CAMBODIA, POL POT, AND THE UNITED STATES

The Faustian Pact

MICHAEL HAAS

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MICHAEL HAAS

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America is great because she is good.
But when America ceases to be good,
America will cease to be great.

—Dwight David Eisenhower

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Preface

When I completed *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard* for Praeger, my focus was on the fate of the Cambodian people in a world that hitherto has treated small countries rather miserably. I was interested in demonstrating the absurdities that follow when several countries engage in *realpolitik* (geostrategic power politics).

In addresses and papers presented to audiences around the world, however, my main interest has been in the foreign policy of the United States. Accordingly, some of my best papers were not incorporated into the book that I was writing.

This new book rectifies the situation by examining US foreign policy toward the Cambodian conflict. Some chapters are recast from *Genocide by Proxy*, but most are entirely new in this book.

Whereas *Genocide by Proxy* records historical fact, the aim of this book, an output from a US Institute of Peace grant, is more analytic. I use a technique known as options analysis, which is explained in Appendix A so that the more technical aspects of the book will not clutter the effort to show how US policymakers acted with certain objectives and preferences in mind.

Genocide by Proxy has only one or two uses of the term "Khmer Rouge," as I prefer there to identify more specifically the

Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK), the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), as well as other groups in which Pol Pot has played a role throughout recent Cambodian history. In this book I use the more colloquial term "Khmer Rouge" to refer to these groups; the term "Polpotists" appears solely for the sake of literary variety.

The sources of information herein pertain primarily to statements of policy by key decisionmakers. I was fortunate in being able to meet with some of these people. As I derived information from confidential interviews, each interviewee was assigned a number in approximate chronological order. A list of these interviewees, which include more than one hundred diplomats, journalists, and scholars, is in Appendix B.

My primary aim in this book, which does not represent the official position of the US Institute of Peace, is to trace serious problems of US policy toward Cambodia. Clearly, Washington's desire to make the world over in the image of the United States went awry with regard to Cambodia. In Dwight Eisenhower's term, the United States ceased to be a great country in the late 1960s. Nothing short of a reformulation of US foreign policy assumptions can prevent future Cambodias, so the final chapter sketches a way in which the people of the United States can ask their leaders to pursue world politics in a manner consistent with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the Charter of the United Nations.

Abbreviations

ABC-TV	American Broadcasting Company Television
ANKI	Armée Nationale du Kampuchea Indépendent
ANS	Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CDC	Cambodia Documentation Commission
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNR	Cambodian National Resistance
Comintern	Communist International
CORKR	Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge
CPAF	Cambodian People's Armed Forces
DDT	dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
ECAFE	UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

ESCAP	UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FEER	Far Eastern Economic Review
FUNCIPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICK	International Conference on Kampuchea
ICM	international control mechanism
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party
IP	Indochina Project
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
KPNLA	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Army
KPNLAF	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF	Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front
LA Times	Los Angeles Times
MIA	soldier missing in action
MOULINAKA	Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NCR	non-Communist resistance
NGC	National Government of Cambodia
NRC	National Reconciliation Council (proposed)
NSC	National Security Council
NYT	New York Times
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCC	Paris Conference on Cambodia
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
Perm Five	five permanent members of the UN Security Council

PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRKAF	People's Republic of Kampuchea Armed Forces
PVO	private voluntary organization
RAK	Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea
ROV	Republic of Vietnam
SB&A	Star-Bulletin & Advertiser (Honolulu)
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SOCAF	State of Cambodia Armed Forces
SOV	State of Vietnam
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia
UPI	United Press International
US DOS	United States Department of State
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIRP	United States–Indochina Reconciliation Project
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
World Bank	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Creating the Khmer Rouge

1

The US Role in Elevating Pol Pot to Power

TWO TRADITIONS IN US FOREIGN POLICY

There are at least two diplomatic traditions in the history of US foreign policy. One is a *moralistic* strain, which supports international law, peaceful resolution of international conflicts, and self-determination of peoples. The other strain, realpolitik (geostrategic power politics) tradition, believes that international change requires the use of muscle to advance commercial and security interests as well as idealistic aims. The two traditions are often fused. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, declared the Americas to be within the US sphere of influence, with Washington presumably ready to back its claim with force, without regard to the wishes of the peoples of the continent south of the Rio Grande River. Beginning with Harry Truman, presidents in the cold war era extended the Monroe Doctrine to other parts of the world on behalf of anti-Communist ideals, lumping Western European democracies and various US-supported Third World military dictatorships into the category "free world," again without consulting the local populations. Whichever tradition dominates, US policymakers tend to downplay historical factors in the belief that destiny has called the United

States to remake the world in the image of the "rags to riches" success story of the first new nation.

Meanwhile, foreign policy is often formulated in Washington without much input from the American people. Embassies that collect information around the world give the executive branch an edge over the legislature in any country. In a democracy the inevitable public outcry against mistaken power plays sometimes undermines the credibility of pompous Metternichian diplomacy—a situation that is particularly exacerbated in the United States, where one branch of government sometimes restrains another when one attempts to be a bull in the world's china shop, unpredictably taking extremely punitive measures against countries who dare to disagree in some small way with US policy.

Accordingly, in Washington there have been two schools of thought regarding Cambodia. One is that the United States should have good relations with all governments. The second view is that Cambodia is a small fish in a big pond and that it should be treated in the context of an ongoing world power struggle. The latter position has prevailed wherever Washington has applied cold war criteria, even when no such perspective is relevant, ignoring the historical forces operating within a country. The domino theory, which likens states to woodblocks lined up in a row, has motivated Beltway decisionmakers regarding Southeast Asia far more than an appreciation of the reality of nationalism (Slater 1990). Until middle-class hegemonism arises in the domestic politics of Southeast Asia, the United States will tend to view the region as developing but not developed enough to be respected on the same basis as European democracies.

CREATING THE KHMER ROUGE

In 1945, toward the end of World War II, a small US force parachuted to aid Ho Chi Minh in the effort to defeat Japan. When Ho declared Vietnamese independence one month later, it was modelled on the US Declaration of Independence. As Ho

read the text to the assembled citizens of Hanoi, an American airplane dipped down, showed its insignia, and the crowd cheered joyously.

Indochina, according to US observers, was worse off in 1945 than in 1845. The French, President Franklin Roosevelt concluded, should be replaced by a UN trusteeship. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who wanted to regain Britain's empire, vetoed the idea.

Thus, when France sought to establish order in Indochina after the war, Washington rebuffed Ho's efforts to maintain ties. Washington believed Paris' promise that there would be a transition to eventual independence, but refused to back France's scheme of a set of associated states in Indochina as a crude reimposition of colonialism.

While France might have needed military assistance in Vietnam, as Ho continued the struggle for national independence, US troops were bogged down in Korea. In 1952, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk went to Washington to enlist support for an independent Cambodia, he received a lecture from future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he should support France in the fight against Communism in Vietnam. The Prince's argument, that French colonial rule was the most potent recruiting theme for the Indochinese Communist movements, was rejected. In 1953 the new administration of Dwight Eisenhower provided financial aid to the French in order to stop Communism in Vietnam, but the support came too late.

The Geneva Conference of 1954 divided Vietnam into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north and the State of Vietnam (SOV) in the south. Washington took over protection of South Vietnam, renamed the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) in 1956, while reluctantly tolerating nonaligned Sihanouk's rule in Cambodia. Dulles drafted the treaty of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to serve as a legal basis for subsequent US military intervention in Indochina (Sulzberger 1964). The US government escalated support for the Republic of Vietnam on this pretext, although the text of the treaty contains

no clear obligation (Haas 1973: 267–69). Despite the implicit US threat to deny aid to Cambodia unless Sihanouk agreed to join SEATO, the Prince campaigned against SEATO protection during elections held in 1955. Afterward, Sihanouk agreed to US aid; but when China topped the US commitment in 1956, Washington suspended its assistance in protest and then decided to build up the armed forces of Sihanouk's government while secretly aiding a Cambodian insurgent force known as the Khmer Serei. In the final accounting, US aid to Sihanouk's Cambodia exceeded aid from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) combined (Chang 1985: 21).

Eisenhower knew that Ho Chi Minh was popular throughout Vietnam. Since the Geneva accords of 1954 required elections by 1956, Dulles urged Saigon to refuse to sign or to abide by the agreement. The US public would not support sending troops to South Vietnam so soon after the demoralizing stalemate in Korea from 1950 to 1953. Unaware of the deeper nationalistic forces at work, Eisenhower instead approved covert aid for the ROV on the grounds that if the DRV defeated South Vietnam, all of Southeast Asia and ultimately Japan would fall in due course. US aid, in turn, prompted Hanoi to aid the resistance movement in the south (Slater 1990). Sihanouk, meanwhile, maintained neutrality over the civil war in Vietnam. Like Sweden during World War II, Cambodia served as a transit point for supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

President John Kennedy was willing to "pay any price" to defeat Communism. After the abortive effort to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba, a more sophisticated strategy was devised for South Vietnam. Evidence of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in the assassination of South Vietnam's Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 alerted Sihanouk to the reality that Washington preferred proxy, not independent, rulers. When the Prince shortly thereafter found out about US support for the Khmer Serei, he cancelled American aid. Attacks by Saigon's Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) inside Cambodia and US Air Force strafings of two Cambodian villages, calculated

to make the Prince more submissive, prompted him to renounce SEATO protection. When he severed US diplomatic ties in 1964, he became known as the "red prince," but the military cadre built up in Cambodia with US aid remained.

President Lyndon Johnson campaigned against Republican candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 with a pledge not to involve the United States in a war in Indochina. Goldwater recommended bombing North Vietnam—a move seen as reckless by the US electorate, who returned Johnson to office. The gradual escalation of US aid to Vietnam under Kennedy and Johnson meant that a pretext might inevitably be found to enter Indochina. In 1964 Johnson found that pretext. He alleged that a naval vessel from North Vietnam attacked a US ship in the Gulf of Tonkin, although the truth later emerged that the ship was acting in self-defense.

Johnson saw maps of Asia blotted with a disturbing shade of red. He then repeated Britain's error in the American war of independence: As William Pitt, London's foremost opponent of the war pointed out, no firepower on earth can "conquer a map" without winning the hearts and minds of the population.

When Congress voted to commit US troops to Vietnam's civil war in 1965 despite Goldwater's defeat, a primary justification was to contain the influence of China. With the Ho Chi Minh Trail in full operation, Washington misjudged the nationalistic ambitions of Vietnam and failed to understand that anti-Communism was not the top priority of the good citizens of the South. Dangling money in front of poor Asians was a recruiting vehicle for ARVN as well as the Saigon cronyocracy/narcocracy that the United States was thenceforth pledged to defend (McCoy 1972: ch. 5), yet the US army pushed ARVN aside as an army of racial inferiors (Sheehan 1988). When Washington asked its SEATO allies to join in the struggle, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand obliged. South Korea also sent troops. US military operations soon expanded into Cambodia, which Washington considered to be a sideshow (Shawcross 1979), where North Vietnam and the Vietcong maintained enclaves in Cambodia to subvert South Vietnam.

In 1969 Richard Nixon became president. Having campaigned to remove US troops from Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine articulated in his doctrine the principle that any future US military role in the world would be to supplement efforts of indigenous armies to hold back Communism. In Southeast Asia this meant returning combat to the South Vietnamese army. Nonetheless, US operations in Cambodia escalated into the 1969 bombing that was secretly directed by Nixon, presumably to shorten the war. When Washington offered to guarantee Cambodia's existing borders, Sihanouk reestablished relations but refused the offer, as it appeared that his country would lose several islands and villages in the bargain. The Prince then recognized the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Vietnam, the chief adversaries of the ROV and the United States. The Vietcong was PRG's military arm.

Congress in 1970 reacted to limit the US role in Cambodia, but the US embassy in Phnom Penh directed bombing until 1973 in violation of American law. The American people expressed outrage that Cambodia, a country that had never harmed the United States, was a victim of so much destruction, whereas Nixon felt that numerous violations of Cambodian neutrality by North Vietnam justified the bombing. Nixon also noted that Sihanouk permitted some US military operations inside Cambodia in 1969, as they attacked enemies of his regime, but the Prince never approved of indiscriminate bombing, which so terrified peasants that they rallied behind the Khmer Rouge, previously an insignificant force of a few thousand. Sihanouk (1973) obviously drew the line at genocide, a term he subsequently applied to US military strategy in Indochina as a whole. Although he was furious that China and North Vietnam were aiding the Communist insurgency in his country, his recognition of the DRV was an attempt to outflank the Khmer Rouge.

Nixon (1978) was in the dark as to what was going on. His imagination went out of control when he later sought to justify his action by claiming that the Communist resistance in Cambodia was highly organized by 1970, that there was a

firm alliance between Hanoi and Pol Pot, that the Lon Nol era brought peace, and similar errors of fact (Hovey 1977). Despite some cooperation with Sihanouk in 1969, the CIA established ties with more reliable proxies in Phnom Penh, then pretended to be surprised when Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk in 1970. Subsequent aid to Lon Nol's Khmer Republic lined the pockets of a clique that commanded an untrained army that could only spray bullets, not pinpoint targets.

Nixon thought that détentes with Beijing and Moscow would force Hanoi to capitulate. In the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 Nixon sought to play the "China card" against the Soviet Union so that DRV aid to the Vietcong would dry up. Two separate Vietnams were to be maintained, according to the declaration. Although China and the United States wanted Vietnam to be kept weak, they failed. Similarly, US negotiator Henry Kissinger sought in vain to encourage a Khmer Republic–Khmer Rouge alliance.

National Security Council (NSC) Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Nixon's primary source of information about foreign affairs, was also out of touch with realities in Cambodia. He underestimated Sihanouk's charisma, asked Hanoi to pressure Pol Pot's forces to arrange a cease-fire with the Khmer Republic, urged China's Chou Enlai to bring Sihanouk and Lon Nol into an accommodation that was acceptable to neither Cambodian leader, rebuffed French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's advice to drop Lon Nol when there was a chance for the Prince to resume power, approved massive bombing of Cambodia without an apparent strategic goal, frantically sought to build a fanciful Pol Pot–Sihanouk coalition to replace Lon Nol, and was too late in prevailing upon the Lonnolists to beg Sihanouk to return to power (Shawcross 1979: 260–64). In turn, Kissinger received advice from such diplomats as John Gunther Dean, US ambassador in Phnom Penh, who wanted US support for Lon Nol to end in March so that "pro-PRC Communists" would take over before "pro-DRV Communists." Dean's recommendation was premised on the disingenuous belief

that Sihanouk was pro-Chinese and Pol Pot was pro-Vietnamese.[1] On April 1, 1975, Lon Nol fled Cambodia. His defense minister, Sak Sutsakhan, was left in charge, only to be helicoptered from Phnom Penh only minutes before the Khmer Rouge seized the city on April 17.

Reflecting on the era of US involvement in Southeast Asia under Nixon and Kissinger, Sihanouk later stated, "They demoralized America, they lost all of Indochina to the Communists, and they created the Khmer Rouge" (Shawcross 1979: 391).

Despite efforts of Kissinger and others to account for this series of fiascoes, the impression remains that anti-Communism and assumed US omnipotence deluded Beltway decisionmakers. Indeed, White House contempt for public opinion on Cambodia was one of the proposed charges in articles of impeachment prepared to drive Nixon from office. The domestic disillusionment over Vietnam contributed to a growing drug culture, a distrust of government, and a sense of national humiliation over defeat.

CONDONING THE KHMER ROUGE

The US response to Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 was to continue economic embargoes against both countries.[2] Nonetheless, President Gerald Ford talked about a "great national reconciliation" over Vietnam, a $1 billion aid package to Hanoi, and normalization of relations later in the year. By 1976, an election year, he dropped this rhetoric because of congressional opposition.

When the new Cambodian regime began to assert itself, its Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) seized several islands claimed by Vietnam. In the midst of these operations, the RAK navy confronted the US merchant ship *Mayaguez*, which was forced to surrender; its crew was placed under arrest. Ford responded by having US Air Force and Navy units shell the coast of Cambodia, while mounting an effort to rescue the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of Beijing, the crew and ship were released. But the US military personnel used in

the *Mayaguez* rescue were called to duty from military bases in Thailand, and the US government did not ask Bangkok for formal permission to use Thai airspace and territorial waters. Infuriated, the Thai public demanded an end to US bases and a shutdown of SEATO, which closed its doors on January 1, 1977.

The US embassy in Phnom Penh was evacuated in 1975, but onetime CIA collaborators remained in the country. The Khmer Rouge regime began to search for these individuals, who endured the confessions, torture, and executions that were meted out to other alleged enemies of the regime. Information about human rights abuses leaked out slowly, but not definitively enough for Washington to respond.

When Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency in 1976, he vowed that there would be no more Cambodias or Vietnams. Ford's election plans nosedived after he pardoned Nixon, so he could not pardon Hanoi as well for imposing a military victory over South Vietnam.

Shortly after taking office, Carter dispatched Leonard Woodcock to Vietnam as a special representative to proceed with negotiations to normalize relations with Vietnam. Woodcock went to Hanoi, but he received no reply to a request to go to Phnom Penh. As a US mission remained in Laos, he went to the Cambodian embassy at Vientiane in order to obtain approval for a trip to Phnom Penh, but he encountered a locked door that refused to open. The new Khmer Rouge regime, known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK), considered the United States to be aggressive and imperialistic, unworthy of serving as an interlocutor. Nonetheless, Washington eased travel restrictions to the land of Angkor Wat, and a shipment of DDT went from the United States to Cambodia to help in insect eradication (interviewee #40), although it is not known whether the gift left the transshipment port of Hongkong.

The Ford administration cleared the way for inaugural visits of the World Bank to Hanoi in 1976 and 1977. Carter granted licenses for $5 million of private humanitarian aid to Vietnam (Lewis 1977: A13). In 1977 the United States, having vetoed Vietnam's application for UN membership in 1975 and 1976,

allowed the newly renamed and unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to join the United Nations. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (1983: 450) noted that Hanoi was trying to maintain equidistance between China and the Soviet Union.

Democratic Kampuchea preferred to follow its own path. As events unfolded, Carter became aware of the genocide in progress in Cambodia. Although human rights were a cornerstone of his foreign policy, he took no action beyond condemning the regime as "the world's worst violator of human rights," referring the matter to the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva, and asking the UN Security Council in October 1979 to discuss the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border war (NYT 1978), which increased in intensity from 1975 to 1978.

NSC Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had bigger fish to fry. He wanted to normalize relations with China in order to show muscle to the Soviet Union. Vance, on the other hand, wanted to improve US relations with all countries in the world; this included Vietnam, which the NSC adviser considered to be of peripheral importance. The thesis that Vietnam could be independent of both China and the Soviet Union, a development that both Beijing and Moscow feared, was brushed aside when Brzezinski persuaded Carter that Vance was "soft" on Vietnam. The NSC adviser evidently wanted to push Hanoi into the arms of the Soviet Union so that he could play the "China card" against Moscow while accusing Hanoi of being the latest Soviet client state, yet another example of the recurring US penchant for geopolitical masturbation.

In May 1978 Brzezinski (1983: 207, 345) went to Beijing with instructions from Carter to "facilitate the emergence of an independent Cambodian government that enjoys the support of its people." When he returned from China, however, Brzezinski espoused Deng Xiaoping's vision of the Khmer Rouge's Democratic Kampuchea government as a victim of Soviet-Vietnamese aggression.

In August 1978 peacenik Senator George McGovern offered an unexpected proposal that an international force go to Cambodia to

stop the ongoing Khmer Rouge genocide. Rather than considering the idea with care, the State Department responded the following day, without apparent deliberation, that the idea was not under consideration by anyone.[3] McGovern's suggestion, in other words, was rejected out of hand. Carter was using human rights performance as a screening criterion to apply to potential aid recipients. Since Democratic Kampuchea received no US assistance, there was no immediate way in which to apply sanctions against Khmer Rouge human rights violations. Although a trade embargo was applied, the Phnom Penh government was not engaging in international commerce.

Vietnam had been insisting on US reparations before allowing a normalization in relations. An angry Congress prohibited any such aid. When Vu Hoang, a senior foreign ministry official, hinted during a visit to Honolulu in midsummer 1978 that Vietnam would drop the US aid precondition—doubtless realizing that the clock was ticking on a contemplated surprise attack on Cambodia (Chanda 1986: 270)—the concession came too late. China was on the verge of agreeing to full normalization with the United States. As Beijing objected to Washington's referral of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border war to the UN Security Council, it appeared to Brzezinski that Deng might balk if Washington agreed to establish relations with Hanoi before Beijing. Despite public pressure to make PRC–US normalization conditional on an end of Chinese aid to Pol Pot,[4] Brzezinski in effect capitulated to Beijing. With SRV–US relations on a back burner, Hanoi signed up with Moscow, and the situation polarized.

History fails to record any specific benefit that the United States derived by playing the "China card" in late 1978 or thereafter. If the aim were to contain Moscow, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Cam Ranh Bay during 1979 proved that the power play had no deterrent effect and may instead have been an incentive for a probing Soviet role in Asia.

In any case, Washington yawned while DK–SRV relations deteriorated after 1975. Although at least 30,000 Vietnamese died from Khmer Rouge attacks between 1975 and 1978 (Lindgren,

Wilson & Wallensteen 1989: 6), Hanoi tried to settle its dispute with Cambodia peacefully. After Phnom Penh refused to negotiate, Beijing refused to mediate, and the United Nations failed to act on Hanoi's complaint about a breach of the peace, members of Vietnam's army entered Cambodia in late 1978 along with Cambodian refugees to end the aggressive and genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge. Encountering little resistance, the invading forces set up a new government in Phnom Penh known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The Khmer Rouge army then fled to the Thai border in utter defeat.

RE-CREATING THE KHMER ROUGE

Although rumors were rife in Thailand during 1978 that Vietnam was planning to invade Cambodia (interviewee #40), there was little that Washington could do. In early 1979 US Defense Secretary Harold Brown (1979: 7) condemned Vietnam's attack on Cambodia as "minor league hegemonism," echoing China's rhetoric. Fearing that Vietnam would defeat Thailand next, Bangkok agreed to allow resistance forces, including the Khmer Rouge, to regroup along the Thai border with Cambodia. Pol Pot's army set up camps along the Gulf of Siam. Forces of the former Lon Nol regime, which eventually formed the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), were allowed sanctuary farther north along the border. A small army loyal to Prince Sihanouk formed north and east of the KPNLF. The KPNLF and Sihanoukists were known as the non-Communist resistance (NCR); their armies were soon called the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Army (KPNLA) and the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS).[5] Sihanouk's political party, named the Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) in 1979, became the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCIPEC) in 1981.

Carter initially declared the United States to be neutral in the dispute among contending Cambodian factions. China, however,

showered $80 million in annual aid to the Khmer Rouge (Chanda 1986: 348) and urged Washington to support all three resistance factions (Porter 1988: 816), but the initial US policy was to provide assurances to Bangkok, which feared an aggressive military force on its borders. When Washington contemplated aiding its ally, Thailand, the Soviet Union assured US officials that Vietnam's sole aim was to eliminate Pol Pot. Eager to confront the Kremlin at every opportunity, Brzezinski talked Bangkok into volunteering as a US proxy against Vietnam by serving as a conduit for Chinese aid to keep Pol Pot's forces going so that Hanoi would be denied a victory (interviewee #10). The US public would never permit an open alliance with Pol Pot, Brzezinski (1983: 440) reasoned, but China and Thailand could be more pragmatic (Becker 1986: 440). Hence, the Khmer Rouge became a Sino-Thai ally, a US ally twice removed. Translating US policy into common parlance, Washington decided to back the PRC objective of restoring Pol Pot to power. The Faustian pact between the United States and the Khmer Rouge dates from this period. Clearly, geostrategic considerations outweighed human rights regarding Cambodia. Faust made a similar bargain, which he later regretted.

Sihanouk went to the UN in January 1979 to focus the debate on Vietnamese aggression. Thanks to Andrew Young, US ambassador to the UN, Sihanouk escaped from Khmer Rouge security guards at his hotel in New York. The US government offered to host Sihanouk as a guest but was relieved when he soon agreed to return to Beijing under the care of Deng Xiaoping, who argued that the Prince could serve as a symbol to unite the Cambodian people more effectively than the discredited forces of Pol Pot. Washington was eager to play the "Sihanouk card" to avoid any taint of association with the Khmer Rouge.

Since the embargo of Vietnam remained in effect after 1975, the Carter administration could retaliate against Hanoi's entry into Cambodia only by canceling normalization talks. A similar embargo applied to the PRK, a regime described as "Vietnam-installed." US allies, while maintaining embassies in Hanoi,

stopped all aid to Cambodia and Vietnam; diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh that left during the Pol Pot era did not return because the PRK was considered illegitimate. Washington and its closest allies had sufficient votes in the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to freeze disbursements on loans to both countries.

Brzezinski believed that he was the one who persuaded China to keep Pol Pot going when Khmer Rouge troops were nearly annihilated by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in early 1979 in order to counter a Soviet ally (Becker 1986: 440). The Russian-baiting Brzezinski (1983: 17, 410) admits that he "winked" when China attacked Vietnam for a month during early 1979. Carter had urged Deng to reconsider the proposed aggression on pragmatic grounds, as Vietnam might get sympathy if attacked unprovoked, but he never suggested that China's "lesson" to Vietnam would be intolerable. When China's army proceeded, the US response was to register moderate disapproval, calling for the withdrawal of China from Vietnam as well as Vietnam from Cambodia. Washington also urged the Soviet Union to join in exercising restraint over the situation.

In February 1979 Sihanouk urged an international conference on Cambodia; he feared that he would be forced into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge. But Beijing and Washington opposed a conference.[6] They insisted on a unilateral PAVN withdrawal from Cambodia, which of course would return Pol Pot to power. Three months later Vance proposed SRV–US discussions on Cambodia, arguing that Washington was driving independent-minded Vietnam into the arms of the Soviet Union; but his idea died when Brzezinski suggested clearing it with the Chinese, knowing their views on the subject. Washington became China's proxy in regard to Cambodia.

During 1979 word of a famine in Cambodia emerged from observers of the Christian Conference of Asia (NYT 1979a). Rosalynn Carter, the president's wife, visited the Cambodian border of Thailand during 1979 to investigate aid to the famine in the war-torn country. After her trip she urged increased US

support for private emergency aid. Those who have studied the relief effort with care have concluded, nevertheless, that specific US efforts were undertaken to ensure that Khmer Rouge soldiers were fed at a time when the real need was to save more ordinary peasants (Mason & Brown 1983: 110, 126; Vickery 1984). Operation USA quietly provided $7 million in relief aid to Cambodians under PRK rule from 1979 (Kyodo 1990), but Washington initially denied licenses to other nongovernmental organizations to provide aid to Cambodia and Vietnam.

In 1979 officials from the defunct Pol Pot regime contended with the PRK government for the Cambodian seat in the United Nations. Although Secretary of State Vance (1983: 126–27) wrestled with the decision for weeks, he ultimately instructed Andrew Young to vote to seat the Khmer Rouge rather than to side with Moscow and its allies on the issue. In 1980 the US government again backed the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate representative of the Cambodian people in the UN. President Carter supplied some covert aid to the NCR in 1979, but he denied Sihanouk's request in 1980 for funds to help raise an army of 10,000 (Clymer 1990: 1).

In late November 1980, before President-Elect Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, former CIA official Ray Cline of Reagan's transition team established contact with the Pol Pot forces (LA Times 1980). When Reagan took office in 1981, his rabid anti-Communism was manifest in a policy of confronting Moscow around the world to roll back Soviet victories since World War II (Haas 1983). A vilification of Vietnam as a Soviet proxy, and thus as a part of the "evil empire," could serve to justify increased military spending. The Cambodian conflict provided a pretext for Reagan to vent fury on Hanoi, victorious in the war with the United States, by "bleeding Vietnam white" (interviewee #72).

The first sign of a change in US policy toward Cambodia was an increase in US military aid to Thailand after 1980. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that Vietnam would ultimately cry "uncle" when Soviet spending failed to keep up with Sino-US outlays (Alagappa 1989: 23; Chanda 1981). Although Bangkok

claimed not to be involved in the war directly, the increased shipment of weapons to the Thais was available for resale to the Cambodian resistance, as PRC aid gave the Khmer Rouge sufficient funds to make such purchases (Smith 1979).

In 1981 Sihanouk's idea for an international conference on Cambodia came to pass. Although the PRK was an obvious interlocutor in any discussion on a future Cambodia, China said that it would not attend if Phnom Penh sent a representative. When the United States concurred, the PRK's exclusion prompted Vietnam and its Soviet bloc allies to boycott the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK). During the conference Thailand's allies in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)[7] sought to draw up a declaration that would call for disarming the Khmer Rouge during a UN-supervised transition. But China disagreed, and US diplomats twisted the arms of ASEAN representatives to accept an arrangement for a so-called UN transition that would establish internationally organized elections without disarming the Khmer Rouge army (Chanda 1986: 387, 389; Shawcross 1979: 356). In short, ICK's peace plan would have given Pol Pot's army ample opportunities to return to power before elections. Instead of shaping a just or realistic peace plan for Cambodia, ICK turned out to be an occasion to vilify Vietnam. Aware of the gameplan for ICK, even Sihanouk boycotted the conference (Chanda 1986: 389).

Later in 1981, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick voted to award the Cambodian seat to the Khmer Rouge, although allies such as Australia and Britain indicated that they might not do so again the following year. After US pressure to marry the Khmer Rouge and the NCR, in 1982 the three factions signed an agreement forming the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), although the Khmer Rouge held the foreign ministry portfolio in CGDK and thus remained in the UN seat. CGDK was formally seated in the UN in 1982, and no credentials votes were contested in later years.

Thereafter, US annual covert aid to the resistance grew from $4 million to perhaps $10 million (Chanda 1986: 402; Erlanger

1989; Tran 1990). The secret funds were administered by a Working Group set up in 1981, presumably to service NCR forces (interviewee #57). The aid amounts were fungible; that is, sums earmarked for a particular type of aid were left to the recipient Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) to spend without subsequent US accountability audits on how the money was actually spent. Weapons made in Singapore and Taiwan under Belgian and US license, respectively, then went to Pol Pot's allies (Schanberg 1990), who could resell for profit. In this manner US aid could go to the Khmer Rouge through untraceable conduits. The Working Group formally consisted of the defense and foreign ministers of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, together with senior US State Department officials. In practice, senior officials from all countries, including CIA staff, attended regular meetings to receive requests from either ANS or KPNLA for weapons (ABC-TV 1990: 6). Weapons flowed after reviews of battle plans. The CIA shared intelligence derived from surveillance satellites and other sources at Working Group meetings. In addition, Congress appropriated about $500 million each year for the transfer of excess nonlethal supplies of Defense Department stocks and transportation costs for the shipment of donated lethal aid from nongovernmental sources (US House 1990: 152). Known as the McCollum program, this aid began as a conduit for supplies to the resistance in Afghanistan and was later extended to Cambodia. Through whatever route, US lethal aid destined for the NCR ended up in the hands of the Khmer Rouge (ABC-TV 1990: 3; Lee 1982), although the State Department vehemently denied any such transfer.

Washington, thus, increasingly became an ally of Pol Pot by dint of support for his allies. To avoid embarrassing questions, both the Carter and Reagan administrations pretended not to take a leadership role regarding Cambodia. Haig said that he was merely backing non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, who were linked through ASEAN as one of the "six pillars" of his Asia-Pacific security policy. Accordingly, no queries needed to be addressed to Washington on Cambodia; they should go instead

to ASEAN. If the ASEAN Lola wanted to back Pol Pot, that is what Lola got, although US officials would theatrically walk out of conferences when Khmer Rouge delegates spoke. Washington, meanwhile, sought to influence ASEAN's policy through the leverage of Chinese pressure and US aid (interviewee #10). ASEAN, in turn, asked Washington to do more to balance Chinese aid, but US amounts were so significantly below Beijing's aid levels that Washington's policy clearly supported a strong Khmer Rouge and a weak NCR. The strategy was to control the situation without appearing to do so. The US government first pretended to be a junior partner with ASEAN and China on Cambodia, then a supporter of Sihanouk. Washington never questioned the feasibility of ASEAN's or Sihanouk's strategies in the early 1980s.

THE PARADOX OF US SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER ROUGE

US support for the Khmer Rouge requires an explanation. One reason for US policy was the "Vietnam syndrome," a term applied to the reluctance of the US public to support foreign adventures of any kind, particularly in Southeast Asia. Any renewed US military aid to fight Vietnam would have evoked a public outcry, so even the NCR was kept weak. Appearing to have a passive policy was seen as a plus, muting domestic criticism and debate. Covert aid, thus, might blow up in Reagan's face unless the US public could first be conditioned to accept a return to CIA mischief as normal US diplomacy. In this way, Reagan's support for the terrorist Contras in Central America during the 1980s provided a model for action in Cambodia and succeeded in weaning the US public away from a reluctance to use force, even when it violated international law. Nonetheless, congressional Democrats hampered the Contras, and NCR aid was modest.

A second explanation was that Beltway foreign policy experts were eager to trip up Vietnam, a country that not only defeated the United States but also threatened Thailand, a US ally,

thereby exposing the weakness of Washington's containment and deterrence policies worldwide. Cambodia was to be Vietnam's Vietnam, according to this punitive outlook, which yearned for the day when the United States had once been the world's economic benefactor and balancer of power against aggressive Stalinism. The United States, in short, wanted to be a bully in the world's schoolyard, unpredictable yet powerful, and Washington had a score to settle with Vietnam over its ignominious defeat in 1973. A profoundly emotional Washington appeared to terrify countries around the world into voting for Khmer Rouge representation at the United Nations just to get even with Hanoi. If a country even abstained, poor countries perceived that they risked cuts in US foreign aid. On the other hand, the Reagan administration was eager for progress on negotiations to identify US soldiers missing in action (MIAs) in Vietnam, so US involvement in Cambodia never directly threatened Hanoi.

A third explanation was the complexity of the situation. Experts and lay persons alike were lost in a maze of conflicting claims and unfamiliar actors. Public opinion played almost no role, leaving Cambodian machinations in the 1980s to a bellicose yet inattentive president and a confused but subordinate State Department. China thus led US policymakers by the nose, appealing shrewdly to Sovietphobia and Vietphobia rather than to a profound analysis of long-range options for the United States in Southeast Asia. The third explanation meshed well with the idea that Southeast Asia was not of strategic interest to the United States. Although a superpower by definition has worldwide interests, the decision to peripheralize Indochina was premised on the primacy of the Soviet threat for world domination, which China alone could counter as a landbased power. As noted previously, US policy toward Cambodia resulted in an expansion of Soviet power to a Vietnam that initially wanted to maintain equidistance between all the major powers of Asia, including China, but this was a subtlety almost unknown inside the Beltway.

When the US administration was asked to explicate policy toward Cambodia during the early 1980s, the standard response

was a statement that the people of Cambodia should exercise the right of self-determination. As the PAVN military presence prevented free elections, it should be removed. The PRK should be denied legitimacy, even to the extent of voting to seat the Pol Pot faction in the United Nations from 1979 to 1981. Meanwhile, Washington worked to forge a coalition between all three factions, thereby creating the "non-Communist resistance" Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Therefore, a fourth explanation of US policy toward Cambodia seems plausible: As a superpower engaged in realpolitik, Washington was accustomed to creating reality, not adjusting to it. The solution in Cambodia was to bring about a stronger NCR to ward off Pol Pot, the PRK, and Vietnam. The low probability that a strong NCR reality could be brought into existence with insufficient funds did not matter to Faustian policymakers.

An important American cultural value has been expressed in Thomas Paine's maxim, "We have it in our power to make the world again." Whereas the new world envisaged by Paine's contemporaries was one in which international law would provide justice to all nations, the world sought in the era after World War II was one that would successfully confront a Communist empire by protecting US hegemony in a "free world" that too often suppressed democratic aspirations, as in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, and elsewhere (Chomsky & Herman 1979b). Beyond the objective of toppling the PRK to install the NCR was the reality that US policy sustained the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The fourth explanation for US policy, thus, flowed from wishful thinking instead of strategic analysis.

Support for the NCR was a figleaf for a policy of keeping Polpotism alive and well until something better emerged. Having already been accused by Sihanouk of committing genocide in Cambodia during the Lon Nol era, Washington had too much blood on its hands to single out Polpotism as an evil to be eradicated. The US public needed to be sufficiently confused over Cambodia so that the conflict could continue with no plan

for resolution. This meant, of course, that more Cambodians (and Vietnamese) would die. Washington's racism saw white bodies as more precious than yellow bodies. Blood would continue to flow inside Cambodia for a decade, and US aid would be implicated.

NOTES

1. This is according to a telegram from Dean. John McAuliff reports that this communication was uncovered through a Freedom of Information Act request in 1989.

2. Neighboring Laos, however, escaped these reprisals when a Communist revolution succeeded in 1975.

3. *NYT*, August 22, 1978: 76–77; *NYT*, August 23, 1978: 41. Due to a newspaper strike, these articles appear untitled on microfilm.

4. The pressure came from Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, for example: *NYT*, August 30, 1978: 90.

5. In the continuing acronymic shellgame, KPNLA was briefly named the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF). ANS became the Armée Nationale du Kampuchea Indépendent (ANKI) in 1990. Phnom Penh's army, initially the People's Republic of Kampuchea Armed Forces (PRKAF), became the State of Cambodia Armed Forces (SOCAF) in 1989, and the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) in 1990.

6. Senator Edward Kennedy, however, favored the idea of an international conference on Cambodia in 1979 (NYT 1979b).

7. Thailand's ASEAN allies at the time were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984.

2

The Mythology of US Policy toward Cambodia

PURPOSE OF THE MYTHOLOGY

The discourse on Cambodia in the 1980s was littered with deception and obscurity. As Americans were largely forbidden to travel to Cambodia, few sources of information existed to contradict the impression that Vietnam was annexing Cambodia; certainly, Vietnam posed an immediate threat to Thailand. The "party line" on Cambodia that was disseminated from Washington was a set of fears and suppositions that became a mythology designed to minimize pressure from the public.

There were ten major myths. To explain how the United States could support the Khmer Rouge in this period, we focus on the mythology in this chapter (see Table 2.1).

MYTH #1: VIETNAM ENGAGED IN UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION

The US government tried to constitute a reality in which the Cambodian situation would be viewed as a straightforward conflict in which one country committed aggression against another. Washingtonians pointed to December 25, 1978, when Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia, as the beginning of the Cambodian-Vietnamese war.

Table 2.1
Myths of US Policy toward Cambodia

MYTHS	REALITIES
Vietnam engaged in unprovoked aggression.	Vietnam was subjected to unprovoked attacks from Democratic Kampuchea and China; Thailand attacked Vietnam's troops.
The US government opposed the Khmer Rouge.	US aid to the NCR leaked to Khmer Rouge; US officials voted to seat DK delegates in UN and backed DK resolutions on Cambodia.
The war was fed by fanaticism, not profit.	Weapons manufacturers in Britain, France, Singapore, Taiwan, and West Germany made profits; the Khmer Rouge and Thai military got commissions; Sihanouk lived in luxury.
No genocide occurred in Cambodia under Pol Pot.	1.5 million died, including domestic dissidents, Moslems, and non-Khmers.

Vietnam sought an Indochina federation.	The idea was French; Vietnam wanted only ASEAN-style co-operation with its neighbors.
Vietnam's departure would solve the Cambodian conflict.	Vietnam was unable to leave Cambodia until the PRKAF was strong enough.
The new Phnom Penh government was a puppet regime, installed and sustained by Vietnam.	Cambodians welcomed Vietnam in 1978/1979. Vietnamese advisors were needed due to a shortage of qualified Cambodians. Hun Sen asserted independence of Vietnam from 1986.
Negotiations would never resolve the Cambodian conflict.	Hanoi and Phnom Penh pleaded for negotiations but lacked interlocutors.
A powerful, independent non-Communist resistance existed.	The NCR was weak all along.
Washington passively followed ASEAN policy on Cambodia.	Washington pressured ASEAN.

However, an alternative date for the beginning of the war was April 17, 1975, when the Khmer Rouge came to power and attacked Vietnamese territory before South Vietnam's flag was hoisted down. Repeated Khmer Rouge border incursions from 1975 to 1978 on Vietnamese civilians, including atrocities such as impaling children, prompted Hanoi to defend its own people. Indeed, more Vietnamese have been estimated to have died in the attacks from 1975 to 1978 than in a century of fighting against the French (interviewee #61). When Hanoi finally answered pleas from Cambodians and Vietnamese fleeing Khmer Rouge genocide in 1978, the army of Vietnam was regarded by Prince Sihanouk as the savior of the Cambodian people (Chandler 1983: 150; Kiernan 1982: 186–87). But this was not the US interpretation, and even the film *The Killing Fields* was edited before its release in 1984 to remove all references to the joy expressed by Cambodian villagers when Vietnam's army rescued them from genocide. According to international law scholar Gary Klintworth (1989: ch. 2), Hanoi can claim to have exercised a legitimate right of self-defense in 1978.

Subsequently, on February 17, 1979, China launched an unprovoked attack on Vietnam for nearly a month, leaving combat-ready troops on Vietnam's border and threatening more attacks. In addition, Thailand ordered artillery to fire on Vietnamese positions inside Cambodia during the 1980s (Kampuchea 1985: 38; Xinhua 1985).

The myth of one instance of aggression involving two countries is contradicted by the fact that four countries were at war, including four factions inside Cambodia. US policymakers did not decry Chinese, Khmer Rouge, or Thai aggression; they instead criticized Vietnam's effort at self-defense in 1978–1979.

MYTH #2: THE US GOVERNMENT OPPOSED THE KHMER ROUGE

Although Americans heard verbal condemnations of the Pol-potists from Washington, the Khmer Rouge remained in the UN. Each year resolutions backing the Khmer Rouge position on

Cambodia received US support. In 1979 US food aid literally kept the Khmer Rouge army alive.

Meanwhile, several US allies gave military aid to Pol Pot, directly or indirectly, without any protest from Washington. China gave direct aid and admitted it, providing larger sums of money to the resistance than all other sources combined. Britain, France, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States claimed that they only aided the non-Communist resistance, but NCR aid was significantly below the level of Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge. Failing to lavish aid on NCR soldiers, ANS and KPNLA salaries failed to attract troops away from the disciplined army of the Khmer Rouge. Anglo-American funds were used to train NCR soldiers at the jungle warfare school in Pulada, Malaysia. In Vietnam the US army learned that many soldiers eager to be trained for the army of South Vietnam completed their schooling satisfactorily, then faded into the countryside with US weapons as the latest recruits for the Vietcong. Anglo-American training of Khmer Rouge soldiers was doubtless taking place in the 1980s on the same basis. Photographs of Khmer Rouge munitions in warehouses on US-leased land in Thailand perhaps best complete this picture (Stein 1991).

Since supplies could reach the NCR only through Thai territory, Thai military personnel handled distribution. To profit from the transaction, Thai officers supplied aid to the highest bidder, which of course was the Khmer Rouge. The myth of Washington's opposition to the Khmer Rouge was thus contradicted by the fact that NCR aid was a cover for Western countries to play the "Khmer Rouge card" against Vietnam. Most countries in the UN, fearing a cutoff of US economic aid, supported the Sino-American-Thai policy that legitimized the Khmer Rouge, thereby encouraging Pol Pot to believe that he would return to power in due course.

MYTH #3: THE WAR WAS FED BY FANATICISM, NOT PROFIT

As the war continued, weapons manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France, Singapore, Taiwan, and West Germany had a

vested interest in the war. The Thai government agreed to provide space for border settlers after international aid sources promised to defray expenses, not only of the displaced Cambodians but also of Thai residents in neighboring villages. Thai military personnel enjoyed commissions on reselling supplies, and the Khmer Rouge billed miners from Thailand for permission to cross their strongholds to work in gem mines inside Cambodia (Economist 1989b).

Smuggled Singaporean and Thai goods monopolized most of the retail civilian trade in Cambodia due to the US-inspired embargo on trade with the Phnom Penh government (Tasker 1990a: 50). Some NCR leaders piled up small fortunes by reselling supplies to the Khmer Rouge or to civilians (Economist 1989a). Prince Sihanouk basked in a life of luxury on the payroll of China and North Korea. With funds from outside sources, many border settlers were recruited as mercenary soldiers, receiving attractive combat pay rather than relying on meager international handouts in makeshift camps inside Thailand. Thus, the war tired ordinary Cambodians but whetted the appetites of others for profits.

MYTH #4: NO GENOCIDE OCCURRED IN CAMBODIA UNDER POL POT

Washington never pressed the world community to issue a definitive judgment on Khmer Rouge massacres. Although the UNCHR received a US complaint in 1978, Washington never pressed the body to rule on the matter and even allowed the Khmer Rouge to be represented on the subcommission to which the matter was initially referred.

Although a US Central Intelligence Agency (1980) report concluded that the Khmer Rouge was responsible for the death of about 1.5 million Cambodians during Pol Pot's rule from 1975 to 1978, the Reagan administration refused to acknowledge this

element in the conflict. At the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) during mid-1989, when Vietnam pointed out the well-documented slaughter of Moslem Chams and non-Khmer ethnic groups, according to the definition of the UN Convention on Genocide, these facts did not impress US delegates. Instead, they went along with the Sino–Khmer Rouge view that what happened in the Pol Pot era did not fit the legal definition of genocide. During testimony before Congress after PCC, an official of the US State Department (1989) finally admitted that genocide had occurred—although as late as February 1990 Khmer Rouge delegates to the UNCHR drafted a resolution, supported by the United States, insisting that the Khmer Rouge play a role in governing postwar Cambodia.

Washington's reasoning was that any focus on human rights might give credence to Vietnam's claim to have intervened on justifiable humanitarian grounds, a claim also supported by Klintworth (1989: ch. 5). One problem was that "genocide" is a legal term, and the executive branch of the US government did not want to call for a tribunal to make a juridical determination. When the government of Bob Hawke in Australia indicated a desire to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Washington discouraged Canberra (interviewee #33).

Sihanouk, who approved of a massacre of leftists that drove the Khmer Rouge underground while he was in power in 1967, once argued that the United States committed genocide in Cambodia. US executive branch officials thus took every opportunity to muddy the issue of human rights.

MYTH #5: VIETNAM SOUGHT AN INDOCHINA FEDERATION

Had this been true, a federation would have been set up in the early 1980s. As the 1980s continued, it was clear that no such federation was intended, but that did not stop Washington from

continuing to claim that Hanoi's action to oust the Khmer Rouge was an instance of imperialism.

The idea of "Indochina," a term invented by French imperialists, was foreign to Vietnam. The Communist International (Comintern) ordered Ho Chi Minh to change the name of the Vietnamese Communist Party to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1931, and then it asked Hanoi in 1951 to dissolve the body into three national Communist parties. France proposed an Indochinese federation within a projected French Union, a clone of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and Ho Chi Minh only went along with the idea of joining the French Union in the hope that Vietnam would have autonomous rule within the federation. When Paris reversed itself and preferred to reimpose colonial rule over what it called "Indochine," Ho concentrated his independence struggle within Vietnam, then renounced all interest in a federation after 1951.

After 1975, Hanoi suggested that the three countries of Indochina shared many common values and thus could enjoy a "special relationship." Indeed, Vietnam (1978) denied any interest in a federation in the region. In 1980, when the foreign ministers of the three countries agreed to hold regular meetings, Laos and the PRK insisted that they did not want any permanent framework to institutionalize the special relationship, so bilateral coordination committees were established instead. Then in 1988 these bilateral bodies, set up primarily for economic cooperation, were abolished as useless (interviewee #12).

Washington needed the bogey of Vietnamese expansionism as an argument to keep the Cambodian conflict going. US support for the war in fact pushed the PRK into the arms of Vietnam for protection. A different policy could have been to divide the PRK from Vietnam by negotiating an agreement with Phnom Penh that would isolate Hanoi, an option that was obvious to me after Vietnam announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1983 (Haas 1984).

MYTH #6: VIETNAM'S DEPARTURE WOULD SOLVE THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT

As Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge often argued, the situation in Cambodia was not a "Cambodian problem." Although both stressed that the presence of Vietnamese troops was the issue instead, we have evidence that Hanoi did not intend to stay very long in the first place.

Vietnam did not have enough gas initially to go to the Thai border. When there was unexpectedly little resistance during the first two weeks, the army fuelled up to make a complete sweep in the first half of 1979. When this was accomplished, Hanoi announced—as reported in the *New York Times* (1979d)—that Vietnam would withdraw its forces as soon as the PRK commanded an army that could maintain law and order. General Nguyen Vo Giap resigned as defense minister in 1980 because he wanted his troops withdrawn at that time, whereas most of the Politburo argued that Chinese and Western aid for the resistance had transformed Cambodia into a pawn on a superpower chessboard to the extent that Pol Pot would return to power if PAVN troops left prematurely.

Support to keep Pol Pot's army as a factor interfered with Hanoi's timetable for an early departure. Bangkok agreed to let Cambodians stay in border camps when China convinced the Thais to profit from the situation (interviewee #86; Weatherbee 1989: 20). UN and Western aid provided food for the refugees, but initially the Khmer Rouge was the principal conduit for that food (Mason & Brown 1984). When a new fighting force emerged from the refugees, Vietnam stayed on to protect Cambodia from Pol Pot. In short, Washington created conditions that kept the Khmer Rouge alive, thereby discouraging Hanoi from leaving Cambodia in the early 1980s. The conflict, as Brzezinski once boasted (Becker 1986: 394), was transformed from a conflict between Cambodians into a proxy war, with big powers pulling the strings on smaller countries and factions. Vietnam then could not leave until détentes between China, the Soviet Union, and the

United States flowered after Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union in 1985.

MYTH #7: THE NEW PHNOM PENH GOVERNMENT WAS A PUPPET REGIME, INSTALLED AND SUSTAINED SOLELY BY VIETNAM

Although the People's Republic of Kampuchea would not have come into existence without help from PAVN troops, and a large number of Vietnamese advisers ran the government in the early years, these facts overlook two points. First, the Cambodian people welcomed Vietnam's army and collaborated in the effort to end Pol Pot's rule. Second, Cambodians were in charge of the government but lacked trained personnel at all levels due to the devastation of the educated class during the Khmer Rouge era. When the PRK began to build an army, Vietnamese troops were reduced in number. Civilian Vietnamese advisers left Cambodia as new civil service and technical personnel were trained at institutions of higher learning in socialist countries. By 1988 there were no Vietnamese advisers in the PRK government, and Hanoi withdrew its army in 1989.

Evidence of differences between the PRK and Vietnam were difficult to identify because the US government and its allies refused to negotiate with Phnom Penh, where they could make their own assessment. In fact, however, the traditional suspicion between Cambodians and Vietnamese caused relations between peoples in the two countries to sour over time. The only genuine Russophile and Vietphile, Prime Minister Pen Sovan, served only from 1981 to 1982, when he was voted out by his fellow Cambodians for having a noncollegial style of decisionmaking (interviewee #5; Carney 1982; Munty 1988). In 1982 In Tam, a former member of Lon Nol's cabinet, abandoned support for Sihanouk in order to aid the PRK, which was retitled the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989. In Tam's reasoning was that he could not align with the Khmer Rouge, and he found Phnom Penh to be

sufficiently independent of Vietnam. Hun Sen's independence of Hanoi so impressed the Prince at their first meeting in 1986 that a peace process began. One of the points on which the two could agree was how much they despised the US government's role in interfering with the normal history of the country (interviewee #74). After PCC, Pol Peng Cheng, a legal adviser to Sihanouk, defected to Phnom Penh because the Prince had double-crossed Hun Sen by backing the Khmer Rouge plan at the start of the conference (interviewee #76).

Similarly, Hanoi had differences of opinion with Phnom Penh. One point of contention was Phnom Penh's delay in assembling the PRKAF so that Vietnam could remove its forces from the malaria-infested firing line. Indeed, Hanoi wanted to leave by June 30, 1989, while Phnom Penh preferred March 31, 1990 (Haas 1988b). A second problem was the failure of the Cambodian leaders to establish legitimacy by meeting villagers outside the capital city. I learned at Hanoi in January 1990 that the Vietnamese government was tired of backing a regime that assumed it was popular without actively seeking support throughout the countryside.

The myth that the PRK was a puppet of Hanoi was a typical divide-and-rule tactic designed to delay the peace process. Washington never batted an eyelash while Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, but objected to Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. As long as Sihanouk refused to talk to Hun Sen, the war could continue, leaving Cambodia in a quagmire. When a peace process emerged, contrary to Washington's pressure, the conflict was no longer a ball of wax; it began to unravel like a ball of string.

MYTH #8: NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NEVER RESOLVE THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT

Since the US government supplied weapons to support continued war, there was a need to delude the American people into believing that negotiations were futile. Starting in 1979, Hanoi and

Phnom Penh pleaded for negotiations on several occasions. An early SRV proposal was to remove PAVN troops from Cambodia if China would stop aiding Pol Pot. The PRK's first proposal was to pull troops back from the border with Thailand if Bangkok would do likewise, moving the Khmer Rouge border camps away from the border. The US government opposed negotiations on both offers, instead supporting early UN resolutions that called for Vietnam to withdraw unilaterally, even though there was no viable PRK army. Since this would leave the Khmer Rouge as the predominant military power in Cambodia, the US solution would have had the effect of bringing the Khmer Rouge back to power.

In 1983, when Hanoi announced an eventual PAVN withdrawal, US officials refused to press for negotiations on a transition. US nonrecognition of both the Hanoi and Phnom Penh governments ensured that any negotiations would have to involve other countries. Then, when Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden went to Hanoi in 1983, Washington objected that any effort at dialogue with Vietnam would weaken the position of the Cambodian resistance. The outcome most favorable to US interests was a defeated PRK, a weakened Khmer Rouge, and a strong KPNLA that could march into Phnom Penh militarily; as this scenario was unlikely, protracted war was preferable to negotiations.

MYTH #9: A POWERFUL, INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE EXISTED

Remnants of the Lon Nol army remained in Thailand during the Pol Pot era. When PAVN troops entered Cambodia in 1978, Kong Syleah merged several of these units together with the Khmer Serei (Free Khmer). Sak Sutsakhan, the Khmer Republic's defense minister who later became a US citizen, formed a pro-US force known as the Khmer Sar (White Khmer). Son Sann, Sihanouk's onetime premier, also organized a group of republican exiles in Paris with ambitions to return to power in Phnom Penh. Using Kong Syleah's and Sak Sutsakhan's contingents,

Son Sann decided to form a third faction. In January 1979 he flew to Bangkok, recruiting Dien Del to command the two forces, augmented by some Cambodian recruits from France in February. By September the KPNLA was officially formed; it reportedly grew from 3,000 to about 15,000 by the mid-1980s (Becker 1986: 441; Thayer 1983). Sihanouk was asked to head the KPNLF but declined, instead setting up an independent force, the ANS, which was commanded by his son Prince Ranariddh, a professor at Aix-en-Provence University, who turned down an offer from Hanoi in 1978 to command an army of Cambodian exiles to rescue his beleaguered father from the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh (Chanda 1986: 336).

Meanwhile, Generals Dien Del and Sak Sutsakhan feuded with the heads of KPNLF, whom they claimed were interfering with military strategy. Son Sann's colleagues complained that the generals would not cooperate with ANS. Dien Del bluntly regarded ANS and FUNCIPEC as being full of corrupt and incompetent opportunists (Vickery 1984: 251). Although differences within the NCR were patched up from time to time, the effectiveness of both factions was compromised. More US aid went to Sak's forces than to those commanded by Dien Del or Prince Ranariddh, thereby dividing the NCR even more.

One strength of the KPNLF was that it was the only faction firmly committed to democratic principles, although views ranged from left to right. When the KPNLF cooperated with the Khmer Rouge within CGDK from 1982, former KPNLF supporter In Tam and others defected to the PRK; they would not ally with the odious Pol Pot (Kiernan 1982: 188).

As for FUNCIPEC, in due course Prince Sihanouk could not even control his son Ranariddh. By mid-1989 FUNCIPEC was honeycombed with Khmer Rouge.

The number of troops in the NCR was never more than 15,000, recruited largely from refugee camps by a promise of earning extra money due to Western aid. NCR forces rarely took the offensive, and they were mostly crushed by Vietnam by 1985. In 1989 observers such as Jusuf Wanandi, adviser to Indonesia's

defense ministry, openly lamented the fact that the NCR lacked military clout.

MYTH #10: WASHINGTON PASSIVELY FOLLOWED ASEAN POLICY ON CAMBODIA

Whereas US administration officials pretended that they were merely supporting a policy formulated among non-Communist Southeast Asian states, the reality was that US diplomats pressured Thailand to aid both the Khmer Rouge and the NCR (interviewee #10). The US role was active but quiet.

Meanwhile, ASEAN was divided on the Cambodia issue. Indonesia and Malaysia were internally divided on the question, with the foreign and defense ministries taking different positions. Singapore's obnoxious rhetoric on Cambodia annoyed both Indonesia and Malaysia, which preferred diplomacy, since a continuation of war was strengthening China's role in the region and thereby encouraging the Soviet Union to intrude. When heads of state at the annual Malindo (Malaysian-Indonesian) summit in 1980 expressed a preference for a solution that would keep Beijing and Moscow out of Southeast Asia, Bangkok immediately took offense, believing mistakenly that the two leaders wanted to allow Cambodia to Finlandize to Vietnam.

Thus, although ASEAN publicly presented a united front on the Cambodia issue, the truth was that ASEAN unity prevailed despite Cambodia. The State Department wanted to avoid scrutiny of its policy toward Cambodia, so support for US allies in the region was a convenient foil. The disingenuous claim that US presidents were merely backing their ASEAN allies was a convenient way to avoid a policy debate in Washington.

CONCLUSION

Insofar as the US government wanted to get even with Hanoi, only China and the Khmer Rouge could frustrate Vietnam in the early 1980s. As this meant a covert alliance with the Khmer

Rouge, a seemingly necessary option that would be unpalatable to the public, US administrations dispensed disinformation. Facts relevant to this policy were difficult to ascertain because Congress was initially out for blood from Vietnam, funds dried up for US scholars to pursue research in Hanoi that might identify a different version of the situation and the public did not want to hear about any more US machinations in Southeast Asia. Whereas the evidence to suggest the ten myths seemed reasonable in Washington during 1979, the *idée fixe* of the mythology took on a momentum of its own to discount any conflicting information thereafter. Consequently, a serious consideration of alternative policies was simply not undertaken during most of the 1980s in Washington.

II

Sustaining the Khmer Rouge

3

Scenarios and Policies for Cambodia in the 1980s

REQUIREMENTS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT

Although Washington pretended that ASEAN and PRC preferences limited US policy options toward Cambodia, many alternatives were under consideration elsewhere around the world. The major actors involved in the Cambodian civil war were the four Cambodian factions, China, the Soviet Union, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. As they all had different visions of the situation, the minimum requirements of their policies appeared incapable of being reconciled.

The People's Republic of Kampuchea wanted to stay in office. The Cambodian resistance—the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk, and Son Sann factions—sought to return to power. China's goals were to minimize Soviet influence in Asia and Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia; Indochina would then be Finlandized by China. The Soviet Union hoped for an extension of its power around the world, particularly to checkmate China. Thailand wanted its border secure from possible Vietnamese aggression. The United States aimed to contain Soviet influence and to have a strong set of alliance partners to do so. Vietnam

Table 3.1
Cambodian Scenarios of the 1980s

SCENARIO	PROBABILITY
1. Pol Pot victory	low; falling
2. PRK legitimization	low; rising
3. liberal democracy	very low
4. Sihanoukization	low; rising
5. balkanization	very low
6. sideshow	high; falling
7. Koreanization	very low
8. quadripartite rule	very low
9. NCR rule	very low
10. CGDK rule	very low
11. PRK + NCR rule	low; rising
12. interim council	very low
13. UN transition	low
14. grand design	very low
15. Yugoslavianization	very low
16. neutralization	low
17. ASEANization	low
18. PRK overthrow	low; falling

looked forward to special relationships with the PRK and Laos, a corollary of which was a reduction of China's influence in Indochina.

Nine parties, therefore, held veto power over a Cambodian settlement. The four Cambodian factions refused to self-destruct. The external powers were willing to supply arms to their allies indefinitely. Having received cut-rate oil and weapons from China, Bangkok would not block supplies to the Khmer Rouge, and Thai military officers profited from NCR aid.

SCENARIO ANALYSIS

At least eighteen scenarios for a future Cambodia were discussed in the 1980s (see Table 3.1). The first four scenarios contemplated giving all power to one of the four Cambodian factions.

Scenario 1, a Pol Pot victory, was the Khmer Rouge option. The defeat of the other three factions required a reduction of

external aid to the NCR and the PRK, with a guerrilla war won as it was in 1975, first against one faction, then against another. The probability of attaining scenario 1 was low, as it conflicted with the minimum goals of the Cambodian government, which could count on SRV and Soviet military aid, and the probability fell when Vietnamese forces first trounced the Khmer Rouge forces in combat during 1978 and 1979, then crushed their base camps in 1985.

Scenario 2, legitimization of the Phnom Penh government, was advanced by the PRK, the USSR, and Vietnam. To eliminate the three rival factions, all external powers but Vietnam had to walk away from Cambodia, believing that the Cambodian resistance lacked credibility. Since the Khmer Rouge was the only effective resistance force, advocates of this view pointed out that ANS and KPNLF were junior partners when CGDK was formed in 1982 with the Khmer Rouge. The probability of this solution was low, since China objected that this would leave Vietnam with hegemony over Indochina. But Phnom Penh gained increased respectability as it rebuilt Cambodian schools and provided stable rule for rice farmers to return to normalcy. Later, the necessary condition was PAVN's departure from Cambodia and the collapse of CGDK aid; the former occurred in 1989, and NCR support was in doubt at the end of that year. Thus, this scenario rose in prominence over time.

Scenario 3 was for a liberal democratic Cambodia. The leader of this government would be Son Sann, who would have to discredit all rival factions. To do so, Sihanouk would have to die, China would have to stop aiding Pol Pot, the United States would need to bankroll Son Sann exclusively, and the PRK would have to lose SRV–Soviet support. As Son Sann's group was internally divided between civilian and political factions, the probability of this scenario was pitifully low, although the US government preferred this scenario.

Scenario 4 was for Sihanoukization; that is, a government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who in turn would possess real power. This would happen only if all four Cambodian factions

laid down their arms after Sihanouk won in internationally supervised elections, which presupposed external disengagement, incarceration of the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk's popularity with the people, a Sino-Soviet détente, an imposed international settlement, and the unpopularity of the PRK. The probability was low on all counts until a peace process emerged.

The next three scenarios aimed to leave the situation so entangled that each actor might get a piece of the rock but not as much as it wanted.

Scenario 5 was for balkanization, an increased level of warfare in which the four factions would occupy and defend their own pieces of Cambodian real estate—a war of each against all. This worst-case scenario, feared by all and proposed by none, would result from a greatly increased supply of defensive and offensive arms to all four factions, followed by more battles and guerrilla warfare. This was possible only in case of an intensification of the cold war as well as increased Sino-Soviet hostility. Such a prospect was contrary to the interests of all actors, so it had a low probability.

Scenario 6, the sideshow model, was a continuation of present policies for protracted but stalemated low-level military conflict. This was the scenario so eloquently identified by William Shawcross (1979) for the 1965–1978 era. The persistence of Sino-Soviet and Russo-American cold wars as well as continued Sino-Vietnamese confrontation guaranteed this scenario as long as the involved parties preferred not to escalate their conflicts, having checkmated one another. This was the most likely scenario until Soviet party leader Gorbachev decided to urge an end to the cold war beginning in 1985.

Scenario 7 was Koreanization, in which there would be two Cambodias separated indefinitely; that is, a formal agreement to allow a strip of territory inside Cambodia to house the resistance forces, with the PRK being dominant in the rest of the country. The PRK and SRV would have to accept a CGDK enclave inside Cambodia. Thailand would have to accept a PRK Finlandized to Vietnam. More aid was needed to make the CGDK viable,

economically and militarily. The probability was close to zero, since it left Vietnam's troops unacceptably close to Bangkok.

The next four scenarios pretended that a coalition solution was possible.

Scenario 8, based on the Laotian model of the 1960s, was for a quadripartite Cambodia in which the four factions would stop fighting and start learning to live together. Alternatively phrased, since the four factions were "facts of life," all might have to be included in a settlement. There would have to be national reconciliation and a cessation of outside aid. Because sharp divisions accounted for the conflict in the first place, and external powers had a vested interest in the outcome, what was required was a common threat, such as a famine or plague that would threaten to wipe out the Khmer race. The probability, in short, was zero. Nonetheless, this was the scenario advanced by US delegates at the Paris conference in 1989.

Scenario 9, a non-Communist Cambodia, would occur if Sihanouk and Son Sann were to prevail against the other two factions. Son Sann and Sihanouk would have to accept each other and prevail against both the PRK and the Khmer Rouge. There would have to be a withdrawal of aid from Communist countries, an increase in NCR aid, an overwhelming NCR victory in elections, and a disappearance of the Khmer Rouge. The probability was extremely low because the non-Communist resistance factions were internally divided politically and were not effective fighting forces at any time.

Scenario 10 was for a tripartite CGDK solution, which meant the dissolution of the Phnom Penh government and fraternal cooperation between the Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist resistance. Necessary conditions were external disengagement, the collapse of PRK legitimacy, and a change of heart by Pol Pot. The probability was zero, since the Khmer Rouge could hardly be expected to fight to regain power and then abandon the struggle. A CGDK victory would unravel, leaving Pol Pot in power.

Scenario 11 was for an anti–Khmer Rouge tripartite government, in which the Hun Sen, Sihanouk, and Son Sann factions

joined forces. Some Indonesian defense ministry officials preferred this solution, which could occur after a defeat of the Khmer Rouge and a détente between the other three factions. A Vietnamese troop withdrawal, Phnom Penh's acceptance of multipartism, and a PRC decision to drop the Khmer Rouge would have to come first. Since the CGDK refused to accept PRK as an interlocutor during most of the 1980s, this scenario was infeasible until 1988, when the three met together at the initial Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), which launched direct negotiations between the warring parties.

Whereas CGDK advanced the idea of an interim quadripartite government, scenario 12 was Hun Sen's alternative—an interim council to arrange for elections, leaving SOC in place. CGDK would have to suffer defeat due to an end to external aid, massive defections of soldiers to the SOC, and a strong SOC army to replace PAVN. None of these events materialized. At Paris Hun Sen modified his proposal from a quadripartite to a bipartite council so that SOC would not have to go on record as accepting responsibility for including the Khmer Rouge.

Clever package deals underlay the next two scenarios.

Scenario 13 was for a UN transition. UN bureaucrats might take over the top positions of the Cambodian government until elections established who would rule in a postwar Cambodia, with UN peacekeepers kept in place to enforce a cease-fire and military demobilization. The Cambodian government would have to surrender its administrative authority, the Khmer Rouge would have to hibernate, and major powers would have to pay for the costs involved. These conditions required war weariness on all sides. The probability was low, as Vietnam was ready to defend the PRK, and the Khmer Rouge showed no peaceful intentions. Even the General Assembly opposed a broad UN solution, demanding instead that Vietnam pull out of Cambodia without UN peacekeepers in place, thereby laying a red carpet for the Khmer Rouge to return to power.

Scenario 14 was a Metternichian grand design for Indochina or Southeast Asia. At the Peace of Westfalia of 1648, territories

shifted from one country to another to bring peace, but the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century reduced the viability of this method of conflict resolution. To keep all parties content, what could be exchanged? In the case of Cambodia, China could drop the Khmer Rouge in exchange for a renunciation by Vietnam to all claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Similar to the détente following the Cuban missile crisis, there might be a recognition of the legitimate security needs of all countries in the region. This could be achieved through measures such as an internationally guaranteed neutralization of Cambodia, a reduction of troops at borders of neighboring countries, and mutual nonaggression pledges. Sino-Vietnamese and US-Vietnamese normalization also could be thrown into the pot. Although the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) adopted elements of this scenario as its peace plan in 1979, the parties most directly involved seemed eager to impose a military solution during most of the 1980s. With the conflict so intensely polarized, diplomacy played a small role at first. There was little incentive for horsetrading, so the probability for this scenario was rather low.

Three scenarios expected the Cambodian conflict to obsolesce over the long run.

Scenario 15, Yugoslavianization, envisioned a Cambodia independent of its patrons, that is, a new generation of leaders rising to the top in all four factions within a period of forty years of worldwide détente and increased Japanese and Western development aid to the PRK. Although the short-term probability was low, I advanced this scenario as a long-term possibility (Haas 1984).

Scenario 16, one ingredient in NAM's plan, was for a neutralized Cambodia; this scenario, sometimes called the Austrian model, entailed an international treaty of guarantee, thereby cancelling the Cambodia-Vietnam friendship treaty that allowed Hanoi to send troops at the request of Phnom Penh. The PRK and Vietnam would have to be satisfied that the Khmer Rouge would no longer pose a threat. China would have to stop aid to the Khmer Rouge when it was convinced that a neutralized Cambodia would

not be Finlandized to Vietnam. Since mere legal guarantees were suspect, in light of the erosion of previous political settlements involving Laos and Vietnam, the probability of Austrianization was low.

Scenario 17 was sought by foreign ministries in Indonesia and Malaysia—an ASEANization of Cambodia. Under this scenario the three Indochinese countries would be gradually brought into the framework of the Association of South East Asian Nations. External countries would have to leave Cambodia alone while Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam became assimilated to ASEAN's consensus-building norms for decisionmaking, whence they could be admitted as members. Acceptance of the scenario by all ASEAN and Indochinese countries had to be coupled with a withdrawal of PRC aid to the Khmer Rouge. However, ASEAN countries allowed the Khmer Rouge to continue to participate in the Colombo Plan and a few other regional organizations, whereupon Vietnam ceased to participate. ASEAN's strategy of polarization torpedoed this scenario.

This leaves a final scenario from the realm of fiction. It is from the plot of the famous novel *The Ugly American* (Lederer & Burdick 1958).

Scenario 18 was for an overthrow of the PRK. If this occurred, Vietnam would no longer have a Cambodian government to support, and the Cambodian people would welcome the resistance coalition. Delegitimization of the Phnom Penh government, the required condition, would occur due to developments such as PRK corruption, excessive repression, economic mismanagement, and efforts at Vietnamese colonization of Cambodia. But as time went on the PRK rebuilt a normal government in Cambodia over the ruins of the Khmer Rouge. The probability of scenario 18 was low, and it declined over time.

Each country had a favorite scenario. Each Cambodian faction hoped to prevail. China wanted to bleed Vietnam, so it backed the return of the Khmer Rouge. ASEAN pressed the CGDK coalition to replace the PRK. The Soviet Union and Vietnam expected gradual legitimization of the Phnom Penh government.

The spectrum of preferences constituted a deadlock (Haas 1984). The sideshow scenario was the most likely, but it soon ran into competition.

POLICY CRITERIA

Jimmy Carter lacked a coherent policy toward Cambodia. He secretly aided the Khmer Rouge while declaring the United States neutral on the conflict in Cambodia. Ronald Reagan took immediate steps to develop and carry out a policy that represented a sharp break with previous presidents (Haas 1983).

We can explain the US choice of options in the early 1980s by using options analysis, a procedure in which we assess how well each scenario fulfills goals of US foreign policy. Options analysis, which is explained more fully in Appendix A, enables us to see the rationale of US policy toward Cambodia.

First, we estimate the importance of criteria brought to bear on each policy alternative by President Ronald Reagan (see Table 3.2). Policy feasibility was high but not an overriding consideration: Reagan was more interested in the appearance of toughness toward the Soviet Union in Asia than in how well such a stance might achieve the objective of containing Moscow in regard to Cambodia, which was of lesser interest than the East-West confrontation in Europe.

Among security goals, probability of officeholding was of moderate concern. Reagan was elected by a landslide and did not expect to lose his bid for reelection in 1984. The Reaganauts wanted to maximize US power in the region, consistent with the role of a superpower; this meant containing the Soviet Union and its allies, the PRK and Vietnam. Reducing superpower conflict was of little importance; Reagan assumed initially that the Soviet Union and the United States had incompatible objectives. Support for allies was of moderate concern, as Reagan wanted to reward loyal allies while remaining free to engage in unilateral adventures.

Reagan believed that he had a clear mandate to raise living standards of the American people, and he was particularly beholden to defense contractors. Weapons shipments to the Cambodian resistance provided some income to some manufacturers, but the main payoff of Cambodia for this goal was to point to yet another conflict requiring a general US military buildup.

Reagan placed top priority on the desire to roll back or stop Communism. With China moving to a free market economy, this left Reagan's view that the Soviet Union was an evil empire, Vietnam was a client state in the empire, and the PRK was a puppet of Hanoi.

Regarding prestige criteria, Reagan was not particularly interested in being perceived either as altruistic or as peaceloving. Restoring the United States to a leadership role in the world was of transcendent importance, however.

SCENARIO ASSESSMENTS

In our analysis of how well each scenario served to implement Reagan's goals (Table 3.2), support for a non-Communist Cambodia emerged as the top priority despite the slim chances for such a future. Only one scenario was more likely—a continuation of present policies, known as the sideshow scenario. The second and third priorities had much lower scores. ASEANization, the second most desirable scenario, ran upstream against Reagan's goal of having the United States assume world leadership. A Son Sann victory, the liberal democratic scenario, would mean abandoning Sihanouk, so it appeared less altruistic and peaceloving than aiding the Sihanouk–Son Sann coalition.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Regarding the use of alternative forms of statecraft, the main problem as the 1980s began was that Reagan's preferred option (an NCR victory) was largely unattainable. The do nothing option was largely unavailable, since Reagan wanted the United States

to play the role of a superpower, a term used to refer to a country with global interests.

Sending troops was excluded from consideration due to the "Vietnam syndrome," that is, the unwillingness of the American public to support any use of US troops abroad, particularly in Southeast Asia, in either combat or noncombat roles. Reagan did not want angry demonstrations in the streets during his term in office.

Because the preferred scenario was the victory of a militarily weak NCR, military aid was essential. The earliest aid was covert, in part because of the Vietnam syndrome but also because it went to allies of the Khmer Rouge. The covert aid was largely lethal. When Congress voted overt aid in 1985, Reagan sent nonlethal supplies, which of course could be resold to buy weapons. There was no distinction in practical terms between covert and overt aid; the lethal/nonlethal distinction was for internal propaganda only (Stone 1989a).

Regarding economic policies, the United States government favored an economic boycott and embargo of the PRK and Vietnam. Transactions would increase, Hanoi was informed, when PAVN troops left Cambodia.

The United States had no relations with either North Vietnam or the DK government of the Khmer Rouge. Nonrecognition remained the policy after Vietnam unified as well as when the PRK assumed power in Phnom Penh. If Hanoi wanted diplomatic recognition from Washington, the terms were a withdrawal of PAVN troops from Cambodia and a full accounting of US soldiers missing in action in Vietnam. Nonrecognition by Washington was yet another way to condemn Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. CGDK recognition was the opposite side of the coin, although the Khmer Rouge was part of the coalition.

Since State Department personnel were not allowed to talk about Cambodia with either Hanoi or Phnom Penh, US diplomacy on Cambodia required other parties. Instead of direct negotiations for peace, discussions with ASEAN and the NCR aimed to pressure various parties to continue the war.

Table 3.2
Scenario Options Matrix for the 1980s[a]

CRITERIA	WEIGHTS	SCENARIOS																	
		KR	PP	LD	SN	BN	SH	KN	QP	NC	CG	TP	IC	UN	GD	YN	NN	AN	OT
Policy feasibility	Medium	F	F	P	F	P	E	P	U	F	U	U	U	P	P	P	U	P	P
Officeholding	Medium	P	P	F	F	F	V	P	P	E	P	P	U	G	F	F	P	F	V
Increase power	V.High	P	P	G	F	P	F	P	F	E	P	P	U	F	P	G	P	F	?
Reduce superpower conflict	Very low	P	V	F	G	P	F	P	V	P	P	P	E	V	G	F	G	E	P
Support allies	Medium	F	U	V	F	G	V	F	F	E	P	F	U	F	F	F	G	E	F
Raise living standards	Very high	P	P	F	F	F	F	F	P	F	P	P	P	P	P	F	F	F	P
Stop Communism	V.High	U	U	E	V	F	F	U	?	E	U	F	U	P	P	G	G	E	?
Appear altruistic	Low	U	U	G	V	F	F	U	G	E	P	F	V	E	G	E	E	E	P

Appear peace-loving	Medium	U	U	G	V	F	F	G	V	E	F	F	V	E	E	E	E	E	P
Assume leader-ship role	Very high	U	U	V	G	F	P	P	F	E	F	P	U	P	E	E	F	F	P
SCORE[b]		15	14	61	55	36	49	24	40	83	20	26	19	42	45	61	46	63	35
RANK		17	18	3	5	11	6	14	10	1	15	13	16	9	8	3	7	2	12

[a]Assessment Code:
E = excellent
V = very good
G = good
F = fair
P = poor
U = unacceptable
? = unclear

Scenario Code:
KR = Pol Pot victory
PP = PRK legitimization
LD = liberal democracy
SN = Sihanouk victory
BN = balkanization
SH = sideshow
KN = Koreanization
QP = quadripartite Cambodia
NC = NCR victory
CG = CGDK victory
TP = PRK + NCR victory
IC = interim council
UN = UN transition
GD = grand design
YN = Yugoslavinization
NN = neutralization
AN = ASEANization
OT = overthrow of PRK

[b]Multiplied by 10 to eliminate decimals; score averaged when "?" ratings appear.

Table 3.3
Policy Options Matrix for the 1980s[a]

CRITERIA	WEIGHTS	POLICIES																
		DN	ST	OM	CM	BE	NR	CR	NP	NW	QW	QP	PC	SW	SP	BA	BS	BC
Policy feasibility	Medium	U	U	E	E	E	E	E	P	E	Y	P	F	E	P	V	G	G
Officeholding	Medium	P	U	P	F	V	V	G	G	F	F	G	G	P	P	G	G	F
Increase power	V.High	U	P	G	G	G	G	V	P	F	F	P	F	F	P	F	F	F
Reduce superpower conflict	Very low	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	G	P	P	G	G	P	G	P	P	P
Support allies	Medium	U	G	E	E	V	V	E	P	E	E	P	?	E	P	E	E	E
Raise living standards	Very high	F	U	F	F	P	P	P	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	F	?	G
Stop Communism	V.High	U	F	E	E	E	E	F	?	F	F	?	P	E	?	V	G	F
Appear altruistic	Low	U	U	U	P	F	P	F	E	P	P	E	E	P	E	E	E	G

Appear peace-loving	Medium	U	U	U	P	F	F	G	E	U	U	E	E	U	E	V	V	G
Assume leader-ship role	Very high	U	G	G	F	G	G	G	E	P	P	G	G	P	F	F	F	P
SCORE[b]		8	23	56	57	61	61	59	57	43	41	51	54	50	45	61	58	48
RANK[c]		17	16	8	6	2	2	4	7	14	15	10	9	11	13	2	5	12

[a]Assessment Code:
E = excellent
V = very good
G = good
F = fair
P = poor
U = unacceptable
? = unclear

Scenario Code:
DN = do nothing
ST = send troops
OM = overt mil. aid
CM = covert mil. aid
BE = boycott/embargo
NR = nonrecognition
CR = CGDK recognition
NP = negotiations for peace
NW = negotiations for war
QW = quiet diplomacy for war
QP = quiet diplomacy for peace
PC = back peace conference
SW = secret diplomacy for war
SP = secret diplomacy for peace
BA = back ASEAN
BS = back Sihanouk
BC = back China

[b]Multiplied by 10 to eliminate decimals; score averaged when "?" ratings appear.

[c]Three options tie for ranks 103; they receive a rank of "2."

Quiet diplomacy with Beijing served to coordinate military aid to the Cambodian resistance and allowed PRC troops to confront Vietnam. Quiet diplomacy pressured Thailand to go along with the Sino-US policy on Cambodia. In short, there was quiet diplomacy for war rather than quiet diplomacy for peace.

The United States government did not advocate a peace conference after ICK. Washington appeared to be passive, supporting resolutions by ASEAN and the UN. The Paris Conference on Cambodia of mid-1989 was not Washington's idea.

Secret diplomacy for war was an adjunct to covert lethal aid. The State Department denied the existence of a Working Group. There was no secret diplomacy to advance a peaceful resolution of the conflict by talking to the PRK or Vietnam during the 1980s—until 1989 at Paris.

US propaganda was in the form of disinformation, as documented in Chapter 2 of this book. Washington officials believed their own propaganda and refused to listen to different versions of reality from impartial observers. The nature of the propaganda was a rationale that it was US policy to back ASEAN as well as to back Sihanouk. Support for China was downplayed, and benefits to the Khmer Rouge were denied.

As our options analysis reveals, the three best policies were a boycott/embargo of the PRK and Vietnam, nonrecognition of both regimes, and official support for ASEAN (see Table 3.3). Recognizing CGDK, backing Sihanouk, and providing covert aid followed closely behind. Diplomacy for peace and overt military aid came next, but these options were rejected, so that is where there was a cutoff between acceptable and unacceptable policies.

CONCLUSION

Based on our assumptions about criterion weights and assessments of how well each scenario would implement the basic foreign policy goals of the United States, we find that the Reagan administration sought the victory of the non-Communist resistance far above other scenarios. To carry out this policy,

which was far from attainable in 1980, there was a long-term strategy of isolating the PRK and Vietnam diplomatically and economically, aiding the NCR, and providing public support to ASEAN and Sihanouk.

Support for ASEAN and the NCR was a mere figleaf over US policy. In all nakedness the public would ultimately see that aid to the NCR was aid for the Khmer Rouge. Therefore, the problem for the US government in the 1980s was to deflect attention from Cambodia.

4

The US Role in Preserving Pol Pot

FALLING FIGLEAVES

The month of June 1982 was a watershed in regard to Cambodia. CGDK, as already noted, was formed. Hanoi announced the first of several partial withdrawals of its forces from Cambodia. And George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as secretary of state.

Shultz had more interest in peace than in confrontation, but he devoted little immediate attention to Cambodia. A few months before Haig left office, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage went to Vietnam to open a dialogue on MIAs. Upon his return he reported that Hanoi was eager for negotiation, and in due course a dialogue on MIAs (but not on Cambodia) emerged.

Vietnam stated on several occasions that it was willing to withdraw from Cambodia under conditions that would assure that Pol Pot would not return to power. In 1979 UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim went to Hanoi to learn that if China stopped aiding Pol Pot, Vietnamese troops would leave Cambodia. In 1980 Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach proposed discussions with ASEAN. In 1981 he suggested an ASEAN-Burma-Indochina conference, after which the regional countries could meet with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 1982

he repeated the proposal, while not insisting that the PRK attend. In 1983 Vietnam pledged to withdraw unilaterally from Cambodia in due course, although no firm date was given.

Therefore, in 1983 new channels of communication with Vietnam seemed appropriate. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson flew to Hanoi for a round of quiet diplomacy, with no adverse reaction. But when Bill Hayden, Australia's new foreign minister, went to Vietnam to seek a new dialogue, Washington barked (Lincoln 1988). Japan, to whom Hanoi owed a debt of $71 million (Awanohara & Morrison 1989), continued to trade with Vietnam despite US efforts to encourage a boycott and embargo of economic transactions of Vietnam. Simultaneously, Japanese corporations were interested in investing in Vietnam, but the reaction by ASEAN and the United States to Japan's overtures was negative, causing Tokyo to fear a US bite (Tasker 1987) in the form of a protectionist retaliation (interviewee #71).

In 1979, meanwhile, the PRK proposed a demilitarized safety zone on both sides of the Cambodian-Thai border. In 1983 Hanoi was willing to accept an agreement wherein its troops would withdraw at least thirty kilometers from the Thai border. But Beijing refused to talk to Hanoi about terms that could bring peace to Cambodia, including a Vietnamese withdrawal. At the ASEAN meeting in mid-1984 the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore pleaded with Shultz to ask China to drop its policy of nonnegotiation (Porter 1988: 825), but to no avail. Later that year, when Sihanouk hinted that he was willing to meet PRK Premier Hun Sen, China vetoed the talks.

Later in 1984, Stephen Solarz, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, went to Vietnam in order to gather additional information and to present an ingenious plan for peace. His idea was to have the PRK make common cause with FUNCIPEC and KPNLF, thereby excluding the Khmer Rouge from a future Cambodia. Solarz's scheme seemed unrealistic to Thach, since Sihanouk ruled out any negotiations with Hun Sen, and the NCR armies scarcely existed as strategic players (interviewee #23). Solarz, nonetheless,

interpreted Thach's response to his proposal as obstinacy. He concluded that Vietnam would be more willing to compromise if Congress openly aided the NCR (interviewee #24).

Congress was still sensitive in regard to any renewed military aid against Vietnam, so Washington had been deferring to China, which backed the Khmer Rouge, rather than seeking to build an effective NCR (interviewee #124). Nevertheless, Solarz steered an appropriation of $5 million in military aid (lethal or nonlethal) through Congress in 1985. There was a stipulation that such assistance could not go to the Khmer Rouge "directly or indirectly." But the NCR and the Khmer Rouge were allies, so the provision was disingenuous. In due course NCR aid reached the Khmer Rouge, with the Thai military selling to the highest bidder. If Solarz did not know the fallacies of his policy, the US State Department did not point out the difficulties. The reality of Cambodia continued to elude US officials, who pretended that the NCR could prevail, not only against the PRK but also against Pol Pot despite insufficient support to accomplish this objective (interviewee #74). Although lethal aid was approved, the Reagan administration sent only nonlethal items (boats, rice, salaries of soldiers, training, travel, uniforms, vehicles), and the full amount was not spent for the rest of the decade (Clymer 1990: 3; Lewis 1989; Stone 1990b: 2; Sutter 1988).

The year 1985 marked one decade since the dramatic helicopter evacuation of personnel took place from the US Embassy in Saigon. American news reporters sought visas to visit Vietnam in order to film documentaries on progress after a decade. Washington eased restrictions on Americans traveling to Vietnam. After so many years of propagandistic reporting on Indochina in the US media, new information sources soon emerged. Some Americans in due course flew to Phnom Penh for a few days, obtaining a firsthand account of the new Cambodia. By 1988 Vietnamese academics were visiting the United States, including onetime ROV premier, economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh, who had become a member of the SRV parliament. Oanh was the genius behind many economic reforms after Vietnam's Party Congress

concluded in 1986 that socialism had failed to bring prosperity to Vietnam.

DIALOGUE ABOUT DIALOGUE

The idea of a regional dialogue, with both the Khmer Rouge and PRK present, gained support after 1985. "Proximity talks," in which various parties meet together informally—although not necessarily for direct negotiations—had worked for the Afghanistan conflict, so they might be useful in regard to Cambodia. Vietnam agreed, indicating that it would leave Cambodia by 1990 in any case.

After 1985, the Reagan administration pointed to its NCR support and the desire to bring Sihanouk back to head a new government in Cambodia. That a victory for the NCR was impossible without a coalition with either the Khmer Rouge or the PRK was never admitted. There was no initial candor that a CGDK victory over the PRK would turn the Khmer Rouge loose to annihilate the NCR. Washington could not make a strategic assessment that the NCR was almost nonexistent militarily; it was stonewalling until a pro-US opportunist somehow came to power in Phnom Penh.

As 1986 began, US policy still supported the Sino–UN peace plan, but Washington was opposing ASEAN's new proposal for a quadripartite reconciliation government, as this meant according a measure of power to the PRK (Chanda 1989a: 38). Strategically, Washington was backing China. Economically, Congress was quarrelling with ASEAN and Japan on trade matters, as trade imbalances and balance-of-payments deficits were shrinking the value of the dollar. Psychologically, the Reagan administration was still fighting the Vietnamese enemy while trying to overcome the so-called "Vietnamese syndrome." As the peace process gained momentum, the US government could no longer control ASEAN. Accordingly, State Department personnel quietly began to consider that they should abandon the "support ASEAN" option and instead give more attention to Sihanouk as the only horse that

they were willing to back in a future Cambodia. Solarz disagreed, advocating increased NCR lethal aid so that the Khmer Rouge would not end up as the only rider of that horse.

In 1987 efforts to bring the four Cambodian factions together continued. Although Washington was not involved, ASEAN, French, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Romanian, and UN mediators did try to advance the peace process. In October Hun Sen released a peace plan for a "neutral and nonaligned" Cambodia, with a quadripartite National Reconciliation Council (NRC) to hold elections for a constitutional convention; the breakthrough was PRK acceptance of Khmer Rouge representation on the NRC. Sihanouk decided to meet Hun Sen for the first time, as the PRK proposal appeared to be close to the minimum requirements for a comprehensive settlement, and the two met outside Paris in December 1987 and January 1988. Again, the United States stayed out of the peace process. After the second meeting the Prince asked ASEAN to proceed with proximity talks. Indonesia, which was eager to serve as host, then convened the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in July 1988.

During the spring the Bangkok press published information about how US lethal aid was reaching the Khmer Rouge. The US press picked up the information, and the American public was outraged. Nevertheless, when JIM I opened, there was no specific US policy to prevent Pol Pot from seizing power when Vietnam withdrew (Brown 1989: 82–86). After Shultz indicated to ASEAN in July that Washington wanted safeguards against the return of Polpotism, the Reagan administration disingenuously proposed doubling NCR nonlethal aid, whereupon news of Thai embezzlement of that aid killed the idea (Clymer 1990: 5). Instead, Congress cut military aid to Thailand (US House 1989: 115) and passed a joint resolution in October 1988 calling upon the US government to bring Pol Pot to trial. By January 1989 the new administration of George Bush was spending the entire $5 annual NCR allotment and was requesting $7 million for the following year, while Congress was objecting that aid to Pol Pot's allies was aid to Pol Pot.

Soviet moves toward a détente had more impact on US policy toward Europe than toward Asia. In September 1988 Gorbachev offered to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay if the United States removed its nearby bases from the Philippines. The proposal embarrassed US negotiators, who were clinging to the doctrine of "forward defense" in order to keep Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. Although US diplomats asked their Soviet counterparts to pressure Hanoi in order to facilitate a peace settlement, Vietnam was changing its policy and the United States was not. At JIM I in 1988, Hanoi stated its willingness to accept the ASEAN and UN peace plans, provided that there was a guarantee that the Khmer Rouge would not return to power. Accordingly, Moscow informed Washington that Vietnam was eager to leave Cambodia to the Cambodians.

GEORGE BUSH AND CAMBODIA

Bush's inaugural address declared that "the statute of limitations had been reached on Vietnam." The highest Asian-American on Bush's staff was Sichan Siv, a Cambodian who had escaped the Pol Pot regime, emigrated to the United States, joined the KPNLF, and had even served as a member of the CGDK delegation at the UN although he had become an American citizen. Bush's adviser on Cambodia was Karl Jackson, a former University of California colleague of Hanoiphobic Professor Douglas Pike, a onetime State Department official in Saigon. Other key policymakers on Cambodia were Secretary of State James Baker III and NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft, both of whom had more interest in the larger chesspieces on the global chessboard than in the pawns. Scowcroft was an exponent of "low-intensity warfare," that is, the use of guerrilla bands to destabilize undesirable regimes through terrorism short of war. His support for the Cambodian resistance was consistent with his predilection.

In February 1989 Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan held discussions with Hun Sen in Bangkok a few days before JIM II convened. After the State Department objected in vain

to the Thai–PRK dialogue, Bush met Sihanouk in Beijing. In March FUNCIPEC leaders, meeting the new president in the White House, implored him to increase military aid to the NCR. Solarz, resourceful as ever, suggested a UN trusteeship for Cambodia; but his suggestion was regarded as a harebrained scheme (Ottaway 1989).

On April 5 Hanoi announced that it would withdraw all PAVN troops from Cambodia by September 30. This unilateral, unconditional declaration startled the world. Sihanouk called for an international conference, preferring Paris as a venue. But even before France agreed to schedule the Paris Conference on Cambodia, pressure began to mount in Washington. Sihanouk openly asked for US lethal aid so that ANS could cope with a resurgent Khmer Rouge after PAVN troops departed. Vice President Dan Quayle, while touring Southeast Asia in May, revealed that Bush was contemplating covert lethal aid to the NCR, as the US government would "never" recognize the SRV-installed regime in Phnom Penh (Chanda 1989b; Richburg 1989b: 22). The Bush administration, itching to project power, then called for overt lethal aid. Senator Claiborne Pell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair, next steered a vote of 97 to 1 on an amendment that would have given nonlethal aid to the NCR on the condition that the two factions split from the Khmer Rouge. Pell, in short, wanted to dissolve CGDK. After the Bush administration gave assurances that no aid would reach the Polpotists and that no funds would be disbursed unless the Paris conference failed, White House pressure on the Senate garnered support, and Quayle broke a tie vote in the Senate for the appropriation without the amendment. The aid increased from $5 million to $7 million, including an amount for training of Cambodians to handle public administration in the event of a transitional government, although the legislation required the CIA to clear weapons shipments through Congress (Clymer 1990: 6–7; Pear 1989). During a July 5 press conference Sihanouk admitted that the NCR had "good cooperation on the battlefield" with the Khmer Rouge (US Embassy, Beijing 1989: 3). Although the Prince thus admitted that

aid to ANS contravened US law, on July 20 Senator Charles Robb introduced an amendment for lethal aid to the NCR. The Robb amendment passed through a complex parliamentary maneuver, albeit without specifying a dollar amount. The aim was to signal that US policy was firmly behind Sihanouk, who thus could afford to make fewer concessions in Paris. Although Solarz wanted the NCR to fight the Khmer Rouge, for Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon the target was to be PAVN and SOCAF forces (Becker 1989; Sieverts 1989; Stone 1989b: 8).

Secretary of State Baker met his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, at Moscow in May. The two agreed that all external aid to the Cambodian factions should end in order to hasten a settlement (interviewee #64). They also favored the presence of a UN organ during the transition, something still opposed by leaders in Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Baker conceded that the government in Phnom Penh could be included in a transitional quadripartite authority (Friedman 1989).

During June the US government further showed its militancy by blocking the dispatch of a UN Development Program (UNDP) mission to Phnom Penh, where it could assess requirements for reconstruction aid as an input to PCC. Meanwhile, both Vice President Quayle and Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmit underscored US opposition to the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in an interim coalition government (Chanda 1989a: 39), contrary to ASEAN's plan for an interim quadripartite government. The U.S. view was that Sihanouk should have real power in a new Cambodia, rather than serving merely as a figurehead. The Bush administration, in other words, appeared to accept an interim tripartite option that excluded the Khmer Rouge.

On the eve of the Paris conference, Bush concluded that the Pol Pot faction should be "marginalized" (Pedler 1989), but that Vietnam should postpone its withdrawal until all parties agreed to an interim government (Yu, Pregely, & Sutter 1989: 1). US policy, as usual, tried to align morality with geostrategic considerations. Since they did not match up, Washington appeared to stumble along, hoping that there would be no urgency for a coherent

policy. The meeting in Paris required coherence, however.

THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA

Baker's address to the PCC plenary session on July 31 indicated that the United States opposed the return of the Khmer Rouge. He endorsed the idea of a UN transitional arrangement that would demilitarize the country and organize free elections. If a coalition government emerged with Khmer Rouge participation, US support for the new regime would be reduced proportionately, he said. On the other hand, Baker pledged that the United States would accept Khmer Rouge participation if Sihanouk insisted.

Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister, and Ali Alatas, his Indonesian counterpart, cochaired PCC. When the plenary session of the conference broke up into technical committees, Baker returned to Washington, but the US delegation remaining in Paris did nothing to implement his proclaimed policy. Sihanouk, meanwhile, was visibly under the thumb of the Khmer Rouge in the early part of the conference. The Khmer Rouge's chief delegate, Khieu Samphan, refused to shake hands with Hun Sen at PCC (Chanda 1989c), although they had done so at JIM II earlier in the year (interviewee #34).

Two plans were presented. The NCR and Khmer Rouge, calling themselves the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR) because both Pol Pot and Sihanouk had resigned from CGDK before PCC, opted for an interim quadripartite government that would replace both CGDK and SOC. Hun Sen, fearing that the transition would be long and, thus, a Khmer Rouge trick to effect a *coup*, proposed a National Reconciliation Council (NRC) with equal representation between CNR and SOC. The interim council would draw up modalities for an election in order to select members of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, leaving SOC otherwise in place.

US delegates brushed aside several compromises. For example, SOC and SRV delegates opposed having the UN provide an international control mechanism (ICM) to oversee the transition

in Cambodia, since the overwhelming majority of UN delegates had accredited the Khmer Rouge for a decade and thus might be biased. Hanoi and Phnom Penh preferred an ICM that would report to the Paris Conference on Cambodia. India then proposed a compromise: PCC would be in charge of the ICM but would contract with the UN to provide the body. Although this was agreeable to the SOC and Vietnam, the US delegates were unimpressed.

Since the rule of PCC was unanimity, Khmer Rouge delegates refused to allow the term "genocide" in any document issued by the conference. Instead of objecting, US delegates nodded while the Khmer Rouge and its allies argued that no policies or practices of the Pol Pot era "fit the legal definition of genocide."

US representatives opposed to any provision that would guarantee a future Cambodia to have a "nonaligned" status. The United States was thereby opposing a key ingredient in all the recent ASEAN and UN peace plans for Cambodia.

Meanwhile, Alatas was dining with various delegations to secure compromises. Vietnam agreed to India's compromise on the UN, was willing to allow the words "human rights" to substitute for "genocide," and was ready for half a loaf on all other matters in dispute if the SOC emerged satisfied with the results of the conference. As for the issue of including the Khmer Rouge in a transitional Cambodian administration, Hanoi expressed no opinion, leaving this question to the four Cambodian factions to decide among themselves.

Although the US delegation was informed about Alatas' progress, it failed to follow suit. Instead, it convened meetings of the Western alliance partners to build solidarity against any proposed compromise (interviewee #86). On August 11, two weeks into the conference, the highest remaining member of the US delegation, Vietnamese-speaking David Lambertson, made an appointment with Vietnam's Le Mai, ambassador to Thailand. During the conversation, Lambertson asked Le Mai to coerce Hun Sen to adopt the Sino–Khmer Rouge peace plan that was being presented in the name of Sihanouk at the conference (interviewee #30). In

contrast, a French delegate asked China to apply pressure on the Khmer Rouge to agree to a compromise on powersharing (Beckaert 1989c).

One week before PCC was scheduled to conclude, Sihanouk realized that Cambodia would be thrown into civil war again unless he ditched the Khmer Rouge and agreed to a tripartite settlement with Son Sann and Hun Sen. Fearing for the lives of his family (interviewee #5), he reasoned that the initiative for a tripartite solution would have to come from the country whose chief delegate had said on the second day of the conference that it wanted to exclude the Polpotists from a role in a future Cambodia (Allman 1990: 158; Beckaert 1989b, d; Colhoun 1989). Accordingly, intermediaries passed the word to Charles Twining, Lambertson's immediate subordinate, to be delivered to Richard Solomon, who was flying to Paris to head the US delegation for the final plenary session in his capacity as assistant secretary of state. Britain, China, France, and the Soviet Union were willing to accept Sihanouk's solution. When Solomon arrived, however, his instructions from Washington were otherwise. The initiative had come too late. The Prince was expendable. The US government, determined to blame Hanoi's alleged intransigence for the failure of the Paris conference, was intent on wrecking the conference unless Hun Sen rolled out a red carpet to welcome Pol Pot to Phnom Penh.

MORE MISCONCEPTIONS IN US POLICY

The premise underlying US policy at Paris was that Vietnam was leaving Cambodia because it could not achieve its military objectives. The SOC was assumed to be so weak that it would fall apart like a house of cards without PAVN troops. No compromise with the SOC or Vietnam, therefore, was warranted; no treaty was preferable to a compromise. Hanoi and Phnom Penh, according to US intelligence, were expected to sign a treaty of capitulation.

On the contrary, Vietnam perceived that it had accomplished its mission. PAVN forces had entered Cambodia to stop attacks

on Vietnamese citizens inside Vietnam and to rid the world of the genocidal Pol Pot; its troops remained, as requested, until the new PRK had an army of its own to defend itself. Demographically, there were too few young men for the PRK to recruit into a PRK army in 1979, but by 1989 the situation was different. A new Cambodian national army was in place, and the SOC had established a measure of legitimacy among the population. As the Phnom Penh government was ready to take over its own defense, Hanoi was leaving. The only problem remaining was to eliminate the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk tried to break with the Khmer Rouge at Paris, and China wanted the Polpotists to play some role but not a dominant role in a new Cambodia. By refusing to allow a compromise at Paris, the United States was again sustaining the Khmer Rouge.

On September 9 Solomon reported on PCC to a meeting of the Asia Society in Los Angeles. After blaming Vietnam for refusing to endorse the Khmer Rouge peace plan, he attacked Hanoi for removing its troops from Cambodia in the absence of a "comprehensive political settlement," a code word for an agreement between external parties to allow the Polpotists a role in an interim government that Vietnam was asked to pressure the SOC to accept. Saying that the departure of PAVN troops would complicate a settlement, Solomon (1989) in effect asked Hanoi to keep its soldiers in Cambodia a while longer.

That was not the only perfidy of Solomon's speech. After repeated declarations by State Department officials that the main obstacle to normalizing US relations with Hanoi was the presence of PAVN troops in Cambodia (interviewee #92), Solomon stated that there would be no such normalization after Vietnamese soldiers marched home, as there was no comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict.[1] In short, Washington worked hard to prevent such a settlement at Paris to preserve a strategic relationship with China, then Solomon pointed the finger at Hanoi as the obstinate party. That Solomon would not report that Hanoi was ready to make many concessions at Paris, while Washington made none, was a continuation of the disinformation

campaign. When correct information circulated among members of Congress, the Bush administration lost credibility on the subject of Cambodia. Congress, as a result, was determined to prod the State Department step by step until a genuine settlement without the Khmer Rouge was in sight.

During September the Bush administration considered whether to supply additional aid to the non-Communist resistance. Congress, however, argued strongly that further escalation was contrary to the wishes of the American people, who opposed a return of Pol Pot to power (Awanohara 1989). Representative Chester Atkins (1989) asked the State Department to pressure Sihanouk to dissociate himself from the Khmer Rouge. His colleague Jim Leach (1989) renewed a call for an international tribunal to try Pol Pot. Neither suggestion evoked a response from Foggy Bottom. Subsequent congressional grilling caused the State Department to admit that Pol Pot had indeed committed genocide in Cambodia and that it was US policy to oppose a role for the Polpotists in any future Cambodian government (US DOS 1989).

In October, however, US military personnel strutted along the Cambodian border, training the NCR on the use of new anti-tank weapons. Reportedly, some of $20 million in supplies began to flow to the ANS and the KNPLA, the latter noting in public that the assistance was covert (Bangkok Post 1989; Erlanger 1989; Thayer 1989). The State Department emphatically denied that US aid was reaching the Khmer Rouge,[2] but there was of course no way to prevent NCR or Thai army personnel from making such a sale on the sly. Weapons were rumored to be stored in US Agency for International Development (USAID) warehouses (Beckaert 1989a: 29-1), and in due course a former Green Beret reported that US army superiors had ordered him to destroy documents proving that US military personnel in Thailand were selling weapons on the black market with approval of the NSC and the Thai government (IP 1990a). Although the US government gave up on Sihanouk after Paris, in March 1990 Pol Pot's radio station said that US policy was "very correct," and Sihanouk

noted that some US officials "appreciate the efficiency" of the Khmer Rouge (ABC-TV 1990: 2).

CONCLUSION

In short, when Vietnam withdrew its troops on September 26, US policy was still Faustian. Hanoi could no longer be vilified for violating the sovereignty of its neighbor. The Khmer Rouge, eager to reconquer Cambodia, became the new bogey. But there was no US policy to prevent Pol Pot from returning to power.

NOTES

1. The Bush administration dug up a forgotten statement by former Secretary of State Shultz (1985: 28) to justify the new condition: "Vietnam will have to agree to a settlement in Cambodia acceptable to ASEAN, which includes the negotiated withdrawal of its forces." I am indebted to Keith Richburg for locating this quotation, a policy repudiated by a State Department official before the Paris Conference on Cambodia (interviewee #92).

2. I discovered this when I telephoned the State Department and asked them to comment on the matter. Charles Twining (1990) of the State Department later acknowledged overt nonlethal aid to the NCR.

III

Marginalizing the Khmer Rouge

5

Scenarios and Policies for Cambodia in the 1990s

NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT

On September 26, 1989 Vietnamese troops paraded through Phnom Penh on their way home. A new reality emerged. The strongest force among the resistance, the Khmer Rouge, had only one adversary on its route back to power—the untested army of the State of Cambodia.

The major actors engaged in the Cambodian civil war remained the four Cambodian factions, China, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States, but Vietnam was less involved. Gorbachev's drive to end the cold war was coming to fruition. The minimum requirements of the outside countries' preferred scenarios for Cambodia appeared increasingly capable of being reconciled, but diplomacy lagged behind.

As 1990 began, the State of Cambodia wanted to stay in office but was willing to discuss a UN transition with a role for the Khmer Rouge in planning that transition. The resistance (the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, and Son Sann factions) advanced militarily while favoring elections to decide the new rulers of Cambodia. China still sought to minimize Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia but gave up its desire for hegemony in Southeast Asia. Hanoi supported its SOC ally through diplomacy but phased out military

Table 5.1
Cambodian Scenarios of the 1990s

SCENARIO	PROBABILITY
1. Pol Pot victory	moderate; rising
2. PRK legitimization	uncertain
3. liberal democracy	low; falling
4. Sihanoukization	moderate; rising
5. Cyprus model	very low
6. sideshow	discarded
7. Koreanization	very low
8. quadripartite rule	discarded
9. NCR rule	very low
10. NGC rule	very low
11. PRK + NCR rule	low; rising
12. interim council	accepted provisionally
13. Fifth Republic model	discarded
14. Thai monarchy model	discarded
15. encapsulation	accepted provisionally
16. UN transition	accepted provisionally
17. grand design	superseded
18. Yugoslavianization	very low
19. neutralization	accepted provisionally
20. ASEANization	discarded
21. SOC overthrow	low; increasing
22. Red solution	very low; falling

aid. The Soviet Union wanted to set its own economic house in order and thus was phasing out aid to Indochina. Thailand no longer feared Vietnamese aggression but instead was eager to profit from the restoration of peace to Cambodia. The United States appeared confused about its objectives.

The four Cambodian factions had veto power over a Cambodian settlement. The external powers tried to coordinate a mutual disengagement.

SCENARIO ANALYSIS

Options narrowed considerably (see Table 5.1). The first four scenarios involved giving all power to one of the four Cambodian factions.

Scenario 1, a Pol Pot victory, seemed closer to fruition than ever before, as the Khmer Rouge launched attacks on the SOC army after September 26. In early 1990 the Khmer Rouge controlled

about 10 percent of the countryside, and by midyear the figure was 30 percent (Krauss 1990). To attain this end-state required the defeat of the SOC, as the NCR was largely a military fiction, and a reduction of external aid to the other three factions. The probability increased during 1990, as the SOC lost ground and the NCR collapsed militarily. Soviet and Vietnamese aid to the SOC was drying up, and NCR aid was uncertain due to conflicts between the US House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Bush administration. At the same time, the Khmer Rouge did not have enough personnel to launch large-scale attacks; its victories were retail rather than wholesale. Had Pol Pot's forces advanced too quickly, PAVN troops might have been recalled with the approval of the world community. The probability of a Khmer Rouge victory was increasing, albeit slowly, because Pol Pot wanted to control enough peasants to win in the event of an election.

Scenario 2, victory by the Phnom Penh government, was the hope of the SOC and Vietnam, with the defeat of all rival factions. This would occur if China stopped aiding the Khmer Rouge and the SOC maintained military support from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, while increasing in popularity in case of elections. The probability of this solution was low as long as China objected that this would leave an SOC Finlandized to Vietnam. But neither Hanoi nor Moscow had funds for any further support of a government that had failed to secure greater legitimization during the 1980s. By the fall of 1990 Beijing revised its policy and considered dropping Pol Pot, who had an arms cache estimated to last for several more years. This scenario had an uncertain chance of success, as it needed an election victory combined with UN peacekeepers to hold the Khmer Rouge at bay. Many Cambodians were grateful that SOC soldiers were protecting them from the Khmer Rouge, but SOC factional infighting in the last half of 1990 revealed powerful hardliners who might be less popular with the voters than the pragmatic Hun Sen. Although this option was entertained within certain circles in the United States, the arrest during May 1990 of SOC officials seeking to

form a new political party made this option less popular.

Scenario 3, a liberal democratic Cambodia, took on a new twist by 1990. Although Son Sann professed that he was the leader of KPNLF, KNPLA commander General Sak Sutsakhan formed his own political party. Since the KPNLA had little military muscle, this scenario required a victory for two liberal democratic parties in UN-organized elections. The Son Sann and Sak Sutsakhan factions would have to unite, China would have to stop aiding Pol Pot, the United States would need to bankroll KNPLF and KPNLA factions in an election campaign, and the SOC would have to lose SRV–Soviet support. The probability of this scenario, low during the 1980s, slipped even lower in 1990.

Scenario 4, Sihanoukization, took a dip during the Paris conference, since many delegates lost patience with his mercurial personality. Sihanouk would need a victory in UN-supervised elections, thanks to external aid to his faction during an election campaign, with UN peacekeeping for five to ten years until the Khmer Rouge threat evaporated. Sihanouk also had to be popular with the people. The Prince's maneuvers in late 1990 to become the president of the interim Supreme National Council (SNC) were transparent efforts to engineer endorsements from the other three factional leaders that would impress the people. The probability of scenario 4 was rising, since all these conditions were being met during 1990.

The next three scenarios aimed to give each actor a slice of the Cambodian pie.

Scenario 5, balkanization, quickly faded. The Khmer Rouge did most of the fighting after September 26, allowing ANS and KPNLA to march in afterward (ABC-TV 1990: 2). As the civil war involved two sides, Hun Sen suggested the "Cyprus model" as the successor to scenario 5. Under this scenario an international force would interpose itself between the two contending factions, provided the major powers were willing to defray the costs. But there was no consensus that the SOC should be awarded most of Cambodia. The probability was low, since the cost might be high.

Scenario 6, the sideshow model, was discarded. The prospect of a Khmer Rouge victory provoked a storm of attention in Australia, Britain, and France. More letters were written to the British Foreign Office on Cambodia in the fall of 1989 than on any other subject in the history of British diplomacy (interviewee #73). A solution had to be found without allowing the Khmer Rouge to assume power by default.

Scenario 7, Koreanization, required a formal intra-Cambodian agreement to establish a demilitarized zone between the two armies. This presupposed war weariness. After September 26 the Khmer Rouge was determined to win on the battlefield, and the SOC was prepared to prevent a Pol Pot victory at all costs, so the probability was extremely low.

The Paris Conference on Cambodia wrestled with alternative plans for an interim coalition, pending internationally organized or supervised elections. The next six scenarios envisaged a coalition solution.

Scenario 8 was for an interim quadripartite government, in which the four factions would have equal weight and equal veto power (four ministers in every government department, one from each faction) to rule Cambodia until elections redistributed power among the contending parties. The scenario's logic was that all four factions, being "facts of life," had to be included in a settlement. Hun Sen's government, which controlled most of Cambodia, would have to relinquish sovereignty to an interim body that might never agree on anything. This would occur only if Hanoi and Moscow abandoned Phnom Penh to the Polpotists. The probability, in short, was nearly zero.

Scenario 9, a non-Communist Cambodia, had a more complex plan for implementation in 1990 than a decade earlier. The combined factions of Sihanouk and Son Sann would have to prevail against the Khmer Rouge and the SOC, electorally and militarily, which entailed UN-organized elections, considerable outside sources of campaign funds, post-election military aid from Western countries, the abandonment of the Khmer Rouge and the SOC by their external patrons, and a firm coalition

between Sihanouk and Son Sann. During 1990 China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam agreed to stop aiding their favorites in the Cambodian conflict, whereas Congress blocked the Bush administration's option of aid to the NCR, so the probability of this scenario increased. In early 1990 the Marxist-oriented government of Nicaragua held an election in which several opposition parties ran candidates; an opposition party, bankrolled by the United States, triumphed. Accordingly, the NCR option became a Nicaraguan option, except that Washington trusted the UN more than the SOC to guarantee "free and fair" elections in Cambodia. The flies in this ointment were that Pol Pot had stockpiled weapons, and the Khmer Rouge controlled nearly one-third of the population. The probability was low but it increased when the SOC accepted a UN–sponsored election and Congress voted humanitarian aid to Cambodia at the end of 1990.

In February 1990 the three resistance factions dissolved CGDK to form the National Government of Cambodia (NGC). Scenario 10 was for a tripartite NGC solution without the SOC faction, in other words the dismantling of the Phnom Penh government and NGC cooperation after victory over the SOC. This would occur in the event of Russo-Vietnamese disengagement, collapse of SOC legitimacy, and a change of heart among the Khmer Rouge. The probability remained close to zero, since the Khmer Rouge was even stronger in 1990 than in 1980. Once in power, Pol Pot could marginalize the NCR.

In scenario 11 the Hun Sen, Sihanouk, and Son Sann factions would join an anti–Khmer Rouge tripartite coalition. There would have to be a defeat of the Khmer Rouge and a détente between the other three factions. Phnom Penh would have to accept multipartism, and external support was needed to reward a coalition against the Khmer Rouge. Some NCR followers knew that Hun Sen was a more reliable interlocutor than Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge (interviewee #27), but NCR leaders backed away from a tripartite solution because they wanted to play both ends against the middle, letting the Khmer Rouge and SOC

exhaust and discredit each other, so that the NCR could prevail. The probability of this scenario increased somewhat in 1990 but not enough to be a viable option to resolve the conflict.

Scenario 12, a new option proposed by Hun Sen at the Paris conference, was for a interim bipartite council. The council would establish the framework for internationally supervised elections, while the SOC government would remain in place during the transition. NGC had to accept SOC's authority, believing that this arrangement afforded the best opportunity for a peace settlement. The Khmer Rouge, in turn, would have to be pressured to go along with China. The probability was zero at Paris but improved when the Khmer Rouge showed in 1990 that its army was strong. All factions but the Khmer Rouge signed an agreement to establish this body, called the Supreme National Council, at a conference in Tokyo in early June, although specifics on how the SNC would operate remained to be determined. In early September the Khmer Rouge joined the other three factions, endorsing the SNC concept at a four-party conference in Jakarta held under the PCC framework, but only if the UN ran key SOC ministries, so this option was held in abeyance until the four factions accepted the UN transition option, as explained below.

France advanced scenario 13, a Cambodia based on the Fifth Republic, at PCC. The formula was to allow Sihanouk to be interim president of a new government, with Hun Sen continuing as premier. After the UN held elections, the new parliament would nominate a new premier (or retain Hun Sen), based on voter support for the various political parties. Sihanouk would then accept the nomination and would resign, whereupon elections for a new president would be held. The SOC would have to trust Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge would have to stay on the sidelines unless it won sufficient votes in the elections. The SOC had to believe that the Khmer Rouge would abide by such an agreement; as this was untenable, the scenario went into the dustbin at Paris.

Thailand's Premier Chatichai Choonhavan proposed scenario 14, a Thai-style constitutional monarchy. Sihanouk would have

the same powers as the French president but would remain in office without an election. The requirements for scenarios 13 and 14 were identical, as was their zero probability.

Amid frustration that no peace plan would work, a new scenario emerged to force a quick resolution.

Scenario 15, encapsulation, acknowledged that Cambodia was a pawn in a superpower struggle, so it should be released from that role; a civil war encapsulated from big power conflicts would then wind down. All external powers would have to stop aiding their clients, believing that they would gain nothing from continued fighting or would prevail when the four factions sued for peace. The probability increased during 1990, as each external country promised to stop sending aid, but the Khmer Rouge was seeking nothing less than total victory, so international peacekeepers would be needed before the encapsulation scenario could be fully implemented.

Horsetrading was the essence of the next two scenarios.

Scenario 16 was for a UN transition, referred to as the "Namibia model" in view of the successful transition of that country from South African colonial rule to independence through elections despite an ongoing guerrilla war. UN bureaucrats would take over the top positions of sensitive ministries (defense, finance, foreign affairs, information, interior), leaving SOC personnel otherwise in place, until elections established who would rule in a postwar Cambodia, with UN peacekeepers in place to enforce a cease-fire and military demobilization. The premises of this scenario were universal fear of a Khmer Rouge victory and willingness on the part of major powers to pay for the costs involved, along with war weariness on all sides and the drafting of a workable transition plan. The probability increased during 1990. The Khmer Rouge menaced the SOC. China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Vietnam agreed to stop aiding their allies. And the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Perm Five), after meeting initially in January 1990, subscribed to twenty-six principles for a UN transition by August (Perm Five 1990) and a

forty-eight page text by November. The four Cambodian factions then had to draw up an agreement on how the SNC would operate as the repository of sovereignty. The SNC would then contract with the proposed UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC), and a new Cambodia would emerge in due course.

Scenario 17, a Metternichian grand design for Indochina or Southeast Asia, appeared in 1980 to be beyond the scope of the conflict, which involved only one small country. A desire to end constant war by satisfying the hunger although not the gourmet appetites of all the contending countries and factions required diplomacy to put together a deal. The Soviet Union wanted détentes with China and the United States so that it could recover from economic chaos; it was unilaterally prepared to stop providing supplies to the SOC and Vietnam for the war in Cambodia. Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia unconditionally, preferring to attract outside aid and trade in order to overcome its status as one of the ten poorest countries in the world. China, which fell into an economic depression when the world imposed a boycott and embargo after the mid-1989 massacre near Tiananmen Square, agreed to drop the Khmer Rouge and even wanted to avoid a quarrel with Vietnam over conflicting claims to the Paracel and Spratly islands by offering to allow exploration for oil in case the dispute lacked practical consequences. Thailand wanted an Indochina of marketplaces rather than battlefields, so it was willing to opt for peace when Vietnamese troops left Cambodia. Presumably, Pol Pot was promised exile in China, and Hun Sen was doubtless assured that UNTAC would prevent the Khmer Rouge from coming to power militarily. But these were bilateral tradeoffs more than ingredients in a grand design, concessions without bargaining for counterconcessions.

Four scenarios, which expected the Cambodian conflict to obsolesce over the long run, became less relevant in 1990 negotiations. They remained beneath the surface, nevertheless.

Scenario 18, Yugoslavianization, appeared to come to pass when the youthful Hun Sen articulated SOC peace plans and

Sihanouk's son Prince Ranariddh came forward as FUNCIPEC chief negotiator. Sihanouk accepted Hun Sen as an interlocutor in 1986, and Ranariddh was prominent at both JIMs and at PCC. A new generation of leaders in all four Cambodian factions had not yet emerged, however. During 1990 hardliners reshuffled the SOC cabinet in an effort to limit Hun Sen's power before internationally supervised elections. Ranariddh proved to be a clone of Sihanouk. Pol Pot and Son Sann, although feeble, refused to die. More time was needed to blot out the memory of the conflict, but few of the actors had patience for such a long-term strategy, so the probability decreased to zero.

Scenario 19, a neutralized Cambodia, was acceptable to most sides at the Paris conference, although the US delegates objected to foreclosing a decision by a new Cambodia to choose its own foreign policy. The scenario was thus an end-state, but there was a need to address questions of power within the framework of a neutralized Cambodia after a peace settlement. A treaty of guarantee was within reach, provided the four Cambodian factions compromised on powersharing. The probability, in other words, was high but beside the point in 1990.

Scenario 20, the ASEANization of Cambodia, was also an obsolete approach. All three Indochinese countries wanted to join ASEAN, but the six countries would not admit new members until the Cambodian conflict was first resolved. Instead of permitting a gradual ASEANization process, the mood in 1990 was to end the war first and to sort out regional cooperation later.

Scenario 21 was for an overthrow of the SOC. In mid-1990 a few nonparty employees of the SOC government tried to organize a new political party in anticipation of elections, whereupon they were arrested and detained on grounds of plotting a coup. There was some delegitimization of the Phnom Penh government, but scenario 21 was less relevant by 1990, as Hun Sen was willing to test his popularity in UN-supervised elections to choose a new government for Cambodia, although SOC corruption and purges lowered the prestige of the government but not the likelihood of the scenario.

Scenario 22, the Red solution, envisaged an accommodation between the Khmer Rouge and the SOC to freeze out the NCR. This option emerged in later 1990, when a Sino-Vietnamese détente seemed to be in progress. A détente developed in 1991, but Khmer Rouge-SOC hostility continued unabated.

During 1990 the preferences of the various countries were in flux. Each Cambodian faction wanted to try a peaceful solution, although the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government continued the shooting contest. Vietnam wanted to befriend China. ASEAN was no longer threatened by Vietnam. The Soviet Union and Vietnam cut support to the Phnom Penh government. US policy, meanwhile, was changing.

POLICY CRITERIA

George Bush lacked a coherent policy toward Cambodia. Although he wanted to "marginalize" the Khmer Rouge before the Paris conference, no such policy was implemented by US delegates. Instead, Washington backed the interim quadripartite government option, through which Pol Pot could have taken advantage of the situation.

We can explain the US choice of policies in 1990 once again by using options analysis. First, we note the estimates of importance of the criteria brought to bear on each policy alternative by President Bush (see Table 5.2).

Policy feasibility was a much more important consideration for George Bush than for Ronald Reagan. With the budget and trade deficits threatening a serious recession, Bush had many practical economic problems to solve and felt uncomfortable articulating ideological banalities about world leaders whom he had met during long years of experience. The time had come for hard choices.

Among security goals, probability of officeholding was of much concern, as Bush's election victory was less secure than that of his predecessor. Effort to maximize US power in the region was a moderate consideration, since Soviet power was

receding; by doing nothing, the United States remained the only world superpower. Reducing superpower conflict was of much importance, as this would enable Bush to bring the federal budget under control so that the deficit accumulated by Reagan's overspending on defense could be reduced. Support for allies was of moderate concern, as the cold war was ending, and the primary need shifted to establishing a new world order.

Bush believed that he had a mandate to raise living standards of the American people. He was less beholden to defense contractors and more to Wall Street.

Bush placed low priority on the goal of rolling back or stopping Communism. Soviet bloc countries were abandoning their socialist experiments, and membership in the Soviet bloc fell dramatically.

Regarding prestige criteria, Bush called for a "kinder, gentler nation." He very much wanted the United States to be perceived as altruistic and peaceloving. Restoring the United States to a leadership role in the world was of moderate importance; he preferred to act collegially with allies.

SCENARIO ASSESSMENTS

In our comments on how well each scenario instrumented Bush's goals (Table 5.2), support for a UN transition became the prominent solution. Whereas support for an NCR victory was Reagan's choice in the early 1980s, that option fell to fourth position by 1990 because of its relative infeasibility. Bush hoped that the NCR or either of its members (Son Sann, of course, more than Sihanouk) would be voted into power through the UN–sponsored election, so it was not off the list of preferred outcomes.

Combined with the UN transition scenario was support for the bipartite council, as formed in Tokyo and confirmed in Jakarta. The United States was prepared to allow a neutralization of Cambodia, and Baker was willing to engage in a fair amount of Metternichian grand design diplomacy, especially to forge an

encapsulation deal, in order to bring about an end to the war. In the event that the UN transition was violated by the Khmer Rouge, the previously unthinkable options of an anti–Khmer Rouge tripartite coalition or even a victory for the Phnom Penh government were held in reserve. After the Tokyo conference the US government decided to begin discussions with SOC representatives; this move was consistent with the view that the Khmer Rouge had to be marginalized by any means necessary. The remaining options were seriously flawed insofar as they either kept the war going or allowed Pol Pot a chance to seize power.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

By 1990 many policy options regarding Cambodia began to evaporate. As before, the do nothing option was largely unavailable, but the reason was that Bush did not want the return of the Khmer Rouge to power on his conscience.

Sending troops was unthinkable in regard to Cambodia, although Bush wasted no time in dispatching soldiers to Panama at the end of 1989 to arrest Manuel Noriega in Panama (but not Pol Pot in Cambodia), and US troops arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-1990 almost before the international community had given support to an embargo of Iraq following its annexation of Kuwait. Bush ascribed more importance to economic aspects of Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait oilfields than to the struggle for control of ricefields in Cambodia.

Bush did not want to leave the NCR unprotected from the Khmer Rouge, so he thought that military aid was essential. Covert aid, of course, need not go through public scrutiny, where it would be questioned as yet another backdoor form of assistance to the Khmer Rouge, who could commandeer the aid from the weak NCR. Overt aid, thus, had lower priority but was not forgotten. Bush continued to favor such assistance during 1990 so that the NCR would remain viable.

With regard to economic policies, the US favored an economic boycott and embargo of the SOC and Vietnam in order to

Table 5.2
Scenario Options Matrix for the 1990s[a]

CRITERIA	WEIGHTS	SCENARIOS															
		KR	PP	LD	SN	CP	KN	QG	NC	NG	TP	BC	EN	UN	GD	NN	OT
Policy feasibility	Very high	G	F	P	G	F	P	P	P	F	P	V	F	G	P	V	P
Officeholding	High	U	P	V	G	F	F	P	V	P	F	G	V	V	P	P	G
Increase power	Medium	U	P	E	F	P	P	P	V	P	F	F	P	P	P	P	?
Reduce superpower conflict	Very high	P	E	P	G	G	G	P	F	P	E	E	E	E	E	E	P
Support allies	Medium	U	U	E	G	P	P	F	V	F	F	G	P	F	F	F	F
Raise living standards	High	P	P	F	F	P	P	P	F	P	F	F	P	F	P	F	P
Stop Communism	Low	U	P	E	F	P	P	U	E	U	P	F	P	P	P	P	?
Appear altruistic	High	U	G	V	V	F	F	P	V	P	G	V	V	E	E	E	P

Appear peace-loving	High	U	G	V	V	F	F	P	V	P	V	V	F	E	E	E	P
Assume leader-ship role	Medium	U	P	E	G	P	P	P	V	P	F	F	G	E	E	U	P
SCORE[b]		13	41	65	59	35	32	20	63	23	51	66	52	70	56	58	30
RANK		17	10	3	5	12	13	16	4	15	9	2	8	1	7	6	14

[a]Assessment Code:
E = excellent
V = very good
G = good
F = fair
P = poor
U = unacceptable
? = unclear

Scenario Code:
KR = Pol Pot victory
PP = SOC legitimization
LD = liberal democracy
SN = Sihanouk victory
CP = Cyprus model
KN = Koreanization
QG = guadripartite government
NC = non-Communist victory
NG = NGC victory
TP = SOC + NCR victory
BC = bipartite council
EN = encapsulation
UN = UN transition
GD = grand design
NN = neutralization
OT = overthrow of SOC

[b]Multiplied by 10 to eliminate decimals; score averaged when "?" ratings appear.

pressure them to compromise. After Vietnam withdrew troops from Cambodia in September 1989, European and Japanese corporations were busy snapping up all the best investment contracts, so the US business community wanted to open economic opportunities with Vietnam as soon as possible.

Nonrecognition of both the SOC and Vietnam remained US policy during 1990, but diplomatic discussions increased after midsummer, when the CIA reported that the Khmer Rouge controlled 30 percent of the countryside and Hun Sen warned that the Khmer Rouge would violate any peace agreement (UPI 1990a). US diplomats opened discussions on Cambodia with members of Vietnam's mission to the United Nations in July. In August SOC and US diplomats had discussions at Jakarta and Vientiane.

Although the United States recognized CGDK, NGC recognition was a different matter. After NGC formed in February 1990, US diplomats continued to interact with the NCR, but Secretary of State Baker announced in July that the United States would not vote to accredit NGC in the Cambodian seat at the UN in the fall.

Accordingly, diplomacy on Cambodia picked up momentum during 1990. Direct US negotiations for peace became a new element. Washington brought about the Perm Five meetings and was no longer asking various countries to continue the war.

Quiet diplomacy for war was replaced by quiet diplomacy for peace. US negotiators played a role in bringing about the Tokyo conference (Erlanger 1990), then persuaded various parties to make the August intra-Cambodian conference at Jakarta a success.

The United States government was for a peace conference, but time for a reconvening of the Paris conference was not ripe during 1990. Progress among the Perm Five, as well as the conferences in Tokyo and Jakarta, needed to come first. The SNC had to meet, as it did at Bangkok in September and Paris in December, until all the preconditions to a successful Paris agreement had been attained.

Secret diplomacy for war faded, since US aid was exposed as aiding the Khmer Rouge. Secret diplomacy to advance a peaceful resolution of the conflict proceeded instead, as Baker tried to encourage the Perm Five to design a peace settlement.

US propaganda began to spread correct information about the situation. The era of the coverup was over, since members of Congress were aware of the perfidy of Reagan's policy toward Cambodia. The rationale for backing ASEAN and Sihanouk receded in importance; attaining peace was more important. Support for China pitted Bush against Congress: Bush feared that Beijing would turn inward if subjected to severe sanctions, while Capitol Hill was outraged at the "butchers of Beijing," as they were called by Congressman Solarz, for killing peaceful demonstrators near Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

Our options analysis reveals that a peace conference, quiet diplomacy, negotiations for peace, and secret diplomacy for peace replaced priorities pursued during the era of confrontation of the 1980s (see Table 5.3). Backing ASEAN, China, and Sihanouk, as well as providing military aid, came next but harkened back to a bygone period, as friends of the United States had their own policies in flux while Washington shifted ground. A punitive policy toward the SOC and Vietnam remained in place but had receded to a lesser role in US policy.

CONCLUSION

US foreign policy was seeking a UN compromise to disengage from a conflict in Cambodia that had little meaning as the cold war was ending. Whereas the Reagan administration sought a stalemate to keep the non-Communist resistance alive, Bush was trying to bring the NCR to power through clever diplomacy, aware that any opening for the Khmer Rouge could spell political disaster at the polls in 1992.

There were still some figleaves over US policy. Bush was trying to aid the NCR without helping the Khmer Rouge. He could not openly support the Hun Sen government, who would

Table 5.3
Policy Options Matrix for the 1990s[a]

CRITERIA	WEIGHTS	POLICIES																
		DN	ST	OM	CM	BE	NR	CR	NP	NW	QW	QP	PC	SW	SP	BA	BS	BC
Policy feasibility	Very high	U	U	G	V	F	F	U	G	U	U	E	V	E	E	?	?	G
Officeholding	High	P	U	P	P	F	G	U	E	U	U	E	E	U	P	F	F	P
Increase power	Medium	U	F	F	F	G	G	P	G	U	U	G	G	U	G	F	F	F
Reduce superpower conflict	Very high	P	U	P	P	P	P	P	V	P	P	V	V	P	V	F	G	P
Support allies	Medium	U	G	E	E	V	V	E	F	P	P	F	G	F	F	E	V	E
Raise living standards	High	U	U	F	F	P	P	P	F	F	F	F	G	F	F	F	P	G
Stop Communism	Low	U	F	E	E	F	P	U	G	U	U	G	G	U	F	V	G	F
Appear altruistic	High	U	U	P	P	P	P	U	E	U	U	E	E	U	E	G	G	P

Appear peace-loving	High	U	U	U	U	P	P	U	E	U	U	E	E	U	E	G	G	P
Assume leadership role	Medium	U	P	P	P	F	F	U	E	U	P	E	E	U	E	F	F	P
SCORE[b]		5	12	38	41	36	37	14	75	9	10	80	81	24	71	53	53	39
RANK		17	14	9	7	11	10	13	3	16	15	2	1	12	4	5	6	8

[a]Assessment Code:
E = excellent
V = very good
G = good
F = fair
P = poor
U = unacceptable
? = unclear

Scenario Code:
DN = do nothing
ST = send troops
OM = overt military aid
CM = covert military aid
BE = boycott/embargo
NR = nonrecognition
CR = NGC recognition

NP = negotiations for peace
NW = negotiations for war
QW = quiet diplomacy for war
QP = quiet diplomacy for peace
PC = back peace conference
SW = secret diplomacy for war
SP = secret diplomacy for peace
BA = back ASEAN
BS = back Sihanouk
BC = back China

[b]Multiplied by 10 to eliminate decimals; score averaged when "?" ratings appear.

defeat the Khmer Rouge only if there were a new alliance between the NCR and the SOC. The UN transition option finessed all the unpalatable alternatives. Washington appeared to be keeping its options open so that Pol Pot would never regain power, but Congress was doing more than the White House. The events of 1991, which saw increased SNC cooperation, vindicated Congressional efforts to steer U.S. policy toward a more peaceful solution.

6

A Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge

THE SUPPRESSION OF A CAMPAIGN

When rumors of genocide in Cambodia reached the outside world, there was little tangible evidence. Leftists Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979a: ch. 6) were among the skeptics of the Khmer Rouge genocide thesis. Senator McGovern's suggestion of an international force to drive out the Khmer Rouge came during congressional hearings in 1978, when testimony on the genocide was being presented. Clearly, the State Department was ignoring these accounts.

Any authentication of the information would have done much to vindicate Vietnam's claim that it attacked Cambodia not only in self-defense but also to stop the genocide. Since the genocide thesis was inconvenient to US foreign policymakers, it was buried and forgotten. Americans who had a score to settle with Hanoi were doubtless pleased that two nefarious regimes, Democratic Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, were killing each other with no prodding from Washington.

THE LITERARY CAMPAIGN

As individuals escaped from Pol Pot's regime, the expatriate Cambodian community around the world heard intimate details

about the Cambodian holocaust. When these accounts were shared with the public, a wider audience could be reached.

Sydney Schanberg, a reporter who happened to be in Cambodia at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975, had worked with photojournalist Dith Pran. Whereas Schanberg escaped, Dith unluckily stayed on. Then, after wandering through his native land for a few years, Dith popped up in Thailand. When Dith gave an account of life under Pol Pot, Schanberg (1980) set pen to paper and wrote an article entitled "The Death and Life of Dith Pran," which shocked readers of the *New York Times Magazine.*

In mid-1980 Gregory Stanton, who was conducting relief work in Phnom Penh for Church World Services, a division of the National Council of Churches, heard reports of mass graves, found the reports correct, and decided to start the Cambodian Genocide Project to document the charge of genocide against the Khmer Rouge (Friedman 1982). Enlisting the help of David Hawk, former executive director of Amnesty International USA and then consultant to the Khmer Program of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, the project continued this work until 1986, collecting interview materials and translating records at the Tuol Sleng detention facility in Phnom Penh. By this time the project was retitled the Cambodia Documentation Commission (CDC).

Meanwhile, Hollywood responded. A film based on Schanberg's 1980 essay was released late in 1984. People then viewed *The Killing Fields* in cinemas around the world, emerging with moist eyes and heavy hearts from an experience unparalleled in the history of film. Instead of entertainment or catharsis, the message of the motion picture and publication of the 1980 article in book form was that something had to be done to stop the Khmer Rouge, who were alive and well (Schanberg 1985). That US aid was ending up in the hands of the Polpotists was still a secret. The film served to raise the consciousness and conscience of the nation as never before. Filmviewers resolved that every effort must be undertaken to stop the Khmer Rouge from returning to power.

Two years later Haing Ngor, the actor who portrayed Dith Pran in *The Killing Fields*, teamed up with author Roger Warner to write a similar surreal experience of escape from hell in *Haing Ngor: A Cambodian Odyssey* (1987). Although academic accounts of the Pol Pot era began to surface (e.g., Kiernan 1985) at this time, they had far less impact on the American public than literary and journalistic accounts (Becker 1986; Chanda 1986) of a regime that deserved to be placed on trial for genocide rather than seated in the United Nations, as ASEAN, China, the United States, and various allies insisted.

BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A CAMPAIGN

Since the PRK and the Khmer Rouge were opposite sides of the Cambodian coin, a campaign to oppose Pol Pot would have been regarded in certain Washington circles as an effort to legitimize the PRK, which had been set up under the protection of the Vietnamese army in 1979. The imagery of Vietnamese "advisers" running Cambodia with PRK puppets, the only alternative to the Khmer Rouge, was enough to stop any such campaign dead in its tracks. Since this image was based on myth, it was important to hide the truth. Indeed, the US diplomatic and economic boycott and embargo of Cambodia were even more severe than those imposed on Vietnam, where some US scholars could visit under the auspices of the US-Vietnam Friendship Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam from 1978. In 1985, when American journalists went to Vietnam in order to report on a country that had slipped into newspaper obscurity over the past decade, none went to Cambodia.

In 1985 John McAuliff organized the first of several semiannual study tours under the banner of the United States–Indochina Reconciliation Project (USIRP), a project of SANE/Freeze, but none of the sixteen or so scholars went to Cambodia. In 1986 the PRK, which had elevated Hun Sen to the premiership two years before, invited the USIRP group to Phnom Penh. In due course

journalists and scholars began to report about a government in Cambodia that was establishing its credibility by rebuilding the country from scratch while asserting, however subtly, its independence of Vietnam. In 1988 I was one of those scholars, and I soon contributed to a flood of news about the PRK, which was then beginning to establish an information infrastructure for a new policy.

In 1986 the CDC completed most of its documentation and began lobbying. Hawk then visited the foreign ministers of several countries, asking them to act on the overwhelming evidence of Khmer Rouge violations of genocide.

At the 1986 session of the UN Human Rights Commission survivors of the holocaust, such as Dith Pran, personally appealed to the delegates to add a phrase about the need to prevent the return of the genocidal Khmer Rouge to the annual resolution calling for self-determination in Cambodia. These efforts bore fruit when Congress adopted a joint resolution in October 1988, asking the Reagan administration to take actions to bring the Pol Pot clique to trial. Then when Vernon Walters, the US delegate to the United Nations, spoke in the annual General Assembly debate on Cambodia, he threw his lot behind a change in the General Assembly resolution on Cambodia that asked euphemistically for the nonreturn of "universally condemned policies and practices." This resolution passed.

An unlikely channel of information in mid-1988 also served to raise the consciousness of some observers on Khmer Rouge insidiousness. During the campaign for parliamentary elections in Thailand, a charge emerged that Thai military personnel were profiting from the resale of US military aid intended for the NCR; the buyers, who had plenty of funds, were officers of the Khmer Rouge army. The Reagan administration was thus implicated in aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Although details of the Cambodian peace process emerged during my trip, a fact that I reported when I returned to Hawaii in the fall of 1988, Asian news publications were more eager than US media to hear what I had uncovered (Haas 1988a, 1988b).[1]

Later, US scholars published news stories in the American press about the seriousness of Vietnam's plan to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990 as long as the news angle was that Hanoi was leaving the PRK to fend for itself against the Khmer Rouge (e.g., Blumenthal 1989). But there was still no change in US policy.

During mid-1989 a debate ensued in Congress over aid to the NCR, a pet project of Congressman Solarz. At the suggestion of Sihanouk, President Bush favored lethal aid. When the proposed appropriation reached Senator Pell, as noted in Chapter 4, there was stiff opposition. Many senators, aware of the situation in Cambodia, wanted to force the NCR to dissolve its ties with the Khmer Rouge as a condition of any more aid. In due course, the compromise was that no secret aid would flow without prior clearance from Congress (Sutter 1991: 8). The US delegation at Paris played into Pol Pot's hands again, backing Sihanouk despite his role as a front man for the Khmer Rouge. But this time the Bush administration's intransigence went too far, outraging many diplomats at the conference whom I later interviewed. The US delegation's torpedoing of prospects for peace at PCC was a fact that I reported to some members of Congress, at their request, shortly after the conference recessed on August 30.[2]

MORE DISINFORMATION

President Bush's successful presidential campaign of 1988 focused for a time on a murder committed by a dangerous criminal while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison. His opponent, the governor of that state, was accused of being soft on crime. But after Paris Bush continued to grant an indefinite furlough to the genocidal Pol Pot. Kissinger's adviser on Asia during the early 1970s, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, was questioned in Congress on the failure of the conference; his refusal to admit that Pol Pot had committed genocide (Stone 1989c) was a gaffe that was later retracted (US DOS 1989). Although both Hanoi and Phnom Penh favored a UN force to

monitor Vietnam's troop withdrawal (Honolulu Advertiser 1989; Richburg 1989b), the US government remained opposed. Without this monitoring Solomon could later discount Hanoi's action as an "apparent withdrawal."

The Bush administration, while opposed to a role for the PLO in an interim UN administration of Palestine along with the Israeli government, was asking the SOC to give up power to a similar body that would put Polpotists back in Phnom Penh. Regretting an embargo of the "butchers of Beijing" the Bush administration shipped aid to Pol Pot's allies despite a State Department cable attesting to ANS–Khmer Rouge military cooperation in violation of US law (US Embassy, Beijing 1989) while continuing an embargo against the SOC and Vietnam, governments that were then experiencing some improvements in human rights. Some right-wingers, notably Michael Horowitz, were questioning why Bush was appeasing a hardline regime in China rather than cooperating with Hun Sen, a free market proponent.

SHIFTING AUSTRALIAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH POLICIES

After Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia on September 26, many observers outside the United States were rapidly concluding that any victory of the Khmer Rouge would be due to the Faustian bargain to which the White House had subscribed. Accordingly, journalist John Pilger (1989) presented a documentary to a London television audience on October 31, alleging British aid to the Khmer Rouge. In early November he took the tape to Australia. The public reaction went beyond any other issue in the history of Australian and British foreign policy. In Britain, for example, the public clamor included a petition with 125,000 signatures, 16,000 letters to the Foreign Office (including letters from 120 members of parliament), and 7,000 letters to Prime Minister Thatcher (Carey 1990; interviewee #73). New personnel were assigned to answer each letter, the military aid stopped, Britain quickly contributed $394,000 to the

UN Children's Fund for use inside Cambodia, and there was an announcement that two members of the Foreign Office would go to Cambodia in December to review aid prospects (interviewee #104; Tasker 1989). Despite pressure from the United States to cancel the trip (SB&A 1989), Whitehall proceeded. Arguing that increased aid to Cambodia served humanitarian aims, agricultural and medical aid projects were identified, and the British government supplied more than $300,000 to Oxfam and other private voluntary organizations (PVOs) as well as $1.6 million to various UN agencies operating in Cambodia (Hughes 1990).

In Australia the impact was an outcry to change policy. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who had gone to Washington to press for a more active role in bringing peace to Cambodia earlier in October, then sent his deputy, Michael Costello, on a mission of shuttle diplomacy in December on behalf of a plan that would finesse the issue of powersharing. Basing his plan on a conversation with Congressman Solarz about a UN transition option,[3] Evans proposed that a UN body run Cambodia in the interim before elections for a new parliament rather than an unworkable intra-Cambodian body. Canberra also increased aid to PVOs inside Cambodia, and a foreign ministry official went on leave to coordinate Australian PVOs in Phnom Penh.

France, meanwhile, sent an aid official to Cambodia in January 1990, who in turn was placed in charge of a new chapter of Alliance Française in Phnom Penh during the fall. France also committed $1 million in aid to Vietnam (interviewee #53), which was accorded diplomatic recognition by the European Community at the end of 1990.

MORE DISARRAY IN WASHINGTON

A storm of domestic discontent with the Bush administration's apparent Faustian policy toward Cambodia erupted on November 29, 1989. A petition, signed by 203 members of Congress, asked Baker to identify a policy that would deny a role for Pol Pot in a future Cambodia. The US government was still backing

the interim quadripartite government option, believing that a lightly armed UN presence could prevent Pol Pot from retaking power in the transition (Twining 1990). Due to isagreements inside the Bush administration, in which NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted to continue to "bleed" Vietnam; while Secretary of State James Baker preferred a diplomatic solution (Colhoun 1990), there was gridlock in response to this domestic pressure (interviewee #73).

The only apparent motive for US policy, according to many ASEAN and Western diplomats whom I interviewed during the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, appeared to be that if the United States could not win in Indochina, nobody else would be allowed to do so either. This harsh judgment overlooked the fact that Bush did want a settlement but not one that would risk alienating Beijing. With Europe moving closer to the Soviet Union, US world leadership was increasingly expendable, so one consideration was that a Sino-US partnership would save Washington from global diplomatic marginalization. US investors in China, including the president's brother, were doubtless grateful for Bush's reluctance to impose sanctions on post-Tiananmen China, as some $1 billion in US investments were at stake (interviewees #85, 90).

During the fall Baker was secretly trying to bring about a dialogue on Cambodia within the Perm Five (interviewee #40). When the first Perm Five meeting convened at Paris in January, the formalistic initiative failed to impress those eager to stop the Khmer Rouge, whose army advanced closer to Phnom Penh. Something more was needed to impress the Bush administration that higher priority should be given to measures to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power.

THE CAMPAIGN SHIFTS GEARS

In early 1990 a new group formed in Washington after a meeting organized by John McAuliff of private voluntary organizations operating in Indochina. Known as the Campaign to Oppose

the Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR), the group was formed by Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), after a trip to Phnom Penh in 1989. With nearly fifty endorsing and sponsoring organizations, CORKR proceeded to provide information to every member of Congress on the realities of US policy toward Cambodia. CORKR received considerable support after former secretary of state Edmund Muskie visited Cambodia, then wrote a report (Muskie 1990) and, with many others, evidently shared his personal impressions with Senator George Mitchell, his successor in the US Senate.

Since US aid to the NCR was leaking through to the Khmer Rouge, CORKR argued, all NCR aid should end. The Solarz appropriation expressly forbade aid to the Khmer Rouge, so CORKR claimed that the Bush administration was violating the law by continuing to supply aid to the NCR.

In February the House voted 413 to 0 to urge the Bush administration to drop the "quadripartite government" option in favor of a "United Nations–supervised interim administration" option, which was being backed by Australia's Evans despite Perm Five footdragging. During hearings in the Senate that month the State Department's Lambertson admitted that the policy on Cambodia was changing, although it was clear between the lines that Beijing was stonewalling Washington on Cambodia.

By March, after learning that the Khmer Rouge was coordinating battle plans with the NCR forces, using CIA photos of CPAF army positions (Jennar 1990: 2), some 26 senators and 117 representatives signed a petition to press for a new policy. Former CIA director William Colby suggested that non-UN international observers could supervise SOC elections, following the example of Nicaragua, which had just voted out the Sandinista Party. Once legitimized, the SOC could ask Vietnam to crush the Khmer Rouge and the world would applaud, according to Colby (US Senate 1990).

Implicitly, CORKR wanted the State Department to deal directly with Hun Sen and to consider a possible alliance between the NCR and the SOC. The Bush administration's counterargument,

that the Polpotists might push for a military solution if they felt excluded (Stone 1990a), contradicted the fact that the Khmer Rouge planned to fight whether excluded or included.

Bush administration officials continued to throw cold water on efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict that disputed the official view that the Khmer Rouge had to be included in a settlement. In March, when Premier Chatichai of Thailand proposed closing the border camps (where Khmer Rouge and NCR officials kept their supporters under control), US officials worked to undermine the idea, claiming that they could not pressure China to stop aid to the Khmer Rouge (Wedel 1990). But China was trying its utmost at the time to get economic sanctions lifted despite a failure to improve human rights after the June 1989 massacre in Beijing.

Since the Khmer Rouge seemed opposed to any compromise, many Washingtonians believed that support for the SOC was the only alternative to inconclusive diplomacy while more Cambodians suffered. Congressman Solarz (1990) felt that the United States would have to legitimize Hun Sen if China would not pressure Pol Pot to compromise.

On April 26 Peter Jennings of ABC-TV (1990) emceed a Pilger–inspired documentary, "From the Killing Fields." In the live discussion that followed, a particularly eloquent point stated by four women (Overseas Adoption Director Cherie Clark, President Donna Shalala of the University of Wisconsin, Susan Walker of Handicap International, and actress Liv Ullman) was that Cambodian children were in agony because of the US embargo of humanitarian aid, which Foggy Bottom feared might make the SOC look good. Following the broadcast, which later received the Alfred I. duPont award for excellence in television journalism, several senators proposed a $5 million amendment to the budget that would aid Cambodian children. USAID (1989), which had been helping children in the NCR camps already, hinted that it would interpret such legislation as aid to youngsters trapped in border camps inside Thailand, where parents were denied permission to return to their native land (McGrory 1990). The

Bush administration squirmed, as never before, over the fallout from Jennings' documentary.

RESPONSE TO THE CAMPAIGN

Despite US pressure to stop aiding the Khmer Rouge, China continued to ship weapons to the resistance (UPI 1990b). In late May Bush extended most-favored-nation trade status to the PRC, arguing that this would encourage human rights reforms, although China's human rights situation had not improved since the June 4 incident at Tiananmen Square. Solomon, however, disingenuously justified a continued aid and trade embargo against the SOC and the SRV to force economic and political reforms in spite of warnings from a US business executive, Mike Morrow, detained in Vietnam for three weeks, that only a lifting of the embargo would stem the pace of a recent political crackdown by Vietnamese leaders who assumed that nonrecognition after PAVN's withdrawal signalled a US policy to undermine the SRV (Morrow 1990; Nhu 1990). US officials then applied the screws to Eastern European countries, newly liberated from Communist Party rule, insisting on an end of aid to Phnom Penh if they wanted to join the World Bank (interviewee #127).

At the end of May a US Immigration Service official in Bangkok (an employee of the Justice Department, not the State Department) quietly decided to grant entry visas for five Cambodian orphans to join foster parents in the United States under the program of World Family Hawaii, an organization headed by Dr. Daniel Sussott. Senator George Mitchell, on behalf of a family in his home state of Maine, then wrote Thai immigration officials to urge that the adoptees be allowed to transit in Thailand after they left Cambodia for Laos. Cambodian orphans thus entered the homes of hospitable Americans, a sign that Washington would at last allow humanitarian measures for humble Cambodians. Washington also approved visas for Phnom Penh's Classical Dance Company of Cambodia to perform in September. Harassed by Cambodian resistance supporters after they arrived, many

members of the troupe received death threats, and four decided to defect in order to join their families in the United States. When the troupe requested protection, the State Department instead interrogated them to find out why they did not all want political asylum (McAuliff 1990).

The Bush administration pushed a $7 million appropriation of covert aid to the NCR, which the House approved 260 to 163 in late June. While the rest of the world was hoping for diplomacy on Cambodia, White House officials, in short, still appeared to be hung up on the issue of military aid. Faust could not wriggle out of his bargain either.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, after a General Accounting Office report in September indicated that there was no way to prevent US aid to the NCR from going to the Khmer Rouge, killed the $10 million covert aid program unless pre-cleared with Congress (FEER 1990; Sutter 1991: 8). In October the two houses agreed to transform the covert program into $20 million in humanitarian aid throughout all Cambodia that would expand when peace returned to the country (IP 1990b, c), but the Bush administration blocked a USAID needs assessment mission to Phnom Penh until April 1991. In early 1991 the US Treasury Department eased restrictions for licenses to PVOs to provide humanitarian aid to Cambodia and Vietnam (US 1991: 4671), but the trade embargos remained in effect. The embargo, instituted against the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, was thus imposed on its sole adversary, the State of Cambodia!

Clearly, the ideal world model for Washington was a world of stable countries headed by friends of the United States. Wherever an anomaly emerged, US policy was to change the situation, not to adjust. The active methods for changing the situation included bombings, bribes, CIA subversion, sanctions, and troops. A passive method was to wait until US-supported opportunists toppled a disliked regime. As all the active methods had failed in Cambodia, the policy appeared to be a waiting game. Hun Sen would become decreasingly popular, the Bush administration reasoned in light of Nicaragua, to the extent that

US-inspired sanctions caused more hardship (interviewee #57).

But the aid embargo was being ignored by Australia, Britain, and France, which decreasingly needed the US nuclear umbrella. Accordingly, the State Department concluded that the best strategy was to have elections in Cambodia with as many political parties as possible; if, as expected, no faction would command a majority, a coalition government would be necessary, and a compromise candidate would assume power. As Sihanouk was no longer considered pliable, Washington's favored candidate increasingly appeared to be KPNLA military commander General Sak Sutsakhan. As a US citizen and Lon Nol's successor in 1970 in Phnom Penh, Sak was the main horse that Foggy Bottom had been quietly riding for some time. The Pol Pot card could be played to keep Hun Sen weak, then international forces could wipe out Pol Pot, leaving Sak in control. Although this strategy increasingly appeared to describe US government policy for a decade, extricating Washington from the Faustian pact required help from other countries.

THE PEACE PROCESS CONTINUES

During 1990 there were two dialogues. Delegates from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Perm Five) met at Paris in January, then rotated between New York and Paris at monthly and bimonthly intervals. Intra-Cambodian discussions, the second dialogue, were at first conducted through communiqués and press statements. In February the four Cambodian factional leaders met the foreign ministers of ASEAN, Australia, and France in a meeting known as the Informal Meeting on Cambodia, where they endorsed a set of principles to which the Perm Five had already agreed, although many issues were still in dispute.

While the Perm Five made progress, other countries wanted to play a role. With the aid of Australian, Japanese, and Thai intermediaries, the Cambodian factions began to converge on a variant of Hun Sen's proposal for an interim bipartite council.

During May Thai officials paved the way by negotiating a ceasefire among the four Cambodian forces. With the aid of the State Department's Richard Solomon, Tokyo hosted a conference in early June, where Hun Sen, Sihanouk, and Son Sann agreed to form a Supreme National Council along the lines of Hun Sen's PCC proposal. Khmer Rouge delegate Khieu Samphan went to Tokyo but refused to sign the document, which Sihanouk later repudiated as a result.

In mid-July CIA and Defense Department intelligence officials disclosed to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Khmer Rouge controlled 30 percent of Cambodia and was advancing steadily. In the wake of a petition from sixty–six senators to deal directly with Phnom Penh, Bush decided to shore up bipartisan support for his Cambodian policy by accepting the advice of Baker over Scowcroft on Cambodia (Colhoun 1990). Baker emerged from a session with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at Paris in July to confirm a new leak that he endorsed the European Community's decision earlier in the year to vote against seating NGC in the UN because the Khmer Rouge was a member of the coalition. Bush's motive was to avoid a UN fight and to accelerate the peace process (interviewee #54). Still believing that Hanoi could pressure Phnom Penh into a settlement, Baker then asked Kenneth Quinn (a Cambodia expert who replaced Lambertson as deputy assistant secretary of state) to start discussions on Cambodia with the head of Vietnam's UN mission in New York in early August. A US forensic team soon went to Phnom Penh, accepting an invitation issued several years earlier (Chanda 1990: 10), to identify the remains of MIAs, and USAID announced that it would make up to $10 million available to Cambodian children under legislation passed by Congress after the ABC-TV special on Cambodia. Then the State Department announced that US and SOC diplomats would hold discussions at Jakarta and Vientiane in early September.

At the end of August the Perm Five (1990) adopted a twenty-six point text on principles for a UN transitional arrangement for Cambodia. Since the next step was to secure endorsements

from the four Cambodian factions, China's Premier Li Peng and party leader Jiang Zemin secretly invited Vietnam's Premier Du Muoi and party leader Nguyen Van Linh to Chengdu, China, for discussions. When the Vietnamese assured their hosts that the Perm Five proposal was acceptable in principle, but that China would have to find out Hun Sen's views through direct contact, the PRC leaders agreed to meet the SOC premier in due course. Li and Shevardnadze met shortly afterward at Harbin, Manchuria, where both countries agreed to stop aiding their Cambodian allies. Although Bush was still hoping that Congress would approve aid to the NCR, Bush hinted that any hitch in forming the SNC might mean a separate peace with the SOC (Friedman 1989). Yielding to this pressure, the four Cambodian leaders assented to the Perm Five text and formed the SNC at Jakarta during the second week of September. The US ambassador to Indonesia, John Monjo, then talked for forty-five minutes to Hun Sen, while the US chargé d'affairs in Vientiane met his SOC counterpart. One week later the four factional leaders met at the former Cambodian embassy in Bangkok for the first meeting of the Supreme National Council, but they could not agree on who would chair the body.

On November 26 the Perm Five adopted a forty-eight page text, concluding its work. As PCC cochairs, France and Indonesia convened the SNC in late December to review the draft. While the resistance accepted the Perm Five document, Hun Sen deferred acceptance of the plan until further details emerged on demobilization and on a provision dealing with the Khmer Rouge's genocide. Vietnam's Thach later attacked the draft for dismantling the sovereign State of Cambodia, although this was not Hun Sen's objection. To apply pressure on Phnom Penh, China resumed aid to the Khmer Rouge in early 1991 on the pretext that Vietnam was still sending military aid to the CPAF, although Beijing did not mention the more substantial Soviet contribution.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of an election that it might buy on behalf of Sak Sutsakhan, USAID used congressionally approved humanitarian funds to build roads, construct schools, provide tractors to NCR "liberated" villages inside Cambodia, and to open

the most modern hospital in the country, where 1,000 nurses and physicians were treating 100,000 each month (AP 1991), a project that UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) officials objected was fueling the war (Becker 1991). At the end of the year, an independent Cambodian Study Group documented seventeen joint military operations between the Khmer Rouge and the NCR, including one as recently as November 19 (Srisuworanan 1990). After the State Department corroborated the report in March, a cutoff in aid to the NCR occurred in April 1991, only to be rescinded when the four factions agreed to a ceasefire effective May 1.

FLAWS OF THE UN TRANSITION PLAN

Clearly, the Perm Five plan was an effort of the external powers to bail out of Cambodia, to wash their hands but not to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. The agreement, which provided for a UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia, had several serious problems (Haas 1990a).

Violations to the agreement were anticipated. No internationally organized peace organ has ever worked unless the principals have been willing to abide by a cease-fire.[4] Often, some factions oppose an accord reached by their leaders. The Khmer Rouge could easily hide weapons and civilianize their troops to evade any settlement that aims to disarm them. The Khmer Rouge might even kill UN personnel. An expectation of widespread violations would run costs above the $2 billion estimate. Deaths of UN peacekeepers might exceed the price that any international volunteers would be prepared to pay for peace in Cambodia.

Electoral neutrality would be difficult, since all four factions poisoned the airwaves with malicious propaganda broadcasts about one another after 1978, although they tuned down the rhetoric after the Jakarta meeting in September 1990. Although the issue of voter eligibility was settled by allowing the franchise to those born in Cambodia before 1975, neither recent Vietnamese migrants to Cambodia after 1978 nor Cambodian border settlers in camps along the Thai border could be expected to be free from

voter intimidation or pressure. After Khmer Rouge bases were crushed by the Vietnamese army in 1985, Pol Pot's strategy was to control villages by paying peasants more for their rice than the PRK while eliminating any PRK administrative officials that it encountered (Guardian 1990; Richburg 1990; Tasker 1990b). The Perm Five plan proposed to take over certain functions of the SOC ministries of defense, finance, foreign affairs, information, and public security, but not from the Khmer Rouge, which controlled enough of the countryside to be assured of at least 15 percent of the votes (Reuter 1990). There was no explicit provision to prevent the first "free and fair" election in Cambodian history from turning into a bloodbath. US officials whom I interviewed in April 1990 even pooh-poohed the prediction that the Khmer Rouge might sabotage UN-organized elections.

Each of the four factions expected a portion of the vote from an election. This being the case, the electoral outcome could be one of immobilism, that is, a return to the interim quadripartite government option that Hun Sen rejected at PCC. Newly elected Khmer Rouge delegates to a constituent assembly might return to Phnom Penh in a fully legitimized role as members of a national legislature, increasing their ability to effect a *coup* after UN officials left the country. As at PCC, a quadripartite body would be unlikely to reach a consensus on anything, then the four factions might return to the battlefield again.

The provision to disarm the four armies also had unacceptable ambiguities. All uniformed soldiers of the CPAF would be easy to round up, but resistance guerrillas might maintain their shadowy existence in close proximity to arms caches. Since the Perm Five did not envisage an UNTAC armed force, Phnom Penh could not accept an agreement to disarm unilaterally—leaving the field open for a Khmer Rouge *coup*.

There was no provision to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. The Perm Five instead legitimized the Khmer Rouge as a party to the agreement and called upon all countries to refrain from interfering in Cambodian internal affairs in the future, an apparent assurance that the Khmer Rouge could return

to power again without objection from the world community.

Accordingly, the SOC dug in its heels, refusing to sign the proposed agreement unless concrete guarantees appeared that UNTAC would provide security against a Khmer Rouge uprising and ensured that the Khmer Rouge would not return to power by coercing Cambodians at the ballot box (UPI 1990c). After more than two months of deadlock, China decided to reverse course in early March 1991, shipping weapons to the Khmer Rouge on behalf of a military solution. As the Soviet Union was likely to follow suit, aiding the Phnom Penh government, Prince Sihanouk immediately called for a meeting in Beijing between the three resistance factions and three principal external aid suppliers (China, the Soviet Union, and the United States). Solomon arrived for a preliminary meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev, and Japan sent an emissary as well with proposed textual modifications. Either an acceptable compromise would emerge or civil war would heat up. Yet the meeting proved inconclusive. Solomon proceeded to visit Bangkok and Jakarta. During hearings in mid-April he appeared to articulate assurances to the State of Cambodia and Vietnam regarding the Perm Five agreement, such as an education program on human rights to inform Cambodian voters of their rights, the formation of a new Cambodian army while existing forces were demobilized, and a post-UNTAC trial of Pol Pot and company. There was even a State Department hint that the NCR would disavow their ties with the Khmer Rouge as soon as UNTAC formed (interviewee #88). Vietnam, meanwhile, was assured that its relations with the United States would be fully normalized following the holding of elections by UNTAC. Meanwhile, Lorne Craner, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, accompanied Senators Phil Gramm and John McCain on a trip to Phnom Penh.

At the end of April, the foreign ministers of France and Indonesia called for a ceasefire as a confidence building measure that might assure sufficient good will to convene another SNC meeting. After CPAF captured an important Khmer Rouge base two miles from Pailin, causing Thai gem miners to flee, the four

factions agreed upon a May 1 cease-fire, which was fairly well observed. The next step was to convene the SNC to advance the process in case the resistance was willing to accept a set of SOC amendments on such matters as demobilization, guarantees for the nonreturn of the Khmer Rouge, and the scope of UNTAC's power.

I conclude the narrative at this point. Several months of negotiation appear to lie ahead. In November Sihanouk planned to return to Phnom Penh, where the SNC would be located. Sihanouk would head the SNC, the Perm Five peace plan would be revised to answer Hun Sen's objections, and a mutually acceptable agreement might emerge from the Cambodian factions, whereupon the Paris Conference on Cambodia could be reconvened. On the other hand, the agreement might be aborted. In midsummer 1991, I was neither optimistic nor pessimistic regarding peace in Cambodia, but the United States was talking to the State of Cambodia and thus backing away from the Khmer Rouge at last.

CONCLUSION

The flawed agreement appeared to be deliberate. It was a framework to effect a lawful transition to unitary rule in Cambodia. Most UN agreements have been pieces of paper that give the appearance of fairness to a peace settlement that actually favors one side.

Therefore, I concluded that the aim of US dialogue with Hun Sen but not Pol Pot was to give assurances that Washington was prepared to ask the NCR to cooperate fully with the SOC after UN-organized elections (Haas 1990b). When the State Department (1991) admitted in early 1991 that NCR forces had collaborated with the Khmer Rouge, an aid cutoff seemed inevitable (Thayer 1991). Faust might be released from his bondage.

Rescuing Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge was not likely to be easy, as they were expected to have a few seats in the new Cambodian parliament as well as arms caches to continue

guerrilla warfare after peace returned to Cambodia under UN auspices. The Khmer Rouge could only be marginalized, not eliminated, through diplomacy. The rest was up to the Cambodian people.

NOTES

1. See the preface to my *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard* (1991).

2. Before going to the Paris Conference on Cambodia, I stopped off in Washington to interview congressional staff. I explained the nature of my assignment and the fact that my grant from the US Institute of Peace prohibited lobbying. After returning from Paris, I wrote a short paper to report my findings in factual terms. Upon request from members of Congress and their aides, I sent a copy of the paper, which reported facts but had no policy recommendations. A redraft of this paper appears as chapter 19 in my *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard.*

3. Solarz was reiterating his earlier proposal for a UN trusteeship for Cambodia (Ottaway 1989).

4. This was the consensus of a discussion following the presentation of papers at a panel, "Recent Developments in United Nations Peacekeeping," at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, April 14. Panelists were Moritaka Hayashi, Alan James, Leonard Kapunga, and George Sherry.

IV

Beyond Cambodias

7

Toward a New US Foreign Policy

A CASTRATION COMPLEX?

The United States, a country that historically championed human rights, pretended that its presence in Indochina over the years was on behalf of what Reagan called a "noble cause." First came the objective of defeating imperial Japan. Later, the fight against Communism so clouded Washington's vision that it was blind to the forces of nationalism, deluded into ignoring the aspirations of proud inhabitants of countries with older civilizations. The more Washington sought to exhibit instruments of mass destruction instead of observing principles of human rights for which it was accountable at home, the more US foreign policy leaders foundered, acting as if it were normal for one nation to push another around. The view that Cambodia had to be someone's puppet, and thus could not receive treatment on its own terms, was thus a continuity in US policy. A related misconception was that mortal enemies for decades might happily form a coalition just to receive the kind blessing of Western powers, who could then trot off nonchalantly into the sunset, believing that a just peace had been reached through the fine art of ahistorically grounded parliamentary compromise.

When US negotiators signed the Paris accords in 1973, ending military participation in the civil war in Vietnam, Washington

hoped that the South could defend itself against the North. Cambodia was bombed heavily to prevent supplies from going from the North to the South through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Nevertheless, in 1975 Communist revolutions occurred in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Having failed to prevent the spread of Communism, Washington no longer sported a "macho" image in the world.

A body of academic writing in the field of international relations began to emerge in the late 1970s, arguing that the United States had reached its apogée as a world power and was declining (e.g., Stein 1984). Others countered with the notion that US power had established a hegemony that could not be toppled so easily (Nye 1990). The prevailing opinion concerning the decline of hegemony appeared to be among chauvinists who perceived that their country had been castrated in a figurative sense by Hanoi.[1]

During the same era a remedy for "decline of hegemony" emerged among scholars who advocated a theory that was labelled "neorealism" (Keohane 1986). According to this view, the United States was still the most powerful and richest nation; if the world was not behaving according to US interests, the solution was to use that power and wealth in the tradition of realpolitik. Failure to do so would result in world instability, or so the argument went. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 appeared to be an answer to the prayers of the neorealist school, as the new president pledged to restore the United States to a position of world leadership through an active foreign policy. Ironically, though, a founder of the realist school, Hans Morgenthau (1985), was an early opponent of US entry into the civil war in Vietnam.

Collusion with China and Thailand to keep Vietnam, a Soviet ally, at bay in Cambodia was one application of neorealist foreign policymaking, *ergo* the Faustian pact with the Khmer Rouge. A more modest policy—one that would have sought diplomacy, negotiation, and the removal of the genocidal Pol Pot from the region—was not what US policymakers and their neorealist foreign policy advisers from the academic community seemed to be advocating. The blood of Cambodians and their Vietnamese

protectors, therefore, served to baptize the rebirth of a macho role for the United States in the world.

The international system proved unable to bring peace to Cambodia. Selfish interest took precedence. War raged throughout the 1980s with no apparent end in sight. The Paris Conference on Cambodia did not fulfill the auspicious hopes of its organizers because the issues were inextricably linked to residues of the cold war. When PAVN forces left Cambodia on September 26, 1989, a new military situation unfolded. Cambodian proxies began killing Cambodian proxies again.

Despite the decade-long Faustian policy of the United States, Cambodia inched closer to peace throughout 1990. As Washington failed to derive any positive result from its neorealist strategy, a new foreign policy had to be tried. With Communist regimes collapsing in Eastern Europe, the cold war ended in 1989. Neorealism seemed obsolete, but there was no replacement ideology. Then in mid-1990 the Bush administration decided to open a dialogue with the SOC and Vietnam with the goal of preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge, even if narrow US interests would fail to be maximized. What emerged may be called a "postrealist" era in US foreign policy.

WORLD PLURALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REALPOLITIK

Instead of producing stability, geostrategic thinking served up protracted conflict and instability. Practitioners of the theory of realpolitik denied peace and stability to small states, while large states exulted in narcissism, believing that war is inevitable unless a country is armed to the teeth. The Cambodian case shows the fallacy of basing world politics on realpolitik alone. The world of states, each protecting their sovereignty, went berserk with regard to Cambodia.

But the avoidance of future Cambodias requires not just an end to cold war realpolitik. There must be a conception of

Table 7.1
Tenets of Neorealism and Pluralism

NEOREALISM	PLURALISM
Human nature is irrational, selfish.	Human nature is rational, perfectible.
There is an endless struggle for power.	Power should be diffused.
Politics is separate from economics.	Satisfaction of economic needs is a major goal of world politics.
Foreign policy must be centralized.	Foreign policy must be decentralized.
Wealth will always be distributed unequally.	The poor should be allowed to catch up with the rich.
Stability results from pursuing self-interest.	Stability results from a more equal distribution of resources.
The UN cannot fulfill its aims.	The UN can fulfill its aims.
The agenda of foreign policy is to react to worst case scenarios.	The agenda of foreign policy is to effect peaceful change.

international politics based on pluralism, a condition in which all peoples live together in harmony without political domination. World pluralism represents a fulfillment of conditions sought by Woodrow Wilson after World War I—a peaceful world based on principles such as the self-determination of peoples and the peaceful resolution of international disputes (Moynihan 1990).

Because Wilsonianism ignored economics, it was incomplete as a guide for a pluralistic world. World pluralism requires that there be an end to exploitation of one nation by another, since political domination goes hand in hand with economic exploitation. World pluralists chide neorealists for failing to practice democratic values in the world polity.

Realpolitik theory differs from world pluralism on at least eight major axioms (see Table 7.1).[2] While realpolitik regards human nature as irrational and selfish, world pluralism believes in the

perfectibility of the human race and the possibility of rational decisionmaking. Realpolitik assumes that there is an endless struggle to monopolize power, whereas world pluralists seek ways to balance and diffuse power so that the cost of political domination will exceed the benefits of aggression. Realpolitik conceives of politics as an independent sphere of human activity, having primacy over economics; world pluralists consider the two realms to be interrelated, and they place priority on the satisfaction of basic human needs. The realpolitik theorist is an apologist for centralized decisionmaking on matters of foreign affairs, in contrast with the world pluralist's reliance on democratic decisionmaking so that the masses can reject serving as mere cannon fodder. Realpolitik assumes that some countries will always have more wealth than others; world pluralism promotes a new economic order in which poorer nations can catch up with rich nations. The realpolitik practitioner reaches international equilibrium by pursuing self-interest; for the world pluralist, a stable world requires an equitable distribution of resources in which rich countries make concessions to poor countries. Realpolitik has contempt for the United Nations; world pluralism knows that peoples on the planet want the UN to fulfill its original aims by establishing a framework for a new economic and political world order. Realpolitik reacts to events in terms of worst-case scenarios; world pluralism takes affirmative steps before crises occur so that the preconditions for peace can be attained.

The dismantling of totalitarian control over Eastern Europe during 1989, two centuries after the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, was perhaps the most dramatic political upheaval of the last half of the twentieth century. The superpower arms race appeared useless, and nuclear disarmament appeared attainable for the first time since bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In time, the gap between the standard of living of the First and former Second Worlds might narrow, but there was no immediate optimism about prosperity in the Third World. As long as the world economic order remained

Table 7.2
Principles of the Asian Way

ASIAN WAY PRINCIPLES	WESTERN DIPLOMACY
equalitarian socializing before diplomacy	businesslike diplomacy
consensus-building	maximization
incrementalism	blueprintism
values have primacy	details have primacy
unique solutions	universalistic solutions
multilateral cooperation	integration

unequal because of realpolitik, pretexts for war would remain. World pluralism, in contrast, seeks to prevent conflict through a process of collective peaceful change in which international problems are identified and solved before they erupt into crises. The principles of world pluralism are ideas that are practiced in US domestic policy. Applying the principles of US democracy abroad is the essence of world pluralism.

THE "ASIAN WAY" OF DIPLOMACY

The Cambodian peace process proved that a new form of diplomacy, one adapted to a pluralist world, needed to reach center stage. Developed initially by the onetime executive director of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),[3] Burma's U Nyun, the term "Asian Way" applies to a method of diplomatic interaction that ultimately proved useful in regard to Cambodia.

A contemporary invention among Asian leaders, not an anthropologically derived set of cultural principles, the Asian Way looks at human relationships in a manner that differs sharply from Western realpolitik forms of diplomacy. There are at least six elements to the Asian Way (see Table 7.2), as I note in my *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation* (1989a: ch. 1).

Decisions emerge, first of all, after a process of equalitarian socializing. There is an emphasis on getting acquainted at a personal level before discussing particulars. The intra-Cambodian dialogues and JIMs at Jakarta progressed in this manner, whereas PCC was a circus. Khieu Samphan's willingness to be part of a Cambodian family at JIM II was an advance over JIM I, but his refusal to shake hands with Hun Sen at PCC was an unmistakable clue that there would be no meeting of minds during the following month. The need to limit plenary sessions at conferences and to maximize informal discussions was finally learned when the four Cambodian factions agreed to form the SNC at Jakarta in September 1990 (Vatikiotis 1990: 10).

The Western focus on negotiations, with give and take, assumes that agreements occur when all sides have pluses (points gained) that outnumber minuses (concessions). If Westerners fail to reach an agreement, the immediate conclusion is that one party was too greedy. For practitioners of the Asian Way, on the other hand, discussion develops decisions by consensus-building, not by horsetrading. Negotiators specify points of agreement first, then cautiously move to areas of ambiguity but avoiding matters of disagreement. Asian Way diplomacy breaks down when one party insists on pressing a point on which there are sharp differences. Khieu Samphan's milder manner during meetings at both JIMs was in sharp contrast with his acrimonious opening speech at Paris. Hun Sen and Sihanouk, in contrast, showed mutual respect and avoided abrasive words whenever they talked together, so they could look forward to later encounters after each meeting. At the final session of the Jakarta conference of September 1990, Hun Sen pointedly refrained from responding to a barb from Khieu Samphan, as he did not want yet another agreement to come undone (Vatikiotis 1990: 10).

Asian Way decisionmaking is incremental. While Westerners seek a blueprint, in this case a "comprehensive political settlement" for Cambodia, the Asian Way proceeds step by step. Westerners keep their eyes on the prize, whereas process fascinates Asians. The good life for Westerners comes in the

future after planning. For Asians, serenity is available in the present by enjoying what is immediately at hand. When Asians reach agreements on a minor point, they gain increased confidence and trust to approach more sensitive issues. The distinction between incrementalism and comprehensivism resembles perceptions of a water glass. The Western approach often sees negotiations as half empty; Asians see them as half full. India reminded Westernized Singaporeans, who bellyached about the failure of the Paris conference, that much progress had been made. When Perm Five diplomats realized that they could only consider a few issues at a time, they followed the example of the JIMs and abandoned the PCC model, which attempted too much.

Westerners tend to cite problems of technical feasibility in order to say "No" to idealistic aspirations. Asian leaders, in contrast, seek a commitment to abstract principles first. Questions of value have primacy over questions of implementation, which are left to subordinates. Political resolve, thus, is more important than considerations of cost and time. Sometimes this means that a country will suffer severe losses over an extended period, confident that its cause is just. While Americans tired of a decade of war in Vietnam, Hanoi recalled standing up to China over centuries. The stubbornness of the Cambodians was an obvious element in the 1980s. When Hun Sen and Sihanouk agreed that the survival of Cambodia as a nation was more important than who would rule the nation, an interim arrangement was a mere technical question, but they could not extricate Cambodia from the superpowers, so the interim was an opportunity for Polpotist anarchy.

The Asian Way promotes unique solutions over universalistic nostrums. The phrase "Asian solutions to Asian problems" means that Asian cultural idiosyncrasies should be preserved whenever possible. While Australia proposed a Namibia model, France suggested a Fifth Republic model, ICK presented an Austrian model, and Thailand advanced a Thai model, ultimately the solution had to be Cambodian. This meant taking into consideration that the Cambodian people were unaccustomed to elections

and parliamentary democracy, which the West insisted would be the "obvious" way out of the quagmire. A national reconciliation council was a more syncretic, Cambodian approach.

Finally, the Asian Way stresses the need for solidarity through multilateral cooperation with neighboring countries. Although Paris and Washington tried to engineer a Cambodia that would be integrated into commercial opportunities and governmental channels in France and the United States, ASEAN sought a peace that would enable Indochina to join the rest of Southeast Asia. Promises of Western or Japanese aid were of less consequence than good relations with Cambodia's immediate neighbors, so Chatichai's and Alatas' diplomacy ultimately bore the most fruit. Encapsulation of the conflict from outside forces was the goal desired by Asian Way peacemakers.

Principles of the Asian Way, therefore, predicted successes in the Cambodian peace process. On many occasions Asian countries fail to follow these principles, and some Western countries adopt them from time to time (Ash 1990).[4] The Cambodian conflict was a learning experience for all, proving the harmfulness of cold war modes of thinking about world politics. When Mikhail Gorbachev asked George Bush to end the Cold War at the Malta Summit in December 1989, the 1990s began with a need to define a new era of world diplomacy. Questions of planetary survival, requiring a fundamental transformation in our thinking (Cf. Kothari 1989), came to the fore.

CONCLUSION

Asian Way principles tell us how to proceed toward world pluralism because they emerged in the wake of the decolonization of Asia, when there was a temptation to fight endlessly over disputed borders. ASEAN countries have most fully perfected principles of the Asian Way, and their reward has been continuing peace and increasing prosperity.

As the world of realpolitik awaited a funeral, a place in the coffin was being prepared for the Cambodian conflict. With

resources once used for military spending to be freed up for other purposes, it increasingly seemed possible to achieve the peaceful global economy that would be the underpinning of a just, world pluralistic future. In the 1990s the United States had the capacity to become a great nation again, a world benefactor that could right the wrongs accumulated from decades of cold war thinking.

Where else could the world start afresh but in ricefields of a people who yearned to go beyond the horror of the killing fields?

NOTES

1. Consistent with this Freudian explanation, many US observers engaged in "penis envy" with respect to Japan, which, starting in the 1970s, managed its economic affairs better than the United States. I leave a more thorough psychodynamic analysis of this period in US foreign policy to others.

2. The principles of realpolitik stated here are from Morgenthau (1985).

3. Now the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

4. A variant of the "Asian Way" is the "Pacific Way," described in my book *The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific* (1989b).

Appendix A

OPTIONS ANALYSIS

The purpose of this appendix is to explicate the methodology used in this book. I place this discussion in an appendix because the principal aim of the book is to focus on the substance of policy regarding Cambodia.

An *option* is any possible selection from a set of alternative choices for a decisionmaker. There are two types of options—scenarios and policies. *Options analysis* is the methodology of determining the best scenario or policy from a set of alternatives.

Scenarios are goals or end-states of situations that are in flux. A scenario is a view of what might happen in due course; a worst-case scenario is the most feared outcome, a best-case scenario is the preferred outcome in terms of a decisionmaker's goals. For example, a worst-case scenario for Washington in 1979 was the establishment of an Indochina federation by the Hanoi government. The best-case scenario was an Indochina consisting of independent non-Communist states.

Scenarios look ahead, so they may be unattainable utopias. Accordingly, it is useful to look at conditions that are needed to bring them about. Sufficient conditions are elements that must be present to achieve what the scenario envisages. Necessary conditions are the intervening factors that will lead to the attainment of the sufficient conditions. Probabilities of a scenario can be based on the likelihood that necessary and sufficient conditions will be attained in the fullness of time.

Several *policies* may have to be implemented in order to reach a scenario. In the case of US policy toward Cambodia in 1979, one policy alternative was to do nothing; this policy was assessed as leading directly to the worst-case scenario. A second policy alternative was to openly ask Congress to send military supplies to the army of the Khmer Rouge; this was considered domestically unpalatable. A third possible policy was diplomacy, but this was deemed futile. A fourth alternative was to send covert aid to the non-Communist resistance, in the hope that the NCR would eventually rise to power. But the fortunes of the NCR ultimately depended upon a peace process, which Washington opposed in the early 1980s.

While scenarios are unique to a decisionmaking situation, foreign policies are limited to the use of a finite set of tools of statecraft (Levi 1974). The tools come from a range of military, economic, and diplomatic toolboxes.

Military policies include utilizing troops in a conflict situation or providing military aid. The troops can play combat or noncombat roles. Military aid can be lethal or nonlethal, overt or covert.

Economic policies range from increased transactions in the form of financial aid to decreased transactions, such as boycotts and embargoes. The increases can be modest or considerable, the decreases can be selective or total.

Diplomacy, an exchange of views between representatives of states, nonstate actors, or heads of international organizations, is also available from a continuum of choices. The most direct forms of diplomacy, open negotiations, contrast with secret diplomacy. Quiet diplomacy occurs when interlocutors do not reveal the sensitive content of their discussions to outsiders yet want the world to know that they are talking. A diplomatic boycott involves nonrecognition and nondiscussion. Propaganda is a tool that comes in handy when one state wants to influence another verbally outside formal channels for state-to-state interaction; what appears to be diplomacy, such as a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, can be propaganda.

There is no guarantee that uses of the tools of statecraft will instrument a desired scenario. The formulation of a strategy of statecraft requires as much care as the determination of a preferred scenario. A do nothing policy can often be the wisest.

Scenarios and policies may be considered *options*. Both scenarios and options are assessed in terms of three parameters—goals (criteria),

Table A.1
Criteria to Assess Scenarios and Policies in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

Main Criteria	Subcriteria
feasibility	probability of implementation
security	probability of officeholding
	enhance power in the region
	reduce superpower conflict
	support for allies
prosperity	raise living standards
	build socialism/stop Communism
prestige	appear altruistic
	appear peaceloving
	gain respect for leadership

weight assessments, and outcomes. Options analysis makes each element explicit.

Regarding *goals*, four sets of criteria usually emerge in the analysis of foreign policies—feasibility, security, prosperity, and prestige (see Table A.1). *Feasibility* means the extent to which an option is judged capable of being realized.

Security means how confident a country's leaders are that they maintain their power and their country's military capacity to defend itself. Three enduring security goals are probability of officeholding, extent to which the country can enhance its power, and degree of support provided for allies. In the cold war a fourth goal has been reduction in superpower conflict so that the threat of nuclear war will diminish.

The main goal of *prosperity* is to improve the standard of living of those groups who are important to decisionmakers. For socialist countries, the building of socialism has been a second parameter of the goal of prosperity; for capitalist countries, the equivalent is to stop Communism.

Prestige is the respect enjoyed by a country in the international system for employing policies with pluralist objectives. Countries differ

in the extent to which they want to appear altruistic or peaceloving or desirous of playing a leadership role.

In options analysis, *weights* are next applied to each goal. This permits us to differentiate more from less important scenarios, more instrumental from less instrumental tools of statecraft.

We then make policy *assessments* of alternative scenarios and policies. The analyst takes one option at a time, rating how well a scenario or policy fulfills each goal previously identified.

The last step in options analysis is to discover the best policy or scenario; that is, to choose an *outcome* that resolves a decisionmaking quandary. As circumstances change, there can be new goals, weights, options, and corresponding reassessments. New scenarios may emerge. The result will be new outcomes.

Several computer programs are utilized by US government agencies to aid in options analysis, although few are available commercially. In this book I use *Decision Pad* (Apian 1988), which is quite user-friendly and can be purchased through any computer software store at a reasonable cost. *Decision Pad* computes individual assessments for an option into a weighted average score. Scores across various options can then be compared to determine the superior outcome.

The scales for weights for *Decision Pad* in this monograph are qualitative in form ("Very High," "High," "Medium," "Low," "Very Low," and "None"). There is a similar scale for assessments ("Excellent," "Very Good," "Good," "Fair," "Poor," and "Unacceptable"). The program equivalences each term to an equidistant point along a scale from a zero point for "None" or "Unacceptable," then assigns equal increments to each higher rating. If an assessment is unclear, a "?" can be entered, whereupon the program calculates the range of possibilities for that option, ranking that option with the other options by the average of the range. All computations are performed automatically by *Decision Pad*. Although several rating systems are possible, such as placing each option along an arbitrary numeric ten-point scale, I prefer a qualitative ordinal scale, which tends to approximate the way decisionmakers think on nonquantitative issues.

Decision analysis permits composite ratings of two or more raters. We can thus rate Democratic options and Republican options, then press a button to determine the option best satisfying alternative criteria weights and assessments.

Appendix B

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND RELATED SOURCES

I am indebted for information and insights to more than a hundred interviewees in my efforts to find out why Cambodia has remained at war so long, possibly longer than any other country in history. I wish to extend particular thanks to interlocutors from twenty countries as well as the United Nations. My Australian informants include Graham Alliband, Gareth Evans, Malcolm Leader, Ian Lincoln, Robert Tyson, and Mary Wilk. Cambodians include Kek Galabru, Tep Henn, Khieu Kanarith, Uch Kiman, Kann Man, Truong Mealy, Ieng Mouly, Dith Munty, Thiounn Prasith, Keo Puth Rasmey, My Samedy, Sichan Siv, Ly Sorsane, Keat Sukun, In Thaddee, and Boonroen Thach. From Canada I had an opportunity to talk to Daniel Dhavernas and David Sproule. Interviews with Hu Qianwen, Li Chichun, and Zhang Wuwei of China were also very useful. French diplomats Sylvie Bermann, Marie-Claire Gerardin, Jean-Jacques Galabru, Hugues Nordi, Jean-Claude Poimboeuf, Daniele Spengler, and Violaine Charpentier de Villemeur provided useful information, too. German interviewees were Joachim Broudre-Groger and Hans Carl von Werthern. From India I was briefed by Jesudas Bell, R. R. Dash, and C. D. Sahay. Indonesians aiding my project were Azhari Boer, Soendaroe Rachmad, Malikus Suamin, Juwono Sudarsono, Admiral R. M. Sunardi, and Jusuf Wanandi. Japanese interviewees included

Hiroshi Inomata and Satoshi Nakajima. A New Zealander, Frank Wilson, provided very pertinent information. From the Philippines I had an opportunity for frank discussion with Alberto Encomienda and Leticia Shahani. S. R. Nathan of Singapore provided useful information. From the Soviet Union I benefited from discussions with Victor Anissimov, Georgy Kunadze, Alexander Ilitchev, Vladimir Mikoyan, and Alexandre Pavlov. Sweden's ambassador to Hanoi, Karl Lindahl, was one of the best-informed observers I encountered. My Thai informants included Surapong Jayanam, Pisan Manawapat, Upadit Pachariyakun, Don Paramatwinsi, Rangsan Phaholyomin, Amnuay Viravan, and Komgrit Varakamin. In the United Kingdom my list of government officials includes Peter Carter, Andrew George, Julia Nolan, and former diplomat John Pedler. United Nations contacts were Margaret Carey, Linda Hazod, Sir Robert Jackson, Udo Janz, Fritz Locbus, Painda Manely, John McCallin, Ghja Mendoza, Guy Quellet, Janet Reilling, Nessim Shallom, Dhannanjaya Sunoto, Patrick Van de Velde, Jean-Louis Vignuda, and Kaiser Zamel. US informants were Stephen Blake, Richard Bush, Timothy Carney, Thomas Ferguson, Robert Glass, Marie Huhtala, Harriet Isom, Karl Jackson, Jeff Milstein, Charles Twining, Daniel Russel, Richard Wilson, Jay Winik, and Dalena Wright. Among Vietnamese officials I received the cooperation of Nguyen Can, Pham Van Choung, Tran Quang Co, Mai Chi Hai, Bui Xuan Khoa, Le Hong Lam, Vo Dai Luoc, Le Mai, Tran Xuan Man, Le Duc My, Dao Huy Ngoc, Do Tin Nham, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Chau Phong, Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong, Ngo Ba Thanh, Nguyen Trung, Vo Tong Xuan, and Vu Zung. A secretary at the Yugoslavian mission to the United Nations provided useful information. I also interviewed Andrew Mutandwa of Zimbabwe, and I was assisted by R. Zunenga of the Zimbabwe government. Three other persons could not be identified in view of their positions.

I would also like to acknowledge the insights of many speakers at various conferences, including Chester Atkins, Multhiah Alagappa, Radda Barnen, Lady Borton, Helen Chauncey, Jerome Cohen, David Feingold, Anne Goldfield, Harry Harding, John Holdridge, Richard Holbrooke, Judith Ladinsky, John Lapp, Bertil Lindblad, Kishore Mahbubani, Paul Peterson, Frank Sieverts, Noordin Sopiee, Paul Strasburg, Bryan Truman, Lonnie Turnispeed, Sesto Vecchi, and Richard Walden. I am also grateful for wisdom gained in personal contact with such dedicated citizens and scholars as Fred Z. Brown, Ruth

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To protect my sources, I use sequential interview numbers.

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