. Fewer Soviet bloc tourists went on holiday to Vietnam, for example (interviewee #4), but there were no immediate cuts in aid to Cambodia or Vietnam. Clues of dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policies were difficult to discern: Until 1989, economic progress in Eastern Europe awaited a resolution of political uncertainties, whereupon there might be a change in the field of diplomacy.

POLICY OPTIONS OF OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

None of the remaining aligned countries provided troops, but military assistance was provided secretly by Britain and France to the NCR. Both countries were willing to cut off such aid if other external military assistance ceased.

After immediate aid embargoes to Cambodia and Vietnam by Western countries in 1979, the situation eroded. In due course Norway resumed aid to Vietnam, although at reduced levels. France provided aid again, starting in 1982. From 1983, Australia and Japan resumed indirect development assistance to Vietnam through the UN's Mekong Project. PVOs from Australia, Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany were operating in Vietnam by 1987 (UNDP 1988). Donors to the PRK included the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, while PVOs from Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland were at work inside Cambodia as well (Mysliwiec 1988:apps. 1, 3). Vietnam ran a trade surplus with Japan, and Australia and France increased trade as peace prospects improved. There was little trade with Cambodia, since the country lacked exportable products. Eastern European countries continued to supply aid to both Cambodia and Vietnam.

An increasing number of governments wanted to deal directly with the PRK. Australian and British de-recognition of Democratic Kampuchea was an expression of opposition to negotiations with the PDK. France had never established relations with the Pol Pot regime in the first place. Other coun-

tries also opposed the return of the Polpotists, even to the bargaining table, but they gave in when a peace settlement required that all factions negotiate together.

The nonsuperpower aligned countries deferred to their bloc leaders on the more technical questions of a quadripartite council versus a quadripartite government and the garrisoning versus disarming of Cambodian troops. Western countries wanted the UN to play an active role, with both peacekeeping and supervisory functions. Eastern bloc countries followed the logic of the PRK, SRV, and USSR, which preferred a weaker international control commission of carefully selected countries. The USSR's decision at Paris to back a UN body would have been supported by other Eastern bloc nations, but they were not present at PCC.

In short, there was a contradiction between the world's two rival power blocs, as had been expected. The desire to put Pol Pot out of business was universal, however.

NOTES

1. For an explanation of Australia's demurral, see CDC (1990:letter of Gareth Evans). In 1986 Bill Hayden stressed ASEAN opposition (interview #101). Belgium and the Netherlands, eager to bring up war crimes of the Polpotists before the European Community and the United Nations, were also checkmated by ASEAN in 1986 and 1987 (interviewee #101).

2. For more details on changing Japanese policymaking, see Awanohara and Morrison (1989).

18

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

CHANGING NAM POLICYMAKING

In 1983, the year when Albania became the second and last NAM government to exchange ambassadors with the isolated PRK, the seventh NAM summit met at New Delhi. India sought a new formula on Cambodia, but the conference tersely reiterated the UN call for a "comprehensive political solution," repeating earlier language and adding an endorsement of ASEAN efforts on behalf of SEANFZ (NAM 1984: 252–53). Thach entered a reservation into the record, as his government could not abide a resolution that failed to call upon China to stop threatening Vietnam (Carney 1982:85).

NAM foreign ministers met in 1985 at Luanda and in 1986 at New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Thai Prime Minister Prem in October 1986, urging Bangkok to agree to the Malaysian effort to convene a "cocktail party." NAM heads of state and government next convened at Harare in 1986. After repeating that the conflict should be resolved peacefully by all parties concerned, NAM endorsed both a "comprehensive political settlement" and a regional dialogue, thus endorsing the idea of JIM, and was evenhanded in opposing Chinese threats to administer another "lesson" on Vietnam while asking Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia. NAM endorsed ZOPFAN but forgot to mention SEANFZ.

When NAM foreign ministers met at Nicosia in September 1988, they informally expressed satisfaction over JIM I, but there were still divisions of opinion, and no formal statement was issued (Lepanov & Tarabrin 1989:16). Instead, the Nicosia meeting set up a Special Committee of Nonaligned Countries on Kampuchea to ensure that NAM would have input into the peace process. As host to the latest NAM summit, Zimbabwe received an invitation to attend the Paris conference.

CHANGING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY POLICYMAKING

After CGDK formed in 1982, ASEAN corralled more support. Votes on the UN resolution on Cambodia slipped away from the PRK–Soviet–Vietnam view (see Appendix 2). After flipflopping from 1979 to 1981, Chad consistently voted Yes in 1982 and thereafter, condemning Vietnam. Grenada went from No to Yes. Guyana changed from No to Abstain. Mozambique and Seychelles switched from No to a nonvote. Cape Verde Islands, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malawi, Mali, Panama, São Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Zambia moved from Abstain to Yes. Dominica voted for the first time in 1982 and was in the Yes column from that time on; St. Christopher and Nevis made a similar conversion in 1985. Iran, Iraq, and North Yemen changed from nonvoting to Abstain. On the other hand, Albania switched from nonvoting to No, and Zimbabwe moved from Yes to Abstain. By 1987 the hard core of Abstain votes consisted of Algeria, Benin, Finland, Guyana, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, North Yemen, Tanzania, Uganda, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe.

The dramatic events of 1988 suggested that the price of peace might be that Polpotists would soon enter Phnom Penh as members of an interim governmental entity. Accordingly, members of the United Nations could not reenact the Cambodia debate by merely repeating lines of a well-rehearsed play. The familiar resolution, which asked Vietnam to withdraw troops, seemed anachronistic. Australia was ready to defect—that is, to abstain. Due to Congress's joint resolution calling for the trial of Pol Pot, US delegate Vernon Walters changed his speech to reflect the new concern. PDK delegates, meanwhile, lined up a dozen countries, mostly PRC aid recipients, to oppose any modification in the UN resolution. But Kishore Mahbubani of Singapore rounded up at least as many countries willing to back ASEAN in adding a genocide clause of some sort to the UN resolution (interviewee #101).

Accordingly, the Cambodian resolution called once again for a "comprehensive peace settlement" but added a clause expressing concern that the country would not return to "universally condemned policies and practices." This enabled Australia, France, and Sweden to cosponsor the resolution for the first time. The mild language was the UN's first expression of discontent over the genocide of Democratic Kampuchea, which still occupied the Cambodian seat. Efforts of the PRC and the PDK to remove this clause were useless.

A second change in wording was the deletion of a call for a UN conference to resolve the dispute. France, which wanted to host an international peace conference, was thus free to do so. A third alteration was the endorsement of an international control and supervision commission to handle the transition to peace, but it did not specify whether the UN would be assigned the task.

Changes in the resolution produced an even larger majority. Congo and Libya, previously No voters, decided to Abstain for the first time. Benin, which voted to Abstain in 1987, decided not to cast a vote, joining Mozambique, Romania, Seychelles, and South Africa. Burkina Faso, Finland, Iran, and Mexico shifted from Abstain to Yes on the resolution. Cyprus, a previous nonvoter, joined the Yes camp.

CHANGING UN SECRETARY-GENERAL POLICYMAKING

ICK missions continued throughout the 1980s, although with little result. Austria, which supplied the head of the ICK Ad Hoc Committee, offered to host four-party intra-Cambodian talks in 1986, but China would not allow the proposal to proceed.

Waldheim, who believed that the conflict was hopelessly deadlocked, was replaced in January 1985 by Xavier Perez de Cuellar. Perez's first official visit was to Thailand and Vietnam concerning Cambodia. By 1987 the Secretary-General called for negotiations, having identified points of convergence; he played a cautious, neutral role.

Perez reappointed Rafeeuddhin Ahmed as Special Assistant for Cambodia. Ahmed, however, appeared to be an agent for the Thai view of how to resolve the conflict (interviewee #72). In July 1988, nonetheless, he flew to Phnom Penh. The first senior UN official in half a decade to visit the PRK, he presented the Secretary-General's ideas, which in turn were based on General Assembly resolutions. Because the PDK and the PRK were unwilling to accept each other, the plan failed.

Ahmed was present at both JIMs, but the PRK and SRV were reluctant to consider representatives of the UN Secretary-General as unbiased third parties. UN emissaries were ultimately beholden to the majority will of the General Assembly, Hanoi and Phnom Penh reasoned, where states were afraid that opposing the United States would bring cuts in aid.

CHANGING UNCHR POLICYMAKING

UNCHR continued to avoid mentioning Pol Pot's genocide, preferring to condemn Vietnam's effort to stop that genocide. Through lobbying by David Hawk of the Cambodian Documentation Commission and others, the matter was brought up in 1986, prompting PRC delegates to walk out. New Zealand withdrew as a cosponsor of the ASEAN-drafted resolution on Cambodia before UNCHR in 1988. The Netherlands suggested an amendment in 1989 that would deal with the issue of the nonreturn of genocidal practices. When ASEAN refused to support the amendment in order to keep up the pressure on the PRK and the SRV, the Dutch withdrew as cosponsors (CDC 1990: 2–3).

CHANGING POLICYMAKING REGARDING UN AID

After Sir Robert Jackson was fired as Special Representative for a differing view on aid to Cambodia, Tatsuno Kunugi took his place from 1983 to 1986. In 1987 S.A.M.S. Kibria, executive director of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), succeeded to the position.

By 1984 peace prospects affected changes in UN assistance, as some 400,000 Cambodians had already returned home spontaneously (UNHCR 1989a:2). Accordingly, UNHCR began reintegration projects inside Cambodia, building dispensaries and schools and starting agricultural and income-generating projects in the villages receiving many returnees. A dozen or so PVOs joined ICRC, Oxfam, and UNICEF, but the UN system still would not allow development aid to go to Cambodia. By the end of 1989 only 18,343 Cambodian refugees awaited sponsorship from a new home country (UNHCR 1989b: 1).

UNBRO's first director, Winston Prattley, was succeeded by Yoon-Yul Kim, who served from 1985 to 1987. Toshiwoki Niwa then took over in his concurrent capacity as UNDP regional director in Bangkok until March 1990. With 280,000 settlers to service by 1988 (interviewee #51; UNBRO 1989), UNBRO launched a two-year program of elementary education, with the agreement of Thailand, to ease the transition from a state of dependence on international aid to a degree of self-reliance. The project, set up by UNESCO, aided Khmer education committees in construction and equipment of classrooms, curriculum development, and teacher training. UNBRO provided about $60 million in aid in 1989; PVOs donated an additional $3 million (UNBRO 1989).

In the spring of 1988, a UNICEF needs assessment mission went to Phnom Penh. Its report noted that from 10 to 20 percent of all Cambodian children were malnourished (Manuel 1990a:F2). In May 1989, two months before the Paris conference, UNDP decided to send an assessment team to Phnom Penh for development aid in anticipation of peace. Objections from Japan and the United States prevented the mission from proceeding, however (FEER 1989b).

THE PERM FIVE

Gorbachev's appearance on the scene in 1985 impressed Secretary-General Perez. An unparalleled opportunity existed to prove that the UN could play a vital role in the world. When leaders gathered for the opening of the Fortieth General Assembly, Perez asked the five permanent members of the Security Council to meet at regular intervals, similar to NAM and other caucusing groups. The immediate task was to advance the peace process regarding Afghanistan. Britain agreed to convene the sessions. The first

breakthrough came on the war between Iran and Iraq in 1988 (Ekner 1990). The Perm Five, however, steered away from the Cambodian conflict. It was not until 1990 that the Perm Five would take up Cambodia, after the Paris conference of 1989 failed.

NAM AND UN OPTIONS

NAM and UN peace plans vied for world acceptance throughout the 1980s. Human rights concerns were of sufficient salience by 1988 to occupy a place in a revised UN resolution. Nevertheless, the UN consensus shied away from commenting on the delicate powersharing issues that had the superpowers and others in Asia at loggerheads regarding Cambodia.

ICK was superseded in 1989 by the Paris Conference on Cambodia. With a more limited attendance than the UN-sponsored ICK, PCC was skewed toward aligned over nonaligned states, as we shall see in the following chapter.

19

PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA

ANOTHER INFORMAL MEETING IN JAKARTA

Throughout 1989 negotiations were under way to resolve the Cambodian conflict. JIM I and II set the stage. On April 5 Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its combat forces by September 30. France then responded to Prince Sihanouk's request to host an international conference at Paris during the summer with wide representation in order to draw up an agreement for a new Cambodia.

Since an international conference would succeed only if external powers guaranteed a previous agreement among the four Cambodian leaders, Alatas of Indonesia invited the four to meet again at Jakarta in May. The ground rules were that no communiqué would be issued, although a tape recording was allowed (interviewee #76). The Prince insisted on a seating arrangement that would accord him a superior position. Accordingly, the meeting took place in a room with a desk; Sihanouk sat behind the desk, and Hun Sen and Son Sann then entered individually as if they were making appointments with the chief executive officer of a corporation (interviewee #42). Khieu Samphan boycotted.

When Hun Sen entered, Sihanouk reiterated his demand for fundamental changes. PAVN troops would have to leave Cambodia by a definite date, as had already been promised. The Prince wanted more power when he returned to Cambodia than the queen of England but less than the president of France (Richburg 1989d:A33); he was apparently enamored of the Thai king's contemporary role as a humanitarian benefactor to his country. Socialism, never seriously implemented by the PRK, was to be dropped by recognizing inheritance and property rights. Sihanouk also wanted the flag and national anthem changed to his liking. In the area of human rights he demanded a recognition of freedom of association, freedom of movement, and freedom of the press. Buddhism was to become the state religion, and

the KPRP was to give up its monopoly on power, thus forcing the Marxist-oriented leaders to abandon an atheist philosophy and one-party rule. The PDK would be invited to join the new reconciliation government, knowing that Pol Pot would refuse.

Hun Sen listened to the various proposals, which mostly dismantled cosmetological aspects of the regime created after PAVN troops entered Cambodia in 1978. As Sihanouk knew well, constitutional revisions had already occurred throughout the year. Hun Sen assured the Prince that the new State of Cambodia met all but two of his requirements—multipartism and inviting PDK to join the SOC. In both cases Hun Sen would have to convince the KPRP. Hun Sen represented the government but not the ruling party, which enjoyed its role as the sole political party that had saved the country from Pol Pot. To show his good faith, Hun Sen informed Sihanouk that Heng Samrin was ready to step down as head of the Council of State so that the Prince could become head of state. In addition, Sihanouk could head the National Defense Council as supreme commander.

Hun Sen then explained his plan for a transition. A National Reconciliation Council would have Sihanouk as president. All four Cambodian factions would disarm and be represented on the NRC. A military committee would handle the cease-fire and demobilization of troops. A political committee would arrange elections within three months after PAVN's departure. A control committee would liaise with a lightly armed, non-UN international body of 600 persons to supervise the cease-fire and the elections, composed of two nonaligned, two socialist, and two western countries. The Prince appeared to agree to these terms, saying, "Well I guess that I better join you in Phnom Penh" (interview #76), suggesting that he had dropped his demand to dismantle the PRK (Erlanger 1989e), although he cautioned that he had to check out any agreement with other members of CGDK. When Son Sann met Sihanouk, the two agreed as well to the various changes in the SOC constitution and the specifics of the interim NRC. They had reached a bargain, or so it seemed.

When Hun Sen returned to Phnom Penh later in May, the KPRP remained adamant that it was not ready for multipartism. When an internationally supervised election selected delegates for a constitutional convention, a multiparty system would be guaranteed anyway, the ruling party in Phnom Penh argued. Likewise, Sihanouk discovered in due course—to his chagrin—that the understanding reached at Jakarta was opposed by China, his son Ranariddh, and the PDK.

There was a massive demonstration in Tiananmen Square when Sihanouk returned to China. Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem then went to Beijing, followed by General Secretary Gorbachev. Whereas the PRC and the USSR agreed to reduce aid to their proxies in Cambodia, the PRC–SRV deadlock was dramatized by yet another Chinese provocation in the Spratly Islands later in May. Pressure upon the PDK and a conciliatory

policy toward Southeast Asia depended upon a peaceful outcome of the Tiananmen movement, which would signal a trend toward democratization. But even before the massacre near Tiananmen Square on June 4, China was taking a hard line on Cambodia (Becker 1989a:B3; Erlanger 1989c).

In early July, ASEAN met to agree to a common bargaining position for Paris. In the joint communiqué, the six foreign ministers warned that Vietnam should remove its troops as part of a comprehensive political settlement—that is, with the inclusion of the PDK.

PRE-CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS

The conference was to begin on July 30. The Phnom Penh delegation arrived at Paris for the peace conference believing that Hun Sen had come to an agreement with Sihanouk. Hanoi advanced its withdrawal date to September 26 as a conciliatory gesture.

France made an effort to bring the four Cambodian factions together before the conference began. Hun Sen and Sihanouk dined together on July 24, and Son Sann and Khieu Samphan joined them on July 25. When Foreign Minister Roland Dumas greeted Khieu Samphan on the second night, he proceeded to escort the PDK leader to meet Hun Sen. With Hun Sen's hand outstretched, Samphan turned his back, refusing to shake hands (Chanda 1989e). Something had happened to interrupt the progress since their meeting some six months earlier in Jakarta, where they did shake hands. Pol Pot and the top PDK leadership had resigned from CGDK just before the conference, leaving Samphan unable to sign any agreement on behalf of his faction. Sihanouk openly predicted at this point that the PDK delegation would sabotage the conference (AFP 1989b; PPDS 1989:30). He seemed to know about a gameplan for the conference, for he said on the opening day of the conference, "I am flexible, but the Khmer Rouge want me to be tough. So, I have to be tough."

Thus, an unbridgeable chasm existed before the remaining delegations arrived. Seating the Cambodians was even a matter in dispute. Sihanouk argued for a single Cambodian delegation. Hun Sen preferred two delegations—a CGDK delegation and an SOC delegation. Vietnam favored four delegations. Thanks to the intervention of Claude Martin, director of Quai d'Orsay's Asia-Oceania division who was in charge of the conference, the four delegations agreed to sit as four independent delegations, by order of age, behind the blue sign "Cambodge" during the meeting (Economist 1989c:31). The list of participants identified the four parties under the headings as "délégation de S. Exc. M. Son Sann," "délégation de S.A.R. le Prince Norodom Sihanouk," "délégation de S. Exc. M. Khieu Samphan," and "délégation de S. Exc. M. Hun Sen."

PLENARY SESSION

The meeting convened at Kléber Centre near the Arc de Triomphe. In addition to the four Cambodian factions, eighteen governments and the UN sent representatives. Although Vietnam wanted UN Secretary-General Perez to attend in his personal capacity, Hanoi compromised and allowed an official UN delegation. The JIM countries were joined by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Australia, Canada, India, Japan, and Zimbabwe. Yugoslavia, incoming NAM chair, deferred to Zimbabwe, although both were invited. Each delegation was in charge of selecting its own delegates. When KPNLA's General Sak Sutsakhan arrived, requesting entry, the Son Sann delegation refused to admit him to the conference (Beckaert 1989i; Chanda 1989e).[1] New Zealand wanted to attend but was informed by France that Austria, Cuba, and Poland could also make valid claims to attend, and the conference hall was already overcrowded (interviewee #58).[2] France generously defrayed living expenses of delegates from the poorer countries at nearby hotels.

Indonesia's Alatas and France's Dumas were cochairs after Vietnam dropped the idea of a third cochair (India, Laos, or the USSR). Dumas presided. When the conference began on July 30, the first order of business was procedural. Although both JIMs had operated on the basis of consensus, delegates at Paris agreed to the principle of unanimity at the insistence of the PDK. The Prince, on behalf of Khieu Samphan, argued that in the two JIMs "the only consensus was among Indonesia, Vietnam, Hun Sen and the Laotians" (US Embassy, Beijing 1989:2). Sihanouk and Son Sann promised not to exercise a veto, leaving the possible failure of the conference at the feet of either the Khieu Samphan delegation or the Phnom Penh government (Chanda 1989e).

France next presented an "Organization of Work" document. Accepting Vietnam's formula to separate internal from external aspects, the French proposed four working committees, one of which would deal with intra-Cambodian matters, with a Coordinating Committee headed by the two PCC cochairs, with one delegate from each delegation. Khieu Samphan spoke against, delivering a "furious and bitter speech" (Economist 1989c). When Dumas asked Khieu Samphan to provide a reason for objecting to the committee plan, there was no coherent reply, so the session adjourned to give China time to work on the recalcitrant Samphan. One objection, it turned out, was to having India and Laos cochair two of the proposed committees (Manibhandu 1989b; McAuliff & McDonnell 1989/90:83; Yang & Xue 1989:11). A second objection was to the failure to propose a fifth working committee, originally considered by France, that would inquire how to guarantee peace after PAVN withdrew and Sihanouk's installation as the head of an interim quadripartite government, tasks proposed for all four committees.

Samphan gave in the following morning. *Committee I* was to draw up modalities for establishing an international control mechanism to supervise Vietnam's troop withdrawal, to establish a cease-fire, and to prepare for elections. Canada and India were in charge of the first committee. *Committee II*, chaired by Laos and Malaysia, was to formulate ways of securing the territorial integrity and future neutrality of the country, including stopping military aid to the four factions and preventing the recurrence of what the Organization of Work called "genocide." *Committee III* was responsible for an agreement to repatriate Cambodian refugees and to obtain aid for the country's reconstruction; Australia and Japan were cochairs.

The fourth body, the *Ad Hoc Committee*, according to the Organization of Work, was to "examine questions regarding the implementation of national reconciliation and the setting up of a quadripartite interim authority under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk with, among other things, the responsibility of organizing within a reasonable period of time, internationally supervised free elections." France proposed originally that the Ad Hoc Committee consist exclusively of the four Cambodian factions. When the Cambodian resistance, Singapore, and the United States objected that all countries present should sit on all four committees, Vietnam noted that each country possessed a veto at the conference; as no country had the right to impose its will on representatives of the Cambodian people, Hanoi argued that only Cambodians should be on the Ad Hoc Committee. A compromise was then reached under which France and Indonesia agreed to head the Ad Hoc Committee in their capacity as cochairs of the conference as a whole; the two heads could then invite other countries to sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee whenever needed.

The various delegations spoke next in a round robin. All appeared to favor a "comprehensive political settlement," namely, an agreement on both external and internal aspects. Most non-Cambodian delegations condemned the genocidal policies of the Pol Pot era, and they offered concessions of one sort or another. The initial atmosphere seemed upbeat to some members of the press (interviewee #25). Secretary of State James Baker, for example, said that the US government would support a new Cambodian government in inverse proportion to the extent of Polpotist representation, thereby reversing Washington's, previous insistence on an interim quadripartite government, but he then added paradoxically that the United States would change its mind on this point if Prince Sihanouk insisted otherwise. China, clearly a wild card after the June 4 massacre, spoke in seemingly objective terms, pledging to stop aid to the Cambodian resistance if Vietnam withdrew in the context of a comprehensive political settlement. Hun Sen's speech had a coherent, businesslike tone.

Four speakers dampened the optimism. The speech of Singapore's Foreign Minister Wong Kang Sen cardstacked a litany of instances of supposed Vietnamese duplicity; it was presented more as a lawyer's speech to a jury than

as an address at an international peace conference. Then, vitriolic diatribes by Khieu Samphan and Prince Sihanouk, virtual carbon copies of each other, broke the spirit of compromise. Son Sann's speech also contained the phrase "Kampuchea Krom," a reminder that CGDK had not forgotten territorial claims on Vietnam's southernmost provinces. Most speeches occurred on July 31, but some were held over until the following day. After lunch on August 1 an oddly written "refutation" of the remarks of Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in the morning was prepared; it was circulated to the delegates in the afternoon under the name of Sihanouk to contest the view that the SOC controlled most of Cambodia. The die was cast.

Speeches of the Cambodian delegations spelled out two alternative peace plans. Hun Sen offered the plan discussed with Sihanouk in May—with one important modification. Instead of a quadripartite NRC, there would be a bipartite NRC. Sihanouk would still be NRC president, but CGDK and SOC would be the two entities incorporated on an equal basis into the NRC. How CGDK chose to allocate representation in the NRC would be up to the three factions to decide. Through this innovation, Hun Sen would not have to be seen as agreeing to inclusion of the PDK in an interim arrangement; Sihanouk and Son Sann would make that decision. The NRC, as before, was to organize elections within three months. SOC would remain in place throughout the transition, and the new parliament could make constitutional and statutory changes. SOC plan supporters were Laos, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam.

The Khieu Samphan and Son Sann groups deferred to Sihanouk, who reverted to a 1988 CGDK proposal for a quadripartite government before elections as if the May 1989 meeting with Hun Sen had never occurred. The quadripartite plan would dismantle the SOC. In its place, Sihanouk would be president over four premiers and government departments with four heads, each representing one of the four factions. There would be a one-year election campaign, leading to an interim assembly that would adopt a new constitution, followed by parliamentary elections. In short, Pol Pot would be allowed to accomplish at the bargaining table what he had failed to secure through combat—legal infiltration of every root and branch of a government that he had been trying to oust. The three resistance factions, which controlled hardly any Cambodian territory, wanted three-fourths control of the interim government.

Thus, Sihanouk began the conference by double-crossing Hun Sen. The Prince appeared to have negotiated for over a year in bad faith. Later, in private conversation at Paris, members of the Hun Sen delegation asked Sihanouk to account for his turnaround. Sihanouk replied that earlier he was bargaining on his own behalf, but that in Paris he was leading a delegation of three: "I have only one vote," he said, "and I am outvoted two to one" (interviewee #5). Although members of the CGDK were calling themselves the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR), each delegation had

a separate vote. Neither CNR nor SOC had official recognition at the conference. Sihanouk's faction was free to vote as it wished. What the Prince meant was that his faction was divided, with many under the influence of the Polpotists. Prince Ranariddh, who would represent his father's delegation in subsequent sessions of the conference, favored the hardline PDK position. Sihanouk, however, was also under direct Polpotist control. At one point in the early deliberations this became clear: The entire conference heard him, while assuming that his microphone was turned off, ask permission from Khieu Samphan to make a particular statement (interviewee #41). When asked to clarify later, the Prince said, "I dare not disagree with them." The fiction of Sihanouk's autonomy was thereby shattered early in the conference.

At this point the meeting might have been called off, before a month of work that was unlikely to solve the Cambodian dispute. Martin, nonetheless, decided to proceed in the hope that a compromise would emerge in due course. Aware that prospects looked bleak, some delegates fantasized that Quai d'Orsay already had a compromise plan in the wings that would break the deadlock, or so I learned when I arrived in Paris for interviewing at the beginning of the second week of the conference.

After the opening speeches concluded, Secretary-General Perez made a motion to send a UN fact-finding mission to Cambodia to assess how many persons and supplies would be needed to handle the requirements of an international body to supervise Vietnam's withdrawal, Cambodia's ceasefire, as well as a subsequent election. When Khieu Samphan objected that a mission should go only after the delegates agreed to the scope of the future international control mechanism (Becker 1989e), the session recessed with the comment from Dumas that it appeared that one delegation was being unusually difficult. That evening China hosted a dinner at its embassy in Paris with the three coalition factions (interviewee #66; Manibhandu 1989a). The NADK confided the fear that the fact-finding body would legitimize the SOC and investigate its secret camps. On the following morning, after a revision of terms of reference for the body to ensure that the assignment would be brief and technical, there was unanimous agreement to send a UN mission to Cambodia. Norway's Lieutenant-General Martin Vadset, chief of staff of the Arab-Israeli peace organ, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and fourteen assistants flew to Cambodia. Military officers from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Norway, and Poland were in the mission. When the Vadset report was presented to the plenary at the end of August, it concluded that previous estimates of the size of an international organ were too small. A minimum force of several battalions (as many as 6,000) would be needed (FEER 1989g; PPDS 1989:30), although Vietnam remained opposed to any new military force as a confusing element.

COMMITTEES

Next, the conference work devolved to the four task forces, which were to report to the plenary by August 25. Heads of each delegation departed, leaving the work to senior officials. Thus, there were many policy issues to be resolved, but few of the remaining delegates had sufficient power to make the key decisions, a situation that cast immediate doubt on the seriousness of the conference.

Committees began with round-robin remarks on the sort of agreement that each delegation wanted to adopt. France circulated initial texts, called "non-papers," to provide a starting point. Cambodians dominated the discussion in each body, as expected. China and the CNR delegations raised a set of new issues.

In Committee I, one of the key issues was the formation of the international control mechanism (ICM). The CNR, despite Sihanouk's agreement with Hun Sen in May, insisted that there be a UN-run ICM. The SOC delegation, on the other hand, preferred an *ad hoc* body, which would report to the Paris Conference on Cambodia. SOC argued that the UN could not be impartial, since it had seated CGDK instead of the PRK for the past decade, and that a UN-controlled ICM thus would continue to take sides. Vietnam wanted the General Assembly first to rescind the various resolutions on Cambodia from 1979 to 1988. Although Thach wanted to offer an immediate concession on this issue, to permit a role for the UN, the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party refused to allow him to do so when it met in July 1989 (Mahbubani 1989b). India then proposed a well-crafted compromise under which the ICM would report to PCC, which in turn would ask the UN to provide the ICM. The Soviet Union approved this compromise openly, thereby hinting that both the SOC and Vietnam were agreeable. The only condition that Hun Sen attached to this arrangement was to leave the Cambodian seat in the UN vacant during the interim (PDDS 1989:28). The remaining delegates never allowed the Indian compromise to be put to a vote, however. Likewise, neither the Hanoi nor the Phnom Penh delegation was allowed the satisfaction of having an impartial body to certify the end of Vietnam's military role in the Cambodian civil war: The CNR and China wanted to be able to claim that the pullout was phony.

A second dispute was over the amount of power to allocate to the ICM. The CNR wanted the ICM to organize and supervise elections, while dismantling the Phnom Penh government. SOC saw the ICM as a body to supervise the elections only; SOC would organize them. Dismantling SOC was clearly a matter for the Ad Hoc Committee to decide.

A third disagreement within Committee I was on the interval of time between the establishment of an ICM and elections. CNR delegates wanted one to two years, giving them adequate time to campaign, they said. Hun

Sen's delegation preferred three to six months, after demobilization of all armed forces and cessation of external aid, so that PDK cadres could cause as little mischief as possible.

A fourth problem was who was to be withdrawn. Although Vietnam pledged to pull out "foreign military forces," China was adamant in wanting to expel all "foreign forces," claiming that more than one million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia were spies and soldiers.

A fifth issue was the territorial border of Cambodia. The CNR wanted to rescind the border agreement between the PRK and Vietnam.

A sixth issue was when to have a cease-fire and an end of all external aid. The SOC preferred both before a PAVN pullout. The CNR insisted on prior verification of PAVN's withdrawal by the UN. Later, when Phnom Penh was willing to accept UN verification, Washington opposed the concession because it was not part of a comprehensive political settlement (Becker 1989e).

The third to sixth issues were entirely new, unprecedented in previous discussions on peace for Cambodia. The CNR obviously raised them to frustrate the work of Committee I, as they involved internal, not external, aspects of the problem. Because there were fundamental differences of opinion, which the delegates lacked authority to resolve, cochairs Canada and India agreed that the task of Committee I should be to draft a text, leaving areas of disagreement in brackets. For example, the time interval between ICM's formation and elections was left blank, pending a compromise when the heads of delegations returned to Paris for the conclusion of the conference. With this *modus operandi*, Committee I adopted a twelve-page text, with many proposed amendments and brackets, and concluded its work.

Committee II was less fortunate. In the initial round robin, each delegation noted the specific legal guarantees that they sought in the final agreement. Some governments supplied proposed texts.

With the PDK present, measures for the nonreturn of genocidal practices—imperative as they would be to guarantee free elections—were doomed from the start. Although the term "genocide" appeared in the approved Organization of Work document, SRV delegates grew increasingly angry as they listened to CNR and PRC statements, uncontradicted by US representatives, that Pol Pot's regime "did not fit the legal definition of genocide." Even France, which authored the initial terms of reference, refused to use the term "genocide" in Committee II. The JIMs, according to Vietnam, had agreed to use the term. France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States offered an amendment to delete the term. This was yet another new issue. Accordingly, delegates from Hanoi looked up the legal definition in the International Convention on the Prevention of Genocide. A Vietnamese delegate then read a statement, noting well-documented claims that two forms of genocide had occurred under the Pol Pot regime—massacres of persons for religious reasons (the Chams) and massacres of

persons because of their ethnicity (all non-Khmer). In addition, he noted massacres of persons for political reasons (CPK cadres who opposed Pol Pot). The CNR delegations would not budge, however. China, at first suggesting that the matter go to the Ad Hoc Committee, proposed a compromise that would use the words "human rights" instead of "genocide," and Thailand suggested prohibiting unspecified "policies and practices of a recent past." The conference was thus to design a legal guarantee of doubtful utility that a new Cambodian regime would not misbehave. Even Sihanouk could not subscribe to these euphemisms; he agreed fully with the need to use the word "genocide," but he was overruled by a majority that did not want to cave in to Vietnam on any point, even when Hanoi held a correct position (Becker 1989d).

Also newly raised, a second issue in Committee II concerned the guarantee that Cambodia would be neutral. Most countries argued for a "nonaligned" Cambodia, but Western countries objected that matters of foreign policy should be left to the new Cambodian government, which was only to be "neutralized" by external powers. How a neutral Cambodia was to avoid being nonaligned was unclear, but the United States appeared unenthusiastic about having NAM countries gain a convert until Washington first had a chance to use aid as a leverage to sway the new government's foreign policy.

The delegates of Laos and Malaysia did not work together well at the conference, whether for reasons of language, lack of similar legal training, or temperament. They could not even agree on an agenda as cochairs of Committee II. Accordingly, few sessions were scheduled, some were even canceled after meeting notices were posted, and the body met only about six times. Nevertheless, they prepared a four-page draft by August 8, including the words "genocide" and "nonalignment." On August 25, Committee II submitted a twelve-page report of a draft agreement, minus the two terms. Other CNR-proposed amendments pertained to Vietnamese "settlers," territorial boundaries, and the role of the UN, showing that the CNR was trying to disrupt the flow of business of this committee as well.

Committee III cochairs, Australia and Japan, thought that they had the easiest task—to devise an aid program for the reconstruction of Cambodia's infrastructure. Indeed, there was nearly complete agreement among the participants. Japanese and US delegates worked especially diligently to put together a comprehensive plan, whereby a consortium of aid donors would coordinate assistance to the country in a variety of sectors.

Cambodians did not differ on measures for reconstruction. They disagreed on the timetable. SOC wanted new projects immediately. CNR delegates said that aid should follow a settlement, arguing that an influx of assistance would prejudice elections in favor of the incumbent regime. SOC and Vietnam were willing to concede this point.

A second aspect of Committee III's work concerned the repatriation of an estimated 300,000 Khmer refugees and border settlers living inside Thai-

land along the Cambodian border. This afforded an opportunity for more new issues to be raised. The SOC wanted their repatriation to follow a peace settlement; CNR representatives preferred the opposite. Reintegration of former enemy cadres and troops into the countryside spelled a victory for PDK voter intimidation, according to Phnom Penh. CNR delegates further argued that repatriation would be incomplete without telling "Vietnamese settlers" to leave the country. The PDK was proposing to repeat, with the approval of the world community, what their previos genocide had accomplished—the total expulsion of ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia. An SOC law granted citizenship to many new Vietnamese settlers. CNR delegates claimed that 20,000 settlers were in the SOC army, and they asked for the law to be nullified. The Cambodian resistance allies were openly trying to swap repatriation of Khmers at the border for expulsion of ethnic Vietnamese.

In response, SOC delegates said that they were puzzled by the CNR claims. It seems that the PDK clumsily circulated two sets of maps at the conference. Some areas claimed to be under CNR control on one map were shaded on the second map as areas where "Vietnamese settlers" supposedly lived (PPDS 1989:29). As the remaining delegates knew, Vietnamese had been living in Cambodia for generations. Some had been driven out by Lon Nol, others by Pol Pot. Those who escaped genocide had a right to return home. Others (estimated at 80,000 by SOC, 200,000 by Western sources, and 425,000 by Eastern bloc observers, in contrast with the 1.5 million claimed by the CNR),[3] including ethnic Khmers allegedly resettled from Vietnam to Cambodia, would show up in an electoral census and would be barred from voting, according to the SOC, whose request for an international fact-finding body to do a head count was denied. SRV delegates then infuriated PRC representatives when they noted that as many as 500,000 Chinese had returned to Phnom Penh after 1978 as well; whatever screening procedures applied to disfranchise or expel Vietnamese should also be applicable to Chinese, according to Hanoi. SOC delegates assured the conference that they would treat the Chinese with respect (PPDS 1989:30). In private, Hanoi agreed to take back any opportunist Vietnamese entrepreneurs, who had sparked some resentment inside Cambodia over the past decade (Hiebert 1989b). Japan and Thailand then designed verification procedures for certifying who was a *bona fide* "refugee" or "settler."

Despite the repatriation issue, Australia and Japan steered the committee toward completion of a five-page report on reconstruction with very few proposed amendments. The document was based in part on aid assessment missions to Cambodia by the United Nations in 1979 before political considerations intervened (interviewee #72).

From the start, the Ad Hoc Committee was deadlocked. In the round robin, SOC delegate Hor Nam Hong proposed the total eradication of all DK/PDK elements from Cambodian life (Beckaert & Kanwerayotin 1989). On August 4, France proposed a compromise—an interim Quadripartite

High Authority in which the four Cambodian factions would make key political decisions and the existing SOC civil service would carry out instructions, but this proposal impressed no one.

Sihanouk then presented a so-called compromise draft. He would be president of a National Union Government of Cambodia, with vice presidents Khieu Samphan, Son Sann, and Hun Sen. The interim government would have quadripartite heads of only four ministries—defense, foreign affairs, information, and interior. Each faction would then assume full control over three of the remaining twelve ministries. The SOC administration would be retained for one or two months, and there would be a progressive integration of professionals and technical employees of the three other parties into the new government.

Sihanouk's plan still permitted PDK cadres to infiltrate and sabotage the SOC government and was thus a nonstarter. CNR representatives insisted on placing their cadres into all levels of an interim quadripartite government in Phnom Penh for at least a year before elections, giving assurances that each of the four parties could veto the inclusion of any person into the quadripartite transitional government. PDK delegates even refused Sihanouk's compromise; they saw no reason to parcel out ministries in such a way that they might be left with the least desirable posts.

On August 8, Hun Sen's representative presented a new SOC plan. Phnom Penh said that it would veto all proposed PDK officials on an interim body unless such persons unequivocally dissociated themselves from the Pol Pot clique, so a bipartite arrangement was alone possible, based on representation from the CNR and the SOC. Phnom Penh delegates noted that the PRK became the SOC in response to Prince Sihanouk's request for a reconciliation government, so a bipartite National Reconciliation Council was the element needed in an interim arrangement to oversee the transition. The SOC plan envisaged that Sihanouk would be president of the NRC, which would have four commissions—a Control Commission (to cooperate with the international control body), an Election Commission (to supervise elections), a Military Commission (to ensure a cease-fire and to handle other military issues), and a Political Commission (to come up with a draft constitution to be submitted to the newly elected National Assembly).

The CNR continued to insist on a reduction in each military force to 10,000, to be garrisoned in Phnom Penh under a quadripartite command until an ICM could arrive to demobilize the four armies. As this would leave the State of Cambodia Armed Forces (SOCAF) outnumbered 30,000 to 10,000, Hun Sen instead proposed complete demobilization of all troops. Higher-ranking military personnel would be excluded from a future army, and lower-ranking soldiers would be allowed to join a new Cambodian army after a year of return to civilian life, when their applications could be appropriately screened.

The polarized delegations sought to persuade the other delegations, most

of whom had come to Paris to sign a peace settlement, not to take sides. The deadlock boiled down to a choice between a three-month interim bipartite council or a one-year interim quadripartite government.

On August 11, due to the hard line taken by the four Cambodian factions, the cochairs asked Sihanouk to participate in the discussion of the Ad Hoc Committee. The delegations of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam were invited as well, to assist in breaking the deadlock. When nothing concrete emerged, the Ad Hoc Committee continued to meet with its original membership, awaiting a genuine compromise on powersharing.

BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATIONS

As committee meetings degenerated into talkathons, the excitement moved to conversations outside the formal sessions. I was accredited as a member of the press shortly after my arrival in Paris on August 6. Most of the delegates were busy and did not want to be interviewed. My first interview was with an ASEAN country delegate, who complained that the Khieu Samphan delegation was intransigent. It was his view, shared by a member of the Son Sann delegation whom I interviewed next, that the Polpotists came to wreck the conference. When I talked to a member of the Sihanouk delegation, I listened to yet another story—that Hun Sen was refusing to cooperate with Sihanouk. My interview with the Sihanouk representative, however, involved some flimflam. It seems that I dialed the Khieu Samphan delegation, and I was granted an interview. When the discussion began, my interlocutor gave me a namecard, showing that he belonged to the Sihanouk delegation. When I saw him again at the end of the year in FUNCIPEC's Bangkok office, he admitted that he had a "Khmer Rouge passport." In short, Sihanoukists were answering the telephone and fronting for Pol Pot. The Sihanouk faction was honeycombed with Polpotists in Paris. A member of the Hun Sen delegation suggested that the perpetrators of genocide had made promises and threats to rein in members of the Sihanouk delegation, although it seems likely that the lines between the Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan delegations had become so blurred that the flimflam was inadvertent.

While I was interviewing, Alatas of Indonesia was dining with various delegations in order to arrange compromises. Indeed, he managed to extract most of the concessions reported in this chapter in his discussions with the SOC and SRV delegations. When he talked to the Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan delegations, however, he ran into intransigence. The compromises of Hanoi and Phnom Penh were never revealed to the press at the time because neither government would go ahead until the CNR agreed to a compromise on powersharing.

During the third week, China floated the idea of an interim quadripartite

government, with fewer ministries allocated to the PDK than the so-called Sihanouk compromise. This appeared to follow the logic of Baker's opening speech, but it came when PDK's performance in the committees was eloquent evidence that any inclusion of such persons in a transitional government would result in *immobilisme*.

Instead of following Alatas' approach of using reason to appeal to the self-interest of each party, Washington applied pressure tactics. Vietnamese-speaking David Lambertson, deputy assistant secretary of state for Asia and the Pacific, was in charge of the US delegation when his superiors left by the end of the first week of the conference. Understandably, he followed instructions to promote a resolution favorable to the US position. Paradoxically, he went back on Baker's initial speech: Rather than seeking a way to minimize the role of the Pol Pot faction, he pushed for an interim quadripartite government with equal power allotted to the four Cambodian factions. His first assignment was to organize regular meetings of delegates from US alliance partner countries. He next sought to persuade Soviet delegates to talk Vietnam into accepting quadripartism. Aware that Hanoi could compromise no farther, since it refused to impose a settlement on the sovereign state of Cambodia, the Soviet delegates were reluctant to do so as well. On Friday, August 11, two weeks into the conference, Lambertson visited Le Mai, Vietnam's ambassador to Thailand, at the conference center. Lambertson asked Le Mai to coerce Hun Sen to adopt the Sino–Pol Pot plan that was being presented in the name of Sihanouk at the conference. Le Mai responded that Vietnam regarded Cambodia as a sovereign state; it was up to the four Cambodians parties to decide how they wished to be governed. He would pass along the views of the US government, but that was all.

The US delegation was not the only one to apply pressure. A French diplomat urged a PRC delegate to ask Khieu Samphan to moderate his stand or else Paris would do something to embarrass China before the world. The Chinese delegate was understandably outraged at this undiplomatic behavior (Beckaert 1989e).

As August 15 was a French national holiday, the conference recessed for a four-day weekend. The hope was that a compromise would be presented when delegates returned to enjoy the sumptuous noontime buffets at Kléber Centre.

THREE NEW PLANS

On August 21, Son Sann's delegation presented a plan that more properly should have been addressed to Committee I, as it was entitled "Protocol Concerning the Elections." The point of the draft was to delay elections until nine conditions were reached. One stipulation was for an "assurance of true peace and absolute security," which any obstreperous Polpotist could violate. The

result would be that the CNR-proposed interim quadripartite government could be in power indefinitely, according to the plan.

Many delegates expressed surprise that French delegates seemed nonchalant during the critical second and third weeks of the conference, while Alatas was doing most of the significant work. Quai d'Orsay prepared what it thought to be a compromise during the third week. Martin showed it first to Sihanouk, who commented that he doubted that the French plan would fill the bill. So that Martin would not lose face, the Prince told him that he could of course try to present the three-page plan to others if he wished. Failing to perceive Sihanouk's gentle demurral as an unequivocal rejection, Martin then circulated the French plan to the Ad Hoc Committee on August 21. Based on the model of the French Fifth Republic, the compromise proposed an interim quadripartite administration that superficially appeared to contain elements of both the CNR and SOC plans. Sihanouk would be president of Cambodia, not of the NRC proposed by Hun Sen. The other three Cambodian parties would each hold a vice presidential post. All four factions would be members of a Council of State, which would implement provisions of the Paris Conference on Cambodia agreement by majority vote. Hun Sen would serve as premier of the transitional government; he would propose a Cabinet to Sihanouk for approval and would remain as premier until elections one year after the formation of the new government. After elections, Sihanouk would select the leader of the new majority party or coalition as premier.

On August 22, the Hun Sen delegation offered yet another compromise, a seven-page draft that agreed to the French plan with some modifications. Sihanouk was to be head of state; he would be in charge of the armed forces, foreign affairs, and the judiciary. There would be a quadripartite Council of State, as France suggested. Hun Sen's interim Cabinet would consist of 50 percent CNR ministers and 50 percent SOC ministers, a detail unspecified in the French plan. An additional Quadripartite Interim Authority would be composed of CNR and SOC representatives; the body, by unanimity, would supervise voting, assisted by committees on matters of drafting a constitution, implementing a cease-fire, organizing elections, and interfacing with the international control mechanism. CNR and SOC would remain in existence for day-to-day administrative governance in their respective areas of Cambodia until elections, which would be held six months after the agreement went into effect.

Had the French plan surfaced when the conference resumed on August 16, there would have been more time to examine its merits and the SOC counterproposal. Although it was supported by many countries at the conference, including Australia, as a clever basis for a compromise, the French plan came too late. Hun Sen's proposal was a constructive response, but mutual trust no longer existed. A month of harangues and vituperation made the principal opponents too distrustful to meet halfway on any basis.

On August 26, ASEAN presented a compromise in a meeting with delegates of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. There would be a Council of State, headed by Sihanouk as president, with majority voting on all questions of implementation of the PCC agreement. The four key ministries would be quadripartite, the remaining ministries would be divvied up among the four; each faction could appoint personnel to each ministry. In short, the proposal imagined cooperation among uncooperative Cambodians, as if it were designed by someone not aware of the contentious deliberations in the committees, and it met the same fate as all other plans.

Just before the final plenary session, Hun Sen was importuned by a PRC delegate, perhaps even the one who was angered by earlier pressure from France. The Chinese delegate tried to tell Hun Sen that the genocide issue was "ancient" (PPDS 1989:27). Perhaps relieved that China had been forgiven for the Tiananmen incident by the PCC delegates, the PRC diplomat doubtless wanted to bury the past on all accounts. What he clearly failed to understand was that opposition to Polpotism was the *raison d'être* for SOC legitimacy. China had learned little from a month in Paris.

CLOSING SESSION

As the conference was rancorous, foreign ministers of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States jointly decided not to attend the closing plenary session, which was scheduled for August 28. Instead, they sent deputies to read perfunctory statements. Since the role of the United States seemed crucial, Westerners close to the SOC delegation whom I interviewed subsequently asked Charles Twining, David Lambertson's immediate subordinate, to deliver a message to Richard Solomon, who as Martin's counterpart was flying to Paris to head the US delegation for the final plenary session. As the US delegation was aware of Vietnam's willingness to compromise, the message was that if Washington agreed to exclude the PDK from an interim governing body, so would Sihanouk (Allman 1990:158; Beckaert 1989c, f; Colhoun 1989b). Britain, China, France, and the Soviet Union were willing to accept this solution, but pressures inside FUNCIPEC were such that the initiative had to come from the superpower who had said on the second day of the conference that it wanted to exclude the Polpotists from a role in a future Cambodia. When Solomon arrived, however, his instructions were otherwise. The initiative came too late. The Prince was expendable. Maintaining hostility toward Vietnam clearly emerged as the basis for US machinations.

When Dumas returned to the chair, he tried to make the best of a difficult position by asking the delegates to agree that the conference was to be suspended on August 30, not adjourned. His remarks appeared to be nearly a *post mortem*. India objected that there was progress in the committees,

so a record of the month's deliberations should be released in order to encourage negotiations to continue. Likewise, Australia and Vietnam wanted the committees or perhaps just working groups to agree to meet, thereby continuing the momentum of the peace process. Singapore, heaping abuse on the thought that the conference had accomplished anything, then opposed not only the release of the Vadset mission's report but also a continuation of work by committees without any expectation of realistic concessions. In this regard Singapore was speaking autobiographically, as the ASEAN position was that no settlement was better than a partial settlement, and the six countries wanted the final statement to note that the SOC and SRV were not ready for a comprehensive political settlement (Chongkittavorn 1989b). IFMC countries, meanwhile, wanted the final statement to record their perception that the progress at the JIMs had eroded at PCC.

Alatas and Dumas then proposed a compromise—a brief press communiqué. The statement merely noted that a meeting occurred, no agreement was reached, the conference was suspended, and the cochairs would offer good offices for any efforts toward a comprehensive settlement, including reconvening committees. Dumas closed by urging the major powers to take a more active role in finding peace, an observation echoed by Son Sann (AFP 1989c, d). Alatas and Dumas pledged to consult participants within six months about reconvening the conference in Paris.

AN ASSESSMENT

When the conference ended, news stories highlighted the lack of an agreement and charges leveled by one side against another, instead of presenting an objective analysis of what went on and why (e.g., Greenhouse 1990). Hun Sen and Thach, for example, vowed never to sign an agreement with the PDK.

The assumption implicit in the Paris conference was that a unanimous grand design could supersede the incrementalism of the consensus-oriented JIMs. Requiring that every detail must be put on paper ignored the fact that mutual trust was the issue, not specifics of an agreement. Intra-Cambodian hostility was obvious, but a more subtle element of perfidiousness was the failure of certain major powers, which had supplied military aid for over a decade, to lean on their clients so that Cambodia could be left in peace. While the SOC and SRV made many concessions, the number of compromises advanced by China, the PDK, and the United States was zero. Journalist Jacques Beckaert (1989d) stated that if Washington did have a policy, it was "certainly a well kept secret." No member of the US delegation did or said anything improper in public, and most worked diligently and conscientiously, but many Asians and others later believed that they had seen a puppet show in which the failure of the conference had been well planned

in advance at high levels in the US government, with Chinese and Singaporeans taking their cue from a Washington that was so eager to blame Vietnam for the entire conflict that the fate of eight million Cambodians was of lesser consequence (Economist 1989f:30).[4] In one of my interviews, a well-informed Western ambassador described the US performance with a cascade of adjectives, including "low," "mean," and "nasty," over a period of more than a minute. Another envoy opined that the idea of pressuring delegates to design a comprehensive political settlement without instructing the political leaders in Paris to make the needed concessions left PCC as a charade (Chuensuksawadi 1989:1).

In a contract, both parties must make concessions for an agreement to be legally binding. With all the concessions on one side at Paris, the rhetoric about a "comprehensive political settlement" did not match the reality. China, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States pressed for a capitulation, a treaty of surrender, when in fact there was a military stalemate in which the Phnom Penh government was accepting responsibility to govern and to defend the country unassisted. The flawed assumptions were that Vietnam was leaving in defeat and that Hun Sen's government would be swept from power in a flash (US Embassy, Paris 1989b:2). On the contrary, Hanoi was departing because it expected Phnom Penh to be able to handle the situation, both militarily and politically.

The delegates were asked to choose between appeasing the Polpotists as a "fact of life," as US delegates put it, or recognizing the Hun Sen government for a few months before elections for a new Cambodia. Both choices seemed surreal. On the one hand, the State of Cambodia hoped to be legitimized at Paris before it proved that it could defend itself. On the other hand, the CNR was asking the delegates to believe that an international force could suppress PDK "extremists" while PDK "moderates" campaigned for office.

By attending a conference with representatives from eighteen other countries, the SOC indeed received the kind of legitimacy inconsistent with a treaty of surrender. CNR and US officials were asking for a Faustian bargain with Pol Pot even though PDK's top leaders had resigned from CGDK just before Paris so that they could refuse a compromise. The rest of the delegates were trying to stay out of the crossfire, hoping that the conference would be a first step toward a later settlement instead of a Munich that unleashed a new Holocaust. Sihanouk, meanwhile, demonstrated that he was not an independent actor. He switched sides to be with the majority rather than exercising leadership (Becker 1989d, e). ASEAN, France, the United States, and other countries saw him as an inveterate pawn.

When the delegates went home, Vietnam withdrew its combat soldiers on schedule. Cambodians confronted Cambodians with weapons supplied from external sources. The fate of Cambodia depended on whether the SOCAF could defeat the NADK when PAVN troops could not. The major

powers had the option of leaving the country alone or, instead, continuing to make deadly chessmoves in a never-ending struggle for world power from which no country, however humble or deserving, could escape.

Just as new issues emerged at Paris, there were still too many countries involved in the peace process. To proceed to an end game, the issues and the actors needed to be reduced in number.

NOTES

1. Sak's US citizenship was doubtless at issue.

2. From early 1985 to March 1990, US ministerial and subministerial officials were forbidden to talk to New Zealanders of similar rank in light of Wellington's refusal to admit US naval ships unless assurances were given that they carried no nuclear weapons. Vietnam initially objected to Japan (Kyodo 1989), but favored Austria, Finland, Poland, and Sweden.

3. Sources are Chanda (1989a, 1989b:23) and Hiebert (1989b). If all the Vietnamese fleeing from 1970 to 1978 returned to Cambodia in 1979, they would account for at least 400,000. According to one source, two-thirds of the settlers by 1983 were returning residents (Monjo 1983:36).

4. The US ambassador in Paris feebly argued that Vietnam's rejection of the unworkable ASEAN draft permitted the inference that Hanoi wrecked PCC (US Embassy, Paris 1989a:3). I sent a copy of this chapter, presented earlier as a paper at a conference, to the SOC Information Bureau in Paris in March 1990 for comment. In December, to my chagrin, the following misquote appeared in an article in its *Lettre du Cambodge*: "the failure of the conference, a puppet show, had been well planned in advance at high levels in the US government" (p. 4). Perhaps the officer in charge, Mme. Kek Galabru, was having as much trouble with my complicated diction in English as I encounter when reading French. In any case the text herein remains unchanged since I wrote it in March 1990.

Part IV

END GAME

20

DEPROXIFICATION

AFTER PARIS

When the Paris Conference on Cambodia failed, one response was to assign blame. Some of those most responsible for the outcome of the meeting tried to find a scapegoat. Hun Sen and Sihanouk accused each other of intransigence (Smyth 1989). Hor Nam Hong, SOC Deputy Foreign Minister, filed a slander suit against Sihanouk for falsely accusing him, in an interview published in August by *Journal du Dimanche* of once running the DK concentration camp where he was, instead, a prisoner.[1] Kishore Mahbubani (1989b) of Singapore and Richard Solomon (1989) of the United States tried to pin the tail on the Vietnamese donkey, which they insisted should have pressured Hun Sen to share power with Pol Pot. Vietnam's Thach found PRC doublecrosses, PDK militancy, and the congressional vote on July 20 for NCR aid to be at fault (Becker 1989b; Greenhouse 1990; Richburg 1989d). *The Economist* (1989f) noted that many delegates were aware that the Americans tried to set up Vietnam as the villain when more constructive efforts were afoot.

Other countries tried to be objective, pointing to progress in narrowing differences. The conference was only a partial failure, according to Canberra, London, Moscow, and Paris, who blamed the clock—lack of time to achieve a convergence of views. Later concessions, reviewed in this chapter, partially vindicate this judgment.

PCC demonstrated that the main problem was to untangle the Cambodian conflict from the tentacles of outside powers. The four Cambodian factions could not agree because they did not control the game. Détentes between the key external countries had not progressed far enough to leave Cambodians to run their own affairs. The immediate agenda after Paris was for the proxies to stand on their own feet. Proxification, which had occurred some years earlier when outside giants decided to work through client fac-

tions and states, needed to be reversed. The way out was to deproxify; that is, to cut the umbilical cords between patrons and clients in Cambodia in order to stop the chessgame.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

On September 5, Hanoi invited the cochairs of the Paris conference, France's Dumas and Indonesia's Alatas, to observe the pullout of PAVN troops. Secretary-General Perez was also on a list of invitees (Honolulu Advertiser 1989). Richard Solomon of the United States chided Vietnam on September 6, complaining that a withdrawal should only occur in the context of a comprehensive political settlement. On September 20, Vietnam Foreign Minister Thach told his Thai counterpart Siddhi that Vietnam was willing to have the UN officially monitor the PAVN pullout under the PCC framework, and he extended an open invitation to observe the departure of the 26,000 PAVN soldiers from September 21 to 26 (Sisuworana 1989). Hun Sen then proposed a UN fact-finding mission to verify the withdrawal (Richburg 1989a). But the world appeared not to welcome an event that it had demanded for over a decade.

Some 400 journalists and 100 other foreigners showed up for the photo opportunity on September 26, when PAVN soldiers marched through the streets of Phnom Penh on their way home. India supplied the only official governmental delegation from outside the Soviet bloc. In addition, there were officials and parliamentarians from Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Britain, Iran, Iraq, and Thailand, as well as John McAuliff of USIRP.

Before PAVN's infantry withdrawal, Hanoi and Phnom Penh said that Vietnamese troops might return under certain conditions (Becker 1989b). One contingency was a renewed invasion of Vietnam; another was a retaking of Phnom Penh by the NADK. At the end of September, Hun Sen suggested that he would request PAVN troops if the resistance forces received large amounts of aid, although he expected that his 100,000 or so tanks would prevail in due course. Thach gave the impression that Vietnam had left for good, implying that it was up to the Phnom Penh government to win the loyalty of the Cambodian people or be ousted (Becker 1989b), although he admitted at Paris that PAVN forces would return if requested.

During the previous decade Vietnam lost 25,500 lives, while the resistance counted that it killed 10,000 KPRAF/SOCAF soldiers, and the SOC chalked up 11,000 CNR combat personnel dead (Erlanger 1989j:A1; HDS 1989:49; Manibhandu 1989c). Was the slaughter to continue?

Even before September 26, China and Sihanouk pooh-poohed Hanoi's sincerity, predicting that PAVN soldiers would merely change into SOCAF uniforms. As SOC Defense Minister Tie Banh said in April 1989, PAVN military experts and instructors were to remain (Santoli 1989). By the end of September, a resistance military commander claimed the capture of half

a dozen of some 75,000 allegedly disguised Vietnamese troops, but the six quickly vanished when reporters showed up at the battlefront, eager for photographic evidence. There was even an offer from FUNCIPEC to pay a bounty, which NADK declined (Cheung & Hiebert 1989; NYT 1989b).[2] In September Washington talked about an "apparent withdrawal," but in October US Defense Department intelligence officer John Sloan confirmed that Vietnam seemed to be living up to its word (Colhoun 1989a; FEER 1989c; Straits Times 1989a). The British and French governments were also satisfied,[3] and US Secretary of State Baker affirmed his satisfaction with the PAVN pullout for the first time in mid-July 1990 (Friedman 1990:6).

After a general eighteen-month lull in fighting, interrupted primarily by an NADK offensive during the Paris conference, the civil war resumed in early October, when the rainy season ended. Although Hun Sen wanted to declare a cease-fire (Adler 1990), the SOCAF was to be tested in battle. The Phnom Penh parliament voted in August to conscript men sixteen years of age and older who failed to volunteer for the local or provincial militia (interviewee #74). Teenage Khmers sitting in cinemas or operating video games in places of amusement, having dodged the draft in the provinces, suddenly found themselves in the national army. The new SOCAF soldiers were trained, then assigned to a battlefront far from their homes under commanders who in many cases were unseasoned. NADK and KPNLA conscripted even younger recruits (Jagan 1990).

Supporters of the civil war agreed to supply their Cambodian proxies in case PCC failed, so supplies proceeded on schedule (Colhoun 1990c; Erlanger 1989f; Field, Tasker & Hiebert 1989; Honolulu Advertiser 1989; Mann & Lu 1989; Pilger 1989; Thayer 1989a). China continued aid to the NADK. The Cambodian Working Group met and cleared shipments of US ammunition and weapons to the NCR. US-made antitank weapons were on prominent display in the resistance camps. Secret British and French aid to the NCR resumed but stopped when there was a public outcry in a few months. The Thai army facilitated logistics, as usual. Soviet and Vietnamese weapons went to Hun Sen's government, according to prior arrangement (Lewis 1989). UNBRO cut supplies to refugees by mid-October, when evidence surfaced that food was being diverted to the KPNLA (HSB 1989b).

Cambodia's future lay in the hands of the military commanders—ANS' Prince Norodom Ranariddh, KPNLA's Sak Sutsakhan, NADK's Son Sen, and SOCAF's Ke Kim Yan. In March 1989 the resistance forces, in preparation for a new military situation, formed a High Council for National Defense, consisting of the three political leaders (Khieu Samphan, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Son Sann), the three defense ministers (the NADK's Son Sen, ANS' Prince Norodom Chakrapong, and KPLNA's Im Chhoodeth), and the three military commanders. NADK troop strength was estimated at 35,000; KPNLA at 16,000; ANS at 21,000. The SOCAF, meanwhile, boasted a national army of 40,000 soldiers and 100,000 provincial and

local militia (Sutter 1989:app.).[4] In the continuing acronymic shellgame, during October the SOCAF was renamed the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF), and in early 1990 ANS became the Armée Nationale du Kampuchea Indépendent (ANKI).

Aid to the resistance resumed. China increased its support to $100 million; US aid was estimated at $10 million in direct nonlethal aid to the NCR, with possibly $10 million provided secretly through Singapore (AFP 1990d). This averaged to about $2,857 of PRC aid per NADK soldier and $2,000 US aid per NCR soldier, far more than SOC combat pay, for which less Soviet and Vietnamese support was expected.

In the ensuing months NADK launched most of the battles, but afterward they withdrew to let NCR soldiers come forward to claim credit (ABC-TV 1990:2). The NCR announced modest gains, with KPNLA reportedly fighting impressively at first. The CPAF lost ground; many of its recent recruits were on the front line with little backup support, resulting in early surrenders of about 1,000 young men, who preferred life in a border camp to the harsh realities of battle (Bangkok Post 1989a; interviewee #57). About the same number of ANS and KPNLA recruits, asked to carry supplies over minefields originally laid by the resistance itself, also surrendered; some were orphans as young as ten years old (Jagan 1990). The principal casualties of the new war were these children; about 200 each month became amputees when their limbs were blown off by PRC-manufactured green plastic devices (Carey 1990b: 4), a figure that quadrupled by the end of the year (Becker 1991). Most victims lacked prosthetic devices (Graw 1991), but aid lagged behind the carnage. In addition, the war left 2.5 million with malaria and 200,000 with tuberculosis, yet the medical personnel and supplies were unable to reach those in need, so many fled to border camps in Thailand.

Infiltrating provinces on all sides of Phnom Penh, the NADK conducted hit-and-run night raids; from twenty to forty guerrillas were in these units (Hiebert 1989a). A small bridge over which I traveled from Vietnam on the road to Phnom Penh on January 4, 1990, for example, had been blown up before I crossed back on January 6. On January 5, when I was in the capital city, a few petrol bombs reportedly went off in town, but I heard nothing only a few blocks away.

There were reports of coordinated advances among the three resistance forces by late September.[5] KPNLA forces, moving southeast, announced the capture of three towns on the road to Sisophon. ANKI troops were said to march south, seizing bridges and roads in Oddar Meanchey province, gateway to Siem Reap and Angkor Wat. A larger NADK force drove east, laying siege to Pailin, a town on the western border with large gem mines. On October 22, CPAF panicked and Pailin fell (Erlanger 1990f). The NADK appeared ready to take Battambang, Cambodia's second largest city, and then to link with guerrilla units in the Cardamom mountains, which stretch beyond Pailin to an area southwest of Phnom Penh. The aim was a military

solution. When reports of coordinated military activity between the NADK and the NCR reached Washington, members of Congress reminded the State Department that US aid would end under these circumstances. Although US officials asked the NCR to stop cooperating with the NADK, while pleading with China to aid the NCR instead of the NADK, the NCR heard the message but China was deaf.

Since resistance forces had supplies from external powers, Phnom Penh reminded Hanoi that the April 1989 pledge to withdraw provided a loophole to send assistance in such circumstances. While both countries were denying CNR accusations of the presence of some 50,000 disguised PAVN combat forces, about 3,000 fresh PAVN soldiers were said to have entered Cambodia in October, primarily to advise CPAF commanders on battle plans, to provide repairs, and to train soldiers, but there were no new combat personnel.[6] A few remaining Soviet military advisers were also present to facilitate repairs and training (Ehrlich 1990).

During November the resistance proceeded to cut rail and road links between Battambang and Phnom Penh, but these were quickly repaired. In early 1990 the resistance offensive ran out of steam and became a phony war that entirely eluded reporters, with only 10 percent of Cambodia under CNR control.[7]

NADK portrayed its advance to local villagers as a liberation from SOC Vietnamese puppets, while ANKI and KPNLA troops ran amuck with rape, pillaging, and other evidence of lack of discipline as they controlled more villages (Thayer 1990). NADK began to move military supplies and families from border camps in Thailand to "liberated areas" under their control inside Cambodia in order to establish communities where agricultural harvests could feed an army beyond the free meals of the UN relief effort. By mid-1990 NADK forced at least 100,000 from border camps into agricultural areas inside Cambodia to begin farming; all secret camps were closed (Erlanger 1990b).

The long-awaited SOC counteroffensive began in February 1990 after an unconfirmed report of 7,000 fresh PAVN troops (Erlanger 1990f).[8] After four days of fighting, Phnom Penh forces recaptured Svay Chek, a town on the road from Battambang to Sisophon. To explain its defeat, the KPNLF charged that the PRC cut off supplies because the KPNLA refused to coordinate its military effort with the NADK after Washington insisted that such coordination would result in a cutoff of US aid (Guardian 1990b; IHT 1990c). Sihanouk called for lethal aid, but Congress refused (Holley 1990). The NCR had been chewed up and could no longer act autonomously on the battlefield (Becker 1990b).

When the rainy season returned in mid-April, SOC's army withdrew from Svay Chek and two other towns to strengthen defenses around Sisophon. NADK then claimed capture of Staung, a district seat between Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, and Roulos, a town ten miles from Angkor Wat, in a

campaign to encircle Phnom Penh, seemingly repeating its military victory of 1975 (Richburg 1990a). As fighting continued, some 130,000 Cambodians relocated into temporary camps provided by the SOC, but neither side was eager to attack (Eng 1991a; FEER 1991b).

THE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION

Meanwhile, diplomacy proceeded. Throughout September 1989 Thai Prime Minister Chatichai jetted to China, France, Norway, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Vietnam to discuss peace plans. He first sought a cease-fire, but Sihanouk rebuffed this suggestion in Beijing, saying that international verification of PAVN withdrawal was a precondition to a cease-fire. As Hun Sen was still willing to negotiate with Sihanouk, Chatichai tried to get the four Cambodian factions together, and he announced at the end of September that he favored convening a JIM III, adding France to the list of countries to be invited. The Prince dashed all hopes of a meeting, stating that he "categorically refused all suggestions to see Hun Sen again" (HSB 1989a), a position that he reiterated for the rest of the year. Chatichai then encouraged a Sino-Soviet dialogue, but this was too ambitious. The Thai prime minister urged Sweden to extend diplomatic recognition to the Phnom Penh government, an initiative that might catch on, leading to a new diplomatic situation favorable to peace, but caution in Europe ruled out this idea as well. In October Chatichai sought agreement on an international body to verify Vietnam's withdrawal. Khieu Samphan noted that such a body would have to be part of a comprehensive political settlement (FUNCIPEC 1989:7). During this period Foreign Minister Siddhi quietly assured friendly governments that the prime minister's efforts were not being backed by the Thai foreign ministry (interviewee #58), which meant that there was nobody on the scene in various capitals of the world to follow up Chatichai's various initiatives.

As powersharing remained a key problem, Hun Sen revised the plan he had presented at Paris (Swain 1990). He proposed a Supreme National Council with ten representatives, five each from the CNR and the SOC, a number suggesting that PDK would get only one seat. The body would run the country until general elections and would supersede PDK to represent Cambodia at the UN. The UN Secretary-General would then send a mission to supervise the elections, verify PAVN's withdrawal, and maintain a cease-fire.

Canadian Ambassador Allan Sullivan, cochair of Committee I at the Paris conference, visited Hanoi and Phnom Penh in late October in search of a formula to resolve differences. From Canada's peacekeeping experience over the years, Sullivan noted that UN peace organs could be run by the UN Secretary-General without direction from the General Assembly or the Security Council. As both Hanoi and Phnom Penh were reluctant to give the

UN a direct role in view of previous votes in the two political organs, Sullivan noted a breakthrough: The SOC and SRV governments appeared willing to accept an international control mechanism that would be responsible to the Secretary-General alone (interviewee #55). Results of Sullivan's discussions were quietly passed along to other countries concerned.

At the end of October, Washington announced the "Baker Initiative," a plan to encapsulate the civil war. The United States would stop aiding the resistance if China and the Soviet bloc did likewise, calculating that Hun Sen would accept a quadripartite powersharing arrangement, since CPAF was losing on the battlefield. As Baker well knew, the Soviet Union had already agreed to this idea before PCC, while China was in favor only in the context of a comprehensive political settlement. The Baker Initiative was thus nothing new, and again China held out (Oberdorfer 1989a).

In early November Chatichai decried ongoing efforts to pursue a quadripartite solution as futile. He sent Deputy Prime Minister Bhichai Rattakul to Beijing and Hanoi in order to gain acceptance for a dual interim administration consisting of CNR and SOC elements. Thach still insisted that acceptance of any such plan was an internal Cambodian question on which Vietnam's views were irrelevant. Chatichai then sought support for an international control mechanism that would first arrange a cease-fire, next verify PAVN's withdrawal, and then provide for free elections. Again, there was no follow-up to any of the prime minister's ideas. He was checkmated primarily by his foreign minister.

In late November Australian Foreign Secretary Gareth Evans stunned the world by announcing that his government wanted to apply to Cambodia the modalities then in progress for Namibia's transition to independence from some seventy years of South African rule.[9] This meant broadening the scope of the PCC-proposed UN control body of 6,000 persons so that an additional staff of from 100 to 300 top-level UN administrators would run Cambodia until elections decided the composition of a new government. Lower levels of Hun Sen's government of 200,000 civil servants (Field & Hiebert 1990:9) would remain, Cambodia's seat at the UN would be vacated, and the PDK would thus have no role in an interim government unless it garnered a minimum number of votes in an election. The proposal recast Solarz's earlier idea of a UN trusteeship for Cambodia; indeed, the idea arose in a conversation between the two in Washington in early October (interviewee #69). Evans also envisaged closing the border camps, letting the settlers return home, and providing much-needed reconstruction, rehabilitation, and relief to Cambodia.

Evans sounded out the idea, with other options, through Australian diplomats in the countries most directly involved. After he found favorable responses, he dispatched his deputy, Michael Costello, to visit Bangkok, Beijing, Hanoi, Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Tokyo in December in order to seek an agreement in principle on the ideas involved in the proposal. Most

countries endorsed the Evans proposal in principle, and the earlier quadripartite proposals were buried, thereby finessing the intractable issue of powersharing among factions that distrusted one another.

Asked to comment on Evans' plan, Sihanouk (1989b) expressed delight over the idea of a major UN role in an international control mechanism, and he even suggested a five-year term for peacekeeping, renewable for an additional term of five years. The Prince agreed to the idea of a vacant UN seat under three conditions—verification of PAVN's withdrawal, disarmament of all four armies, and a dismantling of both CNR and SOC. Sihanouk stuck to his earlier plan on disarmament: While the UN organ operated, a maximum of 10,000 soldiers from each of the four armies would go to Phnom Penh, where they would be disarmed and garrisoned. Any troops above the ceiling of 10,000 would be kept in barracks in the provinces. An interim quadripartite provisional government would rule Cambodia for a year, setting up an election system. Each faction had the right to veto any proposed leader from another faction in the provisional government. All four factions would have to agree to abide by the results of the elections.

Thus, the Prince accepted a UN role in peacekeeping but rejected Evans' solution to the powersharing deadlock, although he was open to the idea of a vacant UN seat under certain conditions. Later, he conceded that the SOC could not be dismantled but instead should be "reshaped and refashioned" (Chanda 1989c:37).

While accepting the idea of a major UN role in the transition, Hun Sen would not dissolve his government and did not ask the CNR to self-destruct, either. He first suggested dividing the country into two parts representing the two competing claimants to power, neither of which would be seated in the UN. He and his Cabinet offered to resign in December, if the UN seat were left vacant, for the period of UN-organized elections (NYT 1989a). The UN could then agree to include PDK in the elections.

Sihanouk next came out for a one-year UN trusteeship (Erlanger 1989d). PDK, however, refused to share power before elections.

Although Chatichai and Hun Sen called for JIM III at this point, Alatas was cautious. Siddhi and his Singaporean counterpart, Wong Kan Seng, asked for a session of ASEAN's Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), but Alatas decided not to convene SOM when the Perm Five agreed to meet at Paris in early 1990 (NYT 1990). The Perm Five, which had been discussing Cambodia informally throughout the preceding year, expressed concern that the UN force envisaged by Australia might have more than 6,000 persons, maintained for about three years. The cost, accordingly, would be much higher than the $700 million spent in Namibia (Bangkok Post 1990b). Japan and the major powers would therefore have to pay an enormous bill.

Shortly thereafter, the three Indochinese governments endorsed the main idea of the Australian plan for an interim UN administration, provided that

a bipartite Supreme National Council (SNC), composed of CNR and SOC representatives, would hold the UN seat during the transition (Field & Hiebert 1990:8; Richardson 1990a:1). The Polpotists still held out, Sihanouk was equivocal, and China reserved comment.

The SOC, which originally planned to hold parliamentary elections in November after PAVN's withdrawal, announced that they would occur by early 1991 if no peace settlement emerged before then (Pear 1990a). As 1990 progressed, UN-supervised elections in Namibia provided one model. Elections in Nicaragua, held by the existing government with non-UN observers, provided a second model. Polling in Eastern Europe, with no outside observers, was a third model. In all three cases incumbent authorities were losing elections.

Costello flew to Paris just before the Perm Five meeting in January 1990 to report progress from his shuttle diplomacy. By some coincidence, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan, whose government was willing to pay a substantial amount for a transitional UN arrangement in Cambodia, was in town at the time for discussions with President Mitterand. The French head of state warned that there should be no compromise with the Polpotists (Graham 1990; Perm Five 1990b). Aware of PRC obstinacy, he urged Washington to apply leverage on Beijing.

Asian directors of the foreign ministries of the five major powers then met, issuing a joint statement that endorsed the encapsulation and negotiation options and rejected the military option (IHT 1990b). The Perm Five accepted an "enhanced role" for the UN in peacekeeping, whereas the "repository of Cambodian sovereignty" during the transition could reside in an SNC not dominated by any of the Cambodian factions. The SNC, in turn, would delegate responsibility for organizing elections to a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. The Perm Five, thus, appeared to adopt the idea put forward by Hun Sen in Paris for a bipartite transitional body, but insisted that SOC parliament would have to be dissolved so that Hun Sen's party would not derive undue advantage. In short, the Perm Five tried to transcend the issues without actually accepting or rejecting Australia's idea of an interim UN administration for Cambodia. What emerged was an option that might even sabotage the Evans initiative by competing with it. Measures to ensure the nonreturn to power of the genocidal Polpotists were vetoed by China, which moved to strike the entire subject of human rights from any additional role in the peace process (interviewee #76).

After the five-power meeting, France gave Indonesia an official report on the results. Jakarta believed that the time was ripe for a conference of the regional powers, with Australia and France present as well, after the second Perm Five meeting in February. By then China might be more flexible, and the Cambodian factions might become weary of battle and uncertain of

their future support. The meeting would not be JIM III; instead it would be called the Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC), held within the PCC framework.

The Prince was the first to respond after the Perm Five meeting. He tried to dissociate himself from Pol Pot by resigning from his role as CGDK president, and he announced that he would return to live in Cambodia. As the successor to CGDK, the tripartite National Government of Cambodia (NGC) was formed on February 3.

When the Perm Five met in New York on February 11 and 12, China was again intransigent, complaining about the alleged presence of PAVN combat soldiers in Cambodia. The United States was not exercising any influence on the Beijing representative (interviewee #76; Perm Five 1990a). Discussion was related primarily to details about the ICM and SNC, with the UN's Ahmed present, but there was no specific agreement.

On February 12, IFMC deputy foreign ministers issued a communiqué, stating that the external aspects of the Cambodian conflict were no longer at issue, thanks to PAVN's withdrawal in 1989. As this left internal matters, peace was up to Cambodians and, therefore, outside the scope of IFMC. Clearly, they were suspicious of the Perm Five.

The Soviet Union, seeking to end war in Cambodia, renewed its offer to stop aiding the SOC, but China and Pol Pot were intent on war. Western Europeans viewed Washington's dithering on the issue as being protective of China and, thus, of Pol Pot. Accordingly, the EC foreign ministers met in Dublin in mid-February (Pedler 1989, 1990). Prodded by Italy (interviewee #107), the group agreed that it would never again vote to seat the resistance coalition as Cambodia's representative in the UN, despite Washington's views, since the Pol Pot clique was part of the coalition. But EC foreign ministers were afraid to risk lifting the trade embargo for fear of alienating ASEAN (Jennar 1990:2).

Later in February, at the annual ASEAN–EC forum, the European countries were eager to issue a joint statement renouncing any further support of Pol Pot. As ASEAN countries noted that this would cause Khieu Samphan to boycott the IMC scheduled later that month, the European countries demurred, having made their point (Economist 1990a:63), but they threatened to vote for a vacant seat for Cambodia at the UN General Assembly in the fall if the peace process made no further progress.

Next, Sihanouk asked Prime Minister Chatichai to arrange a conference with Hun Sen on February 21 just before the IMC. When they met, the Prince embraced Hun Sen, and the two issued a joint statement—their first—in which they agreed in principle on two points (Financial Times 1990; interviewee #76). One was the establishment of an SNC composed of the Cambodian factions; the second was that a UN presence should be encouraged at "appropriate levels." There was obvious ambiguity in the joint statement.

Then, after eleven years of exile, the Prince moved into a small home in ANKI-controlled territory on February 23. Subsequent to a photo opportunity as he occupied a modest house on the border, his residence received heavy shelling, and he returned to resume accommodations in Beijing (Tasker 1990b:10).

INFORMAL MEETING ON CAMBODIA

In early February an Australian technical mission went to Cambodia for ten days of fact-finding to ascertain the size of the SOC civil service and similar data. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade then prepared a working paper of about 150 pages, entitled *Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal.* Canberra had done its homework.

IMC met at Jakarta from February 26 to 28, with France and Indonesia as cochairs, convening within the PCC framework. JIM countries were all present; Australia, Canada, France, India, and the UN provided resource delegations. Evans distributed the working paper outlining various options and costs, which some key delegates admitted that they lacked time to peruse.[10] All options would have the SNC assume sovereignty over Cambodia for an interim. Sihanouk's plan for a UN administration at the top and middle levels would involve 31,400 UN officials and peacekeepers at a cost of $21 billion per year. A midrange option, based on the Namibian model, was for 12,190 UN officials (2,500 police, 2,000 electoral officials, 1,280 top-level staff, and the rest UN bureaucrats) and 5,500 peacekeepers, with an annual bill of $987 million.[11] The minimum option of 2,500 peacekeepers and 550 electoral officials, midway between Hun Sen's original preference and the PCC consensus figure of 6,000, was financially feasible ($687 million) but was judged unable to guarantee free elections. Even so, the minimum option would be the most expensive peace organ in UN history.[12] Other delegations also presented position papers in closed sessions.

Although Hun Sen reiterated that the UN could organize elections within the framework of the SNC, thereby accepting Evans' plan in principle, he still wanted to maintain the structure of the SOC, whose civil service personnel would remain at middle and lower levels. Because the Australian plan had captured everyone's admiration, the resistance factions reiterated the idea of a quadripartite government in their initial statements and then conceded that the UN should play a significant role. In particular, all parties agreed that the UN would organize elections, provide military security, verify PAVN's withdrawal, and have a role in the civilian administration of Cambodia, but many details remained to be discussed. Thus, the primary outcome of the meeting was to narrow even more the specific elements of a settlement.

Unexpectedly, some delegations tried to regain points lost at Paris. Thach spoke against a UN force for peacekeeping and insisted that the word

"genocide" appear in the record of the meeting, proposing the following statement: "Appropriate arrangements should be made to ensure the non-return of the genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime" (Economist 1990e:58; SRV London Embassy 1990:2). Laos urged that the new Cambodia subscribe to ASEAN's ZOPFAN, thus reversing the opposition of the Western countries at PCC to a nonaligned Cambodia (SRV Embassy 1990:5). All three Indochinese governments opposed dismantling the SOC, and preferred that the UN supervise elections within the framework of the SOC. SOC and SRV delegates objected to a clause favoring a "just resolution to the question of Vietnamese and other foreign settlers" (McDonald 1990). The PDK blocked fact-finding missions.

France's Dumas arrived late, left after barely twelve hours, and scoffed at the utility of the forum in comparison with the Perm Five and the PCC. Australia's Evans was particularly piqued at Dumas (Economist 1990e:58), who left the delegates "feeling that they were little more than an adjunct to the machinations of great power politics" (McDonald & Vatikiotis 1990).

Khieu Samphan objected to a concluding statement by the cochairs of the session (interviewee #12), so the results were recorded instead through interviews with members of the press. At the close of the IMC, Sihanouk called for Thailand to host the next IMC round, but to include China.

LATER INITIATIVES

The next diplomatic bombshell came from Bangkok. Just as Thailand could cut off all aid to the resistance at any time, so the camps with displaced Cambodians on Thai soil could be closed. While the Thai military wanted to make small commissions on sales of arms and other supplies, Chatichai noted that Bangkok business executives were missing out on larger commercial opportunities in Cambodia and Vietnam. Following up on a pledge to Hun Sen one year earlier, the Thai prime minister announced in early March that he would study ways of closing all the border camps, sending about 300,000 Khmers either home or to UN camps well inside Thai territory, where they could no longer be used to back up the resistance forces. Although Chatichai originally wanted to shut down the camps after a ceasefire, he was now threatening to eliminate NGC base camps. The resistance factions were opposed, EC applauded, and Washington tried to discourage Bangkok (Colhoun 1990b). The Cambodian ball of yarn was unraveling. It was not a ball of wax after all.

The focus then shifted to Paris, where the Perm Five convened from March 12 to 13, with the UN's Ahmed available in the wings along with resource delegations from Australia, Canada, and India. Given the contentious session in Jakarta, there was a need for a breakthrough or the peace process would have stopped dead in its tracks. After some discussion to restore the issue of "genocide" to the agenda, China and the Soviet Union agreed to a

compromise—"human rights" guarantees were to be included in the peace settlement. The meeting then devoted most of its attention to the particulars of holding an election. The Perm Five concurred on an amazing inventory of points, suggesting that considerable preparatory effort in the form of working papers and consultations was involved (Economist 1990h; FEER 1990f; interviewee #80). Deferring to the SOC proposal, they agreed to the idea of an SNC, which in turn would delegate "necessary powers" to a UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC), reserving remaining powers to the SOC civil service. Composition of the SNC, which would then hold the UN seat in the interim, would be up to the Cambodian factions. UNTAC would be established by the Security Council, administered by the Secretary-General, and would be charged with the task of establishing "a neutral political environment in which no party would be advantaged" in a subsequent election. There would be a single election (instead of two, as suggested at Paris) for a constituent assembly, which would transform itself into a legislature after handling constitutional matters. Eligible voters would be established by a registration procedure that would allow border settlers and would disallow some but not all recent migrants, although specific regulations remained to be discussed. The Perm Five had accepted the Namibian model. What remained was for the decisions to be placed before the Cambodian parties for a signature. In June the four factions flew to Tokyo to resume an intra-Cambodian dialogue, as we learn in chapter 28.

OPTIONS

Many policy options vied for acceptance after Paris. Most countries tried to maintain earlier positions, which were anachronistic and needed to be reassessed.

There were two new meanings to a *do-nothing* policy. One was to postpone a decision until options became more clear. A second meaning was to ignore the issue. Either option translated into allowing the various Cambodian factions to fight to the finish.

Commit troops was again the default option for the Cambodians, however reluctantly it might be taken by the Phnom Penh government. Although PAVN infantry withdrew and Hanoi could rely on the dual justifications of self-defense and ridding the world of a genocidal regime again, Vietnam's enthusiasm for entering Cambodia in 1989 was substantially below what it had been in 1978. The French army's chief of staff mused in due course whether he would have to send back a French army in order to stop the NADK (Becker 1990a).

Support allies reappeared as an option. Post-Tiananmen China was unashamed of arms shipments to the NADK. Britain, France, Singapore, and the United States secretly shipped supplies to the NCR, with logistical sup-

port from the Thai military; then they stopped because of a public outcry. The Soviet Union and Vietnam sent weapons to Phnom Penh.

The opposite of support for allies was *encapsulation*, whereby non-Cambodian parties would shut off aid to their allies in the civil war. Baker and Shevardnadze as well as Gorbachev and Deng agreed before Paris to encapsulate the conflict, but China vetoed this option after PCC. Vietnam preferred to leave Cambodia to the Cambodians, but advisers reportedly returned so that Battambang would not fall to Pol Pot, whereupon the world expressed its gratitude by refraining from criticism of the seeming SRV perfidy of withdrawing with fanfare and returning in secret.

Partition became an option. If negotiations failed and the four parties were to reach a military stalemate again, the model of divided Cyprus loomed as potentially relevant. One part of the country could be called Eastern Cambodia, the rest Western Cambodia. Although proposed by Hun Sen as a temporary modality to facilitate a cease-fire, this option was unacceptable on a permanent basis to the principal countries and factions involved. Cambodia did not want to be further weakened in comparison with neighboring Thailand and Vietnam.

Coercive diplomacy lingered as an option. Having sought to apply sanctions against Vietnam since 1975, Washington thought that refusing to normalize relations with Hanoi would force SRV leaders to extract new concessions from Phnom Penh. Singapore, the largest trade partner with Cambodia and Vietnam, decided to prohibit bank loans and credits to Hanoi as yet another form of pressure. The rest of the world, however, regarded the US-Singapore position as being too extreme. Instead, Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, and EC and other Western European countries gradually increased contact, including trade and investment, with Cambodia and Vietnam. Japan and the United States blocked multilateral loans, which Hanoi needed even more desperately.

Various forms of *diplomacy* emerged as the main response to the failure of PCC. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai sought to *mediate*, but he soon accepted SOC policies, whereupon he could not sell his proposals to the PDK or the PRC. *Quiet diplomacy* was pursued by Australia, which sent Deputy Foreign Minister Costello on a mission of shuttle diplomacy in the region. The *conference diplomacy* option of France and Indonesia was on hold until the Evans initiative reached a point where incremental agreements became possible. Paris wanted a resumption of PCC. Indonesia's Alatas, responsible for convening a JIM III if requested, waited until the time was ripe; an IMC in February fell short of expectations, but a later "informal meeting" in September succeeded. The Perm Five served as a way to pull the elusive Chinese into a dialogue. Tokyo became an intra-Cambodian venue in June, Jakarta and Bangkok in September, Jakarta in November, then Paris in November and December. In 1991, meetings at Beijing, Jakarta,

and Pattaya narrowed the differences to a point where a resumption of PCC in October seemed in the cards.

Diplomatic negotiations focused on interim rule in Cambodia, after a cease-fire and disarmament of the warring factions, so that "free and fair" elections could be held to select leaders of a new government that would rule by popular consent. The bipartite and quadripartite options from Paris were superseded by two options. The first option was a costly *UN interim government*. The second option was for a more affordable *UN interim administration* at the top, leaving SOC civil servants intact. The third option was a Supreme National Council, either bipartite or quadripartite, that would contract for a *UN control mechanism* responsible for elections and peacekeeping.

The option of *legal condemnation of Pol Pot's genocide* remained. No country was willing to take this step, although during most of 1989 two members of Congress—Jim Leach (1989) and Robert Kastenmeier (US House 1990:196–97) had been urging the establishment of a special international tribunal to put the Pol Pot clique on trial. The practical implication was to disqualify the PDK from any role in a future negotiated settlement.

At the end of 1990 a so-called *Red option* emerged. A secret Sino-Vietnam meeting involving party officials in September, an ongoing Sino-Soviet détente, Chinese assurances about marginalizing the Polpotists, and SOC pleas to cozy up to China made headlines. An arrangement to leave the NCR out in the cold seemed in the making, but Beijing soon complained about Thach's conduct of SRV foreign policy. In mid-1991 Vietnam dumped Thach, signalling that both the PRC and the SRV had made a deal to abandon their proxies rather than allow Western powers to buy a UN–supervised election for the NCR.

In sum, one reason for PCC's failure was that a new military situation was expected to change the picture, a *déjà vu* that harked back to 1978. Instead, a stalemate reemerged. More Cambodians were to die while the rest of the world contemplated how to respond to a renewed breach of the peace. Evans broke with the *realpolitik* precedent in the Cambodian conflict by exercising moral leadership through a pragmatically oriented peace process, while Chatichai offered a way to uncouple the conflict from the major powers. Additional moves and countermoves then proceeded.

NOTES

1. Hor Nam Hong eventually won an award of $4,000 from a French court in January 1991 for an "exceptionally serious" defamation (Economist 1991a).

2. Allegations of PAVN activities after September 26 appear in CNR (1989) and FUNCIPEC–ANS (1989:3, 7).

3. Britain's confirmation was announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe, deputy foreign

minister, in parliament on October 19, 1989. France's acknowledgement was confirmed by interviewee #78.

4. The French assessment of NADK strength was about 6,500 (Economist 1989f:29). Prince Ranariddh also believed that NADK strength was exaggerated (Muskie 1990:5). There were persisting rumors of low morale and disunity within NADK (Asiaweek 1989).

5. Sources include ABC-TV (1990:3), Becker (1990a), Colhoun (1990c), Erlanger (1989e), Pear (1990a), Reuter (1989a), Richburg (1990a, 1990b), SOC (1990), Tran (1990).

6. Although categorically denied by Vietnam, rumors of PAVN's renewed presence were reported in Bangkok Post (1989f, 1989g), Cloud (1990:26), Economist (1990a:63), Erlanger (1990f), Guardian (1990b), Hoagland (1990), IHT (1990a).

7. Three French television crews in early 1990 traveled all over western Cambodia in search of a war to film and came up empty-handed (interviewees #74, 76). Other reporting on the phony war appears in Erlanger (1990c), Field & Hiebert (1990:9), Guardian (1990b), Richardson (1990b), Swain (1990), US Senate (1990).

8. In April, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon became the first US official to say in public that PAVN soldiers had indeed returned, although his estimate was in the "low thousands"; in July, Baker indicated that this number was acceptable as far as Washington was concerned. Some members of the Thai military speculated that the "Vietnamese" were in fact Cambodian residents of Vietnamese ethnicity who returned home from Vietnam after the turbulent 1970s (UPI 1990a).

9. Namibia was a League of Nations Mandate, which South Africa refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council when the UN began in 1945. An insurgent force, supported by Angola and Cuba, had been attempting to overthrow a puppet government installed by South Africa.

10. For reports on IMC, see Cumming-Bruce (1990), Economist (1990c), Erlanger (1990d), McDonald & Vatikiotis (1990).

11. This would be twice the expense incurred in Namibia for a one-year operation (Australia 1990:154). In Namibia the parties agreed to 7,700 UN officials (1,500 police, 1,000 electoral officials, 600 top-level staff, and 4,600 peacekeepers).

12. Estimates were for a twelve-month operation, but the plan actually specified a minimum of sixteen months from the initial deployment of a UN organ to the beginning of the withdrawal of that body.

21

CAMBODIA

CGDK AFTER PARIS

Since Pol Pot resigned from CGDK before Paris, and CGDK was not acknowledged as being present at the conference, the three Cambodian resistance factions banded together as the Cambodian National Resistance during PCC committee meetings. By January 1990 Sihanouk resigned irreversibly from CGDK, so only KPNLF remained.

Under the terms of the formation of CGDK, PDK assumed full control of the Cambodian mission to the UN when it resigned from CGDK. As this proved to be embarrassing, the three factions reconstituted their alliance in February 1990 as the National Government of Cambodia, with Sihanouk as president. There was an NGC constitution, modeled on the French Fifth Republic, but PDK still controlled the UN seat. The NGC flag and national anthem reverted to the pre-1970 era in deference to the Prince.

FUNCIPEC POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Even before PCC ended, Sihanouk declared his intention to resign from FUNCIPEC because he was disgusted with the performance of opportunists within his party, including his son (Beckaert 1989g). The PDK infiltration of FUNCIPEC resulted in a *coup de clique* (Stone 1990b). The Prince's early sellout to the Khieu Samphan delegation at Paris seriously damaged his credibility (Pear 1989b). Pong Peng Cheng, one of his closest advisers, defected to the SOC, where he became a member of the Council of Ministers. When a group of pro-democracy FUNCIPEC supporters arose in 1991 to dissociate the party from the PDK, Sihanouk quickly squelched them again (IP 1991c, 1991f). The Prince was a royalist, not a democrat.

After September 26 Sihanouk, from Beijing, characterized Vietnam's withdrawal as a charade. After that, little was heard from him, and in the fall

he was the star of a newly released North Korean film. For all practical purposes, he had retired from politics and would no longer get involved in conferences and negotiations that had generated more arguments than results. Jusuf Wanandi of the Indonesian Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta joked that the Prince was dead. Messages purportedly written by Sihanouk were transmitted to the PDK mission in New York and elsewhere, but the tone was Polpotist and Vietphobic. The statements refused any further negotiations with the Hun Sen government, opposed another JIM, and even called for Vietnam's expulsion from the UN.

Chatichai's initiatives after Paris for an immediate cease-fire, to be followed by other incremental steps, exposed Sihanouk's weak position. He did not command any troops and he could not control his son, who was hungry to use weapons, newly supplied by Britain, China, France, and the United States, in order to pile up victories so that FUNCIPEC could dictate terms to Phnom Penh (Colhoun 1990c). The reality was that Ranariddh did not command much of a fighting force.

When the Australian initiative gathered momentum in late November, Sihanouk saw his first serious opportunity to resume power on acceptable terms. He welcomed a UN administration to govern Cambodia for a year, with a peacekeeping force that could stay as long as ten years, as this would protect a new regime under his leadership from Polpotist terrorism. The Evans plan envisaged dismantling all armed forces and regimes, which would enable the Prince to appeal directly to the people in an election. Rival armies would be kept at bay by the UN force until a new Cambodian government gained legitimacy and stability. Nonetheless, he addressed a twenty-seven-page missive to Australia's Costello on December 17, 1989, in order to persuade Canberra not to trust Hun Sen.

Early in 1990 Sihanouk experienced "terrible depression." He resigned from CGDK, responding to complaints by Western journalists and scholars for maintaining links with the PDK (interviewee #76; Swain 1990). Since Beijing would have no choice but to remove him from the payroll, he announced that he would take up residence in Phum Seraipheap, Cambodia, by the end of February, living in the ANKI-liberated zone as NGC head of state.

En route to Cambodia, he stopped off at Bangkok in mid-February, asking the Thai prime minister to arrange a meeting with Hun Sen. Their joint declaration appeared to end their feud. The Prince appeared to have totally broken with the Polpotists, although he soon returned to Beijing, presumably to visit his ailing mother-in-law. After going back to Cambodia in April, he flew back to China when he found that he was a direct target of CPAF artillery (AP 1990a).

Sihanouk was wary of negotiations, but he appeared to meet Hun Sen halfway by accepting the idea of bipartite representation on a supreme council that would serve as an interim body while the UN organized elec-

tions. He then challenged Hun Sen to meet to discuss his latest plan in mid-April after going on a "long leave of absence" from the NGC (Schetzer 1990). He resumed his position as NGC head of state so that he could sign an agreement at the Tokyo Peace Conference in June, then boycotted all subsequent conferences in 1991, leaving negotiations to his son.

KPNLF POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

After Paris, the elderly Son Sann bid adieu to his son, Son Soubert, who returned to Bangkok to follow the situation more closely. KPNLF assumed a low profile during peace negotiations, responding quietly but constructively. Being that KPNLF constituted a group with a broad range of opinion, a consensus took longer to develop within KPNLF than within the other factions.

With a fresh supply of sophisticated antitank weapons from Singapore, the KPNLA first took the offensive. The attack shielded Pol Pot from criticism that he was the one who broke the peace. KPNLA proceeded to train boys aged ten and over in the border camps under their control to use weapons; many orphaned boys were forced to carry supplies over minefields to the army (Colhoun 1990b; Jagan 1990). Whereas KPNLF thought that a renewed offensive would force the SOC back to Paris with a weakened position, the reality was that KPNLA soldiers were discrediting the NCR by their association with NADK. When KPNLA refused to coordinate battle plans with NADK in early 1990, because US aid would be stopped for collaborating with NADK, China cut off KPNLA supplies, forcing a retreat by mid-February. Thereafter, ANKI and KPNLA were accused of being little more than bands of rapists and robbers.

While peace initiatives blossomed, KPNLF hoped to do well in future elections, as it favored limited government, private capitalism, and low taxes, which appealed to the desire of most Cambodians to return to normal (interviewee #52). Since KPNLF never held power, it had alienated no Cambodians, and it was the only group favoring a liberal democracy, which was becoming the preferred form of government in Eastern Europe and elsewhere around the world. KPNLF hoped to form a coalition with FUNCIPEC and perhaps KPRP after elections (Stone 1989c:8). In mid-February 1990, when Son Sann went to campaign in a KPNLA-liberated zone, the peasants did not even realize that they were supposed to applaud when he asked for their votes in a forthcoming election (Tasker 1990c). Some 144,000 remained in KPNLF-controlled border camps because the faction lacked funds to establish new villages inside Cambodia.

Since KPNLF was wired into the Bush administration through Sichan Siv, and Son Sann was the only Cambodian leader ever to testify before Congress, the faction expected to have resources to win the peace. In May Sak's faction formed the Liberal Democratic Party in anticipation of elections. Son Sann

ignored his request in September to be a fifth faction of the Supreme National Council, which was formed as an interfactional negotiating body. As the faction best liked in Washington, a place for Sak in the new government appeared to guarantee a fast track for US postwar aid to Cambodia.

PDK POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Even while PCC was taking place, the NADK had launched an offensive (Bangkok Post 1989d). When PAVN troops marched out in September, NADK vowed to retake Phnom Penh. Pol Pot, who earlier promised to quit when Vietnam left Cambodia (Reuter 1989b), instead accused all SOCAF soldiers of being Vietnamese soldiers who merely changed uniforms. In this manner NADK could shoot SOCAF personnel without having fratricidal qualms (VODK 1989).

Chatichai's diplomacy in the fall sought to stop the combat, thereby placing Pol Pot in a dilemma. An aggressive move might lead Beijing to disown him; timidity might be viewed as victory by Vietnam. The apparent resolution of this quandary was that the three resistance forces would move slowly, minimizing their losses and maximizing political pressure on the Phnom Penh government (Field, Tasker & Hiebert 1989). Assorted victories were announced in villages inside the border. At the end of 1989, when NADK claimed the capture of PAVN soldiers, PDK refused even to collect an ANS bounty of $40,000 for producing them (NYT 1989b), telling their coalition partners that the time was not ripe to reveal the evidence to the world (interviewee #45). Each time an attack took place, NADK left an escape route so that SOCAF forces could retreat or surrender. Angkor and Battambang were declared targets, and the propaganda war stepped up. Although declarations of NADK military prowess sought to terrify the peasants and the Phnom Penh government, the effect outside Cambodia was just the opposite: The world community was aroused to the real fear that Pol Pot would return to power.

Financed liberally by China, as usual, PDK continued relocating some 80,000 civilians from "secret camps" in Thailand to "liberated areas" in order to provide a source of food (Eng 1991c). Although UNBRO was cutting back on aid, Cambodians in UNBRO camps under NADK control could obtain medical supplies, and some returned in due course with cases of cholera and malaria due to poor sanitary conditions in the hastily created "liberation zones" (Eng 1991a; FEER 1990e). As NADK troops moved into new villages, they would first ridicule existing leaders as Vietphiles, then pay farmers handsomely for their rice and distribute videotapes (Guardian 1990a; Richburg 1990a; Tasker 1990c). Asia Watch reported the NADK use of boys as porters through areas infested with landmines; the army told parents that they would go to reeducation camps if their children failed to obey these orders (Colhoun 1990b; Oberdorfer 1990). As 1990 began,

observers warned that PDK support was growing: Few younger Cambodians remembered genocide; instead they looked upon Pol Pot as a genuine nationalist who aimed to expel the Vietnamese. Others disputed this claim, noting that hardly any family in Cambodia remained untouched by the killing fields (Gittings 1990).

PDK rule over a portion of Cambodia also was designed to show that there was no reversion to genocide, that Cambodians did not regard life under Pol Pot as anathema. Ta Mok and Pol Pot promised not to run for office or to assume a military or political role in the transitional government resulting from the elections (Holley 1990). Nonetheless, the PDK strenuously objected to requests from human rights observers and international aid officials to inspect PDK-controlled border camps, and Thailand closed several "secret camps" because they became sanctuaries for bandits (interviewee #117). Captured PDK documents revealed that the ultimate goal was victory in Phnom Penh and vengeance against Vietnamese collaborators which were estimated to total two million (Awanohara 1989b; Carey 1989:13, 1990a). As the NADK marched, it defrocked monks, dismantled schools, and prohibited winedrinking and listening to the radio (Economist 1990b). NADK adopted a guerrilla war strategy and did not really need outside aid; it was prepared to prevail over the long haul, and it would fight even it it were included in an interim quadripartite government or if it lost elections held under UN auspices. The Sino-American belief that PDK could be tamed into abiding by the results of a UN-supervised election was illusory.

Polpotists were greatly threatened by Chatichai's initiatives, exposing as they did that only one Cambodian faction was counting on a military solution. During most of 1990 PDK made sure that peace moves were stillborn. Regarding the Australian initiative, the PDK stuck to the idea of an interim quadripartite government but pledged to honor the results of a UN-administered election.

When European delegates to the annual ASEAN–EC meeting pressed for a formal repudiation of the Polpotists, ASEAN delegates told EC diplomats that such a declaration would fan the flames of additional war. Khieu Samphan went to the IMC to avoid condemnation, but he explained his last-minute decision to attend out of "politeness" (Economist 1990a; PPDS 1989:31–32; Weekend Guardian 1990).

Clearly, the PDK strategy was to stonewall negotiations, wage a "hearts and minds" campaign in "liberated zones," and terrorize the rest of the country. Using a Marxist class analysis, the PDK knew that peasants would ultimately resent rule by Phnom Penhites (interviewee #122). PDK, which planned to disband and form a new party in the event of elections (Beckaert 1991:307), wanted to control enough parliamentary seats to return to Phnom Penh, stressing its patriotism *vis-à-vis* the collaborationist SOC. It could only do so if its legitimacy were assured by inclusion in an interim government; failing that objective, NADK was bent on a military victory.

SOC POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

When asked why the Paris conference had failed, Hun Sen confided that he was expecting Sihanouk to opt for a compromise that would allow PDK to play a minor role. "The king of the Khmers Rouges has his hands stained with blood," he said, accusing him of being "not a patriot" (Economist 1989f). When the Prince towed the PDK line to strengthen his bargaining position, Hun Sen felt betrayed, having made concession after concession for nearly two years without any reciprocation except the privilege of sitting at a negotiating table with Norodom Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan.

The Phnom Penh government communicated acceptance of a UN team to supervise PAVN's withdrawal on September 26, but this came too late. Although many Cambodians were grateful for Vietnam's role as protector, they were also happy to see PAVN troops go. So that fears of an NADK victory would not take hold, Hun Sen indicated that he would ask Hanoi to send troops again if needed. He also said that Cambodia had "permanent neutrality," so any treaty to the contrary was void (Erlanger 1989i). Heng Samrin then went to Hanoi to discuss amendments to the country's treaty with the SRV in order to bring the text into line (FEER 1990p:244).

When the war resumed, SOC Defense Minister Tie Banh expressed confidence that his army would prevail, but soon CPAF conceded towns in the west, notably Pailin. The western provinces were under martial law by the end of October. A 9 p.m. curfew returned to Phnom Penh, although I discovered that it was observed in the breach in early January 1990, and the blackout was extended to midnight one year later (GEnie 1991a). The government, spending some 40 percent of its budget on the war, requested small arms from the Soviet bloc. Soviet weapons kept arriving, although they went directly to Cambodia, not via Vietnam. Hanoi responded to a request from the SOC in October for arms and military advisers after first reporting evidence of US weapons from covert aid released by the Bush administration, supposedly to the NCR (Manuel 1990b:A6). There was no immediate counteroffensive because there was not much of an offensive. Having divided military forces into provincial commands, CPAF lacked general coordination. As 1990 began, an advance by CPAF troops in mid-February showed that Phnom Penh at last had its military act together (Field & Hiebert 1990: 9). CPAF strategy was to allow the resistance to expand control to such an extent that its supply lines would be stretched to the limit. If Thailand closed border camps, Hun Sen (1990) expected the resistance to collapse in six months.

Hun Sen cooperated with Chatichai and Evans to move the peace process forward, responding positively to every proposal unless it contained a provision for overt powersharing with PDK. Despite urging from Soviet bloc diplomats to identify a PDK official who might serve in a transitional government (Hiebert 1989d), Hun Sen's government could not appear to ca-

pitulate after a decade of hostility toward Pol Pot. Understandably, many in Phnom Penh feared for their lives if PDK officials returned, even as a part of a transitional arrangement.

The SOC refused to deal separately with the opposing three factions after Paris: The NGC and the SOC were the only Cambodian political entities as far as Phnom Penh was concerned. The lesson of Paris was there was no point in pretending that the three resistance factions were operating independently. Hun Sen even suggested partition in order to isolate the conflict.

On the role of the United Nations, Hun Sen continued to distrust the body that had refused representation to his government over the past decade. At PCC he wanted a minimal role for the UN in a Cambodian settlement because he feared that the General Assembly, intimidated by the United States as before, would dictate policy in Phnom Penh. When Canada's Sullivan explained to him in October that an organ could operate out of the Office of the Secretary-General without regard to the General Assembly, Hun Sen began to entertain the idea of a larger UN role in a Cambodian settlement, but he would not countenance having expatriate FUNCIPEC, KPNLF, and PDK representatives deputized as UN officials to run the country. After a visit by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev to Phnom Penh in early January 1990, Hun Sen told Australia's Costello that he favored an expanded UN role in a Cambodian settlement, accepting the Namibian model as a starting point for negotiations. Soon, the SOC plan evolved into a cease-fire and temporary partitioning of Cambodia into a NGC part and a SOC part, with dual representation in the UN. NGC thus would have to recognize SOC. A Supreme National Council, composed of five representatives each from the NGC and the SOC, would administer the country ahead of general elections; in this way, the odium for including the Polpotists in an interim authority would be on Sihanouk and Son Sann. If the UN handled the elections, the UN would have to decide whether to include PDK as a legitimate party.

Phnom Penh, meanwhile, began to come out of its isolation. Costa Rica, which had an embassy in Taipei rather than Beijing, extended diplomatic recognition at the end of July 1989. Thai parliamentarians carried the earliest Chatichai cease-fire proposal, and Hun Sen personally invited Army Chief of Staff General Chaovalit Yongchaiyut to Phnom Penh. Representatives from Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and the Netherlands soon went to the Cambodian capital to assess the need for aid in the country. Hun Sen went to Ho Chi Minh City to talk to New Zealand's foreign minister about future aid projects. Australia's Costello met Hun Sen at the Vietnamese border in early January. Pong Peng Cheng, Sihanouk's erstwhile legal adviser, was one of several Cambodian exiles, including Princess Lida Sisowath, to return to Phnom Penh (Pear 1990c; Song 1989:9). Kek Galabru, Pong Peng Cheng's daughter, opened an SOC information office in Paris in early spring 1990. Through unidentified intermediaries, the SOC

and US governments even began to cooperate to identify MIAs in Cambodia (AP 1990c). In July John Gunther Dean, US ambassador to the Khmer Republic in 1975, flew to Phnom Penh to hand out scholarships on behalf of the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) (GEnie 1990g). Dean did so in his role as a member of the board of trustees of AIT, a nongovernmental international institution started by SEATO that later became independent. When Germany united in September, Bonn superseded East Germany's diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh, but sent staff to an "interest section" of the Hungarian embassy.

More Western aid flowed. Australia increased funds to PVOs in Cambodia in the fall. Britain took a similar step in the winter. Canada and France agreed to resume humanitarian aid in early 1990; EC, Japan, and the United States followed in 1991; the Asian Development Bank and the European Community began to consider aid projects as well. Japan also decided to aid a UNESCO project to work on restoration of portions of Angkor Wat. Alliance Française opened an office in the fall of 1990; the officer in charge had authority to perform consular functions (FEER 1990j). Australia and Canada established similar offices a few months later. US Immigration Service officials in Bangkok quietly permitted adoptees from Phnom Penh to enter the United States in May (interviewee #109). Since development aid usually avoids war zones, larger amounts would not be forthcoming until the conflict reached a point of resolution, although fifty-two aid agencies, employing some 350 persons, were in Phnom Penh by the end of 1990, dispersing $36 million in aid (Becker 1991; Economist 1990i:33). A UNDP office opened and the Red Cross chartered a plane to fly to Phnom Penh for the first time in a decade.

Nearly all real estate was privatized in late 1989. All subsidies to government enterprises ended in December 1990; firms unable to show a profit were privatized in February 1991 (HSB 1991). An Australian firm, Overseas Telecommunications International (OTCI), established the first satellite ground station and planned to invest $10 million to modernize the telecommunications for the country (FEER 1991a:9–15). In all, thirty foreign corporations were starting to invest, including Shell and Total oil companies and another 70 projects were in the pipeline by mid-1991, including a branch of Siam Commerical Bank and a Peugeot showroom in Phnom Penh. Rice production was down 10 percent due to renewed fighting, and inflation skyrocketed (AP 1991a; FEER 1991a).

Tourism decreased due to the resurgence of fighting, but construction resumed on the four-star Cambodiana Hotel highrise along the riverbank. By mid-1990 the hotel was partly open for occupancy, and a French firm contracted to provide the management in early 1991. An Easter mass was held in Phnom Penh in 1990, the first in two decades.

The Hanoi–Phnom Penh air link terminated in the fall, so all air travel to Phnom Penh had to go through Ho Chi Minh City. In October new charter flights linked the capital with Bangkok (Bangkok Airways), Brussels

(Air Belgique), and Paris (Air Liberté). Phnom Penh Airways and Star Airways of Singapore joined in early 1991. Thai International, although granted landing rights in 1989, was more cautious. Phnom Penh's Classical Dance Company of Cambodia performed in England and the Netherlands in midsummer 1990 and received a visa to go to the United States on tour in the fall, where four members defected and many others received death threats (McAuliff 1990).

Eastern European countries, contributors to Phnom Penh's budget in the 1980s, learned that they could not join IMF unless they stopped aid to SOC (Washington Post 1990). Accordingly, one-fourth of the SOC civil service was laid off in May, anticipating an end of Soviet Bloc aid, estimated at 80 percent of the government's budget and half its military spending. During 1991, when the Soviet Union required all trade payments in hard currency, the country was expected to run out of gold reserves, whereupon it would depend upon Western emergency aid or would collapse. Moscow was asking Phnom Penh to repay its ruble debt in trees (interviewee #109), while granting $100 million in credits and $400 million in military aid (Cornwell 1990; UPI 1991c).

The Cambodian parliament, which planned elections in November 1989, postponed them twice and then cancelled them with the coming of the Tokyo conference. When the Australian initiative gathered support, elections were postponed again until early 1991, then to 1992 to give peace a chance (UPI 1991a). In the event of UN-supervised elections, Phnom Penh officials were betting on 80 percent of the votes, discounting entirely the fear that PDK cadres would coerce a victory, while US intelligence sources in Phnom Penh reported that SOC officials feared defeat in a truly free election (Desjardins 1989; interviewees #70, 86).

The SOC had held the country together in difficult times, and it had made important reforms. Now the Cambodian people were counting primarily on the CPAF to prevent a Polpotist victory. Hun Sen made regular visits to the countryside to increase his popularity and to improve the morale of the people under SOC rule. Both critics and friends of the regime, however, pointed to fancy houses and opulent clothing of some government officials, which were causing resentment. Deputy Premier Kung Sam Ol compared SOC corruption ("2 percent to 3 percent") with the Sihanouk and Lon Nol eras ("100 percent") (Hiebert 1989d; Stone 1990f).

In mid-December 1989, Hun Sen told a conference of ASEAN and Indochinese journalists at Phnom Penh that he and his Cabinet would resign to make way for UN-supervised elections, yet another concession. As for a coalition with PDK, the premier was unequivocal: "Even if I wished to deal with them, my countrymen would not allow it" (Carey 1989:13). It was the other side's turn for a concession.

The KPRP still would not change the constitution to allow a multiparty system, however. After a visit of Heng Samrin to Hanoi in May, supporters

of senior parliamentary leader Chea Sim ordered the arrest and purge of some forty KPRP members and non-KPRP officials close to reformist Premier Hun Sen while he was out of the country, although ringleader Cheam Sa-guan, deputy minister of justice, was too prominent to be purged (interviewee #131). Accused of attempting a coup (interviewee #109), the only visible evidence was that they were forming a new political party in anticipation of UN-sponsored elections (Economist 1990g; Lansner 1990). Since wizened KPRP leaders did not expect to win in UN-sponsored elections, they were taking measures to prevent a loss of power (Heder 1990b; interviewee #86). While Hun Sen's foreign ministry invited Asia Watch monitors to Phnom Penh in mid-1990 in order to clear up conflicting reports on human rights, the KPRP-controlled interior ministry denied the team the opportunity to inspect places of detention (Jones 1990). Wanting to retain partocracy at a time when multiparty elections were imminent seemed a blunder calculated to martyr those arrested. By September Hun Sen appeared to lose ground when he named Hor Nam Hong, a KPRP stalwart, as foreign minister. Meanwhile, PVOs were given greater latitude to operate in the provinces without bureaucratic bottlenecks (interviewee #110). Chea Sim, however, continued to speak out against corruption in the SOC government (Vickery 1990:8).

Hun Sen, meanwhile, continued to maintain diplomatic flexibility. At IMC he made yet another concession by agreeing that the UN could organize elections under the framework of the SNC. He continued to insist that the SOC would "stand aside" but would not be "dismantled" (US Senate 1990). His policy was supported by an Australian calculation that a UN administration from top to bottom would cost too much (Erlanger 1990d). Hun Sen also held out for the word "genocide" in the final peace agreement. His objective was to ensure that there were measures guaranteeing that Pol-potists would never return to power, so he was ready to accept the Perm Five compromise on the substitution of the words "human rights" in a final document (Hun Sen 1990). In mid-March Hun Sen agreed that PDK cadres could serve as members of the SNC, except for Pol Pot and seven of his closest associates (Hoagland 1990). He favored an interim role for the UN, provided that there would be no artificial hiatus that would enable the NADK to march victoriously into Phnom Penh.

CAMBODIAN OPTIONS

All four factions returned to the battlefield after Paris. By October CPAF was not as strong as had been hoped. The military effectiveness of troops supporting Sihanouk and Son Sann gradually evaporated. Only NADK was eager to pursue the military option. Although the four armies asked for outside aid, ANKI and KPNLA lost external support. Only the SOC sug-

gested a temporary or permanent partition of Cambodia along a cease-fire line, as the effect of the fighting was to divide the country in two.

Hun Sen welcomed Chatichai's mediation efforts, but Sihanouk did not go along until the spring of 1990; Son Sann tagged along. The PDK consistently refused mediation. Australia's quiet diplomacy reached all four parties; cooperation with this approach correlated exactly with the levels of enthusiasm accorded to Chatichai's mediation. The four parties attended IMC and accepted invitations to Tokyo in June, Jakarta in August, Bangkok in September, and Paris in December. In 1991 they reconvened at Beijing in March and Pattaya in July and August.

Hun Sen was overjoyed that sanctions against his regime were lifted by most Western countries. Sihanouk and Son Sann faced sanctions from China for not cooperating with NADK and sanctions by the United States when they did, so they had reason to oppose coercive diplomacy as well. NADK feared sanctions proposed by Thailand—to shut the border camps.

Sihanouk favored a maximum role for the UN. Son Sann agreed. Hun Sen did not want the UN to displace the SOC government, but his non-acceptance of a UN role melted. Canada's Sullivan allayed his fear that the General Assembly might run the country. In fall 1989 he preferred that the UN play a supervisory role only, but by spring 1990 he would allow the UN to organize and run elections, provided the SOC civil service could remain. Hun Sen had two remaining objections to a UN role—that the international body would bring in expatriate Cambodians who supported the other factions, and that NADK would take advantage of a weak UN authority to march to victory.

The SOC insisted on a condemnation of the genocide of Pol Pot as a part of the peace settlement. The aim was to take specific measures so that the regime that had terrorized the nation for four years would never reemerge. Hun Sen doubtless had the post–World War II denazification policy in mind. He appeared to accept the Red option, however, when China and Vietnam moved closer in 1991.

22

VIETNAM

VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Although China, the CNR, Singapore, and the United States vilified Vietnam for failing to compromise in Paris, delegates returned home to Hanoi aware that PAVN's willingness to withdraw from Cambodia was the primary reason for the conference, and they also knew that the SOC and SRV delegations were ready for more concessions than all other countries combined. Hanoi remained eager for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, bitter that the JIM process worked better than the UN and PCC processes, but stayed out of the limelight, awaiting initiatives from other countries. Foreign Minister Thach ultimately persuaded the Politburo to accept the idea of a UN control mechanism outside PCC, but this additional concession came in September, too late for an immediate impact on the peace process.

Hanoi went ahead with a military withdrawal from Cambodia on schedule. On September 26 the last 26,000 PAVN troops marched from Cambodia for home; some 25,300 comrades had died, and 55,000 had been seriously wounded (Erlanger 1989j). General Giap, who wanted the army recalled in 1980, was at Ho Chi Minh City to greet the returning soldiers.

Hanoi's official view of its decade in Cambodia was that it served the world community by driving Pol Pot out of Cambodia. Now its job was over, and it was up to the SOC to defend itself like any other government. If the rest of the world wanted to prevent Pol Pot from returning to power, it could do so. Hence, PAVN troops left neither in defeat nor in victory but with honor, perceiving that there cause was just. In any case, Cambodia would no longer drain resources from Vietnam, and the standing army was cut by half to 600,000 regulars (GEnie 1991e).

Although Premier Do Muoi expected a loss of up to 30 percent of Cambodian territory to the resistance (Stone 1990d:1), only 10 percent fell in the first few months. Vietnam reserved the option of returning in case Phnom

Penh so requested. Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thai noted that Vietnam would honor its twenty-five-year commitment to the Cambodian government. PAVN commanders were aware of KPRAF's poor performance earlier in 1989 (Becker 1989b), so there was no surprise when the military situation worsened one month later.

For years, Washington stated that normalization of relations with Vietnam hinged entirely on PAVN's pullout from Cambodia. After Paris, the Bush administration appeared to renege, relying on an obscure four-year-old statement of former Secretary of State Shultz (1985) that PAVN should withdraw in the context of a broader settlement. Instead, Bush decided to coerce Hanoi to exert its influence on Phnom Penh to admit the Polpotists to power in a transitional government, although Vietnam's major source of pressure had just marched out. In February, rumors of the secret return of PAVN combat troops to Cambodia in October did not occasion worldwide condemnation, both because they might be useful to contain NADK forces and because the rumors were untrue.

Vietnam cooperated with the initiatives of Chatichai and Evans but had no new plans to offer, feeling less involved. SRV officials embraced the idea of having the UN in a transitional arrangement, but they first awaited hints of policy shifts from Phnom Penh before agreeing to any new element in a peace settlement. Hanoi viewed the solution of the Cambodian civil war as intra-Cambodian and considered its own opinions of lesser relevance, although it obviously still supported the SOC.

There was an additional nuance in the transition. Vietnam had grown weary of the seemingly endless war. Hanoi was aware that the presence of PAVN uniforms in the country served to encourage Cambodians to enlist in the resistance forces, and it tired of Phnom Penh's "leave it to Nguyen" attitude about the war. Vietnam reasoned that the war dragged on because PRK failed to gain widespread legitimization among the Cambodian population. As every government must ultimately stand on its own, if the regime in Phnom Penh could not gain increased support after a decade, then it deserved to fall. Vietnam's army, in short, was not available to rescue an unpopular government.

In other words, the time had come for Vietnam to devote its attention to its own problems. The calculated risk was that Hanoi, having pulled out of Cambodia, would emerge from economic and political isolation.

The payoff came as had been hoped. Thai business executives moved quickly, although mostly to broker contracts with third countries, such as Japan. Aid officials from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, and New Zealand paid visits next, promising assistance. Even the US government relented, providing $250,000 in medical aid through PVOs in November 1990 and $1 million in April 1991 (FEER 1989k; Honolulu Advertiser 1991). In late December, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis became the first EC foreign minister to go to Hanoi since Cheysson nearly seven

years earlier. By February the Asian Development Bank put SRV projects back into the pipeline for detailed consideration, but US pressure prevented approval; ADB and the World Bank sent missions to Vietnam in 1990 to prepare for new loans, and an ADB technical assistance grant was approved in May 1991. France announced an increase in aid from $870,000 to $8 million (USIRP 1990). Although Vietnam resumed IMF loan repayments, repaying $32 million from January 1989 to mid-1990 (IP 1990p), the United States pressured Japan to veto a loan to Vietnam proposed by a consortium of banks organized by the Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur so that Vietnam could repay the remaining $146 million owed to the IMF (interviewee #53; Hiebert 1990j).[1] During May West Germany signed a cultural agreement on the eve of German economic and social unification, and in August Bonn assured Hanoi that it would continue aid formerly provided by East Germany (GEnie 1990i). Italy, ready to supply fiber-optic cables to modernize the telecommunication system, ran into a US veto at a meeting of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a body set up to prevent strategic technology from going to Soviet bloc countries (Hiebert 1990i). Australia's OTCI, however, proceeded to hook up a satellite system for improved telecommunications and agreed to invest $80 million (IP 1990p). A mission from the US Agency for International Aid (USAID) went to Vietnam in 1991.

In the fall a luxury floating hotel from Australia sailed for Saigon harbor, opening as the country's only five-star accommodation, while French firms were renovating hotels in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. In the spring Thach toured EC countries to promote investment for an industrious workforce that accepted minimum wages of less than $100 per month (Hodgson 1991:49). A government decree, urged by the IMF to prepare the way for foreign banks to operate, was among the factors prompting seven banks (one British, five French, and one Thai) to set up representative offices in Vietnam, but the first foreign bank to receive an operating license was Indovina, a joint venture with Indonesia's Bank Summa (Hiebert 1991c). US banks were allowed to have correspondent banks in Vietnam, which would facilitate the transfer of some $200 million in estimated remittances from relatives living in the United States (IP 1991e). In mid-1990 the SRV National Assembly amended the law on joint ventures to permit foreign corporations to form joint ventures with private companies or individuals (UPI 1990j). An international trade fair in Vietnam then attracted Hongkong and South Korean investors for the first time; Hongkong participants served as brokers for Singaporean investors (GEnie 1990e). The Investment Service Company of Ho Chi Minh City, founded in October 1988, announced that it had worked with 179 foreign business teams during its first eighteen months of operation. The firm had seven representative offices in Southeast Asia and Western Europe. From 1986 to 1989 a total of $1 billion in licenses had been signed, and another $2 billion in investments emerged during 1990

and 1991, with Britain and France accounting for half of the total (GEnie 1990b; Hiebert 1990k:72; GEnie 1991g). By mid-1990 only fourteen of thirty-three foreign investment projects in Ho Chi Minh City came onstream, however; all projects together accounted for $230.5 million in investment, promising jobs to more than 20,000 persons, with an output value of $110 million per year (IP 1990o). ADB (1990:123) expected investment to reach 10 percent of gross domestic product. Even so, as late as November 1990, Washington was blocking the sale of two Airbus planes to Vietnam through COCOM. United Press International, however, opened a bureau in Hanoi in February 1991 despite the US embargo (UPI 1991e).

Nonpetroleum investment was about the same as the sum for oil exploration. By mid-1990 Hanoi had signed six oil exploration contracts with Western countries for a total of nearly $0.4 billion (UPI 1990l), with more concessions under negotiation. Production was expected to increase from 50,000 barrels daily in 1990 to 700,000 later in the decade on the basis of estimated reserves of 20 billion barrels (Kyodo 1991a). Although production reached more than one-half of annual consumption needs in 1990, the country's refining capacity was inadequate (GEnie 1990h; IP 1991b). Its crude went primarily to Japan, but Tokyo observed a trade embargo and would not sell back refined oil. Although some crude also went to Singapore and Thailand, who sold back refined crude, Hanoi was 80 percent dependent on Soviet refined oil (GEnie 1990h), but that supply was down by nearly 30 percent (Hiebert 1991b). Following Australia-Indonesia and Malaysia-Thailand agreements (UPI 1990l), the state oil company, Petro-Vietnam, was eager to settle sea boundary disputes with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Republic of China, as more exploration contracts could then be signed. China's response to shelve the question of sovereignty over the Spratlys pending joint exploration for oil was an effort to isolate Vietnam, which had a superior military position in many of the islets (Chanda & Cheung 1990).

Imports from the Soviet bloc still accounted for most of Vietnam's $1.2 billion trade inflow, but imports from other sources made up for the decline in Warsaw bloc trade, increasing more than 60 percent to $0.5 billion (IP 1990k, 1991b). Compared to 1987, cargo volume doubled in 1990 in the port of Ho Chi Minh City (Hiebert 1991d:46).

While Vietnam was back in the business of receiving Western aid and conducting trade, Hanoi's economic restructuring was beginning to pay off. Economic growth increased in 1988 by 5.9 percent; in 1989 the rate was 8.2 percent (ADB 1990:119). Inflation plummeted from 400 percent in 1988 to 40 percent in 1989, and the rate fell to 3 percent for 1990 (ADB 1990:121; interviewee #14). With some 1.4 million tons of rice exports during 1989, Vietnam became the world's third largest exporter of rice (ADB 1990:121). Thai merchants enjoyed a commission by brokering sales (interviewee #49). Rice exports were going to China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; the

Philippines was signed up for 1990. Shipping services expanded to include a direct route from Vietnam to Hongkong, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan (IP 1990c, 1990l). Lufthansa, Malaysian Airlines, and Qantas began direct flights to Ho Chi Minh City in 1990. Hawaiian Airlines and Northwest Airlines began charter flights in 1991. US firms were lobbying Washington to repeal trade restrictions so that they could cash in on the bonanza. At the same time, new businesses in Vietnam were having a difficult time establishing markets; the local population was accustomed to regarding foreign products as being of higher quality than Vietnamese-manufactured products.

Eastern European countries were abandoning barter arrangements to import Vietnamese goods; all trade was to be in hard currency from 1991. Projections were for a reduction in Soviet bloc trade by $200 million (Hiebert 1991b). Moscow wanted to balance trade rather than suffer a one-way flow. In 1991, as trade with the Soviet Union began on a hard currency basis at world market prices, Laos and Vietnam followed suit (FEER 1991e).

During 1990 Hanoi retired half a million workers when state corporations shut down (Reuter 1990d). The resulting unemployment did not prevent a continuation of economic reforms, including the right of any citizen to set up a business of any size, the abolition of preferential pricing by state enterprises, and an acceptance of joint venture partners controlling more than half of a corporation's assets. Fifty laws of this sort were adopted from mid-1988 to early 1991 (Reuter 1991a), including one that allowed foreigners to own property in Vietnam.

New Western overtures, including $20 million from UNDP, arrived as the Soviet Union decided to reduce the annual aid of $5 billion by 10 percent for 1990 in light of *perestroika* priorities, and a 50 to 75 percent cut was rumored for 1991 (interviewees #75, 134, 138; IP 1990k). When 1991 came, Soviet aid was reduced to $10 million, and credits (primarily for ongoing infrastructure projects) were cut to $100 million. Loan repayment terms for $18 billion in loans (Weisburd 1990a) were to be raised from 2.5 percent to the world commercial rate. Hanoi responded to the cuts by stating that it would have to use the assistance more efficiently in the future (Economist 1989e), and it adopted an income tax as well as luxury taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, firecrackers, and playing cards to make up for expected revenue shortfalls. A 40 percent reduction in Soviet fertilizer aid meant that rice production in 1990 and 1991 lagged behind the 1989 level (Hiebert 1991b:25). Hoarding led to increased prices for rice (Weisburd 1990b), and Vietnam defaulted on rice shipments to the Philippines (FEER 1990g:6). In the perilous transition to a market economy inflation reemerged, credit cooperatives collapsed, and smuggling from Singapore and Thailand was estimated to be at 60 percent of retail goods (Hiebert 1990e: 20).

The Soviet Union recalled airforce bombers and naval vessels from Cam Ranh Bay in early 1990, with 1992 as a projected date for a total pullout

of warships. Party Secretary Linh invited ships from Japan and the United States to dock after normalization of relations (IP 1990d).

As Eastern European countries embarked on capitalist reforms, most of the 280,000 Vietnamese guestworkers expected to be sent home when their contracts expired without replacements, placing $300 million in annual remittances in jeopardy (ADB 1990:124). Hanoi then explored alternative host countries in the Middle East, including Iraq, and Western Europe (AFP 1990c; Hiebert 1990b; Smutny 1990). While Washington fantasized that Soviet bloc developments might isolate Hanoi, the Vietnamese Communist Party's analysis—equally full of fantasy—was that radical changes were occurring in Eastern Europe because CIA operatives stirred discontent in those countries, which failed to embark on the economic reforms already in place in Vietnam (IP 1990l; Morrow 1990).[2]

As the year progressed, the party cracked down on dissent, removing reformer Tran Xuan Bach from the Politburo in March, even though he retained his car, high salary, and villa as if having been put on ice for a later liberalization (FEER 1990c). Meanwhile, some 8,600 persons with "reactionary documents" reportedly went to reeducation camps from January to April, and some 6,000 more were allegedly arrested in May (Economist 1990j; Hiebert 1990e). Although Hanoi disputed these figures, the crackdown abated throughout the year due to the adverse international criticism. In October Bui Tin, deputy editor of the VCP newspaper, fled to Paris. As an officer at Dienbienphu and the commander who accepted the SOV surrender in 1975, his defection represented a serious blow to the prestige of the party and a signal that political reforms were not in the cards for the foreseeable future.

As if there were not enough unbelievable stories about Vietnam in circulation, the Thai Ministry of Interior presented evidence at the end of May that too many US naval warships were bringing in Vietnamese "boat people" in the past year to be a mere coincidence (UPI 1990h). The inference was that CIA agents in Ho Chi Minh City, informed of naval voyage routings and dates, had been organizing a refugee smuggling operation.

Hanoi refused an offer of UK aid in exchange for involuntary repatriation of "boat people" who had recently taken refuge in Hongkong. Vietnam's rationale was that such a policy was inhumane; the United States was opposed—for essentially the same reason. Hanoi enjoyed the novelty of siding with the United States on a matter where Washington disagreed with the world community, as most countries realized that Vietnamese economic migrants were fleeing a country denied war reconstruction aid because of US policies. The EC later gave aid to support voluntary repatriation.

Whereas I personally encountered a sense of urgency about normalizing relations with the United States during my trip to Vietnam in mid-1988, the subject hardly came up when I returned in early 1990. The mood was

one of relief and satisfaction that Hanoi was making the right decision, was reaping the benefit, and that better times were ahead. Hanoi's view was that it needed to be patient until Washington adopted a more reasonable policy (interviewee #67). SRV decisionmakers were galled when Assistant Secretary of State Solomon mendaciously denounced them for failing to make concessions at Paris, but they wanted to face a new future, not to dwell on the past.

Vietnam was active again in diplomacy on Cambodia when IMC convened at Jakarta during the end of February. Embittered over the West's refusal to agree to neutralize Cambodia, Hanoi supported a Lao proposal to place acceptance of ZOPFAN within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. In addition, Thach insisted that the term "genocide" appear in the text of a future agreement, contrary to the PRC's recent effort in the Perm Five to exclude even the use of the more neutral term "human rights." Thach also took back his earlier acceptance of a UN role in an interim authority, pending a clear definition of what that body would do. On specifics regarding an interim Cambodian authority, Hanoi stuck by its decade-long view that this was an internal matter to be settled among Cambodians. The SRV aim was to win back points won at the two JIMs but lost at PCC and through Perm Five negotiations. When IMC was deadlocked, Hanoi immediately blamed the Polpotists.

Perseverance better described efforts to reach a *rapprochement* with China. After two meetings in 1989, Hanoi was waiting for Beijing to resume talks on issues in dispute. PLA and PAVN armies pulled back forty kilometers from the border, without an agreement, to show that the defense ministries wanted a détente if the foreign ministers were unable to proceed; in some military sectors the initiative came from China, and in others the move was from Vietnam, according to Thach (interviewee #12). In March 1990, Vietnam allowed the PRC ambassador to Hanoi to visit Ho Chi Minh City to contact members of the ethnic Chinese community. In April, Hanoi sent Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem to Beijing for an "inspection" of the SRV embassy, a trip that developed into discussions with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and a return visit to Hanoi by China's Perm Five representative, Assistant Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin, in June. Although Hanoi for the first time agreed to discuss internal aspects of a Cambodian settlement, SRV support for allowing the SOC to remain in place during a transition was not what China wanted to hear (Hoagland 1990). On the other hand, party leader Nguyen Van Linh thanked both China and the Soviet Union for their help in wars against France and the United States during May celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth, a gesture to let bygones by bygones. In September Party leaders of both countries met at Chengdu, China, so as to bypass Sinophobe Thach. Both sides agreed to stop arming their clients in Cambodia in the event of a comprehensive peace settlement, and border trade moved from the shopping

bag to the truck convoy stage with $100 million in 1990 and thrice that amount expected in 1991 as détente picked up steam (FEER 1991b).

Vietnam realized that a Cambodian security buffer would exist whether the SOC was dominant or was weakened by an insurgency. Since the Soviet bloc was less likely to aid a peaceful SOC than Japan and Western countries, Cambodia would inevitably accommodate itself to the interests of Japan, Thailand, and Western countries. Observers at IMC decoded Vietnam's continuing call to "respect the sovereignty of Cambodia" as allowing the four warring parties to continue to squabble; the result would be that no faction would prevail, and Cambodia would remain weak. SRV scolding of SOC at Jakarta for being reasonable evidently was a tactic both to rein in Hun Sen and to warn other countries that they would have to pursue a separate peace with Phnom Penh, without either Hanoi or the Polpotists, or face a Cambodia permanently Finlandized to Vietnam. In response, Vietnam was not invited to peace negotiations for the rest of the year. Nonetheless, Thach welcomed the formation of the Supreme National Council, stating that Vietnam would support whatever agreement emerged from intra-Cambodian negotiations.

At the end of the year Indonesian President Suharto went to Hanoi, a visit acclaimed by the Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper as the "most outstanding event" of 1990 (Bangkok Post 1991c). He was the first head of state outside Indochina to go to Vietnam in more than a decade. With the Soviet bloc receding in importance, the foreign ministry abolished the separate division for Warsaw bloc countries, consolidating it with the European bureau (FEER 1990m). As the US trade embargo was almost totally ignored, Vietnam began 1991 with a return to the policy of equidistance of 1975–1976; it needed assistance from all nations. In 1991, as Thach was relieved of his duties as foreign minister, a Sino-Vietnamese consensus converged on Hun Sen's peace plan. The alternative was a UN–sponsored election that would bring democratic reforms too close to Beijing and Hanoi.

VIETNAMESE OPTIONS

PAVN soldiers undeniably left Cambodia by the end of September. US intelligence confirmed that no PAVN uniforms were to be seen. Signals intelligence satellites reported no command-and-control communications between the fighting in Cambodia and PAVN authorities. The NCR's claim that as many as 50,000 Vietnamese soldiers changed into SOCAF uniforms lacked credibility (Ehrlich 1990). In any case, Hanoi had tired of the military option.

Vietnam, thus, was providing technical support to Cambodia, but at greatly reduced levels. The encapsulation option enjoyed high priority in Hanoi, but the world community tacitly approved of PAVN aid to Cambodia in any form whatsoever in order to stop NADK's advance.

The idea of partition was not new to Vietnam, which tolerated half a loaf at the Geneva Conference in 1954. SRV leaders asked the Thais to mediate on their behalf with China, and they supported Bangkok's mediatory efforts to bring peace to Cambodia. Thach cooperated fully with Australia's quiet diplomacy, and it was happy to attend IMC. Thach's performance at IMC, in which he tuned up the rhetoric and appeared to bully Hun Sen, dramatized the need for intra-Cambodian conference diplomacy over regional or international dialogues.

Expecting a full lifting of sanctions, Hanoi was disappointed when Washington continued the economic embargo and did not proceed toward normalization of diplomatic relations. But aid trickled in from other sources anyway. Vietnam wanted sanctions lifted from the SOC as well.

Hanoi cagily refused to commit itself to specifics on the Cambodian peace settlement, leaving the matter to the Cambodians. Thach appeared less interested than Hun Sen in a UN role at IMC. On the condemnation of the Pol Pot regime, Vietnam was adamant about using the word "genocide" in the text of a political settlement but had no interest in pursuing the matter through the World Court. Hanoi's main interest in the issue was political vindication of its decade-long military action.

NOTES

1. The IMF expelled Vietnam in 1985 for nonpayment of a loan to settle accounts for ROV debts. The SRV wanted to resume membership in 1989.

2. Oliver North acknowledged in mid-1990 that the CIA played some sort of role in sewing seeds for revolts in Eastern Europe, so a US embassy in Hanoi could serve a similar purpose (IP 1990j).

23

CHINA

CHINESE POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Although China appeared to play an objective role at the Paris conference, refraining from propaganda and recriminations, a peace settlement might have been politically unpalatable. Its alliance with ASEAN and Thailand would go into the history books, and Beijing would have lost its leverage against Vietnam. Since China only had the "Pol Pot card" to play, that was the sole game it wanted to pursue. In Paris, PRC delegates found that they were not pariahs because of the Tiananmen incident, although Beijing and Washington were no longer serving as each other's proxy in regard to Cambodia. After the conference, China joined the chorus of fingerpointers blaming Hanoi for not pressuring Hun Sen, who was assumed to be a mere puppet of Vietnam, to accept Pol Pot back in Phnom Penh.

When PAVN troops paraded out of Cambodia, Beijing declared the performance to be a sham. China claimed without proof that light-skinned Vietnamese had changed uniforms or otherwise slipped into the Vietphobic countryside to fight dark-skinned Khmers. PRC arms shipments to NADK resumed in September and increased in quality and quantity during the first half of 1990 despite the wishes of the two superpowers (Becker 1990a). Beijing refused to supply ANKI and KPNLA forces unless they agreed to coordinate their battle plans with NADK, while Washington threatened to terminate NCR aid if they agreed to this coordination.

Although steps toward a Sino-Vietnamese détente began in 1989, many issues remained to be discussed. China awaited concessions from Hanoi on Cambodia. In early 1990 Beijing allowed only 6,000 Vietnamese per day (Steward 1990:23) to buy small amounts of consumer goods at the border (Kazer 1990), but trade increased as relations improved. PRC leaders even denied SRV reports that troops on both sides had pulled back forty kilometers from the Sino-Vietnamese border (Hoagland 1990). Due to a re-

shuffle in leadership after the June 4 massacre near Tiananmen Square, there was more concern with consolidating domestic sources of power and avoiding international sanctions than in making concessions on an issue with so many strategic ramifications (P. Smith 1990:12).

On the other hand, Beijing was no longer attacking Hanoi for being an Asian "Cuba" at its soft underbelly, and China became Vietnam's second largest customer with its purchases of rice. When the Soviets reduced aid to Vietnam, China offered $2 billion in aid, provided Hanoi would agree to the PRC plan for Cambodia and would hold out against political reforms (Steward 1990: 24). In May 1990, Vietnam made a conciliatory gesture by approving exit visas for the wife and daughter of Hoang Van Hoan to go to China, where he had defected a decade earlier (FEER 1990d). Within a few days the Sino-Vietnamese dialogue resumed, when Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh visited Beijing. In June SRV athletes were allowed to cross the land border to the Asian Games in Beijing, and China Travel Service began to book tours to Vietnam. Rhetoric on both sides was turned down.

Congress imposed a trade embargo after the June 4 massacre, and the rest of the world followed suit. During 1990 China was in the midst of a serious economic downturn, so the PRC reduced imports by 20 percent (Beecher 1990). A reform that allowed foreign investors to have controlling interest in a joint venture, with no subsequent requirement for repatriation of assets to China, passed nearly unnoticed. France was brokering negotiations between Beijing and Hanoi so that China would have access on the Red River through Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin (Muskie 1990:14), but the deal awaited more normal Sino-Vietnamese relations. Japan and the United States blocked $490 million of PRC loans in the ADB and an equal amount in the World Bank, and Japan held up $5.1 billion in bilateral loans (do Rosario 1990:16; Economist 1990i:34; Friedland 1990:58). Beijing placed a higher priority on economics than on Cambodia due to these uncertainties and was relieved when Bush gave Deng the assurance that he was China's "friend forever" in December 1989 at a time when the Moody index had lowered the PRC rating from A3 to BAAA1 (Mirsky 1990:21–22). After Bush decided to renew China's "most-favored nation" trade status in May, Tokyo cleared its resumption of $5.4 billion in aid to China, and $500 million in World Bank loans were released (FEER 1990i:57). The ADB followed suit.

PRC leaders, ready to drop the Polpotists if Vietnam would forgo a dominant position in Cambodia, continued to justify its continued support for NADK by arguing that Pol Pot would never repeat the "universally condemned policies" of the past. PRC policy was still pro-PDK, according to Sihanouk (Kristof 1990). China's offer for joint exploration of the Spratlys before considering conflicting claims of sovereignty was similar to a Sino-Japanese agreement over the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands.

When Chatichai arrived in Beijing in October 1989, PRC leaders ex-

pressed unwillingness to cut off arms to the NADK, thereby rejecting the "Baker initiative." As Moscow was the author of the encapsulation option, the tables were turned: Cambodia was an issue impeding Sino-Soviet normalization because of PRC, not Soviet, intransigence. China continued to ship weapons to the three resistance armies but incurred US displeasure only for NADK aid (UPI 1990g).

Concerning Evans' proposal for a UN administration in Cambodia, Beijing did not make a clear response. In early 1990, when the Perm Five met, China tried unsuccessfully to veto any mention of human rights issues, doubtless testing whether the other four major powers were still angry with Beijing over Tiananmen Square. When Washington dropped the quadripartite interim government option after February, so did Beijing, which endorsed a multiparty election for Cambodia while denying one in China (Pomonti 1990). PRC diplomats made grudging concessions in the Perm Five process. In September, after finding Thach an unsuitable interlocutor, party officials on both sides met in Chengdu to establish the framework for a détente, but the meeting was only preliminary. Thach's subsequent statements irritated the Chinese, who wanted him removed and got their wish in 1991.

The main PRC objective remained a Cambodia that would be truly independent of Vietnam. If the UN supervised an election in Cambodia, PRC diplomats promised to stop aiding NADK if PDK lost; this was the only way Beijing could disengage from Cambodia and still save face after some fifteen years of support for the Polpotists (Richburg 1989c). In November China announced that its last arms shipment had left the country for Cambodia. But "tons of ammunition" were still flowing to NADK in early 1991 (Beckaert 1991; GEnie 1991b; Spindler 1990), and PLA advisers to NADK remained (interviewee #136).

While the policy of "bleeding" Vietnam was easing, China itself was suffering from international sanctions and appeared willing to trade influence in Cambodia for a resumption of normal aid, investment, and trade. Bush refused to apply this type of pressure.

In the event of elections, Beijing wanted the KPRP to obtain as few seats as possible. One way to do this was to dismantle the SOC; another method was to insist that PDK must be free to run candidates, knowing that it could control voters in many areas of the country and thus would win a few seats in parliament. Elections therefore would legitimize PDK. If Pol Pot won enough seats to remain a thorn in Vietnam's side, Beijing would be satisfied. While Cambodia remained in turmoil, China's influence in the region would be maximized.

During post-Paris peace negotiations, thus, China was slow to make concessions but did not want to appear to block progress in narrowing the issues under dispute and thereby risk alienating US support. The PDK was China's only proxy left, so there was a reluctance to sell Pol Pot down the river. Hardline policies and geostrategic considerations united the PDK and

the PRC. By stonewalling, Beijing could deny both the SOC and the SRV a victory.

CHINESE OPTIONS

The PLA pulled back from the border with Vietnam after PAVN troops left Cambodia. China had more interest in a détente with the Soviet Union than in wasting its funds on combat pay for soldiers when the PRC was experiencing worldwide censure for the massacre near Tiananmen Square. At the same time, Chinese leaders continued to arm the NADK. Claims that PAVN soldiers had merely changed into SOCAF uniforms were used to reject the encapsulation option. Beijing would not abandon Pol Pot.

China wanted to keep diplomatic channels open but appeared unwilling to compromise. Beijing did not go along with Chatichai's efforts to mediate in view of its commitment to the NADK; Australia also discovered PRC diplomats eager to protect their sole Cambodian pawn. In the Perm Five process Beijing resisted compromise at first, but it felt impelled to join a consensus because its interlocutors were considering additional sanctions against the "butchers of Beijing," to use Stephen Solarz's alliterative phrase. Chinese leaders, thus, wanted sanctions lifted against their country and could no longer urge others to impose them on Cambodia and Vietnam, the latter having become Beijing's latest ricebowl. Instead, there were PRC sanctions on the NCR for failing to cooperate with the NADK. The "butchers," who tried to tell Hun Sen at Paris that the killing fields were "ancient history," were still reluctant within the Perm Five to state that human rights should be respected in a postwar Cambodia.

China was for a role for the UN, as this would strip away any legitimacy for the SOC, but Beijing did not want to bankroll this option. The ideal scenario was for a Cambodia that would not Finlandize to Vietnam. When the interim quadripartite government plan gave way to an elections option, Beijing insisted that the PDK should run in elections organized by the UN in order to weaken Vietnam's hold on the SOC.

Beijing wanted Hanoi to leave Cambodia alone and knew that NADK recruitment would wane when Vietnam backed off. The best way to disabuse Hanoi of any ambition to dominate Phnom Penh was continuing support for Pol Pot until Chinese leaders, in consultation with their Vietnamese counterparts in 1991, realized that a UN–administered Cambodia would place the outcome of "free and fair" elections up for auction. Rather than both losing to the NCR, they agreed in mid-1991 to a minimal UN role.

24

THE SUPERPOWERS

US POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

President Bush's successful presidential campaign focused for a time on a murder committed by a dangerous criminal while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison; his opponent, the governor of that state, was accused of being soft on crime. But after Paris, Bush continued to grant an indefinite furlough to the genocidal Pol Pot. Washington's seeming compulsion to force Vietnam to admit defeat did not succeed, however. Assistant Secretary of State Solomon (1989) blamed Hanoi for the failure of the Paris conference, while refusing to admit that Pol Pot had committed genocide (Stone 1989d). Solomon even opposed a UN force to monitor a PAVN troop withdrawal unless it was part of a "comprehensive political settlement," a codeword for including Polpotists in an interim government, which Vietnam was asked to pressure the SOC to accept. The Bush administration, while opposed to a role for the Palestine Liberation Organization in an interim UN administration of Palestine along with the Israeli government, was asking the SOC to give up power to a similar body that would put Polpotists back in Phnom Penh. Some right-wingers, notably Michael Horowitz, were questioning why Bush was appeasing a hardline regime in China rather than cooperating with Hun Sen, who was a free market proponent.

As the contradictions in US policy mounted, Washington was not ready for the imminent departure of PAVN troops from Cambodia in September 1989, as NADK was expected to make immediate gains. Solomon (1989) found himself implying that Hanoi should stay in Cambodia so that the civil war would not resume and Hanoi would retain leverage over Phnom Penh. Clearly, Washington did not expect SOCAF soldiers to outfight Pol Pot's hordes. The Bush administration, while opposing an embargo of the "butchers of Beijing," shipped military aid to Pol Pot's allies despite a State

Department cable attesting to ANS–NADK military cooperation in violation of US law (US Embassy, Beijing 1989:3), while continuing an embargo against the SOC and Vietnam, governments that were then experiencing some improvements in human rights.

Hanoi wanted normal relations with Washington, including an exchange of ambassadors. Three US presidents had opposed normalization principally because Vietnam was illegally occupying Cambodia. Then, in September 1989, the US government announced that there would be no normalization of relations with Vietnam even after PAVN troops left Cambodia. An apparent bait-and-switch tactic emerged, with Washington arguing unexpectedly that Hanoi was first responsible for arranging for a comprehensive political settlement,[1] although US chicanery at Paris blocked such a settlement in order to preserve a strategic relationship with China that was faltering in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident. Baker's speech at Paris opposed the inclusion of the PDK in an interim arrangement, but US delegates backed the interim quadripartite government option. As Hanoi had reacted angrily to such punitiveness in the past,[2] Washington in due course must have been amazed when Vietnam continued to cooperate fully on the issue of identifying American soldiers missing in action.

During September the Bush administration considered whether to supply additional aid to the non-Communist resistance. Congress, however, argued strongly that additional escalation was contrary to the wishes of the American people, who opposed a return of Pol Pot to power (Awanohara 1989b). Representative Chester Atkins (1989) asked the State Department to pressure Sihanouk to dissociate himself from the PDK. His colleague Jim Leach (1989) renewed a call for an international tribunal to try Pol Pot. Neither suggestion evoked a response from Foggy Bottom. Subsequent congressional grilling caused the State Department to admit in September that Pol Pot had committed genocide in Cambodia and that it was US policy to oppose a role for the Polpotists in any future Cambodian government (US DOS 1989).

Meanwhile, Sihanouk's statements reverted to PDK rhetoric, and the Prince faded away as an active figure in the dialogue. Washington dropped a pro-Sihanouk policy in the direction of what loomed as a pro–Pol Pot policy because of continued support for the latter's NCR allies (Pear 1989b). In March 1990, Pol Pot's radio station said that US policy was "very correct," and Sihanouk noted that some US officials "appreciate the efficiency" of the NADK (ABC-TV 1990:2).

In October 1989, US military personnel strutted along the Cambodian border, training the NCR on the use of new antitank weapons, although NADK troops could easily masquerade as "NCR" (Stein 1991). Reportedly, some $20 million in supplies began to flow to the ANS and the KNPLA, the latter noting in public that the assistance was supposed to be covert (Bangkok Post 1989e; Erlanger 1989a; Thayer 1989b). The State Department vehemently denied that US aid was reaching the NADK,[3] but there

was of course no way to prevent NCR or Thai army personnel from making such a sale on the sly. Weapons were rumored to be stored in US Agency for International Development warehouses (Beckaert 1989a:291; Stein 1991). In due course a former Green Beret reported that US army superiors had ordered him to destroy documents proving that US military personnel in Thailand were selling weapons on the black market with the approval of the NSC and the Thai government (IP 1990g).

Washington sat on its hands during the period of Chatichai's diplomacy. US diplomats expressed relief when Siddhi indicated that the Thai foreign ministry would not follow through. Chatichai extended a challenge to the United States, saying that if the United States wanted to make up what it had lost during a decade of war in Vietnam, now was the time to do so by making investments, but Bush ignored his junior alliance partner (IP 1990e). US restrictions on travel to Cambodia and Vietnam were tighter under President Bush than under President Reagan, thereby rebuffing Chatichai's suggestion.

The so-called Baker Initiative was the first hint of a new policy. Baker wanted China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam to stop aiding their proxies in Cambodia; the US government promised to do likewise. As the resistance forces were then gobbling up slivers of territory and driving back the CPAF, the premise of the Baker Initiative was that its implementation would ultimately imperil SOC military security. The Baker Initiative, a nonstarter when it was promptly rejected by China, was a response to the call for a new policy when Washington was seeking to convene the Perm Five as a means to pressure China and the Soviet Union to bring their clients into line. Although Baker tried to get the Perm Five going as early as September, the USSR did not consent to use this channel for negotiations until December, when it was assured that China would be reasonable. Meanwhile, Baker took flak on his nonpolicy toward Cambodia.

A storm of domestic discontent with the Bush administration's policy toward Cambodia erupted on November 29. A petition, signed by 203 members of Congress, asked Baker to identify a policy that would deny a role for Pol Pot in a future Cambodia (FEER 1989j). The US government was still backing a new version of the interim quadripartite government option, believing that a lightly armed UN presence could prevent Pol Pot from retaking power in the transition (Twining 1990). Due to disagreements inside the Bush administration, wherein NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted to continue to "bleed" Vietnam while Secretary of State James Baker preferred a diplomatic solution (Colhoun 1990a), there was again no clarion response to this pressure (interviewee #73).

The Treasury Department, however, lifted a prohibition on humanitarian aid by PVOs to Vietnam. In mid-November 1989 the US Department of Veterans Affairs donated $250,000 of medical supplies to PVOs, with the knowledge that the latter would send them to Vietnam. The United States was back in the business of aiding Vietnam. Other examples of the easing

of Treasury Department restrictions included allowing UPI to open a news bureau in Hanoi, permitting US banks to establish links with correspondent banks in Vietnam, and doubling the *per diem* allotment for US visitors to Vietnam from $100 to $200, whereupon business executives could stay in the luxury floating hotel in the harbor of Ho Chi Minh City. Similar policies were not applied to Cambodia until 1991, when restrictions on PVOs also eased (US National Archives 1991:4671). The trade embargo originally instituted against the DK regime was still imposed on its sole adversary, the State of Cambodia.

During late 1989, when US officials objected to a UK trip to Cambodia to consider humanitarian government aid to Cambodia, London went ahead. To keep the pressure on Vietnam to swallow Cambodian quadripartism, the United States asked Japan to join in vetoing loans to Vietnam through the ADB, IMF, and a consortium of banks led by the French government. The US government maintained its opposition to ADB and World Bank loans to Vietnam in order to hamper European and Japanese firms from getting a head start in investment (GEnie 1991f). By May 1990, US officials proposed that countries delinquent in repaying IMF loans should be stripped of their voting rights and forced to sell their gold reserves, a provision that would adversely impact Cambodia, Vietnam, and nine other destitute Third World countries (Crutsinger 1990).

The only apparent motive for US policy, according to many ASEAN and Western diplomats whom I interviewed during the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, appeared to be that if the United States could not win in Indochina, nobody else would be allowed to do so either. This harsh judgment overlooked the fact that Washington did want a settlement—but not one that would risk alienating Beijing. With Europe moving closer to the Soviet Union, US world leadership was increasingly expendable, so one consideration was that a Sino-American partnership would save Washington from global diplomatic marginalization. US investors in China, including the president's brother, were doubtless grateful for Bush's reluctance to impose sanctions on post-Tiananmen China, as some $1 billion in US investments were at stake (interviewees #85, 90). But a different set of US investors, including former ARVN commander Nguyen Cao Ky, awaited the word to pour money into Vietnam (Awanohara 1990a; Cohen 1989; interviewee #85).

Solarz reiterated his idea for a proposed UN trusteeship for Cambodia when Australia's Evans went to Washington in early October. Baker, while trying to organize a Perm Five peace process concerning Cambodia (interviewee #40), believed that Vietnam's position was deteriorating due to CMEA's collapse within Eastern Europe (Vatikiotis 1990c). Washington still imagined that Phnom Penh danced to Hanoi's tune, relying on informants inside the SOC who reported that Hun Sen feared elections (interviewee #86). The Bush administration's policy was to prop up the NCR

and to condone the NADK until the SOC returned to the bargaining table. But the record was clear: Hun Sen had been trying to negotiate for several years, while the resistance repeatedly refused to make concessions to advance the peace process.

In early 1990, the State Department warned the NCR to steer clear of NADK as reports of collusion surfaced (AFP 1990f; Tran 1990). Lobbyists asked the Bush administration to drop support for the CNR because it included the Polpotists. A group named the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge emerged, with Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, as a principal organizer. In February the House voted 413 to 0 to urge the Bush administration to drop the "quadripartite government" option in favor of a "United Nations–supervised interim administration" option. During hearings in the Senate, the State Department's Lambertson admitted that the policy was changing, although it was clear between the lines that Beijing was stonewalling Washington on Cambodia.

By March, after learning that the NADK was coordinating with the NCR forces, using CIA photos of CPAF army positions (Jennar 1990:2), some 26 senators and 117 representatives signed a petition to press for a new policy (Colhoun 1990c). Former CIA director William Colby suggested that non-UN international observers could supervise SOC elections, following the example of Nicaragua, which had just voted out the Sandinista party. Once legitimized, the SOC could ask PAVN to crush the NADK and the world would applaud, according to Colby (US Senate 1990).

Baker's subordinates contributed to progress through Perm Five meetings by adopting the Namibia formula of "free and fair" elections in which PDK would be a participating party and SOC would be dismantled so that the KPRP would not have an edge over rival parties. The Bush administration's argument remained that the Polpotists might push for a military solution if they felt excluded (Stone 1990c), although PDK policy was to fight whether excluded or included.

Bush administration officials continued to throw cold water on efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict that disputed the official view that PDK had to be included in a settlement. In March, when Chatichai proposed closing the border camps, US officials worked to undermine the idea, claiming that they could not pressure China to stop aid to NADK (Wedel 1990). But China was trying its utmost at the time to get economic sanctions lifted despite a failure to improve human rights after the June 1989 massacre in Beijing.

Since the PDK seemed opposed to any compromise, many Washingtonians believed that support for the SOC was the only alternative to inconclusive diplomacy, while more Cambodians suffered. Solarz (1990) felt that the United States would have to legitimize Hun Sen if China would not pressure Pol Pot to compromise.

On April 26, Peter Jennings of ABC-TV emceed a documentary, "From

the Killing Fields," an Americanized version of John Pilger's "Cambodia: Year Ten," a documentary presented to the Australian and British publics in October 1989. In the live discussion that followed, a particularly eloquent point stated by four women (Overseas Adoption Director Cherie Clark, President Donna Shalala of the University of Wisconsin, Susan Walker of Handicap International, and actress Liv Ullmann) was that Cambodian children were in agony because of the US embargo of humanitarian aid, which Foggy Bottom feared might make the SOC look good. Following the broadcast, several senators proposed an amendment to the budget for $5 million to aid Cambodian children and victims of war. USAID (1989), which had been helping children in the NCR camps already, hinted that it would interpret such legislation as permitting aid to youngsters trapped in border camps inside Thailand, where the CNR denied their parents permission to return to their native land (McGrory 1990).

Despite US pressure to stop aiding NADK, China continued to ship weapons to the resistance (UPI 1990g). In late May, Bush extended most-favored-nation trade status to the PRC, arguing that this would encourage human rights reforms, although China's human rights situation had not improved since the June 4 incident at Tiananmen Square. Solomon, however, disingenuously justified a continued aid and trade embargo against the SOC and the SRV to force economic and political reforms—in spite of warnings from a US business executive, who was detained in Vietnam for three weeks, that only a lifting of the embargo would stem the pace of Hanoi's ongoing political crackdown by Vietnamese leaders who assumed that nonrecognition after PAVNs withdrawal signalled a US policy to undermine the SRV (Morrow 1990; Nhu 1990). US officials then applied the screws to Eastern European countries, newly liberated from Communist Party rule, by insisting on an end of aid to Phnom Penh if they wanted to join the World Bank (Washington Post 1990:30).

At the end of May, a US Immigration Service official in Bangkok (an employee of the Department of Justice, not the Department of State) quietly decided to grant entry visas for five Cambodian orphans to join foster parents in the United States under the program of World Family Hawaii, headed by Dr. Daniel Sussott. Senator George Mitchell, on behalf of a family in his home state of Maine, then wrote Thai immigration officials to urge that the adoptees be allowed to transit in Thailand after they left Cambodia for Laos. Washington also approved visas for Phnom Penh's Classical Dance Company of Cambodia to go on tour in September. Harassed by Cambodian resistance supporters after they arrived, many members of the troupe received death threats, and four decided to defect in order to join their families in the United States. When the troupe requested protection, the State Department instead interrogated them to ascertain why all the troupe failed to request political asylum (McAuliff 1990).

Bush administration officials pushed a $7 million appropriation of covert

nonlethal military aid to the NCR through the House with a vote of 260–163 in late June. The Senate Intelligence Committee then vetoed this covert aid unless it was pre-cleared with Congress (FEER 1990e; Sutter 1991:8). In July Baker agreed to talk to SRV officials regarding Cambodia. Subsequently, the Treasury Department eased licensing requirements on PVO aid to Cambodia and Vietnam. For 1990, PVOs from the United States furnished $11 million in aid to Vietnam (interviewee #137). In September the General Accounting Office reported that there was no way to prevent NCR aid from reaching the NADK. In October the two houses agreed to $20 million in nonmilitary aid, to be used for humanitarian programs throughout all Cambodia that would expand when peace returned to the country (AP 1991b; IP 1990g), but the Bush administration blocked a USAID needs assessment mission to Phnom Penh authorized by Congress. While the rest of the world was hoping for diplomacy on Cambodia, some White House officials, in short, were still hung up on the issue of military aid and bleeding the SOC and Vietnam.

Clearly, the ideal world model for Washington was a world of stable countries headed by friends of the United States. Wherever an anomaly emerged, US policy was to change the situation, not to adjust. The active methods for changing the situation included bombings, bribes, CIA subversion, sanctions, and troops; a passive method was to wait until US-supported opportunists toppled a disliked regime. As all the active methods had failed in Cambodia, the policy appeared to be a waiting game. Hun Sen would become decreasingly popular, the Bush administration reasoned in light of Nicaragua, to the extent that US-inspired sanctions caused more suffering (interviewee #57).

But those sanctions were being lifted by a more assertive world, one that decreasingly needed the US nuclear umbrella. Accordingly, the best strategy was to have elections in Cambodia with as many political parties as possible so that no faction would command a majority; a coalition government would be necessary, and a compromise candidate would assume power. As Sihanouk was no longer considered pliable, Washington's favored candidate increasingly appeared to be KPNLA commander General Sak Sutsakhan. As a US citizen and Lon Nol's successor in 1970 in Phnom Penh, Sak was the main horse that Foggy Bottom had been quietly riding for some time. The "Pol Pot card" could be played to keep Hun Sen weak, then international forces could wipe out Pol Pot, leaving Sak in control. This strategy increasingly appeared to describe US government policy for a decade.

SOVIET POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Although the Soviet Union expressed disappointment with the outcome of the Paris conference, there was little surprise in the Kremlin, since few of the principals appeared ready to back down. The SOC could not coexist

with the PDK in a quadripartite arrangement after a decade of fighting, and China could not find a way to save face after having caused the conflict to erupt in the first place. According to Moscow, Beijing was still deploying chesspieces in Cambodia, as it insisted on backing Pol Pot. The Soviet view, before and after Paris, was that all external powers should stop aiding Cambodian belligerents so that the citizens of the country could develop their own national destiny. The Kremlin was doubtless amused that the understanding between Baker and Shevardnadze before Paris to encapsulate the conflict became known as the "Baker Initiative" afterward, but there was no mirth when China ignored Baker's proposal.

The Soviets had no reason to exert political pressure on Vietnam after Paris, since Hanoi left Cambodia on schedule. Any additional leverage might cause Hanoi leaders to break with Moscow and to return to the equidistant policy of 1976, which the SRV later did in 1991. Being the largest supplier of aid to Cambodia after September 26, the USSR did not want to repeat another costly Afghanistan and was eager to remove the Cambodian issue from the agenda of Sino-Soviet normalization negotiations. Having complained that Vietnam was squandering aid, there was a 10 percent cutback in 1990; for 1991 the reduction was at least 90 percent. The same aid decreases applied to the SOC.

Just before the Paris conference, the Soviets supplied the Phnom Penh government with tanks, promising small arms later if China aided the NADK. Afterward, Moscow continued to supply weapons and training personnel but said that it would sign no new agreements for military aid (FEER 1990a; Straits Times 1989c). The USSR withdrew all civilian aid personnel from Cambodia (Song 1990:24, 41) and routed military assistance direct to Cambodia at reduced levels (Ehrlich 1990; GEnie 1990a, 1991d). Moscow's cut in aid to Vietnam showed that the Kremlin had no more patience for the incessant warfare and the seemingly endless drain on resources (Hiebert 1990c). Hoping to bail out, it reiterated its encapsulation proposal throughout 1990. China openly offered aid in 1991, including $730 million in credits for consumer goods and food and a purchase of $310 million in Soviet arms (Quinn-Judge 1991).

Moscow welcomed a visit by Chatichai in October, and Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev went to Phnom Penh in early December. When Rogachev pressed the Cambodian government to agree to an interim arrangement for the country before free elections, even if this meant identifying one or two PDK officials for a quadripartite government, he met unyielding resistance (FEER 1989i). Rogachev then exchanged views on the idea of a UN role in an international control mechanism. Hun Sen agreed, provided that the UN seat was left vacant; the Soviet Union went along. When Rogachev discussed options with Australia's Costello later in December at Narita airport, he reported that Moscow favored a UN role in an interim admin-

istration. Clearly, the Soviet Union was using its influence as SOC's primary external supporter to extract concessions from Phnom Penh.

One by one, countries of Eastern Europe rallied to adopt new political freedoms as 1989 proceeded. In due course, top officials of the East German and Romanian governments were arrested and charged with treason. When President Bush and Party Secretary Gorbachev met at Malta in mid-December, there was no historic agreement to negotiate or sign. A symbiotic relationship emerged. In effect, Gorbachev would remain in power if the United States made decisions that would be favorable to the Soviet leader's interest. The tenor of the meeting was such that Bush agreed to seek a convergence of views on a variety of subjects with Gorbachev, including the use of the Perm Five to reach a settlement on Cambodia. The cold war was over.

In early January 1990, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet Union would wind down its presence in military bases in Vietnam. Moscow then recalled bombers and fighter planes from Danang. Warships would leave Cam Ranh Bay by 1992 (AP 1990b; Awanohara 1990b; Honolulu Advertiser 1990b).[4] Soviet troops on the Chinese border were being reduced to the minimal level of the 1950s, and Moscow agreed by the end of 1990 to sell Beijing combat aircraft, knowing that this would enhance capabilities to assume control over the Spratlys.

The Soviet Union participated constructively in the Perm Five meetings, while it collapsed economically. Gorbachev proceeded to engage in quiet diplomacy for peace in Cambodia (interviewee #64). When PRC Prime Minister Li Peng visited Moscow in April, Gorbachev agreed to more troop reductions along the border, although there were still 500,000 Red Army soldiers in Asia (Honolulu Advertiser 1990c). The Kremlin continued to make moves on behalf of peace in Asia, while encountering difficulty in managing separatist tendencies within the republics of the USSR. Because Gorbachev appeared to be presiding over the demise of his country as a superpower with global interests, Kremlin hardliners were increasing in power at the end of 1990. A fast-track plan to move to a market economy was abandoned in November. The later resignation of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and replacement by Alexander Bessmertnykh hinted that the superpowers had reached a peak in collaborative diplomacy, with possible implications for further proxy genocide in Cambodia.

SUPERPOWER OPTIONS

Although the Soviet Union and the United States preferred the encapsulation option, their reasoning differed. From the Soviet standpoint, there was a need to match China; US aid was diminutive, helped the inconsequential NCR, and was likely to be cut because of domestic opposition. In

addition, Moscow was gaining a new ally: Previously the USSR had provided weapons through Vietnam, leaving Cambodia within Hanoi's orbit, but now the channel to Phnom Penh was direct. As the Soviets preferred to economize and to enjoy a détente with China, encapsulation enjoyed a higher priority than support for the SOC. Congress thought that aid to the NCR would help the most pro-US elements in the Cambodian resistance to survive while the NADK and the CPAF tore each other to pieces. Baker's proposal for all sides to stop arming their clients was premised on the belief that SOC would capitulate, being overwhelmed by its opponents. However, the information on which Baker and Bush formulated their policies was contrary to the immediate realities on the battlefield in Cambodia.

Neither Moscow nor Washington favored the partition option. They wanted the situation resolved so that they could move on to matters of greater importance.

Chatichai's mediation efforts took him to the Soviet Union, while the Bush administration refused to see Chatichai in the fall of 1989. The superpowers favored the conference diplomacy option of the Perm Five process. Washington leaned on China, using the threat of congressional sanctions, while Moscow had considerable leverage on Phnom Penh. The Bush administration preferred to have the UN govern Cambodia, but the Soviets were less able to foot the bill.

The continuation of US sanctions against Cambodia and Vietnam angered many observers in the United States. Although the action appeared to doublecross Vietnam, the Bush administration stated that it was trying to apply as much pressure as possible in order to obtain a desirable outcome. As Vietnam's Cambodian ally might defend itself militarily, some US leaders did not want Hanoi to boast of a victory. When domestic critics smelled vengeance, the Bush administration allowed a large amount of medical supplies to go to Vietnam in order to show that its motives were tactical, not punitive. Blocking World Bank membership applications from Eastern European countries that continued to aid Phnom Penh was a new form of coercive diplomacy, however.

On genocide, the State Department acknowledged that it had responsibilities flowing from US ratification of the International Convention on the Prevention of Genocide. Administration action based on the treaty was clearly being deferred, whereas some members of Congress wanted to establish an international tribunal to try Pol Pot. The Soviet Union took an equivocal stand on the issue, supporting a compromise that would use the words "human rights" rather than "genocide" in a comprehensive political agreement.

Baker's insistence on an interim quadripartite government for Cambodia, in which the Polpotists would be allowed to play a role in the transition, seemed to be at odds with the genocide convention. When that option proved to be a liability by the end of February 1990, the US position changed to

"free and fair" quadriparty elections, believing that the NCR would have the best chance under these conditions. Senator Charles Robb, consistent with Baker, argued that Washington should accept a PDK victory if that happened to be what the Cambodian people wanted. Advocates of "free and fair" elections refused to explain how a small UN force could protect villages around the country against PDK voter intimidation. The Soviet Union backed the SOC view that the UN should handle the electoral process, should guarantee a military cease-fire and demobilization, but should not prevent the existing government in Phnom Penh from keeping law and order in the interim. The US preference for a more "comprehensive political settlement" was contrary to the interests of countries in the region, and the Soviet view was eventually vindicated. The US government, in short, once again failed to do its homework on Cambodia: Propping up Pol Pot's bedfellows made the Phnom Penh government appear as true patriots by default.

NOTES

1. The position that SRV–US normalization was contingent upon a comprehensive political settlement was specifically denied by the State Department before Paris (interviewee #92). The Bush administration dug up a forgotten statement by former Secretary of State Shultz (1985:28) to justify the new condition: "Vietnam will have to agree to a settlement in Cambodia acceptable to ASEAN, which includes the negotiated withdrawal of its forces." Consistent with a May 1989 statement by Vice President Quayle (interviewee #124), in May 1990 Republican Senator Pete Wilson introduced a resolution calling for normalization of relations only after Vietnam adopted political reforms equivalent to those sweeping Eastern Europe (IP 1990i). This is yet another instance of a double standard, as the United States had long extended diplomatic recognition to Soviet-installed Stalinist governments in Eastern Europe and was not pressing China after Tiananmen on the same basis. In December 1990, Solomon indicated that the normalization process would begin when Vietnam signed a PCC agreement and would be completed when UNTAC held elections (USIPR 1991). Hints of a human rights precondition to US normalization of relations with Vietnam emerged from Charles Twining at a conference in spring 1991.

2. Hanoi suspended MIA talks in August 1988, when three US government officials appeared to vilify Vietnam in public statements, though they merely reiterated previous policies (interviewees #14, 15).

3. So I discovered when I telephoned the State Department to ask for comment on the matter. Charles Twining (1990) of the State Department acknowledged overt nonlethal aid to the NCR.

4. The average number of warships at Cam Ranh Bay was estimated at only fifteen to twenty in early 1990. Withdrawal of thirty-six MiG23s and technicians, according to PRC sources, might "seriously impair the capability of the Vietnamese airforce [which] . . . could in turn affect the military balance in the Spratlys area . . . [where] the Chinese . . . hold an overwhelming superiority" (Awanohara 1990b).

25

ASEAN

ASEAN DISUNITY AFTER PARIS

Singapore appeared to serve as the dummy for a US ventriloquist act in Paris. To the chagrin of Prime Minister Chatichai, Foreign Minister Siddhi of Thailand also played along with China and the United States. Despite valiant efforts on the part of the Indonesians to coax concessions from all sides, no solution was in sight. Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines assumed lesser roles, trying to support a consensus when no agreement was in view. In short, ASEAN was in disarray but did not want to abandon its hard line for fear the six countries would lose their international clout (Jennar 1990:2).

It was Alatas' turn to chair the next annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers,[1] so he was responsible for convening any special meetings among ASEAN foreign ministry officials. Due to lack of agreement, he was not eager to do so immediately.

THAI POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

While PCC was under way, Chatichai hinted that Thailand would increase trade with Phnom Penh to isolate the PDK (Tasker 1989b). Immediate plans to initiate air flights from Bangkok to Phnom Penh fizzled, as did other potential commercial ventures, when peace eluded the delegates in Paris. During the fall, however, inquiries from Bangkok firms to the Thai embassy in Hanoi averaged 100 calls per day, although most were made to broker contracts (interviewees #10, 65), many on behalf of Japanese and US business firms seeking to circumvent the US trade embargo. Bangkok merchants, for example, arranged to sell some of Vietnam's 1.4 million tons of surplus rice in 1989. The brokers undersold domestic Thai ricegrowers, whose

exports declined 700,000 tons in the first quarter of 1990 (Reuter 1990a), but that summer a shortage of Soviet fertilizers produced a rice shortfall in Vietnam. Bangkok Bank was willing to join European banks to put up capital for a loan to Vietnam so that it could repay a loan of the former Republic of Vietnam to the IMF, but the deal fell through when Washington asked Tokyo to stay out.

Chatichai felt comfortable dealing with Hun Sen; half the SOC Cabinet was ethnic Thai (Muskie 1990:7). In contrast with overblown plans at Paris for a "comprehensive political settlement," he sought an immediate cease-fire after PCC. When PAVN troops marched out of Cambodia, Thailand was no longer the frontline ASEAN state. Army Chief of Staff Chaovalit, who first met SOC Defense Minister Tie Banh in the 1970s (interviewee #124), fully backed Chatichai's peace initiatives. When the fighting resumed, Chatichai traveled a diplomatic circuit to Beijing, Moscow, Stockholm, Oslo, and Paris. As junior officers would lose commissions on sales of supplies when the Cambodian resistance collapsed, a deal was struck to allow the Thai military—already benefiting from NADK concessions (AFP 1990a; Economist 1989b)—to enjoy economic concessions from Hun Sen's government in postwar Cambodia as a prelude to playing a role in the postwar reconstruction of the country (McAuliff & McDonnell 1989/90:94; UPI 1991e).

Chatichai continued to head a coalition of disparate political parties. Although he wanted to convene JIM III early in the fall, this was a prerogative of the Indonesian foreign minister.[2] He could not control Foreign Minister Siddhi, who undermined his efforts and valued close ties with China, which continued to sell arms and petroleum to Thailand at reduced prices.

In due course domestic problems buffaloed Chatichai, who stopped his globetrotting to cope with issues that might force him out of office. In November he dispatched his deputy, Bhichai Rattakul, to continue the peace process. Then Bhichai resigned one month later over an unkind statement made by a colleague in the Cabinet.

In late December, US troops entered Panama to arrest General Manuel Noriega, astonishing the smaller nations of the world over the power at Washington's command, although an overwhelming vote later condemned in the United Nations US action as being contrary to international law. When asked why the United States had not acted to take Pol Pot into custody, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon noted that such action required the approval of the Thai government (ABC-TV 1990:5).

In mid-January 1990, a multiparty group of some ninety members of parliament delivered a petition to Chatichai, calling on him to stop aiding the three resistance armies and to get border settlers to return home to Cambodia (FEER 1990o). In March he asked his staff to study the idea of closing the border camps. The United States and its allies refused to provide funds to establish neutral camps outside the control of the resistance, thereby vetoing Chatichai's proposal. Although Thailand could control access to

NCR bases on land, cutting off PRC aid to NADK in Thai territorial waters might mean war with China if Beijing persisted.

Chatichai then sent General Chaovalit to Beijing in order to persuade China to accept the Australian initiative. The prime minister's majority appeared increasingly fragile, and there were rumors that Chaovalit would seek Chatichai's job. After Chaovalit resigned from the army in March, he was named to replace Bhichai. Although Siddhi continued to avoid progress toward peace in Cambodia, the Thai defense ministry hosted General Doan Khue, PAVN commander, in May. Chaovalit successfully negotiated bilateral cease-fire agreements with leaders of all four Cambodian factions, who agreed to meet at Tokyo in early June when Chatichai persuaded Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu that the time was ripe for Japan to provide leadership for peace in Cambodia.

Chatichai, thus, believed that there were only two realistic alternatives in Cambodia—Hun Sen and Pol Pot. The prime minister had obviously chosen Hun Sen. When Chaovalit and Siddhi were forced to resign during 1990 due to domestic considerations, Chatichai's foreign policy seemed even more secure. The new foreign minister, Subin Pinkayan, agreed with the prime minister that the war in Cambodia was over as far as Thailand was concerned, so the priority should be on moneymaking and peacemaking. In February 1991 a coup toppled the Chatichai government. The new regime reversed course, refraining from any more independent diplomatic initiatives on Cambodia, but normalized trade with the SOC.

SINGAPOREAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Being the only ASEAN country at Paris to offer a Vietphobic speech, Singapore's immediate response to the failure of the conference was to reiterate its rhetoric. Deputy Foreign Minister Kishore Mahbubani (1989a, 1989b) blistered Vietnam for the lack of progress at Paris. Similar texts were written by Tommy Koh (1989a, 1989b), ambassador to the United States.

Fresh shipments of Singapore-manufactured M16 weapons went to resistance forces during the same period (Mann 1990). Having played a role in ensuring that PCC would fail, Singapore derived profit when the fighting resumed. The objective of having the United States attend to the military needs of small countries in Southeast Asia was ensured by a Cambodian nonsettlement, but security problems were receding due to the superpower détente. After the United States signed an agreement in 1990 to use facilities on the island vacated by the withdrawal of New Zealand military personnel the year before, some 165 US Air Force personnel began to take up quarters at Payar Lebar airfield to service four F16 fighters, while US naval ships sailed to Sembawang dockyards for repair and storage facilities (Thayer

1989a). Singapore no longer needed a Cambodian pretext to get Washington's attention.

When Australian and Thai peace initiatives began to upstage ASEAN, Singapore quietly dropped the idea of an interim quadripartite government. As Pol Pot appeared closer to capturing power, leaders in Singapore realized that they might need to beg Vietnam to return (Beckaert 1990a; US Senate 1990), so they supported the idea of a strong UN role. When the Australian plan was on hold during the spring, Singapore approved of Chatichai's efforts to keep the peace process alive. Lee Kuan Yew wanted to stop Pol Pot as much as Vietnam, so when Hanoi withdrew its troops, Singapore became more flexible. More profits were available in a peaceful Indochina than in a region at war. Pol Pot offered few profits to the moneymaking Singaporeans in a world beyond the cold war, in which Lee Kuan Yew's Marx phobia would be decreasingly relevant. The government still pretended to impose an embargo on Cambodia and Vietnam while remaining the latter's number one trade partner (HIS 1990:65). Singapore investors planned to spend $10 million to build two new hotels in Vietnam (GEnie 1990e), but the official ban on trade would only be lifted when the United States gave a green light.

PHILIPPINE POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

When Foreign Minister Manglapus returned from Paris, Manila as usual faced an internal power struggle. With various factions plotting *coups d'état* to force President Aquino from office, issues of foreign policy were of lesser concern.

In April 1990, the Soviet Union announced that it planned to phase out its presence at Cam Ranh Bay by 1992. Although the move was unrelated to Phillippine bargaining with the United States over the use of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay, it seemed logical that the United States might be persuaded to do so as well. Foreign Minister Manglapus's threat to charge Washington a high amount of rent for Philippine military bases was taken less seriously, however. Assistant Secretary of State Solomon opined that the bases were around to provide stability, not to balance Soviet power (McBeth 1990), and that other ASEAN countries wanted them to stay. Manglapus, however, heard no such pleas from his ASEAN allies, and the US Department of Defense had other options, including the agreement to use Singapore facilities.

As the government had to fend off several coup attempts, President Aquino increasingly lost control over events at home and abroad. Cambodia seemed a remote consideration. Nonetheless, Manila hosted a two-day meeting with officials from Hanoi in early April. Referring to "once-hostile ties" between the two countries, the two sides suggested that the occasion would become an annual event (Daily Globe 1990). The Philippines was ready to

be a team player on Cambodia within ASEAN, as in the past, and it was trying to move with the tide.

BRUNEIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Brunei, which was not represented at the International Conference on Kampuchea, did attend the Paris Conference on Cambodia. An ASEAN go-alonger, it had no reason to buck the quest for peace.

MALAYSIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Malaysia attributed the failure of the Paris conference to the US longing to defeat Hanoi (Alagappa 1989a). According to Kuala Lumpur, Paris was the last opportunity Washington had to ask Hanoi to rein in Phnom Penh. After PAVN troops left Cambodia, a Vietphobic US policy would become increasingly anachronistic.

Kuala Lumpur pursued a two-track policy. Track one was to open Indochina, commercially and diplomatically. Malaysian Airlines System flights to Ho Chi Minh City began in the spring of 1990. A trade commission office, opened in Ho Chi Minh City by the end of 1990, was upgraded to a consulate in 1991, as Kuala Lumpur began importing edible oils, natural rubber, paper products, and scrap metal (IP 1991f). Track two was to pursue negotiations for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Since a quadripartite formula had failed at Paris, Malaysia wanted to find another solution, preferably one that would ditch Pol Pot. Kuala Lumpur, accordingly, backed the Australian and Thai initiatives.

INDONESIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Foreign Minister Alatas somehow felt personally responsible for failure at Paris, although he worked more diligently than any other diplomat to extract concessions from the key players. He returned home as cochair of PCC, which could be reconvened later. He also chaired ASEAN, so he could summon the six foreign ministers or their deputies to meet. But he was reluctant to make any premature moves. Over half the foreign ministry's annual budget had been spent on too many inconclusive meetings in Indonesia already.

The analysis of some observers in Jakarta was that Indonesia had been "led by the nose" by Thailand's Siddhi (interviewee #39). Having backed the resistance coalition, which increasingly became dominated by Pol Pot, Indonesia appeared to lack any additional room to maneuver. A time was soon approaching, according to the defense ministry, when Indonesia might have to embrace the Hun Sen government, even if it meant differing from some members of ASEAN.

Alatas approved Chatichai's initiatives in public, but he privately felt upstaged. Although he received calls for JIM III from Chatichai and Hun Sen, he was not enthusiastic about more longshot efforts to maintain Indonesia's stature as a major leader in NAM. When the Australian initiative gathered momentum, Alatas was cautious, but he convened an IMC in February and September 1990 under PCC auspices. Although there were many points of agreement at IMC, the delegates would not even allow Alatas to issue a consensus statement. Jakarta was piqued when France tried to downplay Indonesia's role in the peace process (FEER 1990h; Field & Vatikiotis 1990).

After that, Jakarta faded as an active participant in the peace process in relation to the Perm Five. Modest investments in Vietnam signaled a more vigorous export-oriented economic policy.[3] As an Indonesian promotional television commercial proudly announced in my hotel room at the end of December, the year 1989 was the first when oil-abundant Indonesia earned more foreign exchange from nonpetroleum products.

By mid-1990 relations between Beijing and Jakarta resumed after a hiatus of two decades, as China had long ago given up supporting insurgent forces in Indonesia. One of Alatas' motives was to discourage PRC support for the PDK, and he was annoyed when US policy suddenly changed in mid-July to nonrecognition of the resistance coalition that ASEAN had created.[4] As Beijing proved intractable on this issue in dealing with Washington, Jakarta's leverage was limited in any case. President Suharto decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with China at the end of the year. After going to Beijing, he stopped off for an enthusiastic reception in Hanoi, where he found that the Vietnamese had just approved the formation of Indovina Bank as a joint Indonesian-Vietnamese venture, a base from which more investment capital could enter the country.

ASEAN OPTIONS

When PAVN troops left Cambodia, ASEAN defense ministries argued that the Vietnamese threat was over. Hun Sen offered commercial concessions to the Thai military that exceeded existing commissions on arms supplies to the resistance forces, so the economic argument was to end the war. Foreign Minister Siddhi held out, however, and the renewed fighting proved that talk about a cease-fire was premature. Singapore continued to supply weapons to the NCR, but Congress soon cut off that aid conduit. The rest of ASEAN wanted to make peace with Hanoi and Phnom Penh.

The partition option meant tolerating PDK as a proxy of China. The Kuantan Formula of encapsulating the Cambodian conflict gradually met acceptance. Chatichai's proposal to move the compounds for displaced Cambodians away from the border would serve to stop outside aid. Although an end of border camps would affect the NCR before the NADK,

which had better financing, the NCR soon collapsed anyway as a military threat. Chatichai was thus using coercive diplomacy to force a cease-fire. While Thailand developed more normal commercial ties with Cambodia and Vietnam, Singapore held back its investors. Other ASEAN countries followed Bangkok's example, and the era of economic sanctions was ending.

Chatichai's efforts to mediate were resented by Siddhi, envied by Alatas, endorsed by Indonesia and Malaysia, and ultimately appreciated elsewhere in ASEAN. Australia's quiet diplomacy was welcomed by all, but it prompted ASEAN to press for JIM III. Reluctantly, Alatas assembled the JIM II cast of characters, with Australia's Evans and France's Dumas as guest stars, but the new IMC title for the production did not change the lines of the players, the plot of the story, or the failure of applause by the world audience. Whereas the Perm Five showed that conference diplomacy might work, ASEAN did not want the traditional major powers to impose a settlement, so they provided Bangkok and Jakarta as venues for conference diplomacy.

Since ASEAN countries would not have to pay as much for a major UN role in a transitional Cambodia as the superpowers, the six could hardly press for this option when the Perm Five considered it almost too costly. Some ASEAN observers regarded any UN role as a way to legitimize the Hun Sen regime, which would surely win elections, but—more important—as a commitment from the superpowers to undo the proxy war by eliminating the Pol Pot threat to the region.

ASEAN did not want to condemn Pol Pot on legal grounds. The mood was to end Polpotism as military and political bait to attract outside powers to the region.

NOTES

1. Chairs of ASEAN bodies rotate alphabetically each year.
2. Prime ministers have almost no role in setting the agenda of ASEAN, which is primarily a project of foreign ministries.
3. I am indebted to Ngoc Diep Trinh for this point.
4. I am indebted to Hediana Utarti for this point.

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OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

FRENCH POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Foreign Minister Dumas publicly noted that progress had occurred at the Paris conference, but privately he was frustrated. Although he was in a position to reconvene PCC, he lacked enthusiasm for any additional moves relating to Cambodia. Dumas urged Sihanouk to join the SOC, and President Mitterand said that he was fed up with the Prince when he did not heed that advice (Santoli 1989; US Senate 1990). Endorsing neither the Chatichai nor the Evans initiatives in 1989, French officials hoped that PCC would finalize the peace process in due course.

Arms shipments to ANS secretly resumed after the Paris conference. When French military intelligence concurred that PAVN troops had left the country, and the public expressed outrage over the secret aid to Pol Pot's allies, military shipments stopped (Field, Tasker & Hiebert 1989:16).

To reward Vietnam for its good behavior in withdrawing its troops, discussions followed about new aid projects, and about $1 million was committed (interviewee #53). The Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur, a French government bank, organized a consortium of financial institutions to lend Hanoi about $100 million so that Vietnam could pay off the IMF debt accruing from loans to the former Republic of Vietnam. The amount, however, proved insufficient, as Washington asked Japan to stay out of the deal.[1]

Regarding diplomatic recognition of Cambodia, Quai d'Orsay was reluctant to set up an embassy. At the end of 1989, Alliance Française decided to open an office at Phnom Penh in order to lay the groundwork for a return of France to a prominent role in the region. A diplomat, Xavier Rose, went to Phnom Penh in January 1990 on a fact-finding mission; the report was that the SOC government was entirely independent of Vietnam, contrary to US rhetoric (Pedler 1990:3). Mitterand stated that any return to

power of the Polpotists would be totally unacceptable, even in a coalition (Cody 1990). When Alliance Française went ahead as scheduled in the fall, Rose was placed in charge. As Rose had authority to conduct consular functions, Paris was giving semiofficial status to the office in defiance of Washington.

In the spring an SOC information office opened in Paris, although Quai d'Orsay neither approved nor disapproved. The head, Kek Galabru, was the Khmer wife of Jean-Jacques Galabru, a member of France's Council of State.

When the Perm Five convened at Paris in January, Claude Martin annoyed the other four representatives by refusing to provide any information about the thinking of Southeast Asian states (interviewee #73). During IMC the following month, Martin belittled Evans' efforts. Observers sensed that Quai d'Orsay was selfishly hoping that the peace process would be advanced only a notch or two by these meetings so that PCC would be reconvened. Paris wanted the credit for solving the Cambodian conflict but was infuriating too many of the principals (Cumming-Bruce 1990; McDonald & Vatikiotis 1990). Eventually, Dumas saw Martin, who invested too much of his ego toward a settlement, as a liability and transferred him to Beijing to serve as ambassador (interviewee #112). As a China specialist, Dumas was accused of bias.

ITALIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

During 1989 the Pope, as a part of his continuing efforts to roll back atheism in Communist countries, canonized more than 100 Vietnamese saints in an effort to revitalize Catholicism. Although Hanoi was annoyed, a loosening of restrictions on religion was already in progress. The Italian government, which found electoral advantage in following through, dispatched the first foreign minister to visit Hanoi after PAVN troops left Cambodia. Gianni De Michelis offered cultural exchange and a promise of additional economic aid. Other EC countries in due course replicated the offer without sending such high-level delegations. When EC foreign ministers convened at Dublin in February, Italy pushed for a policy that would normalize relations with Vietnam while denying a seat at the UN to the resistance coalition as long as it included the atheistic Polpotists (interviewee #107). The initiative succeeded, uniting Western Europe against the Sino-American policy of confrontation.

JAPANESE POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Eager to invest in large-scale industrial projects in Vietnam, Japan had much to lose when the Paris conference failed. Its proposal for an International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia had to await further

developments. Although Tokyo wanted to assert an independent foreign policy, it was reluctant to differ from Washington for fear of protectionist reprisals (interviewee #71).

In October 1989, Japan quietly provided $150 million of in-kind emergency aid to victims of typhoon damage in Vietnam (interviewee #71). In January 1990, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama hinted that Tokyo was ready to host a second international conference on Cambodia or otherwise underwrite part of the cost of a UN role in Cambodia (Economist 1990e:59; Erlanger 1990e). In February, after Gaimusho officials went to Hanoi and Phnom Penh, the Japanese president of the Asian Development Bank indicated that aid projects involving Vietnam would be considered on a case-by-case basis. In April Tokyo offered $300,000 toward the restoration of portions of Angkor Wat (Masaki 1990), and in 1991 Japan assisted 1,000 Vietnamese guestworkers fleeing the war over Kuwait (Kyodo 1991b). In the spring of 1991 Japan extended humanitarian aid to Cambodians displaced by the war after Nakayama met Hun Sen. The amount was to be $12 million (GEnie 1991c). Japanese firms proceeded to use Singaporeans and Thais to broker contracts so that there would be no ASEAN or US outcry; when US policy changed, they were prepared to come out of the closet (IP 1990p). Trade with Vietnam in 1990 doubled, and Japanese trading firms opened offices in the country, gearing up to corner as much of the market as possible when the US trade embargo would be lifted (IP 1990h, 1990g).

Tokyo was trying to steer the situation into a concern for making money instead of war. In April, after clearing the idea informally with both sides as well as with Washington, Prime Minister Kaifu responded to Thailand's Chatichai by agreeing to host talks between Hun Sen and Sihanouk. By June the invitation was for a quadripartite intra-Cambodian Tokyo Peace Conference. In the wake of the end of the cold war in Europe, Japan wanted to take a more active role to promote peace throughout the world.

CANADIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark felt that the key problem at Paris was powersharing. Ottawa feared that Pol Pot might return to power. As cochair of Committee I of the Paris conference, Allan Sullivan went to Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam in late October 1989 to explore options relating to an international control mechanism. He was the first high-ranking Western diplomat to visit Phnom Penh in nearly fifteen years. Sullivan also met representatives of the three resistance factions. When he encountered unexpected flexibility in Hanoi and Phnom Penh, the peace process was ready for the Evans initiative. In early 1990 Canada announced that it would resume aid to Cambodia and Vietnam. The needs of the Cambodian people could not wait, according to Ottawa. Canada provided resource delegations to the Perm Five meetings, as it was likely to play a major role in a future

UN organ inside Cambodia. In late 1990 Vietnam proceeded to reopen its embassy in Ottawa, which had been closed in 1981 as a cost-saving measure when Canada observed the US trade embargo. Former prime minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau soon opened a government-funded aid mission in Phnom Penh, and a Canadian embassy in Hanoi was prepared for occupancy by mid-1991.

BRITISH POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

The United Kingdom had three foreign secretaries during 1989. After Geoffrey Howe was reshuffled by the government, John Major represented the government in Paris. Major became chancellor of the exchequer later in the year, and Douglas Hurd became the new head of the Foreign Office. Cambodia understandably was not the first problem that he sought to tackle.

The UK Ministry of Defence, however, preempted the situation. Immediately after Paris, a secret shipment of aid went to the NCR. When this fact exploded in October, there was an outcry in the press. John Pilger, a television journalist, released a documentary, "Cambodia: Year Ten," on October 31, noting that UK military aid was going to the side allied with Pol Pot. The public clamor set a record in the field of foreign policy: A petition with 125,000 signatures (including signatures from 120 members of Parliament) and 16,000 letters went to the Foreign Office; another 7,000 letters went to Prime Minister Thatcher (Carey 1990b:4; interviewee #73). New personnel were assigned to answer each letter, the military aid stopped, $394,000 in UNICEF aid from Britain went to the SOC, and there was an announcement that two members of the Foreign Office would go to Cambodia in December to review aid prospects (interviewee #104; Tasker 1989c).

Despite pressure from the United States to cancel the trip (SB&A 1989), Whitehall proceeded. Arguing that increased aid to Cambodia served humanitarian aims, agricultural and medical projects were identified, with the British government supplying more than $300,000 to Oxfam and other PVOs as well as $1.6 million to various UN agencies operating in Cambodia (Hughes 1990).

Britain differed from the US policy of continuing to "bleed" Vietnam. The surge of 34,000 Vietnamese "boat people," who sailed to Hongkong during 1989, presented a problem for London (Bangkok Post 1990a). An attempt at forcible repatriation of the refugees in January 1990 backfired: The world had enough of international kidnapping after the US seizure of Manuel Noriega in Panama. Whitehall then took the view that an improvement of economic conditions in Vietnam would alleviate the situation prompting the people to flee, where as Voice of America was goading the outflow (IP 1991h). Over Washington's objection, the Foreign Office first offered to make individual cash payments to induce refugees to return.

Whitehall then decided to provide Hanoi economic aid, arguing that Vietnamese would stay if the country began an economic recovery. Washington had little sympathy for Hongkong's complaints that refugee camps were overflowing and were taxing public health facilities. The US government opposed British approaches to solving the problem of the "boat people" through either "Gestapo"[2] or "thirty pieces of silver" methods.

London was trying to side with US policy regarding Indochina. At the same time, it had to engage in damage control to cope with the consequences, as public opinion was opposed to any toleration of the Polpotists (interviewee #73). The result was a bit of a schism between Foggy Bottom and Whitehall.

AUSTRALIAN POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Australia went to the Paris conference hoping for an opportunity to pave the way for a comprehensive peace settlement. When the conference failed, Defense Minister Kim Beazley suggested that Australian troops could serve as the "international control mechanism." But implementation of this idea was unlikely: The Australians wanted to supervise a peace, not to get caught up in a war.

Foreign Minister Evans (1989b) expressed frustration over the failure of PCC to charge the committees with the task of continuing to meet so that they could make further progress. When Canada's Sullivan reported that Hun Sen was willing to consider a UN role in an ICM, Canberra was undertaking a thorough policy review. Pilger's documentary appeared in Australia during this time, provoking a public demand for action. Canberra then agreed to provide $6.5 million in aid to UN and PVO projects in Cambodia and a somewhat larger UNDP contribution for Vietnam (interviewee #69).

At the end of November, Evans announced the framework for a plan that presumably nobody could refuse—a Namibian-type UN administration for Cambodia that would bypass the deadlock over alternative interim quadripartite arrangements. Clearly, the Evans proposal had elements of genius: If the UN handled interim governance, the issue of powersharing would no longer exist. At about the same time, Canberra hosted an initial Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, yet another idea that had been planned with care. Australian diplomacy had clearly come of age.

Observers in the region focused on Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Costello's shuttle diplomacy in December to build an incremental consensus for a Namibian-type peace settlement. In January the Perm Five concluded that the Evans initiative was too complex and too costly, however. When IMC met in February, Australia provided a resource delegation, but Evans was openly frustrated at the snail's pace of the peace process as well as a snub from France's Dumas that Canberra's work did not pass Gallic muster. Australian diplomats blamed the French for the failure of the meeting (in-

terviewee #121). Canberra provided resource delegations to the later Perm Five meetings and a generous contribution to the UN for fact-finding studies to ensure that the eventual agreement would stick.

In April Costello visited Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam to advance the peace process, preparing the groundwork for the eventual Tokyo Peace Conference. Australia's energy, idealism, and professionalism, as Thach said on one occasion, merited a reconvening of PCC in Canberra.

NEW ZEALAND POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

Although New Zealand was not allowed to attend the Paris conference, it followed events closely. Wellington offered troops for an ICM, following a similar gesture by Australia after Paris (Bangkok Post 1989b). When PAVN soldiers departed from Cambodia, the government considered the possibility of renewing aid to Vietnam. In December Foreign Minister Russell Marshall went to Hanoi for discussions with his counterpart, Nguyen Co Thach. He then journeyed to Ho Chi Minh City for a conversation with Hun Sen, agreeing to visit Phnom Penh at a future date. The immediate aid project consisted of scholarships for Vietnamese students at universities in New Zealand, and a New Zealand consulting firm signed a $4 billion contract in October 1990 to develop an industrial zone to be financed by ADB (GEnie 1990d). Wellington fully supported Australian peace initiatives.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

PAVN's withdrawal was a signal for Seoul and Taipei to establish commercial links with Vietnam; most business in the south had been controlled by ethnic Chinese, who were eager to reestablish former commercial ties. South Korea quickly became Vietnam's third-largest trade partner (FEER 1990m). A regular shipping route went directly to Hongkong and Taiwan, but US pressure forced Seoul to defer direct shipping, which left Singapore as the principal transshipment port (IP 1990m; Richburg 1989b). Due to US pressure, however, both countries postponed making major investments and establishing diplomatic relations.

SOVIET BLOC POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

No Eastern European countries went to the Paris conference. Poland, which might have deserved a role in view of its presence on two ICSCs, faced delicate internal negotiations regarding the future of the country's political system. As events progressed in 1989, one country after another in Eastern Europe experienced historic transformations from partocracies to multiparty rule, with Communist parties left behind. Cambodia was too

far away, and Vietnam was now odd man out in CMEA, which became the Organization for International Economic Cooperation (OIEC) in early 1991. OIEC members relied on hard currency and world market prices instead of barter arrangements and intrabloc discounts.

Eastern Europeans wanted to live up to previous commitments but openly tired of the Cambodian issue (Washington Post 1990). The United States insisted that any aid to Cambodia and Vietnam would prejudice applications for membership in the World Bank. Their own future was more important than the fate of a few million Cambodians, so they were pleased when Western European countries began to pick up some of the slack. In 1991 the Warsaw Treaty Organization folded as well, but the united Germany decided to honor aid commitments to Cambodia and Vietnam made by the former German Democratic Republic.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICYMAKING AFTER PARIS

European countries viewed Cambodia quite differently from the United States. When Vietnamese troops left Cambodia, they already had embassies in Hanoi. Normalization of relations with Cambodia depended only on the establishment of a legitimized government. European leaders agreed that Washington's obsession with Vietnam was counterproductive.

After Paris, European countries decided to improve relations with Vietnam individually. In November 1990, EC as a unit extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam. Britain, eager to stop the flow of refugees to overcrowded Hongkong, was the last EC country to go along with collective recognition, but this occurred after EC foreign ministers agreed to spend up to $13 million in early 1991 to provide an incentive program for 80,000 Vietnamese, considered ineligible for resettlement in third countries, to return home (FEER 1991b:34). Based on how well the Vietnamese government cooperated with the program, EC later provided $17 million more aid to Vietnam (Eng 1991b; interviewee #139). But most of the "boat people" had relatives in the United States, who sent them the funds to take bus trips from Ho Chi Minh City to China, where they purchased boats near Canton for a short trip to Hongkong with the aim of resettlement in the United States (interviewee #107). Thus, the United States held Vietnam hostage for a Cambodian ransom, while the EC placed Vietnamese "bus people" in a similar position.

POLICY OPTIONS OF OTHER ALIGNED COUNTRIES

Britain and France feared that NADK would trounce the CPAF after PAVN troops left Cambodia, whereupon the NCR would be swallowed up. Accordingly, aid went secretly to the NCR. When the public learned about the military support, the fact of past collaboration between the NADK and

the NCR syllogized to British and French aid to Pol Pot. Because of public outrage, both countries stopped the aid. Except for the USSR, Eastern European countries stopped aid to Cambodia and Vietnam, having other priorities. In short, socialist countries that had been supporting their allies came around to the encapsulation option along with Western aligned countries, albeit for different reasons. As the partition option might commit them to aid either side, they wanted "this Cambodia thing" over, as one Eastern European diplomat put it.

Australia's quiet diplomacy placed Gareth Evans as a prime candidate for a Nobel Peace Prize on Cambodia. Roland Dumas' snub of Evans at IMC showed that France wanted to use its role in Perm Five to reconvene the PCC, while many countries thought that Dumas was trying to revive a corpse. Japan, which had long wanted to assume a prominent role in solving the Cambodian conflict, could do so when Jakarta and Paris disappeared from the list of fruitful venues, but this hope proved unrealized. All the countries discussed in this chapter favored conference diplomacy. Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Japan were involved most directly.

Western European countries, Canada, and New Zealand lifted aid embargoes on Cambodia and Vietnam after PAVN marched home from Cambodia. Soon Australia, France, Italy, Japan and New Zealand increased their aid; Britain followed. Trade with Vietnam increased. Australia and France established quasiofficial offices in the Cambodian capital. Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo were eager to invest in Cambodia and Vietnam but moved cautiously, fearing US retaliatory trade sanctions.

Australia's idea of a UN administration for Cambodia rescued the peace process from oblivion in the fall of 1989. When the idea was costed out, both a UN interim government and a UN interim administration proved expensive and infeasible. A minimal UN presence, with a Namibian-type election administration and peacekeeping force, gained the support of most countries.

Pol Pot was unlikely to observe any agreement that foreclosed an NADK victory. The task of dealing with NADK would remain if a UN peace organ went to Cambodia. The Hawke government's option of placing Pol Pot on trial was still in a filing cabinet, however.

NOTES

1. The actual amount was 100 million of IMF special drawing rights (SDRs), which were denominated in US currency at a rate of 1 SDR per US$1.31 in 1991 (Awanohara 1989a).

2. UK authorities, for example, teargassed refugee compounds in the wee hours of the morning with no regard for those who were bedridden (interviewee #107). The aim was to prompt inmates to agree to return to Vietnam, although many were simply waiting for US immigration authorities to issue visas as soon as their relatives completed sponsorship forms (Haas 1991a).

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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AFTER PARIS

After Paris, NAM met at Belgrade in early September.[1] The failure of the Paris conference was regretted but was not a major item for discussion. Singapore spread the word that Vietnam refused to compromise, and Hanoi responded by referring to PDK intransigence. The remaining countries congratulated India on a superb performance at PCC, which sounded like a snakepit of superpower intrigue. NAM was divided on the issue, so it devoted its attention to other matters after stating that it welcomed the progress of the JIMs and PCC in working toward a peace that would respect Cambodian sovereignty rather than being imposed by external powers. The wording, thus, represented somewhat of a victory for Vietnam. NAM also reiterated support for ZOPFAN. On behalf of NAM, India provided a resource delegation at Perm Five meetings on Cambodia in 1990.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER PARIS

In mid-November attention shifted to New York. Sihanouk failed to go to the General Assembly for the first time in a decade. Although CGDK was moribund, Son Sann read a text prepared by Khieu Samphan supposedly on behalf of the Prince, a repeat of the same charade of 1988. But this time PDK held the UN seat. PDK's Ieng Thirith closely monitored Son Sann's every move while he was in New York.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution that again reflected ASEAN-Sino-US policy. Although PAVN troops had withdrawn to the satisfaction of most governments, Singapore argued that Vietnam had opposed reliance on the UN at Paris. This debating tactic, although contrary to what had happened in private at PCC, carried considerable weight throughout the General Assembly (interviewee #101). After noting that Vietnam had ap-

parently withdrawn troops, as requested previously, the resolution went on to say that PAVN's pullout was unverified and not part of a comprehensive political settlement. The General Assembly then called for a quadripartite transitional government under Prince Sihanouk to prepare for UN-supervised elections. The phrase from 1988 to avoid "universally condemned policies and practices of a recent past" was repeated but remained undefined. Televised coverage revealed that several delegates warmly shook the hands of representatives of Pol Pot after they spoke in support of the resolution during the debate. A senior aide to Secretary-General Perez remarked after the vote, "This is a day of shame for the United Nations and a day of shame for the world community" (Pedler 1989a:1).

The vote, 124–17–12, was higher than the year before (see Appendix 2). Finland and Sweden switched from a Yes in 1988 to Abstain. Four Abstain voters of 1989 switched to Yes: Guyana, Libya, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe. Benin abandoned a nonvote of 1989 to vote for the resolution. Iran switched from Yes to a nonvote. South Yemen, previously a No voter, decided to Abstain. Angola and Hungary went from No to a nonvote. Hungary, then controlled by a reform faction of its Communist Party, bowed to the preference of other parties to abandon any pretense of support for Soviet policies (interviewee #127).

The General Assembly exercise proved anachronistic, as usual. Too few nations had the courage to face realities of the ongoing situation. New York was not the place to work out a compromise sensitive to the nuances of the situation. Most states understood only that they were displeased over an instance in which one state committed aggression against another, for whatever reason. Internal human rights abuses were of secondary importance. Solving the Cambodian problem had low priority, so the General Assembly again served as a forum for propaganda.

UN AID AFTER PARIS

When the war resumed, UN agencies prepared for a new phase in their activities. Whereas some 18,000 refugees awaited resettlement in UNHCR camps, UNBRO was servicing about 300,000 displaced Khmers at a cost of $60 million annually (interviewee #51; UNBRO 1989). Corruption remained rampant in many camps, and many displaced Khmers were prevented from returning home by the military commanders of the resistance forces (UPI 1990f).

As repatriation seemed increasingly likely, UNESCO and WHO added training components to existing educational programs; the International Labor Organization (ILO) cooperated as well. The aim was to provide future returnees with skills to start new communities inside Cambodia when the war ended. UNHCR completed repatriation of Cambodians from Indonesia and Malaysia by early 1991 (interviewee #140).

UNBRO cut food supplies to border camps in October 1989, when activities of soldiers preparing for battle came to light inside the compounds (FEER 1990b:102; interviewee #51). Then, to separate border settlers from those integrated into war machines, UNBRO decided to relocate some camps farther away from the border (Tasker 1990c). As a result, PDK authorities forced those under their control either to move to the unacknowledged or secret camps just inside the Thai border or to move to areas under NADK control inside Cambodia. Later, NADK moved secret camp residents to "liberated zones," but 25,000 returned after encountering mine explosions and severe illnesses (Eng 1991). In March 1990 Alan Doff took over as UNBRO head in his role as the new UNDP Regional Director in Bangkok. Meanwhile, anticipating a food shortage when war resumed inside Cambodia, WFP increased buffer stocks throughout the country.

UNHCR began to plan for eventual repatriation for 330,000 Cambodians from the Thai border and another 110,000 forcibly relocated by the resistance to "liberated" villages on the other side of the border. Resisting efforts of NGC to control the process, the UN agency envisaged a procedure in which border settlers would first go to reception centers during a three-month transition, but NGC wanted the transition shortened to a few days (CDC 1990:14). As the cost would be $109 million (interviewee #117), Australia soon contributed to a Voluntary Fund for the Cambodian Peace Process established in April 1990 to pay travel expenses so that UN officials could plan the parameters of UNTAC; France and other countries followed. Five fact-finding missions visited the country later that year (UN Secretary-General 1990), and the UN sent other fact-finding missions to Phnom Penh in January 1991.

UNDP dispatched personnel to Phnom Penh in spring 1990 so that they would be ready to proceed when requested, and an office opened in October. PDK insistence at Paris that international aid should follow, not precede, a peace settlement proved impractical: Cambodia was in such dire straits that aid was needed for UN officials to put UNTAC into operation. By early 1991 UN agencies had set aside $55 million for reconstruction aid (UPI 1991d).

Contributions to UNICEF relief inside SOC territory increased substantially, thanks to Australia and Britain. Relief efforts for 180,000 villagers in SOC refugee camps began in mid-1991. Although UNDP was still not allowed to to provide development aid, a 300-page report on the need for $662.3 million in aid was prepared (Morello 1989).[2]

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AFTER PARIS

When the Perm Five began discussions on Cambodia in January, one issue was the cost of an international control mechanism or election administration. A previously informal unit, formalized as the Task Force on Cambodia, then proceeded to estimate costs of a UN interim effort and to coordinate

related efforts by several UN technical agencies regarding Cambodia. Xavier Perez de Cuellar named himself as chair of the body, with Rafeeuddhin Ahmed as his alternate.

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER PARIS

After more than a decade of organizing support for perfunctory resolutions calling for self-determination in Cambodia, ASEAN discovered in February 1990 that the European Community would no longer serve as cosponsors for the ASEAN resolution. Upon arriving in Geneva, the delegate from the Philippines—the only ASEAN country with UNHCR membership—was surprised to learn that PDK delegates had already lobbied to obtain cosponsors for a new resolution that in effect asked for elections that would put PDK on the ballot. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and eight other countries were already cosponsors, and a majority of the delegates appeared ready to back the resolution. Faced with an old resolution that would fail and a new resolution that was close to having enough votes to pass, ASEAN jumped on the PDK bandwagon in desperation (interviewee #101). The skirmish appeared to be a prelude to a credentials battle at the General Assembly in the fall, when EC countries would not support any coalition including PDK representation.

In October 1990 Danilo Turk of Yugoslavia, UNHCR chair, objected when a resolution denouncing DK "crimes" was introduced by some EC countries. Arguing that any such action might compromise the ongoing peace process, the commission dropped the resolution, once again allowing Pol Pot a victory.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

With a credentials fight brewing since the EC decision in February to vote against seating the NGC, PDK delegates laid low when the General Assembly convened in the fall of 1990. The UN expected an SNC delegation, but none arrived. The Security Council endorsed the Perm Five/SNC framework and turned to other business. The four factions were still split, but the PDK at least was denied a seat in the General Assembly (although it retained its office in New York). In 1991 the four factions agreed on a joint delegation to the General Assembly to be headed by Sihanouk.

NAM AND UN OPTIONS

While NAM endorsed the encapsulation option, the General Assembly and Human Rights Commission postured instead of presenting creative alternatives to the resurgent war. Having seated the PDK without condemning Pol Pot's genocide, the pro-PDK resolution at the UNHRC in 1990

shocked members of the European Community, who upped the ante by vowing that they would vote to vacate the Cambodian seat or even to award credentials to the Hun Sen regime in the UN unless the peace process produced results.

Chatichai and Evans eclipsed NAM and UN quiet diplomacy after Paris. The success of Australia's peace process, however, galvanized the UN Secretary-General's staff to act. The idea of a UN trusteeship was fanciful. UN personnel ran only one non–self-governing territory in its history—West Irian's transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule. The trusteeship system worked by having a colony of a country that lost World War II assigned to one of the victors until the population was ready to assume independence. Cambodia did not fall into the pattern of previous trusteeships, and the West Irian model was not relevant because war was ongoing. Namibia, a mandate dating back to the League of Nations, seemed a useful model because a guerrilla force was trying to unseat a colonial government. UN officials set up an election system, left the existing South African civil service and local constabulary in place, and provided peacekeepers to observe terms of a cease-fire.

UN administrators in New York, hence, had to demonstrate the feasibility of a Namibian-type process for Cambodia. After generating useful working papers, in March the Perm Five meeting made important technical decisions to establish parameters for an eventual UN operation in Cambodia.

NOTES

1. This section is based in part on interviewee #67.

2. The largest item was for water resources development, which might entail cheap hydroelectric power for Thailand and Vietnam in due course. According to interviewee #86, the document was largely based on a survey completed a decade earlier.

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TOKYO PEACE CONFERENCE AND AFTER

A LOT OF RAIN TO CLEAR THE AIR

When the 1990 rainy season was about to begin, a reassessment was in order. Sihanouk's pleas for weapons went unanswered because the NCR had almost ceased to exist as a military force: Its soldiers fell apart on the battlefield. No amount of arms could hide the impotence of the NCR as a military force. The Cambodian resistance, for all practical purposes, consisted of the NADK.

Unable at first to contain Pol Pot's disciplined army, Hun Sen was said to have asked for help from Vietnam. Although VODK spread false rumors about the reentry of PAVN troops, the world would have been relieved if the stories were true. Indeed, on September 6 Assistant Secretary of State Solomon had, in effect, asked them to remain. Two months later Solomon made a matter-of-fact acknowledgment that a few thousand PAVN personnel were in Cambodia, approximately the same number of advisers that stayed behind after the Vietnamese infantry left in the fall. The worldwide consensus was that NADK should be stopped, and some combination of PAVN and CPAF was needed to hold back the Polpotist tide. The international reaction to VODK broadcasts was that VODK should go out of business along with NADK.

During the fall of 1989, the PDK rejected Chatichai's incremental initiatives and dragged its feet on the Australian plan for a UN administration of Cambodia. Khieu Samphan reluctantly went to IMC, again blocking a joint statement. After the productive Perm Five meeting in March, Sihanouk announced that Pol Pot was abandoning the interim quadripartite government option; instead, PDK wanted to run in "free and fair" elections, which of course amounted to a quadripartite option all over again if the votes split four ways. The genocidal clique wanted to be a part of any new Cambodian

government so that it would march triumphantly into Phnom Penh again (Holley 1990).

Chatichai's proposal in March to close the border camps was thus well timed. The way to stop the war was to stop supplying the warriors. Foreign Minister Siddhi was still refusing to support Chatichai, so the prime minister devised a plan to checkmate his recalcitrant cabinet minister. At the end of March, Chatichai sent Army Chief of Staff Chaovalit to Hanoi to discuss options regarding Cambodia as well as Thai-Vietnamese relations. When Chaovalit reported that Thach wanted Thailand to mediate between China and Vietnam, Siddhi declined, believing that no progress could be made on Sino-Vietnamese issues (AFP 1990f). The Thai public concluded that Chaovalit was a true diplomat, whereas Siddhi was a mere naysayer. Chatichai first offered to host intra-Cambodian talks in Bangkok whenever the time was ripe, but later that month he asked a visitor, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu, to provide a venue for intra-Cambodian talks.

Meanwhile, Sihanouk proposed a Supreme Council of the Cambodian States (SCCS), with six members from the NGC and six from the SOC, thereby accepting Hun Sen's proposal for bipartite powersharing, and he called for an immediate cease-fire agreement. Before the cease-fire went into effect, he asked the Perm Five to convene the Security Council, which in turn would authorize the Secretary-General to send troops to Cambodia to guarantee the cease-fire. With a cease-fire in place, sovereignty could be transferred to a UN administrative authority to work alongside the SCCS. The Prince asked for an intra-Cambodian meeting on April 15, accepting Chatichai's offer to serve as host.

Hun Sen could not attend on such short notice, however; he needed time to examine the new proposal with care. In mid-April Thailand's Chatichai and Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh then went to Tokyo, which would have a major role in financing a UN transitional organ. Soon, Kaifu was offering to hold the intra-Cambodian meeting. In May Hun Sen flew to meet Chatichai. Voicing agreement in principle with the Prince's latest plan, including the concession to let the UN organize elections after the cease-fire (Beckaert 1990c), the SOC premier accepted Kaifu's invitation. Hun Sen wanted Sihanouk to head SCCS, with the PDK being a part of the NGC delegation without veto power. Chaovalit then quietly negotiated cease-fire agreements with the four factions at the end of May, preparatory to a quadripartite conference in Tokyo, with full support from ASEAN.

The Perm Five decided to skip the monthly meeting for April. Having decided to enlist the UN to develop a plan for UNTAC, the task proved to be an enormous undertaking. There was so little information about Cambodia that any plan could easily go amiss. As the main problem of the UN role in Namibia was a failure to undertake fact-finding missions that would have identified potential difficulties, a UNDP mission left for Cambodia during April. Australia pledged $1 million to defray the cost of additional

fact-finding by the UN on April 19 (interviewee #96). Finland and Sweden made similar pledges. When the Perm Five met at the end of May, however, it had been upstaged by preparations for the forthcoming conference in Tokyo.

Since one of the clouds over Cambodia was the failure to develop a Sino-Vietnamese détente, the Soviet Union had been working to mediate between the two governments. In May SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh flew to Beijing for additional talks. China was linking normalization of relations to a satisfactory settlement of the Cambodian problem, while Hanoi was still arguing that the issue was intra-Cambodian and did not involve Vietnam.

TOKYO PEACE CONFERENCE

When Sihanouk arrived in Tokyo for intra-Cambodian talks scheduled to begin on June 4, he pledged that he would sign a cease-fire agreement. As Hun Sen insisted that he would never sign any document with the Pol-potists, he said he would sign on behalf of the SOC, while the Prince was the plenipotentiary for the NGC. Khieu Samphan and Son Sann could sign as members of the NGC but not as heads of independent delegations. Chatichai flew to Japan to serve as cohost of the conference with Foreign Minister Nakayama.

On June 4 the meeting opened. All four leaders were in town. After meeting in private, only three attended the public sessions. Despite attempted mediation by the PRC ambassador to Japan Yang Zhenya, Gaimusho officials, and members of Chatichai's delegation (C. Smith 1990), Khieu Samphan boycotted the conference, fuming that PDK should receive equal treatment. Hun Sen and Sihanouk went ahead and signed an agreement, reaffirming pledges made earlier to Chaovalit, that they "should refrain from all offensive actions" to ensure a "military standstill" (Honolulu Advertiser 1990a). On June 5 they signed a second agreement establishing a Supreme National Council (SNC). In addition to requesting a UN peacekeeping force to implement the cease-fire, the signatories asked the UN to "monitor, supervise and verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of all foreign military assistance" (Jameson 1990). The SNC, set up to "symbolize Cambodia's neutrality, national sovereignty and national unity" (Jameson 1990), was to have its first meeting by July 31, although the resistance refused to accept Hun Sen's proposal for Sihanouk to chair the SNC (Nation 1990b). They also urged France and Indonesia to reconvene PCC.

Tokyo blundered by linking the cease-fire with the SNC agreement. The cease-fire agreement evaporated between Bangkok and Tokyo. The SNC was stillborn.

Although there was only half an agreement, as Sihanouk put it, the Prince

and Son Sann pledged to persuade Khieu Samphan to sign. Sihanouk and Son Sann at first offered to give PDK four seats on the SNC in compensation, but by mid-June they named two delegates each to serve on the body (Jameson 1990). Foreign Minister Nakayama said that he would urge China to pressure the PDK to abide by the accord. As the agreement did not bind the PDK, Khieu Samphan was already suggesting that some points needed to be revised.

AFTER TOKYO

Most reactions to the peace agreement were positive. US press officer Richard Boucher immediately welcomed the agreement as a first step toward a comprehensive political settlement. Japan and Thailand agreed to approach countries supplying the four Cambodian armies in order to encapsulate the conflict. Chatichai went to Washington within a week to urge President Bush to convince China to stop support for the NADK, but the president insisted on a role for the Polpotists in the transition. China's Yang lambasted Sihanouk for signing without Samphan, and soon the Prince repudiated the agreement. NADK forces stepped up the war to proceed with a military solution.

As soon as the Tokyo meeting recessed, PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin went to Bangkok en route to Hanoi. Although he hoped for a breakthrough on Cambodian and bilateral issues, Hanoi said that it would back a UN transition in Cambodia only when China decided to drop Pol Pot (Economist 1990k: 39). China wanted Vietnam to accept what Hun Sen had rejected at Tokyo—dismantling of the SOC before elections so that the SNC would be an interim quadripartite government, and garrisoning of the four Cambodian armies. Foreign Minister Thach replied that these were matters to be decided among the Cambodian factions, not a proper subject of discussion between China and Vietnam. One might wonder why Beijing would want to maneuver Hanoi into playing power politics over Cambodia, as Vietnam had refused to discuss matters internal to Cambodia for over a decade. Xu was of course negotiating on behalf of Pol Pot, hoping that Hanoi would agree to something over the head of Hun Sen, but SRV leaders were consistently rejecting the role of chessplayers on a superpower gameboard (Hiebert 1990a).

The cease-fire was to go into effect on July 31. NADK advanced militarily before and after the meeting, and even ANKI forces engaged the CPAF (Honolulu Advertiser 1990a). Thus, fighting began to escalate, rather than to wind down. Estimates of the number of peasants who fled the fighting ranged as high as 150,000, although the refugee flow was said to be an SOC battle tactic (Economist 1990d: 29); by the fall the government claimed that they returned home (UPI 1990b).

A meeting of the Perm Five, scheduled for early July, was postponed for

a week when Son Sann proposed that the five meet with the four Cambodian factions (interviewee #31), but a nine-party conference proved impossible when the Polpotists refused. During the Perm Five meeting at Paris in mid-July, China delivered the bad news: NADK preferred to enter Phnom Penh by military force if it would not be included in an interim quadripartite government (UPI 1990c). The "5 + 4" talks were off, a convening of the SNC for July 31 was postponed indefinitely, and the Perm Five reported little progress. However, the Perm Five reached consensus on transitional administrative and military arrangements and agreed to reconvene at the end of August.

In mid-July, after Chatichai again visited Bush in Washington, CIA and defense department intelligence officials disclosed to the Senate Intelligence Committee that NADK controlled 30 percent of Cambodia and was advancing (Krauss 1990). Following an intemperate grilling of US officials by the senators who were present, Bush decided to shore up bipartisan support for his Cambodia policy by accepting the advice of Baker over Scowcroft on Cambodia (Colhoun 1990a). Soon, Baker emerged from a session with Shevardnadze in Paris to confirm a prior news leak that he accepted Western Europe's decision to vote against seating the resistance coalition in the UN again as long as the PDK remained a member. Still believing that Hanoi could pressure Phnom Penh into a settlement, Baker then asked Kenneth Quinn (an expert on Cambodia who replaced Vietnamese-speaking David Lambertson as deputy assistant secretary of state) to start discussions on Cambodia with the head of Vietnam's UN mission in New York on August 6. Meanwhile, a US forensic team went to Phnom Penh, accepting an invitation issued several years earlier (Chanda 1990:10) to identify the remains of MIAs. USAID informed Operation USA that it would make $10 million available to Cambodian children under legislation passed by Congress after the ABC-TV special on Cambodia in late April, and the Treasury Department eased licensing procedures for PVO aid to Cambodia and Vietnam.

While Australia, Canada, Western Europe, the SOC, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam praised Baker's statement, he received opprobrium from ASEAN, China, Japan, Sihanouk, and Son Sann. He conceded to ASEAN that the United States would not lead the fight to unseat the NGC at the General Assembly session, but some Western European countries had already agreed to do so. Some sixty-six senators then criticized Baker for not going far enough, urging him to negotiate with Hun Sen.

A flurry of talks ensued. Diplomats from the PRC embassy in Hanoi held discussions with SRV foreign ministry officials on August 5 and 13 to see whether they could narrow their differences. On August 20, the three resistance leaders arrived in Beijing for talks to determine whether to abide by the Tokyo agreement, which Hun Sen refused to amend. Their decision was to repudiate the Tokyo agreement and to seek a meeting with Hun Sen to renegotiate the framework so that the four parties would have equal

representation on the SNC. From Hun Sen's point of view, a disavowal of one agreement meant that any future agreement could be torn up, thereby turning the peace process into a farce. According to SOC intelligence, Ta Mok of the NADK planned to subvert any political settlement (UPI 1990a), so prospects looked particularly bleak.

On August 28 the Perm Five, meeting in New York, announced a breakthrough—an outline of an agreement for a transitional UN organ. The proposed thirty-six articles provided for UN control of the key ministries of defense, finance, foreign affairs, information, and interior, with the SOC otherwise remaining in place (Perm Five 1990c: 2). The cost was estimated to be from $3 to $5 billion for up to two years in order to pay for 12,000 to 20,000 UN officials, half civilian and half military (San Francisco Chronicle 1990: 14). The Perm Five wanted the Supreme National Council, which would hold the UN seat on behalf of Cambodia, to consist of prominent Cambodians rather than to be divided along factional lines (Reuter 1990b).

After the Perm Five meeting, foreign ministers Qian and Shevardnadze pledged to stop aiding their Cambodian allies, whom they agreed to press to accept the five-power peace settlement. PRC Prime Minister Li and General Secretary Jiang then secretly invited their SRV counterparts to Chengdu, China, on September 3 and 4; former Premier Pham Van Dong was also on the guest list, but not Thach. The delegation from Hanoi agreed to support the Perm Five agreement when PRC leaders promised to stop aid to Pol Pot; China in turn would do so when the UN verified that all PAVN forces were out of Cambodia. Vietnam also pledged that it would "never return to Cambodia in whatever way" (Kangwaan 1990). In addition, Vietnam accepted internal aspects of a comprehensive political settlement, including Sihanouk as chair and thirteenth member of the SNC. Beijing offered to make up any shortfall from declining Soviet aid (Economist 1991b: 3), but the price was a total kowtow to the PRC that Hanoi could not accept. China then invited General Giap, who successfully defended Vietnam against PLA aggression in 1979, to be present at the opening of the Asian Games on September 22, a sign that a Sino-Vietnamese détente might be possible. While Bush was still hoping that Congress would approve aid to the NCR, the State Department hinted that any further hitch in forming the SNC might entail a separate peace with the SOC.

JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING ON CAMBODIA

With the UN General Assembly scheduled to convene shortly, a messy credentials fight loomed unless the four Cambodian factions could get together somehow. On September 9 the PCC cochairs convened an Informal Meeting on Cambodia at Jakarta to accomplish two tasks. The first task

was to obtain approval from the four factions on the Perm Five's proposed "Nature and Functions of the SNC." The second was to form the SNC.

Hun Sen, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sann accepted the invitation, but Sihanouk refused, saying that he was removing himself from politics for six months. PRC Prime Minister Li Peng reportedly was extremely angry that the Prince would not attend, as the Chinese were certain that Sihanouk would emerge as SNC chair and Cambodia's chief UN delegate if he invoked his charisma in Jakarta. The SOC urged President Suharto to appeal to Sihanouk to attend; otherwise, Hun Sen would not go. The Prince then said that he had booked a flight to Jakarta, whereupon Hun Sen proceeded to Jakarta, but the Prince insisted that he would remain outside quadripartite negotiations, as before at both JIMs and the earlier IMC. Then the personification of Cambodian unity undertook the most bizarre move yet, flying to Pyongyang instead.

Just before the four factions met, Hun Sen conferred with John Monjo, US ambassador to Indonesia. US and SOC diplomats had talks in Vientiane as well. These were signs that Washington was trying to assure Phnom Penh that every effort would be undertaken to ensure the nonreturn of the Polpotists to power. It was also a threat to make a separate peace with the SOC, thereby forcing the NADK to agree to the Supreme National Council. Although the PDK was ready to agree to military self-restraint, it awaited a reconvened PCC before undertaking final discussions on a cease-fire (Bangkok Post 1990c).

On September 10, leaders of the four factions, after two days of meetings cochaired by Indonesia's Alatas and French Deputy Foreign Minister Edwige Avice, announced an unsigned agreement. Accepting the Perm Five text in principle, they agreed on the Tokyo formula for the SNC, with all decisions to be decided on the basis of unanimity. In a compromise proposed by Sihanouk, the four factions agreed that a thirteenth seat would be possible for an elected chair (Vatikiotis 1990a: 10). Had Sihanouk been in Jakarta, the matter could have been resolved, Hun Sen later admitted, with the Prince as the head of SNC (Srisuworanan & Chaipipat 1990b:A2). The next step was for the SNC to meet. Thailand offered to host the meeting at the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok, whose construction was completed in 1978 but had never been occupied due to the DK–SRV war and its aftermath, and the invitation was accepted for the following week. Military clashes ceased at this point throughout Cambodia.

China, meanwhile, indicated a readiness to talk to SOC representatives. Diplomats from the PRC embassy in Jakarta met Hun Sen immediately after the Jakarta agreement. One week later the SOC delegation took an Air Kampuchea flight from Phnom Penh to Bangkok, the first direct official flight between the two countries since 1978, to attend the first meeting of the SNC. On arriving in Thailand, SOC officials received a red carpet reception by the foreign ministry. At the suggestion of the Thai foreign min-

ister, the Phnom Penh delegates contacted the PRC embassy, whose ambassador obliged with an invitation to visit. In due course there was premature speculation about a "Red solution" in which a PRC–SNC–SRV coalition would marginalize the NCR and the PDK (Pringle 1990). At the end of 1990, China and Vietnam were issuing hostile counterclaims over sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly islands (AFP 1990b), so the "Red option" was far from viable.

BANGKOK CONFERENCE

With the UN General Assembly set to convene on September 18, an agreement to form an SNC delegation would avoid a contentious battle on credentials. Accordingly, Thai authorities quickly refurbished the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok for the inaugural SNC meeting on September 17. While Chatichai's staff prepared the conference facilities, the Thai foreign ministry drafted two texts—a Declaration of Cambodian Neutrality and an Agreement on Military Standstill and Military Self-Restraint, and on the International Monitoring, Supervision and Verification of the Withdrawal of All Foreign Forces. The first document was to be guaranteed by outside powers, whereas the second was envisaged as a confidence-building measure in anticipation of a Joint Military Commission with a UN-designated presiding officer. Thai diplomats then proceeded to meet with each faction separately to ascertain whether sufficient consensus for an agreement existed.

The four factions nominated twelve delegates. Although each faction had a veto power over any unwanted SNC nominee, no objection was raised to any of the twelve. Representative Solarz and US Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt expressed "disgust" when the PDK put forward Son Sen. Although the two compared his role in DK genocide to the Nazi Heinrich Himmler, Hun Sen showed a conciliatory posture by allowing him to sit at the same table, although he was later criticized in Phnom Penh for his flexibility (Bangkok Post 1990d: A1). Prematurely, the VODK indicated that Sihanouk had changed his mind and was ready to chair the SNC, although this required approval from the twelve. In a long distance telephone call, Sihanouk told PDK leader Khieu Samphan that he would agree to anything acceptable to China and the PDK (Srisuworanan 1990a).

When the resistance delegates arrived, an alphabetical seating arrangement placed Hun Sen at one end of an oval table and Khieu Samphan at the other, giving the impression that the other two factions were of lesser consequence (interviewee #125). Since the Thais did not obtain advance agreement on an agenda during the morning, the SNC delegates opened their session in the afternoon by deciding that the first order of business was to choose a presiding officer. Since the Prince was not in Bangkok, Hun Sen suggested a rotating chair so that other matters could be addressed in the meantime, including a cease-fire and the composition of the UN dele-

gation. The resistance held out for the absent Sihanouk, agreeing to Hun Sen as UN delegate on behalf of the SNC. Noting that the Jakarta agreement specified that no party should play a dominant role in the transition, SOC delegates counterproposed acceptance of the Prince as president if Hun Sen served as SNC vice chair, with FUNCIPEC's Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum as UN delegate; the SOC then asked that two from the twelve resign to make room. Since all decisions required unanimity, SOC evidently instructed Hun Sen during the intervening week not to elevate the Prince to a supreme role in advance of elections without also showing to potential voters that Hun Sen enjoyed prominence over the other factional leaders. The SOC, thus, wanted Ranariddh to resign to make way for Sihanouk to become one of the twelve, but the resistance would not budge. The Thais, then, proposed a compromise in which Sihanouk would be the chair, with the seat allocation question to be decided later. A statement to this effect was accepted by Hun Sen, then NGC drafted an alternative, and drafts went back and forth for several hours. Next, Hun Sen accepted a Thai compromise that the SNC expand to fourteen seats to accommodate Sihanouk as chair and Hun Sen as vice chair, but the NGC said "No" (Srisuworanan 1990a; Srisuworanan & Chaipipat 1990a). By then it was midnight, and the participants called it a day.

Meanwhile, believing that Hun Sen had promised to accept Sihanouk at Jakarta, Ranariddh was so upset with the apparent doublecross and personal attack that he breached protocol by failing to attend an evening banquet hosted by Chatichai. He then boycotted the second SNC session, scheduled for the following day, on the frivolous pretext of escorting his son to school in Paris. His apparently impulsive response was said to have irritated many observers, including Perm Five envoys, one of whom pointed out that "the nomination of the Cambodian delegation is more urgent than the question of the chairmanship, which could be discussed in later sessions" (Srisuworanan & Chaipipat 1990b: A2). As a result, the SNC postponed its next meeting for a day. Japanese and Vietnamese diplomats met separately with the Cambodian leaders to urge them to reach an agreement, as did Perm Five diplomats, albeit lackadaisically, but it was all in vain. Due to Sihanouk's telephone call and Ranariddh's departure, Khieu Samphan became the NGC's chief negotiator. With Hun Sen flexible and the resistance rigid, the Cambodians adjourned without deciding anything. The resistance, reduced to placing the peace of the nation below family matters, vowed to fight on. The following day the Prince accepted the fourteen-seat compromise, but SNC delegates had left town.

Hun Sen, angry before his return to Phnom Penh, threatened that if the resistance kept the UN seat, his government would never allow the UN a role in the transition. From Bangkok, the NGC telegrammed New York to ask that the UN leave the Cambodian seat vacant, pending the arrival of an SNC delegate (Srisuworanan & Chaipipat 1990b: A2). SNC officially

became the representative of Cambodia in all UN organs, so any of the twelve could presumably claim the right to sit in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the lame duck PDK chief delegate continued to use UN stationery in his capacity as the holdover official representative of Cambodia. The following day the Security Council endorsed the Jakarta framework, urging the Cambodians to wrap up the final details.

External powers were extricating themselves while the Cambodians were bickering to such an extent that they were jeopardizing the spirit of national reconciliation, which was clearly a precondition to a peace settlement. Hun Sen left Jakarta for home, urging that Bangkok convene the second SNC meeting. Khieu Samphan suggested Siem Reap as the next venue. Chatichai, who did not hide his frustration, indicated that any Bangkok invitation had to be cleared with the Perm Five. The war then resumed.

BATTLEFIELD EVENTS

During 1990, NADK transferred another 80,000 civilians from clandestine border camps to "liberated zones" in Cambodia (Eng 1991b). NADK vowed to fight until the last Vietnamese (presumably including 500,000 or more "settlers") left the country. NADK had 25,000 soldiers to CPAF's 50,000.

China, reducing aid to the NCR, secretly sent two dozen tanks to warehouses in Thailand in order to be available to the NADK; after the Tokyo conference failed, Beijing leaked the news (GEnie 1991b; Tasker, Awanohara & Delfs 1991: 9). NADK appeared ready to consolidate its political hold over western Cambodia, but the tanks remained undelivered (Economist 1990f: 40). Soviet and Vietnamese military advisers were still assumed to be playing noncombat roles; US intelligence believed that from 4,000 to 9,000 PAVN soldiers were wearing CPAF uniforms (Ehrlich 1990; GEnie 1990a, 1991d; Thayer 1990a). Meanwhile, US aid to the NCR stalled in Congress. One Western intelligence source gave CPAF a B+ for defending the country (IP 1991a). The resistance suffered from a high rate of desertions and a deteriorating morale, according to the same sources.

ANOTHER JAKARTA CONFERENCE

After disarray in Bangkok, the Perm Five continued to meet so that an agreement on external aspects would be available to the four Cambodian factions in case they wanted peace. Thach was invited to Washington, where the State Department asked for permission to set up an office in Hanoi to deal with MIAs, so US–SRV normalization seemed to be in the cards. Foreign ministers of Laos, the State of Cambodia, and Vietnam met later in September, calling for a resumption of PCC (UPI 1990d). These were favorable signs.

Accordingly, Jakarta convened an expanded Perm Five meeting on November 9 to review a twelve-page text from the Perm Five that outlined the main parameters of an agreement to have the UN run Cambodian elections, thereby legitimizing a new government to go beyond years of stalemate. In addition to Indonesia and the Perm Five, six countries were represented officially—Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Laos, and Malaysia. These countries were cochairs of PCC committees that had invested time in drafting initial provisions of an agreement in midsummer 1989. Conspicuous by their absence were the Cambodians and Vietnamese. Two days later the meeting adjourned in nearly unanimous agreement.

TWO MEETINGS IN PARIS

After the session in Jakarta, a Soviet delegation went to Pyongyang to visit Sihanouk, who subsequently flew to Beijing to talk to Indonesian President Suharto and Prime Minister Chatichai. Consulting with the Chinese as well, Sihanouk agreed to serve as SNC chair and to accept Hun Sen as vice chair (Nation 1990b), but this was vetoed by the PDK, whereupon the Prince disavowed any interest in chairing the SNC.

In late November, on the eve of another Perm Five session in Paris, Soviet officials met in Phnom Penh with Indochinese representatives to assure the latter that they were negotiating in their interests. Moscow agreed to support SOC views enunciated earlier in the month and to insist that the final text of any agreement would condemn the Polpotist human rights record. As if to acknowledge that the Russians were not prepared to speak on their behalf, Phnom Penh then sent a memorandum to the Perm Five, indicating that previous insistence on a six-month UNTAC was relaxed to a nine-month operation. Fearing NADK violations after uniformed forces disarmed, it asked for a provision that would allow CPAF to continue as a peacekeeping force.

On November 26, one week after the signing of the historic twenty-two-nation European conventional arms treaty ending the cold war, the Perm Five adopted a forty-eight page text on Cambodia, presumably concluding its work (UN General Assembly 1991). In addition to UNTAC, the document proposed the establishment of an independent International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia. The military commander of UNTAC, in turn, would chair a Mixed Military Working Group, which in turn would work with liaison officers in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam concerning complaints of violations of the agreement on their territory. Guerrilla and military personnel were to be regrouped, confined in barracks, disarmed; weapons would be kept on site in the custody of UNTAC, then troops would be allowed to return home. Detailed provisions suggested 20,000 officials in UNTAC, thus enough personnel to dismantle the SOC and handle peacekeeping (UPI 1990c). The communiqué from the meeting,

issued by Indonesia, the UN's Ahmed, and the Perm Five, expressed the expectation that Sihanouk would be elected to chair the SNC and called upon the warring parties to "exercise maximum self-restraint so that the Paris Conference on Cambodia can be reconvened in a peaceful environment." The next step, according to the communiqué, was for a "fully functioning" SNC. Otherwise, PCC would not be reconvened.

Upon receipt of the text, the SOC expressed three reservations—SOC dismantling and thus violation of its sovereignty, failure to focus on genocide, and a disarmament plan that would allow NADK to violate any cease-fire. The SOC asked for NADK and PDK to be dismantled as well. Whereas the document in Jakarta earlier that month contained a provision calling upon the new Cambodian government to exercise its responsibilities in regard to human rights, the forty-eight page text had no such retrospective provision, contrary to Soviet assurances. The Russians, weakened by domestic discord and dependent upon Western largesse to overcome a crisis in food distribution, agreed to the Perm Five document with a reservation in regard to the demobilization process but none concerning genocide (interviewee #115). To the Vietnamese, the Russians appeared to have sold out the Cambodians (interviewee #129), but there appeared to be no other way to attract the PDK to agree to a peace settlement (interviewee #121).

The three Indochinese heads of state then met on December 1 and 2, their first such meeting in five years. Whereas they called for an early SNC meeting to advance the peace process, the resistance wanted a later session. Hun Sen then played coy: stating that security in Cambodia was better than in the Philippines, a dubious claim, he pretended that the SOC could outlast its opponents if hopes for peace faded.

On December 21 the SNC reconvened in Paris, with the French and Indonesian foreign ministers as cochairs. Although in France already, Sihanouk refused to serve as chair or to attend, so the PCC cochairs presided. Rafeeuddhin Ahmed, whose UN staff drafted much of the document, explained in detail how the transition plan would work. Under pressure from all sides, Hun Sen collapsed from nervous exhaustion, then rejected the draft. He indicated that his government accepted the basic principles, including allowing the UN to do what was necessary to terminate the war and to organize elections, but he wanted changes regarding only two issues raised in the November memo—internal security during a transition and guarantees against the return of the genocidal Polpotists to power. The main security problem was that uniformed military personnel could be easily identified; guerrillas might not come forward and thus could cheat on the agreement. In addition, the SOC wanted all military personnel confined until elections, whereas the resistance preferred to disperse them throughout the country to influence voting. As Hun Sen did not trust the military component of UNTAC to keep the peace, Ahmed agreed to write an explanatory note that there would be a guarantee that UNTAC, which might

last for a two-year term, would step in militarily if NADK sought to grab power (Reuter 1991c; UN 1991: 35–37). The cochairs considered the meeting to have achieved progress by narrowing the external issues to two, and they pledged to canvass opinion among the remaining PCC countries about reconvening the plenary in 1991.

Within two days Thach (1990) released a press statement, fully accepting the agreement in regard to external aspects but confident that the question of genocide would be addressed at the reconvened PCC. He attacked the Perm Five draft for allowing a larger role for UNTAC in internal matters than previously contemplated. Although he left internal aspects to the Cambodian parties, he expressed surprise that the agreement violated the UN charter by asking a sovereign state to dissolve itself. What he appeared to say was that Vietnam, backtracking on previous statements, would sign the Perm Five document only if the United States agreed to normalize relations (interviewee #130). China saw the SOC refusal to accept the Perm Five document *in toto* as a Vietnamese doublecross, with Thach possibly getting even for being bypassed at Chengdu (interviewee #111).

OIL TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER WATER

When French Foreign Minister Dumas addressed the SNC meeting, he noted that any failure to accept the forty-eight page text would mean that interest in Cambodia would be back-burnered in light of the impending war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. Yet Dumas instead supplied a reason not to accept the document, as implementation of any agreement to set up UNTAC would necessarily be delayed until after the coming war with Iraq concluded. The potential of enough Cambodian hydropower to handle all Thai and Vietnamese electricity needs for the first half of the twenty-first century had to wait a while longer (Hiebert 1991a).

Accordingly, China let information out at the end of 1990 that tanks, which NADK scarcely knew how to operate, were being delivered from warehouses in Thailand to the NADK (interviewee #128; Beckaert 1991; GEnie 1991b; Thayer 1990a). The pretext was that Vietnam was still providing military aid to the CPAF, while the actual reason was a belief that Vietnamese advisers in Phnom Penh and the provinces still controlled the country and were hence resisting a peace settlement (interviewee #57). China appreciated neither the fear of the return of Pol Pot nor Vietnam's long history of concessions in order to set its house in order. Washington, in anticipation of an election that it might buy on behalf of Sak Sutsakhan, began to spend the $20 million appropriation of USAID humanitarian funds to build schools, contribute tractors, and pave roads for NCR villages inside Cambodia. Some 1,000 doctors and nurses, trained at Cambodia's most modern hospital, were treating 90,000 civilians and 10,000 military per-

sonnel monthly (AP 1991b; Thayer 1991b), a project to which the UNHCR office in Phnom Penh objected as fuelling the war (Becker 1991). Meanwhile, the PDK continued to control more villages. Pol Pot instructed his cadres that "Possession of popular strength translates into possession of political administration in the villages . . . [which] beget representation in parliament" (Thayer 1991c:25). The message was clear: the resistance would gain from any further stalemate.

After relocating civilians from border camps during 1990, the NADK commanders frightened many back when they renewed the war. Some 150,000 were driven from their villages by disease, hunger, and war back to UNBRO camps, while another 130,000 were displaced inside makeshift SOC camps. By spring 1991 SOC camps housed 180,000 (UPI 1991c).

In early January the Soviet Union asked Thailand to convene a meeting of the SNC in order to work on changes in the text of the UN plan that would satisfy all parties (interviewee #115). The SOC was concerned that a deadlocked SNC would serve as a provisional government, so progress was needed as well on internal aspects of a settlement.

In early February, senior officials from France, Indonesia, and the United Nations went to Hanoi, asking Vietnam to bring Phnom Penh in line. Foreign Minister Thach reiterated a position stated long ago: Cambodia is a sovereign state, as is Vietnam; neither makes policy for the other, so disagreements between Cambodian parties must be reconciled between Cambodian parties. In other words, although it was in Vietnam's interest to return matters in the region to normal, Hanoi lost influence over Cambodia when its troops left in September 1989, so the principal SRV interest in Cambodia was to bring perpetrators of genocide to justice in accordance with international law. Although Vietnam's support for peace efforts was unequivocal, the three diplomats left disappointed (MacSwan 1991; UPI 1991f).

Although upbeat about a peace settlement, SOC Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong insisted that the key issue was how to prevent the Polpotists from retaking power. Phnom Penh wanted "concrete guarantees" that they would never return to power, either by force during a transition in which Cambodians were disarmed or through an election in which Sihanouk ran as their front man (GEnie 1991b). Hun Sen declared that neither PDK delegate on the SNC would be allowed into Phnom Penh; instead, with President Bush calling for Saddam Hussein's trial as a war criminal, he said "we must also try the Polpotist ringleaders before a tribunal" (Reuter 1991b), a policy soon endorsed by SNC delegate Ieng Mouly of the KPNLF (Bangkok Post 1991a). President Heng Samrin declared, "We have made concessions and they constantly make demands to the point of even demanding that we commit suicide" (Reuter 1991c). Phnom Penh wanted the UN to monitor, not enforce, a regrouping and demobilization of armed forces, with weapons kept on site rather than being collected; this would

serve to deter a NADK coup. SOC officials were wary of UNTAC's power to dismantle the existing administration in Phnom Penh, fire officials, and conduct elections that might legitimize the PDK. Concessions on these points were imperative if the peace process was to bear fruit.

Meanwhile, the Kuwait war broke out in mid-January 1991. Cambodia was indeed back-burnered. In late February a coup led by armed forces supreme commander Sunthorn Kongsompong toppled the Thai government. The first country to extend greetings was China. Soon after, the well-respected Anand Panyarachun was named prime minister and Arsa Sarasin became foreign minister. Sunthorn flew to Laos in March, concluding an agreement for a demilitarization of the Lao-Thai border and the disarming of Laotian anti-Communist guerrillas infiltrating from Thailand, then announced that he would fly to Hanoi at a later date, but the new government decided to opt out of an independent role in the Cambodian peace process.

With the CPAF massing for an offensive in late February, which eventually included air strikes, both the SOC and SRV called for a cease-fire and an end to external aid to all combatants. In response, Beijing announced that it would resume military aid to the NADK. Sihanouk then called for a meeting of NGC and the three main suppliers of the ongoing civil war—China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Japan indicated that it had a compromise plan to discuss; the main ideas were a confidence-building cease-fire, provisions regarding contingencies in case of noncompliance, and a special organ to monitor human rights (Tasker, Awanohara & Delfs 1991: 10).

With a cutoff in US aid to the NCR likely, in view of a report of the State Department admitting NCR–NADK military cooperation, Washington dispatched Richard Solomon to Beijing in March, with an itinerary that included Tokyo, Bangkok, and Jakarta. USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev flew to China to meet Solomon, as did the leaders of the three resistance factions. Tokyo sent Tadashi Ikeda, a diplomat from the embassy in Bangkok and chargé d'affaires accredited to the NGC. Amid a rumor that textual changes could finalize the peace agreement before the Cambodian new year in April (interviewee #135), the meeting appeared to signal the endgame at last.

Although the State Department felt that Japan was improperly intruding into the Perm Five process, the meeting went ahead. During the conference the external parties reportedly agreed to stop supplying their proxies at an appropriate time, and the Cambodians agreed in principle to a cease-fire. Khieu Samphan, however, would not sign any agreement for a cease-fire until Hun Sen signed the peace accord. Accordingly, France and Indonesia offered to cochair another meeting in Jakarta. Representatives from Paris and Jakarta, joined by UN officials, then sought flights to Hanoi and Phnom Penh to present the proposed compromise. After Thach reminded all sides that the sticking point was demobilizing CPAF in the absence of a viable

UN force to hold back an NADK onslaught, officials of the three Indochinese countries met together in late March in Vientiane to deliberate their response.

With Australia prepared to support changes in the Perm Five text acceptable to the SOC (interviewee #121), Richard Solomon testified before Congress in mid-April that a new Cambodian army would form while existing forces demobilized in order to ensure against anticipated NADK violations of the UNTAC agreements. A human rights education effort, he predicted, could discredit the PDK during the election campaign. Another US government official tried to assure Phnom Penh that Washington would support a coalition between the NCR and SOC parties after UNTAC elections (interviewee #88). Lorne Craner, a deputy assistant secretary of state, was in Phnom Penh at the time, accompanying Senators Phil Gramm and John McCain; Craner was the first official from Foggy Bottom since 1975. The US government was talking to the SOC but not the PDK. Phnom Penh officials awaited guarantees that Polpotists would not return to Phnom Penh except to stand trial for genocide, but no country was willing to take any step along these lines until UNTAC brought a new Cambodian government into being. Hun Sen also wanted to be sure that important SOC leaders would not be fired by UNTAC.

The US government suspended aid to the NCR in mid-April while proceeding to aid children under SOC control. Hanoi agreed to allow Washington to set up an office in Hanoi to deal with the MIA issue. These were signs of shifts in policy. At the end of April France and Indonesia called for the four factions to observe a cease-fire as a confidence-building measure, and on May 1 the guns were silent over most of Cambodia. Phnom Penh invited a UN truce observation mission; after the NADK refused to cooperate during a brief visit of the mission, fighting resumed. Since the NCR could not cooperate militarily with the NADK during a cease-fire, US aid to the NCR could resume. The SNC reconvened at Jakarta in June, when Sihanouk replaced elderly Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum, thereby slipping into the role as SOC chair. More SNC sessions convened at Pattaya in June, Beijing in July, and Pattaya in August, with further sessions slated to resolve each detail of UNTAC through compromise.

The foundation had been laid through negotiations. Compromises had occurred over the years. Proxy genocide was no longer in fashion, thanks to the end of the cold war in Europe. Polpotists were making inroads politically as a viable guerrilla force in a countryside that they could increasingly control if they could keep out foreign development aid. The NCR awaited elections in order to come to power but would need outside aid to win and to prevail over the long haul. In mid-1991, all signs thus pointed toward a peace settlement as soon as SOC fears about measures to prevent Pol Pot from returning to power were properly allayed.

Genocide by proxy might end through deproxification of the militarized

aspects of the Cambodian conflict, and peace would emerge when the SNC, scheduled to set up office at Phnom Penh in November, modified the Perm Five text so that 30 percent of CPAF and the other armies would remain armed, Sihanouk would have the inside track to become head of state, and Pol Pot reduced PDK intransigence. By July the SNC adopted a new flag and national anthem, and most PCC countries agreed to reestablish their embassies in Phom Penh after Sihanouk returned to the royal palace as SNC head in November. On Spetember 7, 1991, Sihanouk declared, "The war is over." An UNTAC-supervised election might enable Cambodia to develop its own independent history after decades of manipulation from the outside. Aid to a country at war for nearly fifty years would then backstop the new regime. I close this chapter neither optimistic nor pessimistic about prospects for peace but instead uncertain, continuing to pray for a better future for the Cambodian people, a pawn too long on a superpower chessboard.

Part V

BEYOND CHESSGAMES

29

THE "ASIAN WAY" TO WORLD PLURALISM

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF *REALPOLITIK*

Cambodia's genocide by proxy shows the fallacy of basing world politics on *realpolitik*. The world of states, each protecting their sovereignty, went awry with regard to Cambodia. To demonstrate this thesis, we begin by identifying how *realpolitik* norms created a chessboard among the countries involved in which Cambodia could only play the role of pawn. We then sketch an alternative—a pluralistic world. As a new world politics arises to replace the cold war, there is a need for an innovative way to conduct diplomacy. Accordingly, we report on the "Asian Way," which the Cambodian case vindicated.

At the height of the Khmer Empire, Angkor Wat represented a contribution to human civilization unsurpassed throughout the world. As the empire crumbled, ruthlessness in suppressing dissent stands out. Installed by foreign countries, turncoat Cambodian factional leaders in due course doublecrossed each other in futile attempts to gain power at any cost while ignoring the interests of the humble people of the country. Cambodian leaders have played one state off against another but without succeeding in the *realpolitik* game. Serving as willing pawns for major power chessplayers, they have nearly presided over their country's extinction. Heroism and idealism have flowed from desperation. Irredentist claims against Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam were seemingly incapable of resolution without the intervention of a stronger outside power, whereupon Cambodia slipped deeper into the carnage of genocide against non-Khmers and autogenocide against Khmers. Then, a civil war in the 1980s proved that some Cambodians could even fight for a megalomaniac to expel foreigners so that internal purges of traitors could begin anew.

Vietnam sought independence in a struggle that lasted longer, perhaps, than that of any other nation. Lacking superior numbers and isolated from

the heartland of Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese became the best strategists in Asia, if not in the world. Historically, they mastered the art of unilateralism because they were left out of efforts at international cooperation. Consisting of a sliver of land along a vulnerable seacoast, Vietnam saw encroachments on its sovereignty as preludes to conquest, and it appreciated Cambodia best when it served as a friendly neighbor or a buffer state. Although Vietnam has been ready to negotiate with sympathetic states in Southeast Asia, military force has usually been the final arbiter of strategic realities involving the country. Hanoi's joy in haggling for a favorable *modus vivendi*, even when no such prospect was even remotely in sight, prolonged various chessgames in its history in order to extract inconsequential concessions, thereby giving other countries the impression of Vietnamese as crass bargainers.

Representing the oldest civilization in the world, modern Chinese leaders have perceived themselves as heirs to the imperial dynasties. Beijing considered Southeast Asia to be culturally inferior; other countries were expected to pay deference and tribute. Although China aided Vietnam during its struggle against France and the United States, Beijing's chagrin at Hanoi's lack of Confucian gratitude was oblivious to the fact that Soviet aid was more crucial in the final years of Vietnam's struggle to expel foreign hegemonists. China regarded its support of Cambodia as an effort to keep cocky Vietnam in check, invoking the *realpolitik* principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Then, when Hanoi responded to a legitimate threat to its security, China administered a senseless Confucian "lesson." Beijing dropped support for Communist parties in the region whenever such a move was geostrategically advantageous, thus failing to apply the standards of loyalty to itself that it required of its proxies.

The Soviet Union, which was created to bring prosperity to the masses without exploitation, tried to set an example by being a friend to all socialist countries. Moscow's aid to Cambodia and Vietnam—although refused by Democratic Kampuchea—flowed from the principle of proletarian internationalism. At the same time, Soviet involvement in Indochina before the Gorbachev era was clearly in the role of a superpower: The aim was to protect and to extend the Soviet sphere of influence, thereby denying real estate to China and the United States. Strategists in the Kremlin were so eager to gain advantage from any situation where its adversaries were weak that they made the mistake of trying to squeeze First World military capabilities from its own Third World economy. It took Gorbachev's leadership to make the Kremlin choose between maintaining empire or starving the masses.

Thailand's reputation for diplomatic skill, for making friends with everyone, is richly deserved. Bangkok yielded to superior force so that it would not be absorbed by military giants, successfully playing outside powers against one another. The Thais historically have kept as many options open

as possible, sometimes pursuing seemingly contradictory policies, in order to protect their autonomy. Having profited from friends with common interests, Bangkok rarely abandons options that provide advantages. The historical interest in Cambodia was primarily to improve its power position vis-à-vis Vietnam or at least to maintain a neutral buffer so that Thailand could pursue the path of peace. A Cambodia at war could serve either objective, so Bangkok never needed to respond to Vietnamese diplomatic overtures until profit motives loomed larger.

Thailand's closest friends are in ASEAN, an organization with a non-*realpolitik* reputation for Third World cooperation in more fields of endeavor than perhaps any other regional body. Based on bitter colonial experience, Indonesia and Malaysia saw a familiar pattern of foreign meddling in Indochina. They preferred to encapsulate Southeast Asia from the intrusion of outside powers, believing that China posed the most serious long-term geostrategic threat to the region. In 1971 they prevailed on fellow ASEAN members to adopt ZOPFAN, calling upon all foreign troops to withdraw from the region so that Southeast Asia would be "neutralized." But this pledge did not lead to immediate action, even from its cosignatories, as US bases remained in the Philippines and Thailand. After SEATO closed its doors at Bangkok in 1977, the Philippines faced a Communist insurgency, so Marcos decided to rely on superpower protection and thus backed Thailand, ASEAN's frontline state in the Cambodian civil war. Singapore's vulnerable position in a world of contending superpowers and imagined cellgroups of a mythical internal Marxist conspiracy added up to support for Thailand in the Cambodian conflict in order to cultivate a strategic relationship with Washington.

France and the United States, two countries that historically championed human rights, at different times pretended that their presence in Indochina was on behalf of a noble crusade. First came the objective of outflanking major power rivals. The next goal was to defeat Japan. Later, the fight against Communism so clouded their vision that they were blind to the forces of nationalism, deluded into ignoring the aspirations of proud inhabitants of countries with older civilizations. The more Paris and Washington sought to exhibit instruments of mass destruction instead of observing principles of human rights (for which they were accountable at home), the more they foundered. While Paris mellowed in time, Washington continued to act as if it were normal for one nation to push another around. The view that Cambodia had to be someone's puppet, and thus could not receive treatment on its own terms, was a continuity in policy on the part of many Western powers. A related misconception has been that mortal enemies for decades might happily form a coalition just to receive the kind blessing of Western powers, who could then trot off nonchalantly into the sunset believing that a just peace had been reached through the fine art of a historically grounded parliamentary compromise.

Japan's international posture also shows uncanny continuity regarding Southeast Asia. Asia's top-ranking economic superpower enjoys high marks for its many accomplishments in the world today, but this has not always been so. Stressing its cultural affinity to other Asian countries, Tokyo hoped to gain friends in Southeast Asia through a proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that would replace Western exploiters with Japanese corporate control. When this idea was rejected, the military option came next. After recovering from World War II, Tokyo thought that aid and investment would buy friends, but again the region was suspicious, as there were many strings attached, and Japan wanted to buy raw materials, not finished products, leaving Southeast Asians as bearers of water and hewers of wood. These ploys failed because Southeast Asians wanted to be treated on an equal, not subordinate, basis.

Finally, we see that the United Nations had little to offer regarding Cambodia. Ho Chi Minh was ignored. The Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and the Paris accords of 1973 bypassed the UN. The view from Hanoi was that the UN served superpower politics. In Phnom Penh the perception of the UN was even less philosophical: Secretaries-general, acting as if they were prime ministers chosen by the majority party of the General Assembly, refused to go to Phnom Penh, the most logical starting point for peace negotiations.

The international system proved unable to bring peace to Cambodia. Selfish interests took precedence. War raged throughout the 1980s with no apparent end in sight. The Paris Conference on Cambodia did not fulfill the auspicious hopes of its organizers because the issues were inextricably linked to residues of the cold war. When PAVN forces left Cambodia on September 26, 1989, a new military situation unfolded. Cambodian proxies began killing Cambodian proxies again.

Instead of producing stability, geostrategic thinking served up protracted conflict and instability. The practice of *realpolitik* proved that world order is unavailable to small states, that large states are expected to be narcissistic, and thus that war is inevitable unless a country is armed to the teeth.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The war in Cambodia of the 1980s began with Pol Pot's genocide and DK attacks on Vietnam in collusion with China. Hanoi became an ally of Moscow at the end of 1978 and then entered Cambodia for a decade. China attacked Vietnam in early 1979, pulling back when the Soviet Union showed muscle, yet vowing to repeat an assault on Vietnam if needed. These events, showing mutual contempt among neighboring countries, explain why peace could not come through ordinary diplomacy throughout the early 1980s.

The first figure whose diplomatic pleas were manifestly sincere was Norodom Sihanouk. Lacking a power base, he could only save his country and

restore himself to power through negotiations. His obvious interlocutor was the leader in Phnom Penh, whoever that might be, but he did not personally know Heng Samrin, whom he considered to be a Vietnamese puppet. He addressed pleas to Hanoi, but Vietnam wanted the Prince to deal directly with the PRK. When Hun Sen emerged as premier in 1986, Sihanouk gradually accepted the humble peasant as a sincere interlocutor on the fate of the country.

Neither China nor Pol Pot wanted Sihanouk to operate as an independent agent. Although he was a junior partner of Pol Pot and on the payroll of China, the Prince used his dramatic abilities to wriggle free from both. He met Hun Sen for the first time in 1987, thanks to the intervention of a French diplomat. A dialogue followed, but there were many issues to discuss. Intra-Cambodian discussion enlarged in due course to regional meetings and then to an international conference.

If delegates at Paris expected to draw up a detailed blueprint for a transition to a new Cambodia, they were inattentive to what had been happening for a decade. The history of diplomacy on Cambodia from 1979 proceeded step by step. When one impediment to an agreement was removed, the peace process moved to a second obstacle, and so forth, until the Paris conference was possible. But the tasks before the delegates were still too interlinked and numerous. Filibustering by the delegation of Khieu Samphan at Paris ensured more focus on points of difference than on points of agreement. The US position—that Hun Sen's government should share power with someone who would not even shake hands before the conference—was absurd. Even more ludicrous was the US view that Hun Sen should share power with Pol Pot, whose CGDK resignation before Paris showed that he distrusted Sihanouk, Son Sann, and even Khieu Samphan. Lack of trust among the warring factions was the issue, not failure to swap bargaining chips, so the conference failed. Thus, PCC was "useless," according to Sihanouk (Chuensuksawadsi 1990).

After Paris, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai decided to take the issues in disagreement one at a time. His efforts constituted an "incremental approach," which differed from the "comprehensive approach" urged by the UN for a decade. ICK and PCC sought a comprehensive settlement, whereas the intra-Cambodian and regional dialogues followed an incremental approach. While Western countries were insisting that all elements of a settlement had to be worked out in detail before they would sign an agreement, the Thai prime minister instead suggested a step-by-step method in which specifics for verifying PAVN's pullout need not be developed until a ceasefire was in place first; election arrangements could be spelled out after the military situation calmed down, and so on. Chatichai did not oppose a comprehensive solution; he just wanted to reach a multifaceted agreement in an incremental, pragmatic manner through concrete measures of confidence-building.

The Thai prime minister achieved important breakthroughs, but he lacked a foreign ministry to follow through. Canada's Sullivan also made incremental progress, but Ottawa was too far from the scene to engage in daily negotiations, so the ball passed to Foreign Minister Evans of Australia, who in turn opted for a comprehensive approach, too ambitious for IMC to succeed. Since the details of a UN administrative authority for Cambodia depended upon the skills of the UN and the financial largesse of the major powers, the Perm Five process was a necessary addition to the peace process, but it was not the full story.

Chatichai then persuaded Sihanouk to buy an incremental approach. The cease-fire agreement at Tokyo in June 1990 could have been signed one year earlier, when Chatichai proposed it before Paris. But Sihanouk learned by mid-1990 that he had been a fool. He erred in buying Khieu Samphan's assurance that he would come out ahead by acting tough at Paris, while reposing in the quicksand of Washington's claim that he was the only horse that they were backing. PDK exploited his statements, contrary to his own views, to ensure failure at Paris, and then Washington abandoned him after PCC.

THE "ASIAN WAY" OF DIPLOMACY

The Cambodian peace process proved that a new form a diplomacy needed to reach center stage in the world. Developed initially by the onetime executive director of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),[1] Burma's U Nyun, the term "Asian Way" applies to a method of diplomatic interaction that ultimately proved useful with regard to Cambodia.

A contemporary invention among Asian leaders, not an anthropologically derived set of cultural principles, the Asian Way looks at human relationships in a way that differs sharply from Western forms of diplomacy. There are at least six elements to the Asian Way, as I note in my book *The Asian Way to Peace* (1989:ch. 1).

First, decisions emerge after a process of equalitarian socializing. There is an emphasis on getting acquainted at a personal level before discussing particulars. The intra-Cambodian dialogues and JIMs progressed in this manner, whereas PCC was a circus. Khieu Samphan's willingness to be part of a Cambodian family at JIM II was an advance over JIM I, but his refusal to shake hands with Hun Sen at Paris was an unmistakable clue that there would be no meeting of minds during the following month. The need to limit plenary sessions at conferences and to maximize informal discussions was finally learned when the four Cambodian factions agreed to form the SNC at Jakarta in September 1990 (Vatikiotis 1990a:10).

Second, the Western focus on bargaining, with give and take, assumes that agreements occur when all sides have plusses (points gained) that outnumber

minuses (concessions). If Westerners fail to reach an agreement, the immediate conclusion is that one party was too greedy. For practitioners of the Asian Way, on the other hand, discussion develops decisions by consensus-building, not by horsetrading. Negotiating parties specify points of agreement early in the discussions, cautiously move to areas of ambiguity but avoid matters of disagreement. Asian Way diplomacy breaks down when one party insists on pressing a point on which there are sharp differences. Khieu Samphan's milder manner at both JIMs was in sharp contrast to his acrimonious opening speech at Paris. Hun Sen and Sihanouk, in contrast, showed mutual respect and avoided abrasive words whenever they talked together, so they could look forward to later encounters after each meeting. At the final session of the Jakarta conference of September 1990, Hun Sen pointedly refrained from responding to a barb from Khieu Samphan, as he did not want the agreement to come undone again (Vatikiotis 1990a: 10).

Third, Asian Way decisionmaking is incremental. While Westerners seek a blueprint, in this case a "comprehensive political settlement" for Cambodia, the Asian Way proceeds step by step. Westerners keep their eyes on the prize, whereas Asians are fascinated by the process. The good life for Westerners comes in the future after planning. For Asians, serenity is available in the present by enjoying what is immediately at hand. When Asians reach agreement on a minor point, they gain increased confidence and trust to approach more sensitive issues. The distinction between incrementalism and comprehensivism resembles perceptions of a water glass. The Western approach often sees negotiations as half empty; Asians see them as half full. India reminded Westernized Singaporeans, who bellyached about the failure of the Paris conference, that much progress had been made. When Perm Five diplomats realized that they could only consider a few issues at a time, they followed the example of the JIMs and abandoned the PCC model, which attempted too much.

Fourth, Westerners tend to cite problems of technical feasibility in order to say "No" to idealistic aspirations. Asian leaders, in contrast, seek a commitment to abstract principles first, leaving questions of implementation to subordinates. Thus, political resolve is more important than considerations of cost and time. Sometimes this means that a country will suffer severe losses over an extended period, being confident that its cause is just. While Americans tired of a decade of war in Vietnam, Hanoi recalled standing up to China over centuries. The stubbornness of the Cambodians was an obvious element in the 1980s. When Hun Sen and Sihanouk agreed that the survival of Cambodia as a nation was more important than who would rule the nation, an interim arrangement was a mere technical question—but they could not extricate Cambodia from the superpowers, so the interim was an opportunity for Polpotist anarchy.

Fifth, the Asian Way promotes unique solutions over universal nostrums. The phrase "Asian solutions to Asian problems" means that Asian cultural

idiosyncracies should be preserved whenever possible. While Australia proposed a Namibian model, France suggested a Fifth Republic model, ICK presented an Austrian model, and Thailand offered a Thai model, ultimately the solution had to be Cambodian. This meant understanding that the Cambodian people were unaccustomed to elections and parliamentary democracy, which the West insisted would be the "obvious" way out of the quagmire. A national reconciliation council was a more syncretic, Cambodian approach.

Sixth, the Asian Way stresses the need for solidarity through multilateral cooperation with other Asian countries. Although Paris and Washington tried to engineer a Cambodia that would be integrated into commercial opportunities and governmental channels in France and the United States, ASEAN sought a peace that would enable Indochina to join the rest of Southeast Asia. Promises of Western or Japanese aid were of less consequence than good relations with Cambodia's immediate neighbors, so Chatichai's and Alatas' diplomacy ultimately bore the most fruit. Encapsulation of the conflict from outside forces was the goal desired by Asian Way peacemakers.

Principles of the Asian Way, therefore, predicted successes in the Cambodian peace process. Some Asian countries fail to follow these principles, and some Western countries adopt them from time to time (Ash 1990). The Cambodian chessgame, a learning experience for all, proved the uselessness of cold war modes of thinking about world politics. When Mikhail Gorbachev asked George Bush to end the cold war at the Malta Summit in December 1989, the 1990s began with a need to define a new era of world diplomacy. Questions of planetary survival, requiring a fundamental transformation in our thinking (Kothari 1989), came to the fore.

A PLURALIST WORLD

The avoidance of future Cambodias requires not just an end to cold war *realpolitik*. There must be a conception of international politics based on pluralism, a condition in which all peoples live together in harmony without political domination. World pluralism represents a fulfillment of conditions sought by Woodrow Wilson after World War I—a peaceful world based on principles such as the self-determination of peoples and the peaceful resolution of international disputes (Moynihan 1990). Asian Way principles tell us how to proceed toward world pluralism because they emerged in the wake of the decolonization of Asia, when there was a temptation to fight endlessly over disputed borders. ASEAN countries most fully perfected principles of the Asian Way, and their reward has been continuing peace and increasing prosperity.

Because Wilsonianism ignored economics, it was incomplete as a guide for a pluralistic world. World pluralism requires that there be an end to

exploitation of one nation by another, since political domination goes hand in hand with economic exploitation. The Cambodian case eloquently testifies to the need for a new world pluralism. World pluralists chide neorealists for failing to practice democratic values in the world polity.

Realpolitik theory differs from world pluralism on at least eight major axioms.[2] While *realpolitik* regards human nature as irrational and selfish, world pluralism believes in the perfectibility of the human race and the possibility of rational and ethical decisionmaking. *Realpolitik* assumes that there is an endless struggle to monopolize power, whereas world pluralists seek ways to balance and diffuse power so that the cost of political domination will exceed the benefits of aggression. *Realpolitik* conceives of politics as an independent sphere of human activity, having primacy over economics; world pluralists consider the two realms to be interrelated, and they place priority on the satisfaction of basic human needs. The *realpolitik* theorist is an apologist for centralized decisionmaking on matters of foreign affairs, in contrast with world pluralism's reliance on democratic decisionmaking so that the masses can reject serving as mere cannon fodder. *Realpolitik* assumes that some countries will always have more wealth than others; world pluralism promotes a new economic order in which poorer nations are able to catch up with rich nations. The *realpolitik* practitioner reaches international equilibrum by pursuing self-interest; for the world pluralist, a stable world requires an equitable distribution of resources in which rich countries make concessions to poor countries. *Realpolitik* has contempt for the United Nations; world pluralism knows that peoples on the planet want the UN to fulfill its original aims by establishing a framework for a new economic and political world order. *Realpolitik* reacts to events in terms of worst-case scenarios; world pluralism takes affirmative steps before crises occur so that the preconditions for peace can be attained. The principles of world pluralism should be familiar: They are the premises for democratic rule.

The dismantling of totalitarian control over Eastern Europe during 1989, two centuries after the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, was perhaps the most dramatic political upheaval of the last half of the twentieth century. An abortive coup in Moscow in 1991 followed, and the USSR began to disintegrate. The arms race between the First and Second Worlds appeared useless, and nuclear disarmament appeared attainable for the first time since bombs code-named Fat Man and Little Boy fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In time, the gap between the standard of living of the First and former Second Worlds might narrow, but there was no immediate optimism about progress in the Third World. As long as economic inequality remained in the world because of *realpolitik*, pretexts for war would remain.

As the world of *realpolitik* awaited a funeral, a place in the coffin was being prepared for the Cambodian conflict. With resources once used for

military spending to be freed up for other purposes, it increasingly seemed possible to achieve the peaceful global economy that would be the underpinning of a future just, world pluralist order. Where else could the world start afresh but in ricefields of a people who yearn to transcend the horror of the killing fields?

NOTES

1. Now the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).
2. The principles of *realpolitik* stated here are from Morgenthau (1985).

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1
Credentials Voting in the United Nations on Cambodia*

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982
Afghanistan	N	N	N	N
Albania	N	N	N	N
Algeria	N	N	N	N
Angola	-	N	N	N
Antigua and Barbuda	-	-	-	Y
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	-
Australia	Y	Y	A	A
Austria	A	A	A	A
Bahrain	A	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	Y	Y	A	Y
Belize	-	-	-	Y
Benin	N	N	N	N
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	-
Botswana	A	A	Y	Y
Brazil	-	A	A	A
Bulgaria	N	N	N	N
Burma	Y	-	-	-
Burundi	A	A	A	Y
Byelorussia	N	N	N	N
Cameroon	A	Y	A	Y
Cape Verde	N	N	N	A
Central African Republic	-	A	Y	Y
Chad	Y	A	N	Y
Congo	N	N	N	N
Cuba	N	N	N	N
Cyprus	A	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	N	N	N	N
Dominica	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	A	Y	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea	-	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	N	N	N	N
East Germany	N	N	N	N
Finland	A	A	A	A
France	A	A	A	A
Ghana	A	A	A	A
Grenada	N	N	N	N
Guinea	N	N	N	N
Guinea-Bissau	N	N	N	A
Guyana	N	N	N	N
Hungary	N	N	N	N
Iceland	Y	A	A	A
India	N	N	N	N
Iran	Y	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-
Ireland	A	A	A	A
Israel	-	Y	Y	Y
Ivory Coast	A	A	Y	Y
Jamaica	N	N	Y	Y
Jordan	A	-	A	-
Kuwait	A	Y	Y	Y
Laos	N	N	N	N
Lebanon	A	A	A	-

Appendix 1 (continued)

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982
Libya	N	N	N	N
Luxembourg	A	A	A	A
Madagascar	N	N	N	A
Malawi	A	-	A	A
Mali	A	A	A	Y
Malta	-	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	-
Mexico	A	A	A	A
Mongolia	N	N	N	N
Mozambique	N	N	N	N
Netherlands	A	A	A	Y
Nicaragua	N	N	N	N
North Yemen	A	A	-	A
Norway	Y	A	A	A
Panama	N	N	N	A
Peru	A	A	A	Y
Poland	N	N	N	N
Qatar	A	Y	Y	Y
Romania	Y	-	-	Y
Rwanda	A	A	A	A
Santa Lucia	-	-	A	Y
St. Vincent & Grenadines	-	-	-	Y
Sao Tome & Principe	N	N	N	N
Seychelles	N	N	N	N
Sierra Leone	N	A	N	A
Solomon Islands	-	-	Y	Y
South Africa	-	-	-	-
South Yemen	N	N	N	N
Soviet Union	N	N	N	N
Spain	A	A	Y	Y
Suriname	A	A	A	A
Swaziland	Y	-	Y	Y
Sweden	A	A	A	A
Syria	N	N	N	N
Tanzania	A	A	A	A
Trinidad & Tobago	A	A	A	A
Tunisia	N	N	N	N
Turkey	-	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	A	A	A	A
Ukraine	N	N	N	N
United Arab Emirates	A	A	Y	Y
Vanuatu	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	A	Y	Y	Y
Vietnam	N	N	N	N
Western Samoa	Y	A	A	Y
Zambia	A	A	A	A
Zimbabwe	-	A	A	A

Appendix 2
Resolution Voting in the United Nations on Cambodia*

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Afghanistan	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Albania	-	-	-	-	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Algeria	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Angola	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	-
Bahrain	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belize			-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Benin	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	-	Y
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Burkina Faso	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Burundi	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Byelorussia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Cape Verde Islands	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Central African Republic	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congo	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	A
Cuba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Dominica	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominican Republic	A	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
East Germany	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Finland	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	N	N	N	N	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	A	A	A	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	A	A	A	A	A	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y
Guyana	N	N	-	A	N	N	A	A	A	A	Y
Hungary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	-
India	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	Y	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Ivory Coast	A	A	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	A	A	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Laos	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Lebanon	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

Appendix 2 (continued)

Country	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Libya	-	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	Y
Madagascar	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Malawi	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mali	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
Mongolia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Mozambique	N	N	N	N	N	A	-	-	-	-	A
Nicaragua	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
North Yemen	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	A
Panama	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Qatar	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Christopher & Nevis					-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
St. Vincent & Grenadines		-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sao Tome & Principe	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Santa Lucia	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seychelles	-	N	N	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Yemen	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
Soviet Union	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Suriname	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
Syria	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Tanzania	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Trinidad & Tobago	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Ukraine	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
United Arab Emirates	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vanuatu			A	A	-	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Vietnam	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Zambia	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe		-	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y

ACRONYMS

ABC-TV	American Broadcasting Company Television
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFP	Agence France Presse
AI	Amnesty International
AIT	Asian Institute of Technology
ANKI	Armée Nationale du Kampuchea Indépendent
ANS	Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste
ANZUS	Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
AP	Associated Press
APATO	Asian and Pacific Treaty Organiztion (proposed)
ARO	Asian Relations Organization
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASPAC	Asian and Pacific Council
BDS	Bangkok Domestic Service
CDC	Cambodian Documentation Commission
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIO	Cambodian Information Office
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CNR	Cambodian National Resistance
COCOM	Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls

Comecon	Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation
Comintern	Communist International
CPAF	Cambodian People's Armed Forces
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
DDT	dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DOS	Department of State
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EC	European Community
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FEER	Far Eastern Economic Review
FUNCIPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif
FUNK	Front d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea
GRUNK	Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea
HDS	Hanoi Domestic Service
HIS	Hanoi International Service
HSB	Honolulu Star-Bulletin
ICJ	International Court of Justice (World Court)
ICK	International Conference on Kampuchea
ICM	international control mechanism
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
ICSC	International Commission for Supervision and Control
IFMC	Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference
IHT	International Herald Tribune
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMC	Informal Meeting on Cambodia

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IP	Indochina Project
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstevnoi Bezopasnosti
KIC	Kampuchea Inquiry Commission
KNUFNS	Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation
KPNLA	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Army
KPNLAF	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front
KPRAF	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KPRP	Khmer People's Revolutionary Party
LCHR	Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIA	soldier missing in action
MOULINAKA	Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NCR	non-Communist resistance
NGC	National Government of Cambodia
NIC	newly industrializing country
NLF	National Liberation Front
NPA	New People's Army
NRC	National Reconciliation Council
NSC	National Security Council
NYT	New York Times
OIEC	Organization for International Economic Cooperation
OTCI	Overseas Telecommunications International
PAP	People's Action Party
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCC	Paris Conference on Cambodia
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization

PPDS	Phnom Penh Domestic Service
PPHS	Phnom Penh Home Service
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PVO	private voluntary organization
RAK	Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea
ROC	Republic of China
ROV	Republic of Vietnam
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République
SB&A	Star-Bulletin & Advertiser (Honolulu)
SCCS	Supreme Council of the Cambodian States
SDR	special drawing right
SEAMCED	Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia
SEAMEO	Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
SEANFZ	Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SOCAF	State of Cambodia Armed Forces
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
SOV	State of Vietnam
SPNFZ	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
UDF	Union pour la Démocratie Française
UIF	United Issarak Front
UN	United Nations
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Organization
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Develoment Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia

UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UPI	United Press International
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIRP	United States–Indochina Reconciliation Project
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCP	Vietnamese Communist Party
VNA	Vietnam News Agency
VODK	Voice of Democratic Kampuchea
VWP	Vietnamese Worker's Party
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
World Bank	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WPK	Worker's Party of Kampuchea
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

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Haas, Michael
Genocide by proxy

DATE DUE	BORROWER'S NAME
MR 4 '93	Jewell
MR 22 '93	Ren
JA 26 '94	Varin, R.
FE 16 '94	Ren